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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an exploration into the function and form of storytelling.  Its 
initial assumption is that consciousness is a genetically transmitted mechanism 
which generates a concept of self by creating a story.  In this formulation, the 
consciousness is called narrative-consciousness.  Since the concept of self 
necessarily suggests its opposite and this in turn involves awareness of existential 
futility, the purpose of the story, generated by the narrative-consciousness, is seen to 
be, in the first instance, the hiding of this unavoidable and potentially damaging 
awareness.  This thesis suggests that to achieve this goal the story must be based on 
the process of self-deception. 
 
The thesis shows that, in general, self-deception involves three significant 
components in its bid to separate any two paradoxical ideas: unease, process and 
hiding and that each of these maps onto a particular component in the final narrative 
of the self.  The narrative created by a consciousness hiding, in particular, the 
awareness of existential angst is given the specific name existentially-self-
deceptive-story, with an acronym ESDeS. 
   
The thesis goes on to suggest that such a narrative-consciousness could 
produce written stories that follow the same pattern, in which case the stories are 
called existentially-self-deceptive-novels, with an acronym ESDeN. 
 
Such a story or genre is then shown to be part of a continuum consisting of 
up to three distinct ways of dealing with existential futility.  The thesis labels these 
Story-1, Story-2 and Story-3 respectively but reserves the name ESDeN for a sub-
set of Story-2. 
 
Analyses of three of these stories, Heart of Darkness, Chance and Thinks 
concludes that the genre necessarily includes genre-markers, bracketing deaths and 
repetition, can also include other optional components such as the self-deceptive 
process or the parent-child mechanism but that its defining characteristic is its 
division between an overt plot and a covert plot which contains a collusive death of 
a character identified with existential angst. 
 
A covert plot is necessarily available but it is, by definition, not easily 
discovered.  Its successful hiding is made possible, primarily, by foregrounding the 
overt content of the novel at the expense of the covert.  In this sense, the only 
necessary requirement of the overt content is it should distract and it does this best 
when the reader cooperates by investing time in interpretation: that is, in order to 
disguise the ultimate the reader concentrates on the proximal. 
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Finally, the thesis mirrors the endings of each ESDeN by drawing attention 
to the fact that this collusion will not work for long: just as self-deception cannot 
withstand too much contrary evidence, the covert plot will not stand too many re-
readings.  Inevitably, for the true ESDeS, another point of recognition will occur 
and this will necessitate the renewal or replacement of the ESDeS. 
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Introduction 
 
Telling, writing, listening to and reading stories are ubiquitous human activities.  
This is not an original observation.  Mark Currie says that if we, as a species, were 
called “homo fabulans”1 it would not be over-stating the case.  Jonathan Culler and 
David Lodge both suggest that, in essence, the activity is in-built: Culler uses the 
term drive - “there is a basic human drive to hear and tell stories”2 - and Lodge uses 
the term instinct: “the storytelling instinct…seems to be part of all human 
cultures.”3  Daniel Dennett also agrees.  He says, more poetically, “just as spiders 
don’t have to think, consciously and deliberately, about how to spin their webs and 
just as beavers…do not consciously and deliberately plan the structures they 
build…we do not consciously and deliberately figure out what narratives to tell and 
how to tell them”.4  Their choices of words suggest that because storytelling is an 
in-built function it must have a “survival” function in the sense that it is used by 
Darwin’s theory.  This entails, according to Stephen Jay Gould, “the claim that 
organisms enjoying differential reproductive success will, on average, be those 
variants that are fortuitously better adapted to changing environments, and that these 
variants will then pass their favoured traits to offspring by inheritance.”5  This 
description can, for the purpose of this thesis, be put into shorthand: “We are 
                                                          
1  Mark Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1998, p. 2. 
2  Jonathan Culler, Literary Theory: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997, p. 83. 
3  David Lodge, Consciousness and the Novel, London: Secker and Warburg, 2003, p. 41. 
4  Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, London: Penguin, 1993, p. 418. 
5  Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2002, p.13. 
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survival machines”6 and, if we all share a particular attribute, it is at least likely that 
it is there to ensure our survival.  Common examples, in other species, are the tail of 
the peacock and anting.  Both at first glance would appear to be not only not useful 
but definitely useless: “the tail of the peacock is a jeu d’esprit par excellence”7 - but 
the Darwinian still wants to ask why: “We don’t marvel at a creature doggedly 
grubbing in the earth….but if it interrupts its digging by doing a somersault we want 
to ask why.”8  So, if the claim that storytelling is “basic” is to be acceptable, in the 
sense of being required for survival, there is an obligation to provide some sort of an 
explanatory narrative to identify its function in terms of evolution and, once this is 
done, to suggest how the storytelling might achieve this end: “what precisely is this 
species-typical or universal structure, and what bearing does it have on literary 
representation?”9  
 
Robert Park suggests that there is a way forward because evolution opens 
“up a way of thinking”10 about behaviour and so the nature of the explanation to be 
given can be in the form of an explanatory “something” not in terms of a biological 
mechanism.  Frederick Crew adopts the same approach and calls it “a Darwinian 
Outlook that can generate fruitful new questions”.11  This outlook is adopted by 
                                                          
6  Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976, 
p. x. 
7  Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, London: Bantam Press, 2006, p. 163. 
8  Brian Boyd, “Evolutionary Theories of Art”, in Jonathan Gottschall and David Sloan 
Wilson (eds), The Literary Animal: Evolution and the Nature of Narrative, Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2005, p. 147. 
9  Joseph Carroll, Literary Darwinism: Evolution, Human Nature and Literature, London: 
Routledge, 2004, p. 123. 
10  Robert L. Park, Superstition: Belief in the Age of Science, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008, p. 25. 
11  Frederick Crews, “Foreword”, to Gottschall and Wilson (eds), The Literary Animal, p. xiii. 
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many including Brian Boyd and Dawkins.  Boyd argues that “evolution must be part 
of any complete account of the human, including human art”.12  Dawkins uses the 
same argument in a negative sort of way.  He points out why storytelling should not 
be ubiquitous: “If a wild animal habitually performs some useless activity, natural 
selection will favour rival individuals who devote the time and energy, instead, to 
surviving and reproducing.”13  Of course it is one thing to claim something has an 
evolutionary origin but another to give a convincing explanation of why this should 
be so.  Boyd, in his review article “Evolutionary Theories of Art”, suggests that all 
such explanations can be grouped under the headings “by-product”, “sexual 
selection” and “adaptation”.14  Robert Trivers explains that these explanations are 
often conveniently couched in metaphorical language: “I choose language of 
strategy and decision, as if each individual contemplated in strategic terms the 
decisions it ought to make at each instant in order to maximize its reproductive 
success”.15   
 
Full blown storytelling should, therefore, be regarded as wasteful in the 
Darwinian sense unless it is possible to find a scenario that makes sense for 
survival.  Several authorities have suggested an adaptive approach.  Lodge argues 
that “evolutionary psychologists have suggested that the ability to imagine what 
another person – an enemy for instance – might be thinking in a given situation, by 
running hypothetical scenarios on the brain’s hardware, was a crucial survival skill 
                                                          
12  Boyd, “Evolutionary Theories of Art”, p. 147. 
13  Dawkins, The God Delusion, p. 163. 
14  Boyd, “Evolutionary Theories of Art”, p. 147 et seq. 
15  Robert L. Trivers, “Parental Investment and Sexual Selection”, in Bernard G. Campbell 
(ed.), Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man, New Brunswick: Aldine, 2006, p. 146. 
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for primitive man.”16  Susan Blackmore adds: “Individuals who could best predict 
the actions of others would be at an advantage.”17  Steven Pinker is regarded by 
Carroll as nothing better than an “undergraduate”,18 but his work is treated seriously 
by Boyd who recognises that although Pinker sees art in general as “not an 
adaptation but an evolutionary by-product” he sees an adaptive purpose for 
narrative.  Carroll sums up Pinker’s discussion on the subject as “narrative may 
serve an adaptive function in enabling us to develop behaviours to test possible 
courses of action and their consequences without risking real-world harm”.19  These 
skills undoubtedly contribute to the storytelling process but they are not, in 
themselves, full-blown storytelling.  They might be necessary for evolutionary 
survival but there must be something more to have justified a further development 
into full-blown storytelling.  As Boyd argues: “why do we not simply design 
schematic scenarios, and imagine consequences?”20   
 
In fact, it is my contention that there are two somethings more.  The first 
“something” is that the individual possesses a consciousness - which is taken here to 
imply only a specific brain process - which has a function to organise sensory data 
in the form of a story.  The second “something” is that making sense, in general, and 
self-deception, in particular, is a necessary part of how the organisation is achieved.  
This will imply that the consciousness can be described as a narrative-
                                                          
16  Lodge, Consciousness and the Novel, p. 41.  
17  Susan Blackmore, Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005, p. 126. 
18  Carroll, Literary Darwinism, p. 64. 
19  Ibid., p. 123, with reference to Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works, New York: Norton, 
1997, p. 539-542. 
20  Boyd, “Evolutionary Theories of Art”, fn. 25, p. 173. 
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consciousness.21  Collectively, these modifications produce what will be called an 
existentially-self-deceptive-storytelling if the self-deception involves the 
accommodation of the awareness of existential futility.  The storytelling will result 
in an existentially-self-deceptive-story related by an existentially-self-deceptive-
storyteller (all three to be given the acronym ESDeS for convenience).  In this 
scenario, the ESDeS function can be seen as having three evolutionary 
justifications.  It might be just regarded, at first sight, as the by-product 
consequences of other more immediately recognisable biological necessities: that is, 
in itself it is not “‘for’ anything”.22  However, once present, it becomes adaptive in 
the sense that it aids social cohesion through a process to be called collusion.  
Finally, however, this thesis wants to make a stronger claim: ESDeS actually 
provides us, as organisms, with the justification and means to survive.  In order to 
achieve this end the story has to be told in a way that achieves the desired 
accommodation of the awareness of existential futility. 
 
The Narrative–Consciousness Theory 
 
Consciousness, like the mechanisms involved in the process of evolution, is the 
subject of many theories23 yet, as Blackmore points out, “no one yet agrees which 
                                                          
21  Some of the words in the text take on a particular meaning for this thesis.  When such a 
word is introduced for the first time it is inserted in bold type and its meaning explained in the 
“Glossary of Technical Terms”. 
22  Jonathan Gottschall and David Sloan Wilson, “Introduction”, Gottschall and Wilson (eds), 
The Literary Animal, p. xiii. 
23  See, for example, David Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1968. 
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[theory] is right nor – more importantly – has any idea how to find out”.24  I 
subscribe to Blackmore’s view that consciousness “is intrinsic to complex brain 
processes and inseparable from them”.25  She goes on to suggest that, if this view is 
taken, there is no use asking the specific question why consciousness evolved, for 
consciousness “is not separable from intelligence, perception, thinking, self-concept, 
language, or any other evolved abilities”.26  However, it is still possible to ask, 
given that consciousness did come into being, whether or not it might have any 
adaptive functions of its own in addition to those of its clearly adaptive companions.  
A first attribute is that it reports experiences.  David Hume, famously, described 
how he stared into his own consciousness looking for “what I call myself”.  He 
argues: “I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, 
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.  I can never catch myself, and may 
truly be said not to exist.”27  But even this is not as simple as it might first appear.  
Blackmore asks her students, in effect, to repeat Hume’s experiment and reports 
that, with practice, it becomes “clear that there are always lots of threads going on at 
once, and none is really ‘in’ consciousness until it is grasped”.28   
 
Herbert Fingarette, looking at problems associated with self-deception, came 
up with a similar change in emphasis.  He specifically moves to an active model of 
mind in which people are doers, active rather than passive: “To be specific the 
                                                          
24  Blackmore, Consciousness, p. 126. 
25  Ibid., p. 9. 
26  Ibid., p.126. 
27  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, London: Penguin Classics, 1985, p. 300. 
28  Blackmore, Consciousness, p. 48. 
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model I propose is that of a skill.”29  He develops his argument at great length with 
respect to self-deception, along the lines of “we must see consciousness as the 
further exercise of a specific skill”: a skill to which he assigns the name, “spelling-
out”.  I am happier with this formulation for it does not imply the pre-existence of 
something other than the experience and therefore agrees with Hume’s “we do not 
exist”.  In this spirit, Blackmore’s experimental report can be rephrased as, there is 
nothing in consciousness until it is spelled-out.  In this sense spelling-out brings the 
consciousness into existence.  Blackmore avoids difficulties with the dualist concept 
of “we” introduced into Fingarette’s description by giving the spelling-out function 
to language:  “Our language spins the story of a self and so we come to believe that 
there is, in addition to our single body, a single inner self who has consciousness, 
holds opinions, and makes decisions.”30  The record of the experiences becomes 
organised in its reporting: “grasped”, “spelled-out” and fashioned into a “story”.  
For convenience I will call this formulation of consciousness the narrative-
consciousness model.  The idea that the self is generated by a story and has no 
meaning beyond its story gives substance to Currie’s assertion that the “only way to 
explain who we are is to tell our own story, to select key events which characterise 
us and organise them according to the formal principals of narrative – to externalise 
ourselves as if talking of someone else, and for the purposes of self 
representation.”31  As it stands, however, Currie’s formulation gives a mixed 
message.  It seems to say a “we” is necessary to create the story of “we”.  It is more 
consistent to omit the first “we”: the story comes first and the “we” comes after.  
                                                          
29  Herbert Fingarette, Self Deception, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960, p.38. 
30  Blackmore, Consciousness, p.81. 
31  Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory, p. 17. 
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But in fact even this is too big a claim.  Just as the organising of experiences is 
consciousness, the story is “we”.  A sentence like “Joseph Conrad wrote Heart of 
Darkness” no longer makes sense.  As Blackmore puts it, “there are experiences but 
there is no one who is having them”.32  There is no Joseph Conrad telling a story, 
there is just the story.  For convenience the story can be identified with a name, 
Joseph Conrad, and so, in this sense, it is permissible to argue that Marlow within 
the story is part of Conrad.  Lodge puts forward, essentially, the same claim as 
Currie.  But he, like Blackmore, assigns the telling to language rather than a pre-
existing self: “the ‘single human voice’ telling its own story, can seem the only 
authentic way of rendering consciousness.”33   
 
The Existentially-Self-Deceptive-Narrative-Consciousness Theory. 
 
Consciousness, then, is no more than a particular brain function.  Its function is to 
organise continuous and disparate data and to project it outwards by means of a 
story.  If this is all that it does - and there is no independent evidence of its 
existence - then it is in effect synonymous with the story.  If it has other functions 
then the part that is the story is called the narrative-consciousness and it is this part 
only that concerns this thesis. 
 
However, not just any story can be written.  It has to be a story that is 
written in a way that makes sense.  Jonathan Culler argues: “Man is not just homo 
                                                          
32  Blackmore, Consciousness, p. 75. 
33  David Lodge, “Sense and Sensibility”, Guardian, Features and Review Section, Saturday, 
November 2, 2002. p. 6. 
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sapiens but homo significans: a creature who gives significance to things.”34  This 
view is repeated so often - by for example Cedric Watts: “man has been called 
homo significans – man the meaning maker”35 - that it has become a truism.  
However, it is soundly based on experimental evidence.  A seminal example is 
provided by F. C. Bartlett.  He gave a folk tale called The War of the Ghosts to a 
group of British subjects.  It tells of a young man who was drawn into a war party 
of ghosts.  A part of it is presented below: 
So the canoes went back to Egulac, and the young man went 
ashore to his house, and made a fire.  And he told everybody and 
said: “Behold I accompanied the ghosts, and we went to fight.  
Many of our fellows were killed, and many of those who 
attacked us were killed.  They said I was hit, and I did not feel 
sick”.36 
 
Bartlett then asked the subjects to retell the folk tale and one reproduction came 
out, for example, as follows: 
In the evening he returned to his hut, and told his friends that he 
had been in a battle.  A great many had been slain, and he had 
been wounded by an arrow; he had not felt any pain, he said…37 
 
As Herbert and Eve Clark point out: The subjects have “made a great many 
errors.”38  They have undoubtedly changed the original and the way that they have 
done so demonstrates the way the narrative-consciousness works.  It takes the given 
text, which seems meaningless to the individual subject, and transforms it into one 
                                                          
34  Jonathan Culler, Structural Poetics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975, p. 264. 
35  Cedric Watts, The Deceptive Text: An Introduction to Covert Plots, Brighton: The Harvester 
Press, 1984, p. 5. 
36  Frederic C. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1932, p. 65. 
37  Ibid., p. 72.  
38  Herbert H. Clark and Eve V. Clark, Psychology and Language: An Introduction to 
Psycholinguistics, New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1977, p. 168. 
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which does have meaning by bringing the events more into line with more familiar, 
and presumably learnt, customs and beliefs. 
 
The notion of narrative-consciousness is thus expanded and can now be 
described as a brain process that organises experience using a principle of “making 
sense” where the name given to the experiences once organised is story.  The story 
is related to others using the medium of spoken language or written text.  As told so 
far, evolution would still not accept even this development for it does not yet appear 
to allocate selective advantage.  As it stands, storytelling still appears to waste time 
which might be better used for reproduction.  For this thesis to be, at least, internally 
consistent it is necessary to produce something which is genuinely adaptive on to 
which storytelling can be grafted.   
 
Again this expanded idea of a narrative-consciousness is not new.  It is 
implied in numerous written texts.  Roquentin, the hero of Sartre’s Nausea (1938), 
essentially reiterates this claim: that at least part of consciousness makes sense of 
who we are by writing a story.  He argues:  
For the most banal event to become an adventure, all one must do 
is start telling about it.…That is what deceives people; a man is 
always a teller of stories, he lives surrounded by his stories, he sees 
everything that happens to him through these stories; he tries to live 
his own life as if it were a story he was telling.39   
 
Mark Currie illustrates what this might mean, beyond a character merely 
expressing a view, with his long analysis of The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde.  It culminates with the view that “identity is only identity when narration is in 
                                                          
39  Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, London: Penguin, 1965, p. 56. 
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process, [this is synonymous with Blackmore’s “grasped” and Fingarette’s “spelled-
out”] so that there is a sense in which Jekyll has no existence beyond the end of the 
writing: his fictionality ensures he has no existence after writing has stopped.”40  
Leigh Wilson makes the same point with reference to the relationship between May 
and Marcher in James’s “The Beast in the Jungle”.  She argues: “The story is 
constructed entirely around their relationship, when one of them disappears the 
narrative cannot be sustained.”41  This thesis needs to argue for the opposite view: 
that the death of one character will be shown to represent the death of the awareness 
of existential futility and, as such, permits the story, in an existential sense, to go on 
in the person of the survivor: May’s (unspoken) secret is the knowledge of 
existential futility and Marcher does not want to know this.  “All the rest” as Camus 
states, “comes afterwards.”42  Any interpretation, such as “romance should have 
been the cure”,43 for example, remains as valid as any other for it will do the job of 
disguising the hiding of existential futility. 
 
To make this jump, it is necessary to push the theoretical scenario a little 
further and to add the second correlate of consciousness.  Summing up so far, it has 
been established that consciousness, as claimed by Blackmore, exists only because 
it comes into being along with perception, memory, intelligence and language.  This 
thesis has argued that it might have a more specifically evolutionary function if it 
included two additional somethings.  The first of these seems plausible: the 
                                                          
40  Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory, p. 124. 
41  Leigh Wilson, “‘It was as if she had said…’:  May Sinclair and Reading Narratives of 
Cure”, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Westminster, 2000, p.21. 
42  Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, London: Penguin, 1975, p. 11. 
43  Wilson, “‘It was as if she had said…’:  May Sinclair and Reading Narratives of Cure”, p.21. 
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consciousness has, at least, a narrative function to make sense of who “we” are.  
Now suppose, if by the very nature of what it means to be conscious, consciousness 
necessarily entails making available the asking of the (human) question “why?”  
This would be, in effect, merely a particular application of the process “making 
sense”.  The fact that the question is asked is an empirical fact.  Many people arrive 
at a point of awareness that needs this question.  When Tolstoy became aware that 
“the truth is death” and, in that awareness, realised that “life had lost its charm” he 
says: “It was all quite dreadful.  And so, in order to escape from this horror, I 
wanted to kill myself.”44  John Stuart Mill, also, had the same experience.  He 
“sought relief [in vain] from [his] favourite books…from which [he] had always 
hitherto drawn strength”.45  If the question, then, is re-phrased in a Darwinian 
framework it becomes “Why should I survive?” and, in this form, apart from the 
instinctual, “because I want to”, there is no answer in favour.  There are, however, 
lots of possible answers against.  The most obvious and immediate one is “There is 
no reason for I will die anyway.”  A more sophisticated one is “I am a contingent 
being: I am here but need not have been.”  And if there is, in these senses, no point 
to an existence then there will be no point in passing on “favoured traits to offspring 
by inheritance” for the same reason.  And if there is no point to the next generation 
then making it does not, in itself, give a point to this generation.  It is a question, 
given the gross overcrowding of the world, the imminence of a global warming 
catastrophe and the exhaustion of natural reserves, that needs answering in a more 
positive way.  In the event of there being no reason, at least as far as the planet is 
                                                          
44  Leo Tolstoy, “A Confession”, in A Confession and Other Religious Writings, trans. Jane 
Kentish, London: Penguin Classics, 1987, p. 33. 
45  John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, New York: Signet Classics, 1964, p. 109. 
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concerned, it would be better if the human race dies off before it kills everything 
else.  Francis Crick is another authority who accepts the general power of 
evolutionary explanation but his answer to a question from Dawkins might fill a 
sensitive person with despair: “Well I don’t think we’re for anything.  We’re just 
products of evolution.  You can say, ‘Gee, your life must be pretty bleak if you 
don’t think there is a purpose.’  But I’m anticipating having a good lunch.”46  He 
seems, to me, to make the point he is trying to avoid. 
 
The human mechanism far from just “having a good lunch” is actually faced 
with existential futility and will need to incorporate, within the story that is its 
narrative-consciousness, the paradoxical fact that life is without necessity but goes 
on.  The mechanism will, therefore, need to generate not just any story, nor a story 
that makes sense in general, but a story to avoid this recognition in order to facilitate 
or to make sense of living.  Camus notes that “judging whether or not life is or is not 
worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy”. He 
continues: “I see many people die because they judge that life is not worth living.”47  
It has to be admitted, however, that such a course of action has not been generally 
followed.  Faced with the “fundamental question of philosophy”, people have 
generally made the pro-life choice.  In order to provide an explanation to resolve the 
paradox it is necessary to postulate that, along with the awareness of existential 
futility, another attribute must have been available at the same time to mitigate its 
potential damage.  If it is supposed that a situation pertained at one time in which 
                                                          
46  Dawkins, The God Delusion, p. 100. 
47  Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 11. 
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one group - who inclined to non-functioning through despair or even actual suicide - 
existed side-by-side with another group who possessed this additional attribute 
which biased behaviour towards the opposite inclination, then the latter group would 
clearly be the more adaptive.  
 
Such an attribute did already exist.  In fact, it existed long before the 
development of consciousness as it is generally understood and, since it did exist, it 
could have been adopted for the function of denying existential futility.  This 
attribute, or skill (to use Fingarette’s terminology), is the power to deceive which, in 
certain circumstances, develops into self-deception.  If self-deception were able to 
hide existential angst and facilitate the creation of an alternate project then it is clear 
that self-deceivers would prove adaptive.  If so, then the skill should exhibit the 
hallmark of evolution by being ubiquitous and, again, this seems to have been 
empirically identified.  Trivers, for one, claims that “a wealth of studies in social 
psychology have demonstrated the ubiquity and variety of self-deception”.48 
Kenneth Harris thinks that Nathaniel Hawthorne provides an example of the literary 
adoption of this same view for he notes that: “the very ubiquity of self-deception in 
[Hawthorne’s] fiction would suggest that he tended to regard it with some sympathy 
as a common human failing.”49 
 
                                                          
48  Robert Trivers, “foreword” to J. S. Lockard and D. L. Paulhus (eds), Self-Deception – An 
Adaptive Mechanism, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988, p. vii.  
49  Kenneth Marc Harris, Hypocrisy and Self-Deception in Hawthorne’s Fiction, 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1988, p. 68. 
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The evidence for the prior existence of deception is provided by a whole 
range of biologists and socio-biologists and Joan S. Lockard sums up the scientific 
consensus in her review article, “Origins of Self-Deception”.  She starts her article 
with the summary: “Many animals have evolved a form of deception that is 
beneficial to their survival.”50  She then goes on to enumerate many examples and 
notes that “deception is prevalent not only among members of different species, but 
also among animals of the same species”,51 again giving numerous examples.  
Lockard has also noted that many socio-biologists “have regarded self-
deception…as a logical extension of the deception model in animal behaviour.”52  
When they use self in this context they are suggesting that “in their view, one major 
distinction between deception and self-deception, as the terms imply, is a matter of 
whether the masquerade is perpetrated by another or by oneself”.53  Clearly this 
depends on the meaning assigned to self.  Dawkins, Hume, Blackmore and this 
thesis essentially deny the existence of a “we” and regard the human animal as 
simply a “machine” that provides, in addition, a narrative account of what it is 
doing.  Allowing this mechanistic interpretation of self enables Robert Trivers to 
argue: 
If … deceit is fundamental to animal communication, then there 
must be strong selection to spot deception and this ought, in 
turn, to select for a degree of self-deception, rendering some 
facts and motives unconscious so as not to betray - by subtle 
signs of self-knowledge – the deception being practiced.  Thus, 
the conventional view that natural selection favors nervous 
                                                          
50  Joan S. Lockard, “Origins of Self-Deception”, in Lockard and Paulhus (eds), Self-Deception 
– An Adaptive Mechanism, p. 14. 
51  Ibid., p.14. 
52  Joan S. Lockard, “Evolution, Ontogeny, and Society”, in Lockard and Paulhus (eds), Self-
Deception – An Adaptive Mechanism, p. 8. 
53  Ibid., p. 8. 
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systems which produce ever more accurate images of the world 
must be a very naїve view of mental progress.54   
 
 
Lockard explains what “not to betray” means: she says “if he [the male of a 
monogamous species] is deceived regarding his own motives, his behaviour might 
be even more convincing”.55  The behaviour referred to here contrasts overt 
behaviour with covert signs indicated by, for example, the autonomous nervous 
system as is the case in the Gur and Sackeim experiment 56 discussed in more detail 
in chapter 1.  This approach avoids the need for the invention of a human reflective 
self.  She goes on to explain what “convincing” might mean: “Weaknesses and 
emotions that could interfere with the successful execution of a lie might be 
rendered impotent by relegating them to the unconscious.”57  The socio-biologists, 
then, have definitely identified the fact that deception of others already existed in 
animal behaviour before human evolution and seem prepared to go further by 
claiming some animals can deceive themselves.  Trivers is able to spell out, 
specifically, the immediate and direct reproductive benefits of self-deception in his 
“Parental Investment and Sexual Selection” which concerns itself with partnerships 
in monogamous, avian, relationships.  He points out that the relationship is 
asymmetric: “a copulation costing the male virtually nothing may trigger…an 
investment by the female that is not trivial”,58 involving as it does the development 
of an egg and a lengthy gestational process.  Trivers then suggests that the male 
                                                          
54  Richard L. Trivers, “Introduction” to Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. vi. 
55  Lockard, “Origins of Self-Deception”, p. 16.   
56  R. C. Gur and H. A. Sackeim, “Self-deception: A concept in search of a phenomenon”, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1979, 147-169. 
57  Lockard, “Evolution, Ontogeny, and Society”, p. 10. 
58  Trivers, “Parental Investment and Sexual Selection”, p. 145. 
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“may maximise his chances of leaving surviving offspring by copulating with and 
abandoning many females”.59  But, as Lockard points out, this is only likely to be 
successful if he convinces his partner to bring total commitment to the rearing of the 
off-spring and he is more likely to achieve this if he convinces the “females of his 
own fidelity”;60 that is, he fools his partner and, as has already been pointed out, he 
is able to do this better if he fools himself first.  Lockard does not say so but it is 
also likely that the female does her childrearing better and is therefore more 
successful if she is also deceived.  In fact, even if she sees through the male’s self-
deception it is in her interest to allow it.  As with the male, her allowing it works 
better if she deceives herself that the male is loyal.  This is not the end of the story 
however for the deserted partner will achieve more success if “it can induce another 
partner to help to raise its young”.61  This in turn “requires deceiving another 
organism into doing something contrary to its own interests, and adaptations should 
evolve to guard individuals against such tasks”.62  Clearly once again the process 
works only if the initiator of the deception is self-deceived.  Self-deception at its 
very inception may be seen to be necessarily a “common” and a collusive process: 
avoiding of uncomfortable facts has a demonstrable shared purpose.  Although the 
use of self in this way may not appeal to everyone - so when used in this way will 
be now be encased in brackets – it nevertheless allows the probability that once 
humans evolve what is more usually called self this deception can transform into 
what is more commonly called self-deception.  Paulhus certainly takes this view.  
                                                          
59  Ibid. 
60  Lockard, “Origins of Self-Deception”, p. 16. 
61  Trivers, “Parental Investment and Sexual Selection”, p. 147. 
62  Ibid. 
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He supports Lockard’s and Trivers’s contention that the consensus of animal 
literature is in favour of (self)-deception and goes on to say that “the evidence for 
self-deception in lower organisms [at least] implies an evolutionary basis for human 
self-deception”.63 
 
However, even here, a problem arises. A close study of self-deception in 
humans has led Mary Haight to conclude that it cannot actually exist.  She comes to 
this conclusion because she adopts a mentalist model of mind which Herbert 
Fingarette and this thesis try to avoid.  However, she does provide a very cogent 
definition which provides a useful starting point and introduces the propositional 
terminology p and not-p.  Haight’s definition says: 
If A deceives B, then for some proposition(s) p, A knows that p; 
and either A keeps or helps to keep B from knowing that p, or A 
helps to make B believe that not-p, or both.64  
 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, her shorter version will suffice. She describes the 
essence of self-deception as “when A deceives B, A – to deceive – must know that 
p, when B – when deceived - must not”.65  For self-deception, A and B must be the 
same and therefore to believe not-p and p at the same time “seems impossible”.66   
 
However, the narrative-consciousness model is able to overcome both the 
self problem and the self-deception problem.  The idea of self has been replaced by 
                                                          
63  D. L. Paulhus, “General Introduction”, in Lockard and Paulhus (eds), Self-Deception – An 
Adaptive Mechanism, p. 2. 
64  Mary Haight, A Study of Self-Deception, Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980, p. 9. 
65  Ibid., p. 9. 
66  Ibid. 
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the story which is either generated by the narrative-consciousness (weak theory) or 
is the narrative-consciousness (strong theory).  The self in self-deception now means 
the story and it is easily possible for a story to contain both p and not-p.  If the 
selective advantage of self-deception in perpetuating the genetic structure of the 
organism is the ultimate reason for its evolution, then these propositions take on two 
additional but separate tasks in the human sphere.  One of them can refer to any two 
contradictory propositions and the other can refer to the specifically existential 
opposition where not-p will stand for the proposition that “life is not worth living” 
and p will stand for its opposite, “life is worth living”.  Hickey, for example, in The 
Iceman Cometh (1939), behaves very like Trivers’s “monogamous male” and gives 
substance to the meaning of self-deception.  He spends the play, unknown to his 
audience, fooling his wife who, in turn, refuses to accept the lies he gives to her and 
to himself.  But equally it is easy to see that the variety of self-deception may be 
greater.  In addition to Hickey, who has to cope with his unhappy marriage, Orgon 
in Tartuffe (1669) may be embarrassed, Arsinoe in The Misanthrope (1666) may be 
in love, Dimmesdale in The Scarlet Letter(1850) has his religion to contend with, 
Hjalmar Ekdal in The Wild Duck (1884) has to accommodate knowledge of his 
wife’s infidelity and many others.67  None of these are of concern to a thesis on 
ESDeS.  They are examples of what I will call normal-self-deceptions.  Each is 
concerned with a life-style choice which is optional.  They are not my concern 
except insofar as they throw light on to the behavioural correlates of all self-
deceptions.  What is of interest is when the self-deception concerns knowledge of 
existential futility: awareness that we are contingent beings who will die.  Here, 
                                                          
67  See for example the “pipedreams” of all the other characters in the The Iceman Cometh. 
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since the consequences of this knowledge may be extreme, the adoption of self-
deception may be described as necessary.  Eagle has noted that a number of writers 
have speculated as to this particular motivation.  Some, he says, “have argued that in 
certain core areas [e.g. death] denial and related mechanisms are necessary in order 
for one to live a normal and healthy life”.68  Terry Eagleton puts the same point 
more poetically:  “Amnesia not remembrance is what is natural to us.”69  Eagle goes 
on to suggest why: “When awareness and insight about oneself lead mainly to 
despair, panic and a sense of helplessness, self-deception would seem a more 
adaptive alternative.”70  Eagleton suggests an exploration into the mechanism of 
self-deception as a means of “denial” would be in order: “[Theory] needs to chance 
its arm, break out of rather stifling orthodoxy and explore new topics.”71  One of the 
topics he has in mind is, like Eagle, death for he asserts: “Nothing more graphically 
illustrates how unnecessary we are than our own mortality.”72 
 
This thesis, then, has moved on again.  It now states that, since self-
deception has been adopted for a specific purpose - the denial of existential futility - 
it deserves a specific name: existential self-deception (ESD).  ESD, then, provides, 
with the assistance of the language attribute, a story to disguise the knowledge that 
life has no necessary meaning (not-p).  In this sense the narrative-consciousness 
theory has become the existentially-self-deceptive-narrative-consciousness 
                                                          
68  Morris Eagle, “Psychoanalysis and Self-Deception”, in Lockard and Paulhus (eds), Self-
Deception – An Adaptive Mechanism, p. 92. 
69  Terry Eagleton, After Theory, London: Penguin, 2004, p. 63. 
70  Eagle, “Psychoanalysis and Self-Deception”, p. 93. 
71  Eagleton, After Theory, p. 222. 
72  Ibid., p. 210. 
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theory and its story, as has been signposted, will be called existentially-self-
deceptive-story (ESDeS).  It is this story which is available; not the self. 
 
Finally, however, as has been shown above, the listening community can 
often taint the evidence.  A scientific study requires repeatability so a written text 
makes the same version available: permanently in the same state for alternative 
examinations.  It will be the case that two readers will not necessarily agree what the 
text means but at least there can now be dispute about the actual words.  The text 
will be equally and unchangingly available for each new reader.  Mary Haight, in 
her study of self-deception, sees this as a problem albeit a necessary one: “The 
dangers of such sources [literature] are clear and I do not forget them.  But they are 
the sources we have, and a good deal more than nothing.”73  Indeed it is a great deal 
more than nothing: this thesis now sees the story of the self, whether told or written, 
as the way to deal with both the problems of self, self-deception and existential 
angst. 
 
When an ESDeS is mimicked in such a novelistic, repeatable framework it 
will be given the name existentially-self-deceptive-novel (ESDeN).  Such a 
narrative will be found to have divided into two.  There will be a covert plot that 
mimics the storing of existential angst and an overt plot which mimics the hiding of 
the covert plot by foregrounding some alternative.  The narrative-consciousness that 
is the reader then will be able to collude with the task of finding out the significance 
of the overt plot and is able, then, to overlook the covert plot.  Such a search or 
                                                          
73  Haight, A Study of Self-Deception, p. 74. 
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quest motivates a whole range of stories not least of which is Heart of Darkness 
(1899), the analysis of which provides the backbone of this thesis. 
 
I will use chapter 1 to generate the theory of the ESDeS, defining all the 
most important terms, and chapter 2 to limit its provenance.  The theory will then be 
illustrated in great detail, in chapter 3, with examples of non-ESDeS and chapter 4, 
with Heart of Darkness.  Chapter 5 and chapter 6 will be used to further develop the 
idea with the extension of Marlow’s Heart of Darkness experience into Chance 
(1914) and the analysis of Thinks (2002) as a contemporary example of an ESDeN. 
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Chapter 1 
Existentially-Self-Deceptive-Narrative-Consciousness Theory 
 
Mary Haight makes it clear that “a theory of self-deception must (I think) depend on 
a theory of consciousness”,1 so this thesis has provided one with its narrative-
consciousness formulation.  This asserts that there is no “we” beyond the story 
which is related by the organism and so, from now on, the passive voice will be 
universally adopted: it is confusing to assert that there is no “we” and then to write 
as if such a “we” existed.  David Armstrong comes to almost the same conclusion 
but describes it slightly differently.  He asserts that consciousness is “no more than 
awareness (perception) of inner mental states….an inner state apt for the production 
of certain behaviour.”2  He means by this that one particular part of the brain scans 
another as perception scans the environment.  This thesis has simply added the 
suggestion that the “certain behaviour” produced is, in particular, a story based on a 
self-deceptive process in order to nullify the by-product of existential futility. 
 
However, other theories of mind do exist and it is likely that these will be 
included in the storytelling process.  Armstrong, for one, has, before coming to his 
own conclusion, stated that “there are many possible ways of classifying theories of 
mind”3 but his method, “based upon different conceptions of the relationship of 
                                                          
1  Mary Haight, A Study of Self-Deception, Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980, p. viii. 
2  David Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1968, p. 94. 
3  Ibid., p. 5. 
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mind to body”,4 is apposite.  Simply put it divides the relationship into the three 
logical possibilities – mentalist (body is reduced to mind), dualist (mind and matter 
are two different sorts of substance) and materialist (mind is reduced to body).  
These main categories can then be further divided: dualism can be either Cartesian 
dualism or bundle dualism and materialism can be either behaviourism or central-
state theory.  Armstrong rejects the first category out of hand - “most have taken the 
common view that physical objects are not mental in nature” and he also, along with 
Blackmore and this thesis, rejects Cartesian dualism, but has some positive things to 
say about the three remaining categories.5  This, it is thought, represents the position 
of most people and so the stories that represent their narrative-consciousnesses will 
be expected to incorporate aspects of each of these approaches.   
 
Bundle dualism rejects the notion that there are two different substances but 
does think that mind consists of a succession of non-physical particulars.  This 
originates in David Hume’s self-examination, described in the introduction, whose 
results lead, according to Armstrong, to certain conclusions:  
there are no continuing objects in the mental sphere 
corresponding to the body in the physical sphere….All that 
observation of what goes on in our minds reveals is a succession 
of what Hume calls ‘perceptions’: that is perceptions, 
sensations, emotions, thoughts and so on.6   
 
These “perceptions” which Hume regards as consciousness might be regarded as 
non-physical and different from the body.  If so, this division invites a further sub-
                                                          
4  Ibid., p. 5. 
5  Armstrong acknowledges, of course, that other models exist: ibid., p. 13, “it may well be 
possible to find theories of mind which stand on the border-lines of our divisions”.  
6  Ibid., p. 7. 
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classification that “cut[s] across …dualism”.7  Either the consciousness can 
influence the body (interactionism) or it cannot (parallelism).  For T.H. Huxley, for 
example, consciousness “is thought of as a mere by-product of the operation of the 
brain”;8 it is a mere epiphenomenon associated with emotional states.  This theory, 
Armstrong asserts, “will have a great appeal to anybody who is sympathetic to 
materialism, but who still thinks that there is something irreducible about mental 
states”.9  Behaviourism is more rigidly empirical: it “denies the existence of inner 
mental states”.10  The movement, which originated with J. B. Watson, is usually 
associated with, and was strongly advocated by, B. F. Skinner and is also the model 
which is essentially adopted by Herbert Fingarette.  Its main contention is that “to 
have a mind is merely to behave physically”,11 although “to behave” is sometimes 
allowed to include “disposition to behave”.12  The final materialist model is the 
central-state theory.  It is strongly adopted by Armstrong and is also essentially that 
adopted by Haight.  A central-state theory, unlike behaviourism, “does not deny the 
existence of inner mental states”.13  However, what mental states might mean has 
been a perennial source of dispute.  Armstrong argues that they still strongly relate 
to behaviour:  “the concept of mental state is primarily the concept of a state of the 
person apt for bringing about a certain behaviour…it is the cause of behaviour.”14   
 
                                                          
7  Ibid. 
8  Ibid., p. 9. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Ibid., p. 57. 
11  Ibid., p. 10. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Ibid., p. 75. 
14  Ibid., p. 82. 
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It is true that most people - that is non-philosophers – are sketchy with 
respect to details and do not apply appropriate rigour to these different approaches.  
However, they do use the different forms of language associated with each of the 
models.  It would be expected, therefore, that the self-deceptive process will be 
found within the novel expressed in three different ways.  The section of the thesis 
that follows suggests that the three ways map onto storytelling to produce three 
identifiable layers: genre-markers, plot process and a narrative structure. 
 
The Genre-marker – Unease: Signposting the Story as an ESDeS 
 
Umberto Eco suggests that a phrase such as “once upon a time” is a genre-indicator 
and a model reader would take it to mean “a fairy tale is about to start”.15  If an ESD 
reading is required it too will be signalled by appropriate markers.  Ultimately it will 
be shown that two groups of functionally different markers are needed.  The first 
group consists of unease associated with self-deception.  The second group consists 
of a meaning marker, a hiding marker and a repetition marker.  This section only 
looks at the origins of the self-deceptive-unease marker: the others will emerge 
from later discussions.   
 
Unease emerges naturally as soon as the possibility of self-deception enters a 
story.  This is because difficulties are encountered as soon as it becomes necessary 
to know exactly what the word means.  Wittgenstein has already visited this 
                                                          
15  Umberto Eco, Six Walks in the Fictional Woods, Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University 
Press, 1994, p.10. 
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question when he rhetorically asks, in his The Blue Book, “what is the meaning of a 
word?”16  He comes to the conclusion that it is not possible to definitely define the 
meaning of (some) words and would agree that self-deception is such a word.  He 
would also argue that it is still necessary to use the word in the same way that he 
argues for the use of the word chair: Wittgenstein “expects a negative answer”17 
when he asks the question “are we to say that we do not really attach any meaning 
to this word [chair], because we are not equipped with rules for every possible 
application of it?”18  However, if several uses of the word self-deception are 
examined and described it turns out not to be possible to find some underlying 
general characteristic which is present each time the word is used.  It might, 
therefore, be thought that an essential element is missing when it is discovered that 
every item in each description is non-essential for all self-deceptions or could apply 
to other behaviours.  Haight says something similar of behaviour associated 
specifically with her analysis of self-deception: “many different ways of thinking 
may lead to behaviour of this kind.”19  To overcome this problem, Wittgenstein and 
Saussure independently introduce the idea of "family resemblances”.  Wittgenstein 
asserts that “you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that”.20  His advice is “don’t think, but 
look”.21  The suggestion is that a series will form a family of cases; that what is 
needed is a comparison of cases that all lie at the same level.  Saussure deduces 
                                                          
16  Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and The Brown Books, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969, p. 1. 
17  Robert J. Fogelin, Wittgenstein, London: Routledge, 1976, p. 135. 
18  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1974, #80, p.38. 
19  Haight, A Study of Self-Deception, p. 73. 
20  Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #66, p. 31. 
21  Ibid. 
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something similar when he refers to the phrase, “my house” and argues that it takes 
its meaning by comparison: “my is associatively related to you, his, her etc., while 
the sign house is associatively related to home, domicile, dwelling, apartment, 
etc.”22  It can, therefore, be argued by analogy that to understand the term self-
deception it is necessary to appreciate that self-deception gains its meaning not from 
a list of characteristics but from placing the word in context and using its similarities 
and differences from other usages to provide a deeper understanding of the phrase; 
that is to build up a repertoire of examples or family resemblances or, as Saussure 
prefers, differences.  However, as Robert Fogelin points out, “the doctrine of family 
resemblances does not leave us with nothing to do; instead it invites us to trace out 
relationships and this should be done with whatever degree of rigour that the subject 
allows.”23 
 
Applying the family resemblances approach to self-deception entails placing 
it along a continuum with other related terms based on a suitable choice of attribute.  
A common chosen attribute is the degree of conscious intent and this leads to a 
continuum including delusion, illusion, self-deception, playacting, hypocrisy and 
deliberate deception.  The first two terms are usually described as involuntary. 
Playacting, in contrast, is usually described as voluntary, for two reasons: the actor 
chooses to play the part and the audience chooses to allow the pretence.  The two 
sides may be said to collude in the deception.  Hypocrisy and deliberate deception 
are voluntary on the perpetrator’s side but involuntary on the victim’s side.  Self-
                                                          
22  Ferdinand-Mongin de Saussure, Cours de Linguistic Général, Paris: Payot, p. 171, trans. 
and cited Roy Harris, Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein, London: Routledge, 1988, p.23. 
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deception lies at the cusp in the sense that it is not easy to see whether it is voluntary 
on either side.  Kenneth Marc Harris, for instance, agrees that hypocrisy can be 
separated from playacting (and delusion) by the ascription of intent.  He argues that 
we “distinguish hypocrisy from…the legitimate stage [and] pathological 
delusion…by directly ascribing evil to the hypocrite, but not to the stage actor or to 
the madman”.24  In the theatre, actors do not intend to deceive the audience except 
in the sense that the theatregoers willingly allow themselves to be deceived, whereas 
hypocrites deceive their audience against their wills.  However, none of these 
categories are so easily decided in practice.  Marc Harris gives an example where 
playacting and hypocrisy might be confused. The narrator of The Scarlet Letter 
describes the face of the main character, Hester, as “like a mask”.25  The use of the 
theatrical term might suggest to the reader that she is pretending and appears to give 
them the choice of whether “to suspend their disbelief” or not.  But since within the 
fictional universe the narrative makes it clear that she is only pretending to be 
humble whilst secretly plotting to escape with her lover, Dimmesdale, the reader has 
no difficulty in ascribing the term hypocrisy rather than playacting.  The two terms 
are separated by the additional information provided by the context.  This, however, 
need not be the case.  Richard Hannay in John Buchan’s The Thirty Nine Steps 
(1915) does genuinely confound the two.  In order for Hannay to escape from the 
pursuing agents of The Black Stone he decides to adopt the persona of a roadman, 
Alexander Turnbull.  He first “set to work to dress for the part”.26  He then “shut off 
                                                          
24  Kenneth Marc Harris, Hypocrisy and Self-Deception in Hawthorne’s Fiction, 
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1988, p. 2. 
25  Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, London: Penguin, 1994, p. 193. 
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all other thoughts”.  He did so on the advice of “an old scout [Peter Pienaar]” who 
had once told him “the secret of playing a part was to think yourself into it”.27  
However, he and his audience, this time, are in different positions: he willingly 
accepts the deceit whereas The Black Stone do not.  The reader, as an outsider in 
this case, knows Hannay is pretending only because the text allows access to his 
intention.  Buchan later reiterates this point from the other side.  This time it is The 
Black Stone who adopt the deceptive mechanism of “being the part”.  Hannay is 
confused, in his turn, and says to himself, “these men might be acting; but if they 
were, where was the audience?”28  Like their evolutionary forebears, it seems, they 
are better able to deceive if they deceive themselves first.  In effect this brief 
analysis of terms only leads the thesis back to its functional description of 
consciousness with an added descriptive term: consciousness is only the “telling of a 
story” or its “spelling-out” or “the living of one’s own life as if it were a story” or, 
now, the “playing of a part”. 
 
Separating the descriptive terms should, in principle, become easier if a 
simple enough situation, such as a fictional story, can be found.  Gilbert Ryle 
favours this approach: “The fact that…examples are faked tends to render them all 
the better as illustrations of the general principle in question.  For irrelevant or 
conflicting characteristics can be omitted or left in the shade.”29  Lisa Zunshine puts 
                                                          
27  Ibid., p. 62. 
28  Ibid., p. 116. 
29  Gilbert Ryle, “Imaginary Objects”, Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Suppl. Vol. xii, 
1983, reprinted in Gilbert Ryle, Collected papers, vol. 2, Bristol: Thoemes, 1990,. pp 80-81. 
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the same argument the other way round: “Literature pervasively capitalizes on and 
stimulates Theory of Mind mechanisms that had evolved to deal with real people.”30  
 
An exemplary hypocrite should emerge from a close reading of Molière’s 
Tartuffe, for the intention here is plain: the play’s list of characters specifically 
describes Tartuffe as “a hypocrite”.  Insofar as the author has privileged access to 
his character’s mind, the point seems decided.  However, there remains a legitimate 
question to ask: “does the text justify the description?”  And the answer is, “it does 
not” because it is just not possible to eliminate ambiguities in any narrative 
description of any item in the self-deception continuum. 
 
Tartuffe is taken up by a well-to-do householder, Orgon, who has rescued 
him from poverty before the play starts.  Tartuffe has succeeded in winning Orgon’s 
affection, and also the affection of Orgon’s mother, Madame Pernelle, by appearing 
to them to be a holy man.  The rest of the household do not share this interpretation 
of Tartuffe’s behaviour, especially Damis, the son, and Dorine, a servant.  Dorine is 
the most outspoken.  She observes, “You imagine he’s a saint, but, believe me, he’s 
nothing but a hypocrite.”31  The scene is nicely and correctly set.  Molière claims he 
is “recognisable at once”,32 but this is not a justified claim.  Tartuffe, in reality, at 
this stage appears to have two sides.  One of which – the saintly – he presents both 
to the family and the audience.  The audience of theatre-goers do not have access to 
                                                          
30  Liza Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction: Theories of Mind and the Novel, Columbus: Ohio 
State University Press, 2006, p. 10. 
31  Molière, Tartuffe, in The Misanthrope and Other Plays, London: Penguin, 1959, p. 49. 
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the other side – the hypocritical – other than through the testimony of some of the 
family members.  Given the evidence, or lack of it, the audience should be in doubt.  
They are, in effect, presented with three alternatives.  Orgon and Madame Pernelle 
are right and therefore the rest of the family are wrong.  The rest of the family are 
right in which case Orgon and his mother are deceived for some reason.  Or Tartuffe 
is just an ordinary person and the family are working out their differences using him 
as a scapegoat.  At no stage in the early part of the play does anyone suggest that 
Tartuffe is a scoundrel – where scoundrel means someone with motives beyond the 
desire to be seen as a good man when he is not. 
 
As the play progresses more information is provided and the family 
members and the audience are in a better position to form judgements.  Tartuffe 
does not stop with Orgon’s admiration and sponsorship.  He goes further.  He is 
invited to marry Orgon’s daughter, Mariane, and he tries to make love to Orgon’s 
wife, Elmire.  He succeeds in having Damis ejected from the family – disinherited 
and cursed – and in gaining Orgon’s possessions by a deed of gift and a casket 
containing treasonable secrets.  In effect, evidence is sequentially presented that 
Tartuffe seems to be considerably more than a mere hypocrite.  He is at the very 
least a deliberate confidence trickster.  By displaying his unseemly behaviour to 
some of the characters the theatre-goers are led to tilt their judgements.  Of course, 
it could be that Tartuffe was initially just a hypocrite but as the play progressed and 
these other opportunities occurred – namely Orgon’s lunatic benevolence at the 
expense of his family - he fell to temptation.  Or he could have been a rogue all 
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along.  But since his lies about himself have a wider purpose than merely wishing to 
be seen to be good, the theatre-goer should, by the end of the play, decide he is more 
than a hypocrite.  It is true that Molière seems to have a wider definition - which 
includes “scoundrel” - but even this is weak.  Harris, perhaps, goes a little further 
even than Molière.  He says “a pure or medieval hypocrite…is a conscious 
dissembler who deliberately plays a role in order to attain evil ends”.33  However, 
even this seems inadequate.  Tartuffe seems more like a sadistic sociopath who 
doesn’t seem to want gain so much as the pleasure to be obtained with the 
destruction of a family.  Certainly, the audience might be entitled to suppose, he has 
no interest in what others think of him provided he gains his real purposes.  He says 
to the officer, as the family are in the process of being evicted from their house and 
Orgon threatened with imprisonment, “Pray deliver me from this futile clamour [the 
family protestations], sir!  Proceed to the execution of your orders.”34  So, however 
the definition of hypocrite is expanded, its use here does not involve what is its 
essential character – a desire to seem better than one is.  Rather, Tartuffe takes 
delight in being horrible.  It is this which spells his ultimate doom for his behaviour 
comes to be recognised for what it is and he incurs universal approbation. 
 
If Tartuffe wanted both monetary and sexual gain and, in addition, to think 
himself well thought of he needed to either keep the two sets of people apart or go 
further than hypocrisy.  He needed to move into self-deception as argued by Rev. 
Seddon: 
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A great many, notwithstanding their determination to indulge 
themselves in criminal practice, and to gratify their darling 
propensities against the plain rules of reason and justice, would 
very gladly at the same time have the safety and benefit of 
religion.  Thus they aim at the grossest absurdity and 
contradiction in nature, to be both religious and vicious.  And 
for this purpose they explain religion to themselves, in such a 
manner, as may not be inconsistent with their beloved 
vices…and…settle into the course of self-deceit.35 
 
 
Which is, of course, what Tartuffe is prepared to do when, desperate for Elmire, he 
justifies his actions with “there are ways and means of coming to terms with 
Heaven”.36  So, if we believe his sincerity, on this occasion he slips into self-deceit.  
It has been shown that it is no easy matter to distinguish between criminal deception 
for gain and hypocrisy on the one hand and it has been further suggested that it is 
possible for hypocrisy to slip into self-deception on the other.  
 
In a subsequent play, The Misanthrope, Molière concentrates on the 
character Arsinoé.  Arsinoé deviates to the other end of the continuum.  Here, the 
centre of gravity of the action is, very definitely, between self-deception and 
hypocrisy rather that hypocrisy and deliberate villainy.  Arsinoé is, like Tartuffe, 
portrayed as behaving differently in different situations.  The fun and action in both 
plays derive from the inability, on the evidence, to come to any firm opinion.  
Molière does not, in Fingarette’s opinion, provide “the crucial test”37 which is, for 
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him, “whether or not she [Arsinoé] spells out her project to herself”.38  Fingarette 
spells-out the problem: 
If Arsinoe were to confide in some other person and admit that 
everything Célimène says is true, that her own prudery and 
friendliness are a façade designed to deceive Célimène and the 
others, there would be no problem.  We would consider her a 
cynical hypocrite.  Suppose, however, that Arsinoé confides 
nothing of the sort to anyone (which is in fact the case).  We 
might then look for other signs that she is in any case fully 
aware of it, that she acknowledges it at least to herself.  If we 
found none, if we found signs, instead, that she is sincere, we 
should then have a case of self-deception.39  
 
A possible source of evidence could perhaps come from the idea of 
privileged access.  This has two aspects.  It can be asked what the author thinks and 
what the character thinks.  Molière clearly thought that he was using Tartuffe to 
describe hypocrisy but did not, in the opinion of the thesis, succeed.  If Molière’s 
intent - a hidden and unobtainable construct – is unreliable then there needs to be a 
clearer idea.  One way to do this is to, first, recognise that intention is merely a 
mentalist explanation of the causes and origins of any choice and, then, to replace 
mentalist evidence with behavioural evidence.  That is, it becomes necessary to 
examine what is available within the containing story.  One source of evidence, 
relevant in the self-deception debate, could be the motivation of the character and 
this could be achieved by gaining access to the character’s inner consciousness.  
Although this thesis argues this claim has no meaning, it has to be acknowledged 
that others think it has.  Henry James, for one, does, although he suggests it is 
difficult.  He argues, for example, that, “to project yourself into the consciousness of 
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a person essentially your opposite requires the audacity of great genius”.40  
Kennedy-Andrews concludes that Nathaniel Hawthorne has this capability: “his 
works offer glimpses of the ‘the whole deep mystery of man’s soul and 
conscience’.”41  It might be thought that access to consciousness, if it were really 
possible, would resolve the self-deception debate for the real motivation lying 
behind the behaviour would become apparent.  Whether or not Arsinoé actually tells 
the outside world she hated Célimène, the inside examination would reveal the truth.  
But this would be, even if it were possible, to miss the meaning of self-deception.  
The story representing the character is no different from the story representing 
narrative-consciousness of the author.  It is, by definition, the same inside as 
outside.   
 
Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter is worth examination in this respect, for 
Hawthorne does attempt to give access to Dimmesdale’s consciousness and it is 
revealed to be in as much confusion as the external behaviour exhibited by Tartuffe 
and Arsinoé.  The text describes Dimmesdale as being in self-deception but gives 
two contrary reasons for it.  “Whereas Chillingworth suggests Dimmesdale is a self-
deceiver because he continues to serve God as a minister, Hawthorne accuses him of 
self-deception for just the opposite reason: for thinking he can turn his back on his 
clerical responsibilities.”42  It is neither clear that they both mean the same thing by 
the use of the term nor whether the term is actually justified.  In the case of 
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Chillingworth’s claim, Dimmesdale is certainly hypocritical if he preaches good 
tenets but does not admit he does not follow them himself, but he is not self-
deceptive unless he believes he does follow them when he does not.  This does not 
seem to be the case.  Dimmesdale is tormented by knowledge of his sins.  
Nevertheless, this comparison highlights Hawthorne’s main concern.  Harris puts it 
well: 
His main concern, I feel, remains the moral dimension of 
hypocrisy and self-deception, and his greatest contribution to 
our understanding of this dimension is embodied in the 
characterizations of Hester and especially of Dimmesdale.  The 
ontological question raised by the study of hypocrisy – what is 
the real self? – also figures prominently, but is always 
subordinated to a moral evaluation.  With Dimmesdale in 
particular, the ontological question becomes a moral issue, as 
the real Dimmesdale can finally be characterised neither as a 
hypocrite nor as a saint, unless he can somehow be seen as 
both.43 
 
Hawthorne concentrates on both the ubiquity of self-deception and, in this 
passage, its paradoxical nature which he clearly puts into p, not-p form.  
Interestingly, Kennedy-Andrews interprets ambiguities like this as “not a didactic 
strategy but a sign of a powerful tension between his attraction to and his fear of his 
deepest themes.  For behind his moralism, and often directly contradicting it, lies a 
sure insight into everything that is terrible.”44  Kennedy-Andrews means by 
“terrible” that which is “demoralising in human nature”45 but, within the context of 
this thesis, it is considered illegitimate to give “human nature” explanatory power 
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without adaptive support.  There can be nothing more terrible than awareness of 
existential futility.   
 
The discussion has led full circle back to Wittgenstein’s and Saussure’s view 
that it is no longer necessary or possible to be committed to definiteness of sense: “I 
think that the notion of family resemblance….helps dispel the commitment to 
definiteness of sense by exhibiting a set of concepts that violate this standard but are 
still perfectly serviceable.”46  This suggests that this approach means that it is 
possible to be comfortable with uncertainty whereas this thesis thinks the opposite is 
the case.  The introduction of the idea of self-deception does lead to uncertainty but 
this uncertainty is not accepted as the way it is.  Just the opposite - it gives rise to a 
feeling of unease.  The only certainty when involved with this aspect of the human 
condition is uncertainty. 
 
Nevertheless, making judgements is involved in the enjoyment of a reading.  
It is, as Umberto Eco describes, “an inferential walk” where the model author forces 
the model reader “to make choices”.  Sometimes, he says, the text wants to “leave 
us free to imagine how the story will continue” or “sadistically to show us…that we 
are to get lost”.47  Here, the case is a variation of this theme.  Here there is a 
negative inferential walk.  Uneasiness arises because of an inability to make a 
decision and uncertainty appears to be intrinsic to the interpretative process of 
recognising self-deception.  Recognition that self-deception is around leads to the 
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possibility that existential-self-deception (ESD) is around too.  Here, the “inferential 
walk” is warning “us” “where not to look”.48 
 
The first necessary step in the production of an ESDeS is to warn the reader 
how to (not) read by inserting a genre-marker for unease.  Unease can of course be 
generated by a number of literary devices, but the unease referred to here arises 
organically out of its association with the possibility of self-deception.  A genre-
marker for unease then should be associated with a genre-marker for self-deception 
and they may be synonymous: in this sense it could be called an existentially-self-
deceptive-unease marker.  In addition, there will emerge, during the process of 
second or subsequent readings, the existential-self-deceptive genre-markers of 
meaning, hiding and repetition.  
 
Self-Deceptive Behaviours: Self-Deceptive-Process 
 
It is being argued that it is seldom, if ever, possible to say with certainty that a 
particular person is in self-deception.  The only clear result so far is that there will 
be a sense of unease elicited by awareness of the possible or actual presence of self-
deception: that is, the existence of a story that does not make sense in that it appears 
to “leave something out”.49  However, it is not necessary to give up: it is only 
necessary to approach the problem of meaning in a different way.  In addition to 
deducing meaning by comparison it is possible to suggest that the meaning of a 
word derives from observing the way it is used.  Wittgenstein argues that “the use of 
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a word in the language is its meaning”,50 and Roy Harris suggests that “this is a 
formula which Saussure would have no difficulty in endorsing”.51  Finally, Mary 
Haight might be said to sum up this detour into language theory when she claims 
that “we diagnose self-deception from behaviour”.52 
 
Four behaviours, associated with self-deception, have been isolated by 
researchers in the field.  These are: 
• An apparent acceptance of two contradictory ideas with the 
concomitant refusal to accept the contradiction. 
• An attitude towards evidence. 
• Post-hoc recognition. 
• Point of recognition. 
 
 
It will be found that this list can be mapped on to, with a change of focus, a little 
reordering and the addition of a crucial step, the plotting of an ESDeS.  The results 
will show that an ESDeS involves a self-deceptive process which can consist of up 
to four stages between an existing cover story and its sequel.  The stages can be 
listed as follows: 
• A process of recognition. 
• A point of recognition. 
• A process of narration.  
• A point of narration. 
 
The identification of two contradictory ideas simultaneously present in a 
consciousness is too difficult to explain - unless the narrative-consciousness theory 
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and the ESDeS are accepted - for it is in the very nature of the problem of self-
deception that one of the ideas needs to be “hidden”.  Nevertheless many writers are 
“convinced that the phenomenon exists”53 and their evidence comes from many 
different fields.  These include the experimental example, the survey of a real event 
and the fictional examples discussed here. 
 
Gur and Sackeim provided experimental evidence54 for a split and the 
apparent refusal to note the contradiction.  They first established that people do not 
like recognising their own voices.  They then carried out an experiment in which 
subjects were asked to recognise their own voices on a tape recording: “At one level 
(reflected in the autonomic nervous system) the subjects know the voice belongs to 
them; at another level (reflected in conscious awareness) the subjects honestly deny 
this knowledge.”55  It is clear that there is a split into “I recognise my voice” and “I 
do not recognise my voice”, with the second being refused a “spelling-out”. 
 
Another example is provided by the outcome of the Mai Lai massacre in 
Vietnam: 
In 1969 intensive interviews were conducted with a 
representative sample of San Francisco Bay residents, the 
subject being the recently published photographs and stories of 
the Mai Lai massacre in Vietnam.…open ended interviews were 
conducted with 42 respondents.  These data were later 
supplemented by survey….The respondents were shown the 
photographs and asked to comment. 
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The responses essentially stated that the photographs and stories were untrue. 
The refusal to believe that American soldiers would engage in 
atrocities in the face of the type of evidence that is ordinarily 
granted credibility [indicated] that…[the]…respondents were 
engaging in self-deception.56  
 
 
There is every reason to suppose that two contradictory ideas were available to the 
respondents but, since one was not accepted, it can only be assumed that it was 
“hidden”.  The title given to the report was, “It Didn’t Happen and Besides They 
Deserved It”.57  The ironic title introduces the idea that self-deceivers not only deny 
contrary evidence but generate supportive evidence. 
 
A final example of self-deceptive contradiction is provided by Dimmesdale in 
The Scarlet Letter.  Throughout the book Dimmesdale serves (his) God as a minister 
despite hiding his affair with Hester.  This is seen by Chillingworth as self-deceptive 
as indeed it is if Dimmesdale truly believes he is behaving consistently.  Insofar as 
he gives a sermon implying he is not sinful whilst he is, in fact, being sinful he is 
certainly hypocritical and the hypocrisy shades into self-deception if he thinks he is 
not.  Nevertheless, it need not and does not stop the effectiveness of the sermon.  He 
preached of how his sins tormented him and so he was able to arouse, because this 
was true, the compassion of his listeners. It could be said that the sermon was 
preached in good faith (not in bad faith (not-p)).  He personally is a hypocrite but 
his audience does not believe him.  They believe in the sins and are properly 
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instructed but do not believe that they really belong to him: “Souls, it is said, more 
souls than one, were brought to the truth by the efficacy of that sermon.”58  He can 
argue, therefore, that it is permissible and legitimate to continue as a minister and to 
preach sermons.  However, the particular sermon he is to give at the time of the 
Election is different for now he plans to run away with Hester and escape his 
torment.  Dimmesdale can no longer argue that the sermon will be effective in the 
same sense.  Since he does so he will definitely need to move over into self-
deception.  If he does so, he exactly fits the self-deceptive paradox central to the 
idea of self-deception.  He, as stated by Harris, “believes both p, that he will give his 
sermon in bad faith and not-p, that he will not give a sermon in bad faith”.59  He 
knows that he is running away with Hester to escape his torments so the sermon 
relating his sins cannot be true but he, at the same time, believes it will be effective 
because it was effective in the past.  He says the people “shall say of me…that I 
leave no public duty unperformed, nor ill performed”.60  The narrator seems to 
suggest, by looking into his consciousness, that he deliberately fails to recognise 
that his hypocrisy now is different from the hypocrisy then: “Sad, indeed, that an 
introspection so profound and acute as this poor minister’s should be so miserably 
deceived!”61  Harris argues: “He lies to himself that he is no worse a hypocrite now 
than he was before.  It is a patent self-deception.”62 
 
                                                          
58  Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, p. 134. 
59  Harris, Hypocrisy and Self-Deception in Hawthorne’s Fiction, p. 85. 
60  Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, p. 184. 
61  Ibid., p. 184. 
62  Harris, Hypocrisy and Self-Deception in Hawthorne’s Fiction, p. 85. 
 46
The above examples attempt to show that it is widely recognised that two 
contradictory ideas can be present in a consciousness at the same time and that one 
is foregrounded at the expense of the other.  It is immediately obvious that it is 
possible to infer a person’s state from evidence.  Mary Haight makes this explicit.  
She says: “In self-deceit the evidence is against the belief held.  Once this is pointed 
out to the person involved, if he then proceeds to resist, by ingenious tactics, the 
natural implications of the evidence, we feel he is self-deceived.”63  In the examples 
above it is asserted that the Mai Lai respondents did exactly this.  These examples 
are, of course, lacking the full facts.  The beauty of using a fictional text, as 
suggested by Ryle, is that all the facts that are going to be available are already 
available.  It is not possible, like a Mai Lai respondent, to avoid the natural 
implications of the evidence by shifting ground. 
 
This is what Orgon and his mother do, in Tartuffe.  At the beginning of the 
play (as has been seen) Orgon and his mother are convinced that Tartuffe is a holy 
man and, therefore, do not believe he is a hypocrite.  The evidence against their 
view builds up.  First (as has been seen) there is Dorine’s negative testimony.  She is 
just a servant and a gossipy one at that so it is possible to ignore her.  There follows 
further negative testimonies from sources that would normally be believed.  And 
further the negative testimonies seem to be very much a consensus of all other 
family members: Damis, the son, Cle ́ante, the brother-in-law, and Mariane, the 
daughter.  Again reasons can be found to overlook their testimonies.  Orgon and his 
family, it could be argued, are going through troublesome times and they are just 
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trying to annoy him.  But then hard physical evidence starts to accumulate.  Orgon’s 
wife’s fidelity is put under pressure but still Orgon refuses to believe.  He is 
persuaded to hide under the table whilst Tartuffe makes a further attempt to seduce 
Elmire. He sees with his own eyes and hears with his own ears that Tartuffe is a 
hypocrite and it is only then that he believes.  But this still isn’t enough for his 
mother.  She says, “People are envious of the righteous” and, again, “They’ll have 
made up a hundred idle tales about him”, and yet again, “It’s human nature to think 
evil of people.”64  Madame Pernelle is seen defending her false belief right up to the 
time when the bailiffs come to remove all the family’s possessions.  She remains 
prepared to believe in Tartuffe against the collective witness of her entire family.  It 
takes the loss of the family’s entire wealth, their house, and the arrest of Orgon to 
shift her. 
 
The first and second behavioural correlates always go together because the 
first cannot continue to exist unless it is defended by the second.  In Fingarette’s 
terminology “spelling-out” p necessitates burying not-p and burying not-p involves 
a cover story which is, in effect, a means for keeping at bay the “truth”.  In the 
Dimmesdale example given above there is a further dimension.  He actually tells his 
parishioners the truth about himself but they choose not to acknowledge it: “He told 
his hearers that he was altogether vile, a viler companion of the vilest….They heard 
it all, and did but reverence him more.”65  Even after he specifically admits to his 
affair with Hester at his death scene his parishioners explain it away: “he had made 
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the manner of his death a parable.”66  They, like the Mai Lai respondents, 
presumably for their own reasons, prefer to believe Dimmesdale is a saint and do 
not wish to be contradicted. 
 
All the examples exhibit a refusal to accept evidence that is contrary to 
beliefs and, if that fails, a generation of “ingenious tactics” to rewrite the evidence.  
This is evidence for, albeit not conclusive for there could be other reasons, self-
deception. 
 
The third behavioural correlate requires an autobiographical account.  Haight 
observes that “if I try to report my own self-deceptions, I can only speak of the past; 
if I am trying now to suppress some unwelcome truth, I cannot say that this is what I 
am doing or I give the game away”.67  The sentence, “I am deceiving myself” is 
contradictory.  The sentence, “I was deceiving myself” is acceptable.  The first 
answer does, however, appear in literature.  The two Marquises in The Misanthrope 
have a hugely comical exchange discussing just this: 
CLITANDRE. You think then, Marquis, that you stand pretty 
well here? [i.e. in having the affection of 
Célimène] 
ACASTE. I have some grounds for thinking so. 
CLITANDRE. Believe me, you should rid yourself of such an 
illusion.  You are flattering yourself, my dear 
fellow – It is sheer self-deception. 
ACASTE. Oh! Of course I am flattering myself. 
CLITANDRE. But what reason have you for thinking you are so 
fortunate? 
ACASTE. I flatter myself. 
CLITANDRE. On what basis are your hopes founded? 
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ACASTE. Self-deception. 
CLITANDRE. Have you some certain proof? 
ACASTE. I deceive myself. 
CLITANDRE. Has Célimène given you some secret assurance? 
ACASTE. No, I am cruelly used! 
CLITANDRE. Do answer me please! 
ACASTE. I met with nothing but rebuffs. 
CLITANDRE. Oh!  Have done with your foolery and tell me!  
What reason has she given you to hope? 
ACASTE. I’m the unlucky one.  You are a happy man.  She 
detests me.  One of these days I shall have to go 
and hang myself.68 
 
Clearly the text is ironical since Acaste is not unaware that he has no chance with 
Célimène even as he says he is deceiving himself to think he does.  Since he uses 
the argument of evidence (as in the paragraph above), it indicates that he has given 
some serious thought to the subject.  And this suggests that this is a post-hoc 
account – once it was true but now it is not.  He is, in effect, playacting what 
happened in the past. 
 
Other, clearer cut, examples of post-hoc recognition abound.  Two examples 
should affirm this.  First, Haight herself reports her “main example will be 
autobiography”.69  Second, in The Scarlet Letter, Roger Chillingworth and Hester 
are reported to have married back in Europe but the reader might have wondered 
why, given their apparent disparity in age and interests.  Roger answers for himself 
that he deceived himself: “Misshapen from my birth hour, how could I delude 
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myself with the idea that intellectual gifts might veil physical deformity in a young 
girl’s fancy?”70   
 
The fourth correlate of behaviour is described as the point of recognition and 
is heavily based on Fingarette’s analysis of The Iceman Cometh.71  In his previous 
discussion of Arsinoé, he asked how it would be possible to identify self-deceptive 
behaviour in the absence of a “crucial” test.  The answer he essentially comes up 
with is that her real feelings must at some point slip out: “She might at some 
particular point in her attacks on Célimène drop the role of prude, at least for a 
moment and explicitly express her enterprise in duplicity.”72  Fingarette argues that 
what would be significant about such an admission would be the intense affect 
going with it.  He uses terms such as “moment of triumph or defeat”, “it would 
come out not as an exclamation having novelty for her but as one which expressed 
aloud what apparently had already been said to herself in silence”, “no signs of 
surprise or reaction to novelty at hearing herself acknowledge the envious project of 
hers” and “impromptu, even incoherent, groping”.73  This thesis agrees with 
Fingarette that it is these (typical) signs which are central to the idea of self-
deception.  The point of recognition carries a power the first three examples do not 
have.  This is because misuse of evidence and recall can be correlates to other terms 
in the deceptive continuum whereas the point of recognition comes with strong 
affect.  Roger Chillingworth, for example, is reported as having a point of 
                                                          
70  Op. Cit., Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, p. 63. 
71  Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 56 et seq. 
72  Ibid., p. 57. 
73  Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
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recognition, but it is not the words that count but what goes with them: “The 
unfortunate physician, while uttering these words lifted his hands with a look of 
horror…he had never before viewed himself as he did now.”74   
 
Fingarette draws attention to Hickey’s situation in The Iceman Cometh in an 
attempt to breathe a bit more life into the idea.  His prolonged exposition fully 
exploits the idea of emotional climax suggested by Chillingworth’s merely stated 
“horror”.  The climatic scene in the play presents Hickey relating to his drinking 
companions his self-justifying account of how he killed his wife.  He has been a 
travelling salesman for years; away from home for long stretches; an unreliable 
husband; a heavy drinker; a gambler; he has caused his faithful wife many years of 
misery; he has given her many promises to change his mode of life.  He knows what 
he is doing is wrong (p) but will not admit it (not-p).  He distorts the evidence to 
continue behaving as he does and does so successfully by keeping his wife separate 
from his drinking companions.  But it is an inherently unstable situation.  At some 
point p has to meet not-p.  The time when it does is called point of recognition.  The 
point of recognition necessitates a solution.  Either p or not-p must go.  Fingarette 
feels it is necessary to quote a long passage to make the point.  He omits “several 
interspersed stage directions and comments by his on-stage audience”.75  This thesis 
adopts the same technique but not exactly the same omissions. 
HICKEY: That last night I’d driven myself crazy trying to 
figure some way out for her.  I went in the bedroom.  I was going 
to tell her it was the end.  But I couldn’t do that to her.  She was 
                                                          
74  Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, p. 146.  The word “horror” is a motif word for recognition of 
existential angst.   
75  Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 59. 
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sound asleep.  I thought, God, if she’d only never wake up, she’d 
never know!  And then it came to me – the only possible way out, 
for her sake.  I remembered I’d given her a gun for protection 
while I was away and it was in the bureau drawer.  She’d never 
feel any pain, never wake up from her dream.  So I- 
 
[Hope and most of the others try not to hear; try to ward this off 
hearing by pounding their glasses and saying things like “Who the 
hell cares.”  Hickey actually “hasn’t appeared to hear” their noise 
and comments.  He continues:] 
 
HICKEY (simply). So I killed her.   
 
There is a moment of dead silence.  Even the detectives are caught 
in it and stand motionless. 
 
[a comment by another character about a sub-plot] 
 
HICKEY (obliviously). And then I saw I’d known that was 
the only possible way to give her any peace and free her from the 
misery of loving me.  I saw it meant peace for me, too, knowing 
she was at peace.  I felt as though a ton of guilt was lifted off my 
mind.  I remember I stood by the bed and suddenly I had to laugh.  
I couldn’t help it, and I knew Evelyn would forgive me.  I 
remember I heard myself speaking to her, as if it was something 
I’d always wanted to say: ‘Well, you know what you can do with 
your pipe dream now, you damned bitch!’  (he stops with a 
horrified start, as if shocked out of a nightmare, as if he couldn’t 
believe he had heard what he had just said.  He stammers.)  No!  I 
never -!76 
 
 
Up to the last sentence the audience could have thought Hickey was merely a classic 
hypocrite presenting his crime in a light that would reflect well on himself but, as 
Fingarette puts it, “Hickey’s surprise and shock at his having expressed himself in 
this way reveals sharply that he was in self-deception.”77  The full effect needs a 
performance.  It is true that Chillingworth “spells-out” for the reader his point of 
                                                          
76  Eugene O’Neill, The Iceman Cometh, London: Nick Hern Books, 1993, pp. 130-131.  
Quoted in Fingarette, Self-Deception, pp 59-60, and acted by Kevin Spacey at the Old Vic, 1998.  
Summarised omissions are indicated by [ ] brackets.  Stage directions are indicated by italics between 
speeches and by italics and ( ) brackets within a speech - as in the text. 
77  Ibid., p. 60. 
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recognition but he can only do so “second hand” through a narrator.  An actor can 
do so much more.  The performance adds in, effectively, the stage directions.  The 
“moment of dead silence”, and “he stops” are perhaps crucial to making the point 
that he is genuinely (re)discovering his self-deception for the first time.  The final 
stage direction reinforces, too, the idea that the consciousness is just a story and 
nothing more.  Hickey is placed in exactly the same position as the audience; as an 
outsider.  He “couldn’t believe he had heard what he had just said”.  “He” is just 
short-hand for Dawkins’s “survival machine” which “believed” before but, at the 
point of recognition, is no longer able to do so. 
 
The Narrative Structure: Covert Plotting 
 
The remaining idea to discuss is how the separation of p and not-p is achieved: how 
exactly the idea that life is not worth living (not-p) is buried.  This takes place inside 
the (human) machine so it is necessary to look at a third model of consciousness.  
This view, that “consciousness is an inner sense”, has been discussed and dismissed 
in the introduction but it is without doubt true that many others use it as a working 
model.   David Lodge suggests that the list includes “Locke, Bretano, Kant, Freud 
and William James”.78  He goes on to quote Antonio Damasio who argues that 
“whether we like the notion or not something like the sense of self does exist in the 
human mind as we go about knowing things”.79  Herbert Fingarette argues that this 
model is normally linked with “such terms as ‘know’, ‘be aware of’, and ‘be 
                                                          
78  Lodge, “Sense and Sensibility”, p. 4. 
79  Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, quoted in ibid., Lodge, p. 5. 
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conscious of’”.80  Blackmore also concurs that others hold this view.  She 
acknowledges too that “I have this overwhelming sense that I exist.”81  And, this 
“I”, although illusory, works with such mental concepts as “believe” and “know”.  
The novel, which is the source material for this thesis’s argument, is often based on 
these concepts.  Lisa Zunshine might be making exactly this particular point:  
The novel, in particular, is implicated with our mind-reading 
ability to such a degree that I do not think myself in danger of 
overstating anything when I say that in its currently familiar 
shape it exists because we are creatures of ToM [theories of 
mind].82 
 
In this spirit, then, the definition of self-deception given in the introduction 
has been given in cognitive terms.  Now, in addition to the emotional and 
behavioural correlates already discussed, the essential features of self-deception are 
also given in cognitive terms.  Sackeim makes the mentalist influence more explicit 
when he later modifies an original list by repeating the formulation but substituting 
the term “mental contents” for “beliefs”.83 The list given here is provided by 
Paulhus based on the earlier list provided by Sackeim and Gur: 
1. The individual holds two contradictory beliefs 
2. The two beliefs are held simultaneously. 
3. The individual is not aware of one of the beliefs 
4. The act that determines which belief is not subject to the awareness is a 
motivated act.84 
 
                                                          
80  Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 35. 
81  Susan Blackmore, Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005, p. 66. 
82  Liza Zunshine, Why We Read Fiction, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006, p. 10. 
83  Harold A Sackeim, “Self-Deception – A Synthesis”, in J. S. Lockard and D. L. Paulhus 
(eds), Self-Deception – An Adaptive Mechanism, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988, p. 162. 
84  Paulhus, “Introduction to section II”, p. 73. 
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The list is, of course, less a definition than a list of necessary correlates.  In this 
it differs from Wittgenstein’s family resemblance approach, for each item on the list 
is considered essential.  If any one is peeled away the possibility of self-deception 
goes with it.  The approach is a minefield but one which it is not necessary to enter 
too deeply.  For it does not work.  Haight, after an exhaustive study of all possible 
ways of using “know” and “belief”, decided it was not possible to avoid the paradox 
inherent in the list.  She does, however, in her analysis, introduce terms that can be 
adopted by the ESDeS model.  First, she says that if self-deception were to be 
possible it would have to involve “buried knowledge”.  She means by buried 
knowledge, “knowledge…not recalled when recollection is to be expected”.85  She 
concludes that “one man’s knowledge cannot be both buried and not buried”.86  
However, it is not necessary to agree with her.  Indeed, it may be that she does not 
agree with herself since she admits, in her post-hoc reflection on her own self-
deception, that “I believe that my ways of not admitting that p sometimes took the 
form of burial.”87  It has to be admitted that here she becomes a “normal” person in 
the sense that she is stating the obvious with a technical word she is unable to 
explain.  She admits “how this happened [the burial] goes of course beyond my 
experience”.88  This section intends to remedy this lack of knowledge by using the 
invention of the concept covert plot to provide an explanatory mechanism. 
 
                                                          
85  Haight, A Study of Self-Deception, p. 13. 
86  Ibid., p. 14. 
87  Ibid., p. 74. 
88  Ibid. 
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Haight argues that if deception is to work it must “demand two people”.89  
Self-deception therefore needs a split: a division into two within one narrative-
consciousness.  One part of the split will “know” and the other part will not.  She 
investigates a number of possibilities including multiple personalities,90 hypnosis91 
and a Freudian unconscious,92 but concludes that none of them serves the purpose.  
She repeats: “I have argued that self-deception is literally a paradox.  Therefore it 
cannot happen.  Deceptions need a split between the deceiver and the 
deceived…and the only split that we may (sometimes) find in ordinary men is one 
that will not allow an idiomatic reflexive use.”93 
 
Her approach can be included with what Fingarette calls the “cognitive-
perception” family.  He is not surprised that the attempt to explain self-deception in 
these terms leads to failure.  He proposes, instead, a fundamentally new “volition-
action family”.94  That is, he changes the mind metaphor to a behaviourist model 
which is, according to Haight, a “shift from a passive model for consciousness to 
that of a skill”.95  Fingarette himself is absolutely specific: “the model I suggest is 
that of a skill.”96  This area of philosophy is, again, another minefield suitable for 
only trained philosophers but, again, there is no need to go into it too far.  Haight 
shows that the approach, appealing as it is, reduces to her own and again concludes 
that it leaves self-deception unexplained.  She argues that “as long as self-deceivers 
                                                          
89  Ibid., p. 24. 
90 Ibid., pp. 24-36. 
91  Ibid., pp. 38-42. 
92  Ibid., pp. 42-51. 
93  Ibid., p. 73. 
94  Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 35. 
95  Haight, A Study of Self-Deception, p. 89 
96  Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 38. 
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are people”,97 “know” and “belief” terms cannot be eliminated.  Nevertheless 
Fingarette’s formulation is used by many commentators including Paulhus, Marc 
Harris, Sarbin and Bittner.  Paulhus draws attention to the fact that “the Fingarette 
book…provided…a clear definition to which subsequent theorists could anchor 
their own positions”.98  Harris adds: “I find the account of the mechanism of self-
deception offered by Herbert Fingarette illuminating with regard to the behaviour of 
certain Hawthornian self-deceivers.”99  Morris Eagle elaborates on what this might 
mean: “According to Fingarette, the self-deceiver engages in a project and 
purposely avoids spelling out some feature of his engagement in order to escape 
guilt, and responsibility, and in order to maintain a particular personal identity.”  He 
regards this stance as “a thoroughly moral one”.100  Fingarette’s point of view, so 
described, is specifically agreed with by Sarbin: “I agree with Fingarette that human 
conduct is influenced by the skill in spelling-out.”101   
 
Fingarette’s formulation introduces, then, the processes of spelling-out, not-
spelling-out and cover story which turn out to be useful, also, to the narrative-
consciousness model.  The formulation, it has already been noted, suggests an active 
model of mind in which “to become explicitly conscious of something is to be 
                                                          
97  Haight, A Study of Self-Deception, p. 92. 
98  Paulhus, “Introduction to section II”, p. 71. 
99  Harris, Hypocrisy and Self-Deception in Hawthorne’s Fiction, p. 3. 
100  Morris Eagle, “Psychoanalysis and Self-Deception”, in J. S. Lockard and D. L. Paulhus 
(eds), Self-Deception – An Adaptive Mechanism, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988, p. 79. 
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exercising a certain skill”102 called “spelling-out”,103 as in “he is so stupid you have 
to spell everything out for him”.  Fingarette goes on:  
exercise of this skill requires sizing up the situation in order to 
assess whether there is an adequate reason for spelling-out the 
engagement.  And the corollary of this is that in exercising the 
skill we are also assessing the situation to see whether there is 
an adequate reason not to spell-out the engagement.104   
 
Using this terminology a person in self-deception might be characterised as “a 
person of whom it is a patent characteristic that even when normally appropriate he 
persistently avoids spelling-out some feature of his engagement in the world”.105  
This means that the person persistently adopts a policy “never to make explicit” his 
action or, in other words, the person might be said “to hide [the action]”.106  
Fingarette then inverts what might be regarded as the normal way of looking at 
consciousness.  He argues that it is not, as might be expected, the normal procedure 
to spell-out an engagement in the world.  For the most part behaviour happens 
without awareness of the behaviour entering consciousness.  Indeed, being too 
aware of what is being done can often interfere with performance as in many motor 
skills such as driving a car or playing the violin.  Fingarette says, “generally 
speaking, the particular features of an individual’s engagement in the world need 
not be, and usually are not spelled-out by him”.107  Indeed, “we must come to take 
its absence for granted”.108  Fingarette is making an empirical argument here.  He 
observes that “absence” is normal but does not give a reason for it.  Once again the 
                                                          
102 Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 38 et seq. 
103  Ibid., p. 39. 
104  Ibid., p. 42. 
105  Ibid., p. 39. 
106  Ibid., p. 49. 
107  Ibid., p. 40. 
108  Ibid., p. 42. 
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use of a claim of “normal” is seen as insufficient.  The evolutionary argument 
provided by this thesis provides a better justification for his observation.  Avoidance 
is the default position because it is the first necessary attitude.  If existential futility 
had not been avoided the human race as presently constituted would not have been 
here.  Avoidance is, therefore, the normal behaviour.  So, if not-spelling-out is 
normal then it is spelling-out that needs explanation.  Fingarette would argue that p 
is available, even if hidden, but need only to be spelled-out if there is a demand.  If 
there is such a demand and yet a decision is made not-to-spell-out then it follows 
that this must also be for a reason.  It is asserted, here, that the two - a reason to 
spell-out and a reason not-to-spell-out - may, under specific circumstances, 
coincide.  If, for example, in the presence of awareness of existential futility, it was 
deemed necessary not-to-spell-this-out (for selfish gene reasons) then it would be 
necessary to spell-something-else-out to cover the gap.  It is here that a change of 
terminology can be introduced, for Fingarette argues that “the phrase “spell-out” 
suggests an activity which has a close relation and analogy to linguistic activity”.109  
So “spelling-out” and “telling stories” suggest each other.  Insofar as the not-
spelling-out is a story it is a covert story.  Insofar as spelling-out is a story it is the 
overt story.  The overt story protects the “hidden” by providing a reason for living: a 
project.  In effect, the process transforms a reason for not living into a reason for 
living.  Once again, despite different motivation and terminology, the same 
conclusion is reached.  Fingarette is concerned to explain normal-self-deception and 
invents the terms hidden and cover story.  This thesis is concerned to explain a prior 
                                                          
109  Fingarette, Self-Deception, p. 39. 
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function: to explain existential-self-deception and uses the term process of narration 
to explain the generation of an available covert plot and a foregrounded overt plot. 
 
One final point needs to be developed at this stage.  Haight, as has been 
noted, discounts the “literal” possibility of self-deception but still attempts to find a 
use for the term self-deception.  In so doing she confirms a further useful idea: 
collusion.  She says, “If self-deception works as I think, it is often a lie only to other 
people.”110  That is, A knows perfectly well that what he wants to persuade B is 
false.  B should call him a liar but is persuaded not to by uncertainty.  If the “lie” is 
so outrageous that B cannot believe that A would attempt it then B entertains the 
possibility that A must believe it (because he is mad – at least on this point).  Haight 
explains: “While we hesitate, he gains more time.”111  The real reason, Haight 
argues, for the “outrageous lie” is that “what he may dread above everything else is 
having to admit to us that p”.112  If the lie concerns awareness of existential futility 
this explanation makes perfect sense: not only does the self-deceiver not want to 
admit that p but he cannot admit to p – not unless “he” gives up his reasons for 
living.  It is also clear why B should entertain “uncertainty”.  In this special case (of 
existential futility) it is in B’s self-interest to do so.  Haight goes on to make this 
claim specific.  She says the reason why the term self-deception is used even though 
it cannot literally be true is just for this reason: “for its suggestion of paradox: its 
ambivalence matches what we feel about self-deceivers.”113  Haight is, in effect, 
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restating the thesis’s assertion that the presence of self-deception necessarily 
introduces unease and the purpose of the unease is to tell the other person, B, where 
“not to look”.  She adds that the uncertainty is necessarily shared between the self-
deceiver and the intended-deceived.   
 
The idea of collusion is developed by Rüdiger Bittner who very definitely 
moves the focus to the audience.  He approaches this idea though the consideration 
of the relationship between Olive and Verena in Henry James’s The Bostonians 
(1886).  Olive and Verena are intimate friends and have in common a devotion to 
the feminist cause.  Basil Ransom admires Verena and does not like the cause so 
tries to get Verena to leave both it and Olive.  There is a point at which the reader 
would not know Verena’s “real” mind so are in the same position as Olive when 
Verena asks for her help.  She seems to be in two minds:  she asks Olive to persuade 
her against Ransom but does not actually leave him.  Olive would argue, says 
Bittner, that “Verena’s request for help against Ransom is not sincere.  It is due to 
self-deception.  Verena does think, Olive concedes, that she wishes to be saved from 
Ransom.  But in thinking this she is deceived, Olive claims; deceived by herself.”114  
Bittner’s suggestion follows Haight’s line of argument.  He says Verena is only 
temporarily self-deceived for she is just trying to gain time to tell her friend of her 
new, real feelings.  It is Olive who is actually self-deceived.  She is avoiding the 
truth: “to avoid the unpleasant consequences of admitting it”,115 where “it” is 
Verena’s perceived treachery and the consequential loss of friendship.  Olive’s 
                                                          
114  Rüdiger Bittner, “Understanding a Self-Deceiver”, in B. P McLaughlin and A. Oksenberg 
Rorty (eds), Perspectives in Self-Deception, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p. 535. 
115  Ibid., p. 542. 
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attribution of self-deception to Verena allows her to think that Verena’s 
prevarication is less culpable than an outright lie.  Bittner relocates the site of the 
self-deception from an individual mind to the interpersonal space; space that is, in 
fact, available to all.  In the same way as chess does not work unless both players 
disregard the actuality of the pawn and accept the rules, pain reduction does not 
work unless Olive and Verena agree to the rules of self-deception.  Olive is 
“happier” thinking that it is Verena who is self-deceived and Verena is content that 
they have both gained time to work out the dilemma; a story that will accommodate 
the new situation.  Finally Bittner, like Haight, agrees that when a lie is 
“unbelievable” it will be, of necessity, temporary.  This analysis, of course, merely 
reiterates Triver’s “monogamous male” scenario so it is not surprising that collusion 
is central to the idea of covert plotting.  
 
It is now possible to return to the narrative-consciousness model and the 
structure of the “story” that represents consciousness.  The above analysis has 
identified the following: 
• There must be a split. 
• The story is in the (public) space between individuals. 
• There must be a not-spelling-out (hiding)(buried knowledge) and 
a spelling-out (cover story).  
• The story will be accompanied by uncertainty. 
• The story will be temporary. 
 
In the light of these, Sackeim’s four-point straw man list can be modified as follows 
and provides the essential framework of the process of narration within the ESDeN: 
1. The story created by consciousness holds two contradictory 
stories (p and not-p) 
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2. Both stories have to be available within the text 
3. One story is immediately available on first reading and will be 
called the overt plot and the other is not and will be called the 
covert plot.  
4. The storytelling is intentional.  
 
In addition the previous sections have indentified that: 
 
5. The story will be genre-marked.  Initially this will be by self-
deceptive unease.  A second reading will uncover other markers: 
a meaning marker and a hiding marker will indicate recognition 
of existential self-deception and the existence of a covert plot 
respectively and contribute, in addition, by their presence to the 
idea of collusion or intention.  There may also be an additional 
repetition genre-marker to recognise that the cover story will 
need to be repeated or replaced. 
 
6. There is a possibility that the immediately available (overt) story 
will follow a sequence of process of recognition, point of 
recognition, choice, process of narration and point of narration 
and if so this will serve as another genre-marker indicating a 
mirror covert plot. 
 
 
The next chapter will acknowledge that there seems to be, at first sight, an 
overlap between the ESDeN and the modernist novel - they seem to have several 
ideas in common and seem to originate at the same period of time.  However, the 
chapter shows that to identify the two would be a mistake but, despite drawing 
distinctions between them, makes it possible to see the two as more of a partnership 
than an opposition.  The chapter will conclude that the ESDeS has the prior idea: 
that covert plotting must exist before overt plotting but notes that overt plotting and 
its alternative presentations and interpretations serve the equally essential purpose of 
hiding the covert. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Provenance of the theory I: An Elaboration of the 
Existentially-Self-Deceptive-Narrative-Consciousness Theory 
 
This thesis claims that all consciousnesses, because they are surviving, must 
accommodate knowledge of existential futility.  This does not mean they are all 
telling an ESDeS.  However, as a matter of logic, there are only four1 positions 
available to people placed near to existential “horror”.  These are: 
• Simply to be unaware of not-p (to be unaware of existential futility) 
• To become aware of not-p and to commit physical suicide (assuming that 
two-way interaction between the narrative-consciousness and behaviour is 
possible). 
• To be aware of not-p but to (deliberately) bury it. 
• To be aware of not-p and to accept it. 
 
The three positions left, after excluding suicide, which needs no ongoing story, will 
be accommodated by three types of story: Story-1, Story-2 and Story-3, where 
Story-2 is an alternative name for an ESDeS.  A taxonomy that tries to differentiate 
one form of story from others is not a new idea so the creation of an alternative 
classification has to be justified.  This is especially true since the proposed new 
genre emerges at roughly the same time as the modernist novel and appears to have 
many things in common with it.  This is not surprising since within the novel genre, 
as David Trotter shows in his “The modernist novel” there are distinctions which 
deserve sub-genre status: “To write about the modernist novel, as opposed to the 
Victorian novel say, or the Edwardian novel, is to write…about the possibilities of 
                                                          
1  Just as other categories of theories of mind can be imagined other categories of story can be 
invented: e.g. madness or repression into a hypothetical unconscious.  
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the genre.”2  So, in a similar spirit, this thesis intends to compare the modernist 
novel with the ESDeN.  They both appear, at first sight, to be novels in the usually 
intended sense of the genre as they both might be seen to be concerned with “the 
representation of life in all its diversity”.3  However, whereas the modernist novel is 
concerned with asking fundamental questions about the genre (the novel) the 
ESDeN transcends the genre.  It is significantly and fundamentally different and the 
difference is so great that separate genre status is allocated to the ESDeN.  The 
modernist novel is properly called a sub-grouping of the novel because whatever its 
differences from the “Victorian novel” it still retains a common focus: “to represent 
reality”,4 whereas this is not necessary for the ESDeS nor is it its primary function.  
Its primary function is to make possible the story even if the story is not concerned 
with this focus.  It is this prior functioning and (theoretical) independence of content 
that is taken to justify calling the ESDeN a new genre. 
 
The first major similarity between the modernist novel and the ESDeN is 
concerned with the dates connected with the two types of text.  It has been well 
documented that the modernist novel has been fairly consistently identified as 
existing somewhere between the mid or late nineteenth century and the mid 
twentieth century although some commentators make more expanded or more 
restricted claims.  Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane and Pericles Lewis 
mark these extremes and their flexibility.  Bradbury and McFarlane use 1890-1930 
                                                          
2  David Trotter, “The Modernist Novel” in Michael Levenson (ed.), The Cambridge 
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in the title of their collection of essays on Modernism5 and, more recently, Lewis 
has asserted that “the history of modernist literature and art is the history of a 
century of crisis from the revolutions of 1848 to the Second World War”.6  The 
ESDeS, of course, has not, before this thesis, been identified as a distinct category.  
However, it has been shown, by this thesis, to necessarily involve a split into overt 
and covert plotting and to be intimately connected with self-deception and both of 
these attributes have been noticed during the same, flexible, period.  CedricWatts 
has identified types of works which map on to the idea of split: some works 
“seemed to be divided against themselves and to resemble, for example, big 
paradoxes or even self-contradictions”.7  He dates their existence as “mainly of the 
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries”.8  Self-deception too becomes more 
prominent at this time. Harris says, of The Scarlet Letter, “we are in a world 
pervaded by hypocrisy and self deception” and Palmer says self-deception “might 
almost be considered the preoccupation of modern literature”.9  Although the 
importance of self-deception and modernist techniques to novels became apparent 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century they had probably contributed to 
earlier works.  Self-deception is evident in Tartuffe, for instance, and earlier 
examples of “modernist” literature can always be identified. Larry Giggs spells this 
                                                          
5 Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane (eds), Modernism: A Guide to European 
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6  Lewis, The Cambridge Introduction to Modernism, p. 33. 
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Press, 1984, p.19. 
8  Ibid., p. 15. 
9  Anthony Palmer, “Characterising Self-deception”, Mind, New Series, Vol. 88, No. 349 (Jan 
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out: “Molière is a modernist.”10  He claims Molière’s comedy “anticipates many of 
the key preoccupations and insights of recent theoretical work”.11  What is 
significant is that both the modernist novel and the ESDeN eventually became 
explicitly noticed.  
 
Wallace Martin points out that “a comprehensive theory of the [novel] genre 
should provide some explanation of why it appeared”.12  It is not, therefore, 
unreasonable to ask, also, why the ESDeS appeared.  The reasons will be found in 
the same set of “multiple causes”.13  Commentators have been aware of these causes 
for the last fifty years.  Of course they only relate them to the novel but their 
arguments apply equally to the ESDeN.  One of the reasons why Riggs thought 
Molière could be a modernist was because “he seems to endorse the replacement of 
the authoritarian religious discourse with secular persuasion”.14  Ian Watt, in 
discussing the rise of the novel, argues that “both the philosophical and the literary 
innovations must be seen as parallel manifestations of a larger change - that vast 
transformation of Western civilisation since the Renaissance which has replaced the 
unified world picture of the Middle Ages”.15  Wallace Martin argues that “for those 
who conceive the novel as the depiction of social reality, its appearance marks the 
emergence of the middle class as the shaping force of history, ending the period 
when literature portrayed all characters but the aristocracy as crude, comic or 
                                                          
10  Larry Riggs, Molière and Modernity: Absent Mothers and Masculine Births, Charlottesville: 
Rockwood Press, 2005, p. 2. 
11  Ibid., p. ii. 
12  Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative, p. 23. 
13  Lewis, The Cambridge Introduction to Modernism, p. 33. 
14  Riggs, Molière and Modernity, p. 2. 
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unworthy of serious treatment”.16  Eagleton describes the change to the modernist 
novel in a similar way: “Modernism reflected the crack-up of a whole civilisation.  
All the beliefs which had served nineteenth century middle-class society so 
splendidly - liberalism, democracy, individualism, scientific enquiry, historical 
progress, the sovereignty of reason - were now in crisis.”17  Pericles Lewis concurs: 
The nineteenth century experienced simultaneous crises that 
contributed in a variety of ways to the development of 
modernism in the early twentieth century.  These 
transformations can be grouped into three major categories: the 
literary and artistic (crisis of representation); the socio-political 
(crisis of liberalism); and the philosophical and scientific (crisis 
of reason).18  
 
 
There is one other unambiguous identity.  Neither the modernist novel nor 
the ESDeN would include all narratives written during the specified period within 
their category.  Commentators discussing the modernist novel include certain 
writers in its canon and, therefore by implication, exclude others.  A list provided 
by Bradbury and McFarlane, for example, includes “James, Mann, Conrad, Proust, 
Svevo, Joyce … [and] … Gide”.19  Rachel Potter, for another example, in 
Modernism and Democracy, demonstrates that the understanding of modernist 
culture has shifted with the inclusion of previously marginalised writers: “Critical 
accounts which have traced the impact of…modernist writing have concentrated on 
the works of Hulme, Pound…and Eliot” but have not included others.  She asserts 
that “writers such as Gertrude Stein, Djuna Barnes…and Mina Loy have not 
                                                          
16  Martin, Recent Theories of Narrative, p. 19. 
17  Terry Eagleton, After Theory, London: Penguin, 2004, p. 64. 
18  Lewis, The Cambridge Introduction to Modernism, p. 3.  Leigh Wilson, Modernism, 
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figured in these accounts”.20  Suzanne Raitt provides another recent example by 
foregrounding May Sinclair as a “modern Victorian”.21  The ESDeS in comparison 
is more stable.  Watts makes the point that the ESDeN is just as non-inclusive as 
the modernist novel but gives a less ambiguous mechanism for identifying it: 
“every narrative has an overt plot; but [only] some narratives contain, in addition to 
the overt plot, at least one covert plot”.22  A novel will be accepted as an ESDeS 
only if it has an intentional, prior, covert plot. 
 
After these similarities and the crucial difference, other differences start to 
emerge but they all reduce essentially to the notion already identified: that ESDeS is 
prior to the possibility of a modernist novel.  This is discovered in a number of ways 
and the first is by looking at the disagreement over which novels to include in each 
category.  ESDeNs include Conrad, for example, but exclude both James and Gide.  
The reason for this differentiation can be approached through a look at the history of 
the novel and will conclude that ESDeS has one prime requirement in its need for a 
covert plot mechanism which mimics the hiding of existential futility in a narrative-
consciousness.  Heart of Darkness does contain a covert plot whereas Strait is the 
Gait (1909) and “The Figure in the Carpet” (1896) do not.  In addition, although this 
notion of prior has been borrowed from previous usages it has been given a new 
sense.  Nevertheless this notion of prior is given substance by showing two 
examples from its history: it is to be found during a study of the history of criticism 
                                                          
20  Rachel Potter, Modernism and Democracy: Literary Culture, 1900-1930, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
21  Suzanne Raitt, May Sinclair: A Modern Victorian, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000.   
22  Watts, The Deceptive Text, p.1. 
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and through more particular debates such as whether or not plotting is the 
fundamental concern of the fictional narrative process.  Penultimately, a return will 
be made to the direct comparison between the modernist novel and the ESDeN by 
looking at a selection of details which enable finer differentiations to be made.  
Finally, having established that the notion of covert plotting is central to the new 
genre, ESDeN, a way of increasing the probability of identifying one prior to its 
reading is discussed. 
 
It is an indisputable fact that critics have observed a change from one type of 
narrative to another.  Several taxonomies have been suggested to describe the 
change.  An example, which maps on to the Story continuum, is one in which 
narratives are described in terms of “the nature of the worlds and characters they 
depicted”.23  The axis extends from myth where the “hero is superior in kind” to 
mere mortals to irony where the hero is “inferior to ourselves in power or 
intelligence”.  An alternative naming can be provided for this scheme in which the 
epic is replaced by the romantic novel which in turn is replaced by the realist novel.  
The two schemes can be regarded as identical if the realist novel is identified as one 
which has to have a hero who is “superior neither to others nor to their 
environment”:24 that is to “ourselves”.  The modernist novel is more difficult to 
classify on this axis but it can also be said to lie in this area if Pericles Lewis has 
made a correct observation of it.  Modernist literature, he asserts, “continued to 
represent reality, sometimes in distorted forms or in nightmarish parody, sometimes 
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in comic detail or with multiple layers of symbolic intention, but usually with some 
implicit ideal of mimesis underlying all the literary experiments”.25  ESDeS, 
however, does not fit easily into such taxonomies.  The reason for this is, once 
again, that it has at its heart the division into two types of plotting which necessarily 
associates the process and the point of recognition and the subsequent hiding 
associated with the process and point of narration with the universal, and the 
content of the distracting overt plotting with the individual.  The covert plotting, 
therefore, must exist for everyone.  Palmer reports Henry James’s opinion of the 
characters in Hawthorne’s work: “they should not be regarded as characters at all 
but ‘as representatives…of a single state of mind’, so that ‘the interest of the story 
lies, not in them, but in the situation, which is insistently kept before us’.”26  Harris 
reinforces this view: “aside from the outsiders like the Indians and the sailors, no 
one is completely clear of hypocrisy and self-deception.”27  The overt plot, in 
contrast, concerns itself with an individual and it can use any mode.  Its theme, 
therefore, can be anything - in The Scarlet Letter it just happens to be adultery - and 
with any mode, mythical, romantic or realist. 
 
So far the similarities and differences between the modernist novel and the 
ESDeN have been essentially empirical but it needs to be asked why the 
replacement movements take the form that they do.  In each case the modernist 
theorist gives the answer in one form and the ESDeS theorist in another.  The 
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27  Ibid., p. 48. 
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development of the modernist’s innovative ideas can be described as the writer’s 
“attempt to respond to [the] crisis of representation”.28  Lewis argues this took two 
forms: “a crisis in both the content and the form of artistic representation.”29  As far 
as form was concerned, modernist writers required “the creation of new conventions 
of representation, more appropriate than the old ones to the modern age”.30  This 
means, in effect, the new conventions had to be experimental: “modernists wanted 
to create art which intersected with the world in new, strange and disturbing 
ways.”31  As far as content was concerned the modernists came to think that: 
For the romantics, the world was full of hidden meaning which 
the artist had to discover.  The modernist generally saw the 
world as devoid of inherent significance.  For them the task of 
the artist was not to discover a pre-existent meaning, but to 
create a new meaning out of the chaos and anarchy of actual 
modern life.32 
 
It is here the difference lies.  The modernist makes the existential dilemma a theme 
whereas the ESDeS theorist makes it a prior assumption.  Before resources can be 
allocated to the awareness of existential futility it must be hidden: the theme can 
only be written about once its importance is negated.  The ESDeS theorist therefore 
argues that the novel will now be divided as of necessity.  This means that there 
now has to exist not only an overt plot but also a covert plot.  The overt reading 
may well adopt the experimental techniques characteristic of modernist literature 
but it is not essential to ESDeS.  The experimental techniques, however, will serve 
a crucial purpose for ESDeS.  A particular aspect, for example, is that “The 
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modernists hoped to shock the middle classes out of their complacency”33 by 
paying attention to “taboo subject matters, such as masturbation, sodomy, and other 
sexual acts”.34  The effect, however, is two-fold.  If a work has the desired 
“modernist” effect then it will also have the effect of ensuring that the reader does 
not notice the underlying, invariant, existence of the covert plot.  Although it is the 
experimentation which is of importance to the modernist writer, from the 
perspective of ESDeS it is only a reflection of the very traditional evolutionary 
motivation.  Covert plotting is essential, any particular experimental technique is 
optional: as a technique within the overt plot it merely serves the function of 
ESDeS.  It could of course be seen as an ironic function.  It tells of existential angst 
and discusses authenticity when it is, in fact, disguising the very act it appears to 
make clear.  Modernist novels may, to paraphrase Frank Kermode, proclaim a truth 
… and at the same time, conceal [the] truth.35 
 
The conclusion that covert plotting is a prior can be approached from a 
different direction.  Instead of comparing the modernist novel with the ESDeS 
directly it is possible to examine terms used by other literary theorists to see if they 
mean the same thing within narrative-consciousness theory.  New Criticism was a 
dominant trend in English and American literary criticism in the mid twentieth 
century, from the 1920s to the early 1960s.  Its adherents advocated close reading 
of poems and rejected extra-textual sources including and especially biography.  
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The same ideas obtained substance, for different reasons, after Derrida’s famous 
claim that “there is nothing outside the text”.36  Derrida is drawing attention to the 
fact that the purpose of critical reading and interpretation is not to reproduce what 
the writer thought and expressed in the text.  Peter Barry argues that Derrida wants 
to suggest that “critical reading must produce the text since there is nothing behind 
it for us to reconstruct.”37  If this is so, the functional effect is the same as the New 
Critics.  The narrative-consciousness theory avoids metaphysics by going a little 
further than even this.  It asserts that there is not even a self beyond the text to 
produce the language that may or may not describe a reality beyond the words.  To 
make this point clearly actually requires a step back in theoretical terms to 
structuralism.  Wallace Martin describes this difference as a change of focus.  It is: 
not “why is this story unique?” but “how and why is it so similar 
to others?”  The question becomes not “what did this 
(identifiable) author mean?” but “what function does this 
(anonymous) collective myth serve when it is repeated on 
certain occasions?”38   
 
 
Barry describes this as what Structuralists, amongst other things, try to do: they try 
to relate a text to some larger invariant “such as a projected model of an underlying 
universal narrative structure.39  However, what structuralism means by underlying 
structure is not the same as ESDeS.  What structuralism has in mind is some 
invariant in the form of a fixed story structure such as boy+girl fall in love despite 
their families hating each other giving rise to two different overt plots such as 
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Romeo and Juliet and West Side Story.  The first part of the division could be called 
underlying but it is not covert.  A covert plot is a “purposeful sequences of 
events”40 exactly like any other plot except that it is “hidden, so that it may elude 
readers…at a first reading”.41  The second part of the division is available at a first 
reading and is definitely overt.  It is obvious that the former is prior to the latter.  It 
is also obvious that the former is much more stable in form than the latter.  In this 
sense, from the structuralist perspective, there can only be a small number of 
invariants.  Christopher Booker, for example, suggests that all stories can be boiled 
down to (only) seven archetypal themes.42  In contrast, there are an almost infinite 
number of overt plots.  ESDeS’s invariant, however, is more extreme than this: its 
invariant is singular - the covert plot; the hiding of existential angst.  This hiding 
must be prior to even the structuralist prior.  The written narrative exists only 
because a narrative-consciousness is writing it and it is either writing it to avoid 
awareness of existential angst or, at least, using the same techniques that it uses to 
maintain its idea of self.  In this form the invariant is psychologically essential: 
singular and universal among those who have experienced “The Horror!”  The 
overt plotting is clearly pluralist and a matter of individual choice. 
 
A final way of looking at the novel in relation to this notion of prior is to 
revisit the debate between advocates of the primacy of plotting and the advocates of 
the primacy of character.  The thesis comes down on the side of the advocates of 
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plot being prior to character.  The idea that plot is prior to character is not new.  
Aristotle says in his Poetics: “We maintain, therefore that the first essential…is 
Plot; and that characters come second.”43  Vladimir Propp is more specific: “What 
counts is their [the characters] role as vehicles of the action.”44  Peter Brooks agrees 
with this general assertion: “And yet, one must in good logic argue that plot is 
somehow prior to those elements most discussed by most critics.”45  Brooks comes, 
after a long discussion of possible interpretations of what is meant by plot, to a 
working definition that takes plot to mean “the outline or armature of the story that 
supports and organises the rest”.46  Clearly all these authorities are talking about 
plot as an opposition to character and as such are discussing whether or not this is 
true of the overt plot.  The idea works equally well, however, if it is used to refer to 
the division between the covert plot and the overt plot.  In an ESDeS, covert plotting 
is the basis that “supports and organises the rest”.  It is in this sense that it is prior to 
overt plotting; in a necessary way, not as a matter of literary choice.  Brooks then 
has three further things to say about plot(s) which continue to make sense in the 
context of ESDeS.  He argues that it is “a form of thinking, a way of reasoning 
about a situation”,47 that “they are intentional structures”,48 and that they “explain 
and understand where no other form of explanation will work”.49  That is, a 
narrative-consciousness writes the story of self and this necessarily involves a 
covert plot.  The overt plot is essential too - to hide the covert plot - but the thematic 
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content or interpretation of the thematic content is secondary to the covert plotting.  
James, for a final example, famously discusses character: “what is character but the 
determination of incident?  What is incident but the illustration of character?”50  
This is interesting but, whether or not he is seen as correct, it is not the concern of 
this thesis.  This thesis thinks he is simply describing the content of the overt.  In so 
doing he further differentiates the concept of the novel from the ESDeS.  For 
ESDeS the contrast is not between character and plot but between one type of plot 
and another.  Hiding is the precondition, whether James knew of it or not, of his 
project.  There can be no point and no interest in a project until existential futility 
has been hidden.  
 
The two essential points of this chapter are an ESDeS requires a particular 
invariant and this is the covert plot and it sees all overt plots as mere distracters.  
These points can be pressed home by returning to the field shared by the modernist 
novel and the ESDeN and looking at fine details. This thesis has chosen four: 
individualism, repetition, split and interpretation.  Once again the terms are common 
to both kinds of novel but the ESDeN will emerge after each discussion with a 
significantly different perspective. 
 
Ian Watt, as has been seen, identifies the rise of the novel, and by 
implication the rise of Story-2, with the more general transformation of Western 
society.  He describes the result of the change: it “presents us, with a developing but 
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unplanned aggregate of particular individuals having particular experiences at 
particular times and in particular places”.51  He goes on to state that the changes he 
describes might be actually “characterised by that vast complex of interdependent 
factors denoted by the term ‘individualism’.”52  Pericles Lewis makes a similar 
connection between the individual and the developing political environment: 
Liberalism could be grounded philosophically either in 
Immanuel Kant’s notion of autonomy – here the autonomy of 
self-governance of the rational individual – or in the utilitarian 
ideal, proposed by Jeremy Bentham and later elaborated by John 
Stuart Mill, of the greatest good for the greatest number. In 
either case, it challenged established authorities, such as 
monarchy and aristocracy and favoured the deliberative 
decision-making of those judged capable of self-government.53 
 
This thesis would agree with this general view provided “individual” or “those 
judged capable” has no connotation of a “we” but is shorthand for individual-
storytelling-machine; the narrative-consciousness.  Modernist literature also retains 
the notion of trying to represent the real world but acknowledges that each 
representation will depend upon the individual perceptual framework.  Ian Watt 
describes the two necessary conditions for this: “society must value every 
individual…and there must be enough variety of belief and action among ordinary 
people for a detailed account of them to be of interest to other ordinary people”.54  
He then acknowledges that “it is probable that neither of these conditions…obtained 
very widely until fairly recently [the middle of the nineteenth century]”.55   
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Girard in his Deceit, Desire and the Novel provides an account which also 
combines the theory of the novel with the theory of the individual.  He asserts that 
romances replaced the use of transcendent models in the form of gods with heroes 
who serve as role models: 
Men who cannot look freedom in the face are exposed to 
anguish.  They look for a banner on which they can fix their 
eyes.  There is no longer God, king, or lord to link them to the 
universal.  To escape the feeling of particularity they imitate 
another’s desires; they choose substitute gods because they are 
not able to give up infinity.56 
 
However, whilst heroes and gods have a lot in common they have one significant 
difference: the former have to be chosen.  A romance will make this pattern 
obvious: it will end with satisfaction with the chosen hero and a happy ending.  The 
novel, and the individual choice, moves the plotting further into realism.  It 
recognises that the adoption of a role model need not lead to satisfaction: it may 
lead to what John Lye, in his website posted teaching notes, calls “ambiguous 
endings”.57  This means that, in the move towards realism, it is recognised that the 
original role model will need to be replaced by another.  The replacement, however, 
need not be so concrete.  It could be that the individual merely needs a different 
telling of the same story, a new interpretation of the story or a different story 
altogether.  This pair of ideas is also central to ESDeS.  The new reality needs to be 
an individual (machine) that needs to constantly replace its story. 
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This formulation of the novel, then, has at its centre the notion of 
repetition.  This notion has also been formally adopted by theorists of modernism.  
It has been argued that the “specificity [of modernism] lies in the recognition that 
the conventions of art needed constant renewal, a sort of permanent revolution, to 
borrow a phrase from the political world”.58  Leigh Wilson goes further when she 
claims that: “The sense that the novel needed to be renewed and transformed is the 
unifying element in modernist fiction.”59  This means, of course, that the “new” is 
what makes the literature modern; that experimentation is synonymous with the 
modernist novel.  A writer has a choice.  If they want to be modern then they have 
to be new in some way but, obviously, if they do not want to be modern they can 
continue to write within pre-existent conventions.  ESDeS is different from both of 
these positions.  It needs repetition but not in the sense of “constant renewal”.  It 
needs repetition as an evolutionary essential.  Every time existential awareness 
becomes foregrounded – at the point of recognition - a new cover story (or project) 
is needed.  This new story need not be “transformation”.  It can be either a 
reformation of an old story or a genuine new story.  In either case repetition is 
essential.  Charlie Marlow’s telling of the story of Kurtz to his listeners on the 
Nellie is adopting the reformulation form of repetition (see chapter 4).  When he 
tells the story of Powell in Chance he may be said to be more properly creating a 
genuinely new story (see chapter 5).  Certainly Lodge in Thinks is definitely telling 
a genuinely new story (see chapter 6). 
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In telling an ESDeS there needs, necessarily, to be a separation of the 
paradoxical idea, not-p from its p.  This could be described as a division into two, a 
binary opposition or a janus-face but none of these are what is meant by an ESDeS 
split.  Jekyll and Hyde may represent the classic division between good and evil.  
This is not what is meant by the ESDeS split.  Poststructuralism also adopts the term 
division, not so much as a split but as a technique: the “tendency to reverse the 
polarity of common binary oppositions”60 in order to uncover or generate new 
possible interpretations.  This has become a classic research tool.  Watts, for 
example, lists several oppositions including “Awareness is better than 
unawareness”61 to guide his reading of Heart of Darkness.  Certainly the privileging 
of no meaning over meaning leads to ESDeS but nevertheless this is not what 
ESDeS means by split.  It has also become generally desirable for a new critical 
approach to adopt a binary opposition approach in its attempt to seek a new 
interpretation.  Bernard Paris provides a specific illustration of this approach with an 
interesting slant on the character-plot dichotomy.  He claims that “the usual practice 
has been to see Marlow [in Heart of Darkness] as a literary device…[whereas]…I 
believe that Marlow is Conrad’s finest character creation and one of the most 
remarkable psychological portraits in literature”.62  Further this oppositional 
approach has entered the general consciousness.  Whatever actual authors intend by 
their work there is a predilection on behalf of the reader to elicit a binary opposition.  
The bibliographic entry for Tim Armstrong’s Modernism: A Cultural History 
                                                          
60  Barry, Beginning Theory, p. 74. 
61  Cedric Watts, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness: A Critical and Contextual Discussion, Milan: 
Mursi Internationsl, 1977, p. 4. 
62  Bernard J. Paris, Conrad’s Charlie Marlow: A New Approach to “Heart of Darkness” and 
Lord Jim, New York: Palgrave, 2005, p. viii. 
 82
provides a good example.  It claims the book takes the conventionally held view, 
expressed by Lewis above, that modernism “challenged established authorities” and 
then reverses it by claiming it “portrays modernism less as a movement in revolt 
from the modern world as attempting to engage with the world”.63  However, 
neither the reality nor the implied reality is what is meant by the ESDeS use of split 
either.  A final very pertinent example should make this difference even clearer.  
The end of the nineteenth century saw the “discovery of Nietzsche”64 and Franz 
Kuna claims:   
It is the modern novel which has embodied most eagerly 
Nietzsche’s formula of the ‘Janus face’ of modern man, who is 
doomed to exist tragically.  The attempt to absorb and distil such 
a view of human existence has tended to make the modern novel 
itself Janus-faced and paradoxical, and to make many modern 
writers employ tragic or tragic-comic myths as the underlying 
pattern of plots in their work.65    
 
He describes what the image means to him in respect of Heart of Darkness which he 
sees, in Nietzschean terms, as the exploration of a territory “beyond good and 
evil”.66  Kuna spells out what the metaphor is supposed to mean: “On the one side 
[of the face] is Kurtz… the idealist….On the other side the members of the 
Eldorado Exploring Company [representing Europe], sordid profiteers and reckless 
exploiters.”67  The Janus face consists of Dionysius and Apollo.  The first side is 
“the primordial” one which represents a man “aware of the illusionary nature of his 
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existence”.68  The second side manifests itself as “rapt vision and delightful 
illusion”.69  Kuna then represents Marlow as the “mediator between the two”.70  
The description of the split comes very close to representing the view of ESDeS.  It 
fails because it is in essence describing a society view rather that an individual view: 
as an optional and mutually exclusive choice.  When he describes Marlow as a 
mediator he means within a realist framework.  Marlow is seen as really trying to 
choose between two ways of life, neither of which is grounded in an absolute 
morality.  In principle Nietzsche would like to dispose of Apollo and leave 
Dionysius in charge.  The overt plot cannot decide.  It leaves Dionysius behind in 
the Jungle and it restores Apollo to reassert order in Europe.  If Marlow is a 
mediator it is not clear, on this analysis, what his mediation achieves other than a 
view that Europeans should stay at home.  Again, this is not what is meant by 
ESDeS’s division into two.  Dionysius may represent existential angst but the 
illusion contained within Apollo is not ESD.  Both these alternatives exist within the 
telling.  It is not so much a split as an interpretation; just another way of digging 
out meaning when there appears to be none.  The reading recognises existential 
angst and illusion but cannot make the choice; it does not conceive of a hiding 
mechanism.  This type of reading is revisited in more detail in the analysis of Strait 
is the Gate in the next chapter. 
 
The final “detail” to be looked at is perhaps the most crucial for ESDeS 
theory after the notion of hiding or covert plotting.  It revolves around the concept 
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of interpretation.  The idea has insinuated itself into all the discussion so far listed 
in this chapter.  Pericles Lewis foregrounds it for modernism: “One of the 
distinctive characteristics of the late nineteenth-century crisis of reason was the 
development of a new attitude towards interpretation...in which the apparent, or 
manifest, meaning of an idea or a text is thought to need decoding in order to 
discover another hidden, or latent, meaning.”71  Frank Kermode also relies heavily 
on this idea which informs the discussion of the “First Story” in the next chapter.72  
Certainly it is a fact that the concept of modernism leads to a never-ending debate 
which has “continually expanded in scope”73 and “still dominates the catalogues of 
academic publishers”.74  Morag Shiach essentially explains why this is so when she 
notes that “no one technique or style defines a novel as modernist”.75  This lack of 
certainty about the meaning of the concept must inevitably lead to the open-
endedness which is one of its defining characteristics.  Wilson emphasises the same 
point: “not only what modernism is, but when has been a matter of persistent debate 
for literary critics.”76  Further, not only is the debate between critics it is also within 
a critic.  Malcolm Bradbury seems to be unable to decide whether the change to 
modernism was gradual or sudden.  At times he champions the former: “it is 
possible to discern its [modernism’s] origins long before we see its fruition”77 and 
sometimes the latter: “we have…increasingly come to believe that this new art 
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75  Morag Shiach, The Cambridge Companion to the Modernist Novel, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007. 
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comes from, or is, an upheaval of the third and cataclysmic order.”78  What is 
undecided and open-ended then invites more debate.  More recent works have 
continued to explore the subject and have looked at almost every aspect of life in an 
attempt to incorporate them under the umbrella of modernism.  Tim Armstrong 
notes that: “Recent surveys of modernism by Levinson, Nicholls and others have 
continued to be preoccupied with modernism’s own fascination with literary 
genealogy.”79  Morag Shiach looks at Modernism, Labour and Selfhood in British 
Literature and Culture, 1890-1930.  Rachel Potter looks at the relationship between 
modernism and politics.80  She argues that originally modernists were hostile to 
modern democracies despite advocating the individual but the relationship between 
writing and politics has shifted.  Paul Wake, despite the innumerable available 
readings of Conrad, still feels able to add “there is an emerging consensus that the 
‘centre’ of the novel [Chance] is…gender”.81  The same continual re-interpretation 
of novels also applies to novelists.  Henry James, who is considered by Bradbury to 
be one of the first modernist writers, still induces an immense volume of criticism 
from each “successive wave of theoretical and critical practice – New Criticism, 
deconstruction, feminism, Marxism, New Historicism”.82 
 
Interpretation then is seen as crucial for modernist criticism.  However, this 
is not what ESDeS means by interpretation.  This thesis asserts that each new 
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interpretation, uncovered by a new reader, is related to the overt plotting and that it 
shows no obvious interest at all in covert plotting.  The new interpreters are doing 
what Shoshana Felman argues critics often do: “the critical interpretation, in other 
words, not only elucidates the text but also reproduces it dramatically, unwittingly 
participates in it.”83  Criticism, in other words, identifies with the modernist text in 
the need for the new: that is, it cooperates with the purpose of the text.  It also, 
however, cooperates, albeit inadvertently, with the ESDeS text.  The net result of 
all the work filling the publishers’ lists is that it can be (re)asserted with confidence 
that, if it is in the nature of covert plotting to stay hidden, the modernist agenda has 
colluded with this underlying and more fundamental purpose too.  The reader is so 
busy interpreting the overt that they have no time for the covert. 
 
It only now remains to develop a means of locating an ESDeN.  Locating a 
modernist novel seems fraught with difficulty and likely to lead to disagreements.  
In contrast, an ESDeN, when found, will not lead to disagreement: it is a relatively 
easy empirical task to ascertain whether or not it contains a covert plot.  As it 
happens, finding an ESDeN in the first place is also relatively easy. 
 
The strong version of the narrative-consciousness-view of mind argues that 
there is no separation between an internal being or teller of the story and the story 
itself: the story is consciousness.  Narrative-consciousness theory regards the 
consciousness as a story-telling machine.  This remains true if the story is in novel 
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form.  Heart of Darkness, in this strong version of the theory, is Conrad and the 
characters in the story, Marlow, Kurtz and the Intended, are aspects of the 
narrative-consciousness called “Conrad”.  A weaker version would argue that the 
story presented in novel form offers an example or image of the story creation 
technique in use by a particular narrative-consciousness: that, since the story that is 
consciousness will necessarily contain a means of disguising existential futility it is 
possible that the novel will use the same techniques: not essential but possible.  The 
possibility in itself will result in some ESDeNs but this thesis goes further and 
asserts that the possibility is raised to a probability if the authors are, before 
embarking on the overt project of writing a novel, able to satisfy some conditions.  
ESDeS authors will have reached a stage of awareness that existential futility is a 
self-evident fact and do not like it.  They will have come to ask themselves, “What 
is the use of being a little boy if you are going to grow up to be a man.”84  They 
will be representatives of the middle term in a continuum which spans absolute 
certainty of meaning to absolute absence of meaning.  They will be writers who are 
generally regarded as autobiographical in the sense that they use their own “real 
life” experiences and emotions directly in their fictional texts.  They will be writers 
who are in the midst of their own self-deceptive crises.  Knowledge of all of these 
conditions is extra to the actual text.  It is not necessary.  It just speeds up a search.  
In short: if the narrative-consciousness is an ESDeS then it seems likely that the 
written story will be an ESDeN. 
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In a way, the adoption of this policy goes against one of the touchstones of 
late twentieth-century theory by reinventing the author.  This is not totally original.  
It merely returns to the view espoused by Empson in “Using Biography” in which 
he claims anybody who ignores the author shows “a great failure to grasp the whole 
situation”.85  It may be true that the intention of the writer cannot be inferred from 
the text any more than it can necessarily be inferred from any other of their 
behaviours but this is no reason not to use author input given directly.  In the 
following chapter 4 on Heart of Darkness, for instance, Conrad provides a very 
clear hint that the key to understanding the work lies in the codicil and this leads to 
a positive critical interpretation of the work as a whole.  However, the thesis does 
not need to go even so far at this stage.  It will only retreat from the concept of “no 
author - only text” on a temporary basis: just long enough to observe that it is a 
reasonable assertion that Gide, James and Conrad, as the exemplars adopted by this 
thesis, have all seen the “Horror!” and are all autobiographical authors as described 
above briefly and in more detail below.86  It is also a reasonable assumption that 
they were all acting-out self-deceptions at the times they wrote the works included 
in this thesis and that they wrote their works as a means of coming to terms with the 
paradoxical dilemmas in which they found themselves.  In Conrad’s case, as the 
thesis’s primary exemplar, there are further suggestive aspects in his interest in 
existential questions and his liking for using a mixture of genres. 
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Gide’s Strait is the Gate has many autobiographical references and was 
written by an author who was probably chronically self-deceptive.  Anthony Palmer 
says: “Self-deception is a persistent theme in the work of André Gide … [and Strait 
is the Gate] … is a striking illustration.”87  It is known, for example, that the overt 
plot of the novella is virtually identical to Gide’s own young life.  The fictional 
story tells of the unrequited relationship between two young people, Jerome and 
Alissa.  It is “the unassuaged memory of Gide’s unsuccessful wooing of his cousin 
between 1888 and 1891”.88  His own father too died whilst he was young and he too 
spent holidays with his real three cousins supposedly preferring the younger girl, 
Jeanne, but professing love for Madeleine who, like the Alissa of the novel, was two 
years older.  Many of the crucial scenes are direct borrowings:  Painter describes 
one New Year as follows: it is a virtual replica of Jerome’s experience with Alissa: 
The New Year was spent as usual at Rouen with his cousins.  
Madeleine had grown, matured beyond her years by a hidden 
grief, and the discovery of her secret was the chief event of 
André’s early years, a revelation which altered the whole course 
of his life.  He returned one evening from visiting Uncle Emile’s 
family, and finding his mother not yet home, decided to go back 
and take his cousins by surprise.  No one was about.  He stole 
upstairs to Madeleine’s room, and found her kneeling at her 
bedside, in tears. “I felt that all my life and all my love would be 
needed to cure the enormous, intolerable sorrow which dwelt in 
her.   I had discovered the mystic orientation of my life.”  
Madeleine’s burden was indeed heavy for a girl so young and 
pure:  she must bear the knowledge of her mother’s infidelity, a 
secret which all Rouen knew and laughed about, and only her 
father and sisters had not yet discovered.89 
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Like Alissa’s mother, Madeleine’s mother fled, soon after, with her lover.  Gide did 
not just use autobiographical material for convenience; he is known to have written 
novels in order to convey messages.  He says of The Immoralist, for example, 
“there, but for the grace of God, go I”.90  This sentiment might equally apply to 
Strait is the Gate.  Gide “invents, therefore, characters who will take [his] ideas to 
the lengths he wishes to push them to, while, he, Gide, stands back and watches”.91  
In the case of Jerome and Alissa, the characters and their concerns are reflections of 
himself and his concerns.  Just as their two stories given separately add up to the 
text as a whole, the two in “each other” become just one self: divided, and the 
question becomes (once again) not what the text tells (for what it tells is a 
“mirage”92) but what it is hiding. 
 
There are two possibilities for this: a normal or an existential-self-deception.  
The first is a possibility since the only significant deviations from the transfer of 
facts from his own narrative-consciousness into the novella are that in real life Gide 
succeeds in marrying his Madeleine, although it is said that the marriage was never 
consummated for Gide openly professed his homosexuality.  The second is also a 
possibility.  Alissa discovers “the existential void at the heart of human reality”.93  
This is an opinion which derives directly from Gide himself: “Certainly Gide was to 
be increasingly concerned with the fundamental gratuitousness of human endeavour 
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and the consequent difficulty in grounding moral choices, and in this respect was a 
precursor of Sartre and Camus.”94   
 
James uses autobiographical material too.  Leon Edel recounts countless 
examples: “Henry James had written two tales whose pages are filled with personal 
history.”95  His characters are said to “all sound like one another and their 
creator”,96 suggesting very directly that his narratives are simply examples of his 
own narrative-consciousness.  When he is said, for example,97 to present the tale 
What Maisie Knew (1897) through two points of view, those of Maisie and Mrs 
Wix, it might be better regarded as a split in narrative-consciousness.  Certainly 
Maisie is split.  At the beginning she “was divided in two”98 and at the end “the 
child stood there again dropped and divided”.99  “The young girl, Maisie, 
becomes”, as Barbara Eckstein argues, “through her learned vision, the man, the 
artist, Henry James.”100 
 
Prior to writing What Maisie Knew, “during the five years from 1890 to the 
beginning of 1895, James devoted himself to the writing of plays”101 and succeeded 
in putting on two, The American and Guy Domville.  Neither was artistically or 
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financially successful and he was a booed off the stage after the first night of the 
latter.  After failure as a commercial playwright, and his humiliation at the hands of 
the audience, the post-Domville James should be interesting for he very clearly fell 
into a deeply depressive state: “He was in mourning for himself, for his dead self, 
who had floundered and struggled when the waters of disaster closed over his 
head.”102  James would have had to reorganise his psyche.  He did so by 
deliberately using his writing.  This is why studying his writing during the 
immediate post-Domville period is likely to be so revealing.  Edel thinks so.  He 
regards his volume, The Treacherous Years, as focussing on “the novelist’s spiritual 
illness between 1895 and the beginning of the new century and describes how he 
rids himself of his private demons by writing about them”.103  Edel adds: “At the 
moment of defeat Henry James seized the skill of his ‘technique’ as if it were a life 
belt.”104  The life belt is a perfect metaphor for self-deception.  It is the only thing 
that keeps the wearer afloat and prevents drowning.  More, self-deception is to be 
represented by “technique”.  It only remains to be said that he did recover and that 
he did so by burying his humiliation: “I take up my old pen again.  I have only to 
face my problems. xxxxx But all that is of the ineffable – too deep and pure for any 
utterance.  Shrouded in sacred silence let it rest xxxxx.”105 
 
Gérard Jean-Aubry in The Sea Dreamer argues that no other work is more 
autobiographical than Heart of Darkness and he makes this point repeatedly: “He 
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[Conrad] was in exactly the same situation as Marlow, the narrator of ‘Heart of 
Darkness’”; “Marlow, who is Conrad himself”; “From ‘Heart of Darkness,’ which 
parallels Conrad’s own life at this period.”106  Certainly, the two stories are alike in 
many respects.  To give the flavour, a few examples are given.107  All of these 
examples are abstracted from Jean-Aubry’s account of Conrad’s life in The Sea 
Dreamer where quotes from the Heart of Darkness and Conrad’s diaries are so 
intermingled it is hard to make out which is which.  Jean-Aubry shows that both 
Conrad and Marlow were ship’s captains and both were out of work for a long time 
before “[Conrad] suddenly took it into his head to command one of the little 
steamboats of the Upper Congo”,108 as does Marlow.   Both obtained employment 
from a Brussels based company: 
And then Marlow gives his unforgettable account of his visit to 
the company’s office.  The women dressed in black, knitting in 
the outer office like impassive Fates; the huge, many-coloured 
map of Central Africa; the interview with the managing director 
which lasted only a few seconds; the compassionate secretary; 
the visit to the doctor; the farewells to his aunt  this succession 
of details and scenes, all extraordinarily vivid and all bearing the 
imprint of a biting irony, are nothing but the memory of 
actuality.109 
 
Both have a long and difficult trip to the home port of the Upper Congo flotilla.  
Both make a long trip, in both time and distance, to the Central Station with the 
same purpose, “to relieve one of the company’s agents… whose health was causing 
the greatest anxiety”.110  Both succeed in relieving the agent - called Klein in real 
                                                          
106  Gérard Jean-Aubry, The Sea Dreamer, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957. 
107  Abstracted from many more from ibid., pp. 150-176. 
108  Ibid., p. 154. 
109  Ibid., p. 160.  My emphasis. 
110  Ibid., p. 169. 
 94
life and Kurtz in the book111 - only to see him die on the journey home.  Conrad 
himself, as does Marlow, becomes ill on his return to Europe and has to spend a 
long time convalescing and, according to Jean-Aubry, “From now on he always felt 
threatened.”112 
 
James was probably only in normal-self-deception and therefore did not 
write ESDeSs.  Gide’s position was more ambiguous: after all normal and 
existential-self-deceptions are not mutually exclusive.  However, Conrad was 
undoubtedly capable of ESD: his concerns were much longer lasting and deeper.  
Jean-Aubry’s biography is replete with both atmosphere and concrete statements.  
The latter is exemplified in the following collection of quotations from his work.  
Jean-Aubry does not think it “altogether correct”113  that Conrad’s experiences on 
the Congo “fastened a deep fitful gloom over his spirits”.114  He asserts instead that 
“this gloom was the very basis of his character”.115  The Congo experience, 
however, “did cause it to spring forth from the very depths of his being”.116  Jean-
Aubry gives a reason for “gloom”: the source of the “chronic melancholy [was] 
born of a constant and painful awareness of man’s greatness and misery”.117  Jean-
Aubry goes on to suggest that Conrad realised that the solution to his depressions 
“could only be found in action”.118  Ideally this would have been in his first 
profession for “only the sea could set him free from his doubts and his 
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depression”119 but, when this proved impossible, he found another way: although 
“he looked at the pens with horror”,120 “he sought relief from his own troubles in 
narrating those of Almayer”.121  
 
However, these biographical detours are indicative only.  Individual factors 
will then emerge from preliminary readings.  Conrad has exhibited two other traits 
which are indicative.  He can be shown to be concerned with existentialism and in 
creating a new genre.  These two observations together put Conrad very insistently 
in the vanguard of ESDeS for they suggest that his oeuvre is very intentionally 
ESDeS.  Bruce Johnson makes a strong case for the first.  He devotes a whole 
chapter to what he calls “Existential models” in Conrad where he regards Conrad, as 
not unique, but “immersed in a Western tradition”122 which is established around 
the concept of “nothingness”.123  Furthermore since this thesis is trying to justify 
ESDeS as a new genre it is pertinent that Johnson regarded this approach as almost 
a genre in its own right: “there was a widespread taste for stories about colonial 
whites”,124 the essence of which revolved around stories where whites were 
“tempted to play God”125 but where the plotting was followed into “metaphysical 
regions”.126  In addition, others have more specifically picked up on Conrad’s 
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interest in genre.  Cedric Watts notes that Heart of Darkness is “enriched and 
modified by…folk-tale, legend and literary tradition generally”.127  Jakob Lothe, 
more recently, makes the same point: “Conrad’s Lord Jim appropriates and 
cumulatively combines aspects of other subgenres of fiction.”  He lists “the sketch, 
the tale, the fragment, the episode, the legend, the letter, the romance, and the 
parable”.128  J. H. Stape argues that Conrad’s autobiographical volume A Personal 
Record “has a peculiar status, in this canon “since it amalgamates both 
autobiography and epic”.129   Cedric Watts argues that it also embraces melodrama.  
He notes that there is interchange between fact and fiction: that Conrad describes a 
smuggling incident twice: once in the autobiographical The Mirror of the Sea and 
once in a fictional narrative The Arrow of Gold.  He notes “the striking difference 
between the two accounts is the autobiographical version gives a fuller, more 
dramatic, more fully characterised and explanatory sequence of events…than does 
the less eventful and less ironic account in The Arrow of Gold”.130  None of these 
observations specifically mention the detective genre as such nor do they do so, in 
particular, in the context of either Heart of Darkness or Chance.  However, other 
critics have been fond of using a detective metaphor to give meaning to Heart of 
Darkness.  Peter Brooks, for example, argues that “the detective story may…lay 
bare the structure of any narrative, particularly its claim to be a retracing of events 
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that have already occurred”.131  Susan Jones picks up on the detective genre idea 
specifically with respect to Chance.  She suggests it draws on “a number of sub-
genres: the romance…the detective novel”.132  This will be a particularly fruitful 
road to go down and will be followed in chapter 5 where it will be shown that the 
overt telling in Chance does not demand this type of critical approach but adopting 
it does enable a significant advance to be made to the narrative-consciousness 
theory. 
 
Following the detour into the psyches of the authors, the thesis will now return 
to their recorded texts.  It will discuss and then eliminate precursor texts in chapter 3 
and in so doing establish the parts of the continuum taxonomy from Story-1 to 
Story-2 and from Story-2 to Story-3.  It will then, in chapter 4, attack the central 
section of the continuum, Story-2, with an analysis of Heart of Darkness, which 
reveals the new genre, ESDeS, to perfection.  It reveals what Johnson calls “the 
original project of the individual, a free choice in his manner of being”133 and what 
this thesis calls the covert plot representing the evolutionary necessity to keep 
existential angst at bay. 
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Chapter 3  
  
The Provenance of the theory II: A Further Elaboration of the 
Existentially-Self-Deceptive-Narrative-Consciousness Theory. 
 
 
The previous chapter identified a narrative type that was sufficiently 
different from other types to deserve a specific genre category.  The difference lies 
in its motivation.  The telling of the actual story has a primary and prior purpose to 
accommodate existential awareness which is, as Lodge points out, “one of the things 
that distinguishes human beings from every other kind of life on earth…we know 
we are going to die.”1  The chapter also suggested that, as a matter of logic this 
accommodation could take three forms, excluding physical suicide.  This chapter 
will look at selected stories and novels in some detail in order to give more 
substance to the nature of the story-continuum.  The First-Story and Story-1 define 
the beginning of the continuum where there is a collective story and a collective 
defence.  Then, as: 
Watt observed…whereas narrative literature usually recycled 
familiar stories, novelists were the first storytellers to pretend 
that their stories had never been told before, that they were 
entirely new and unique, as is each of our own lives according to 
the empirical, historical, and individualistic concept of human 
life.2 
 
Now, along with the individual stories there needed to be individual defences.  This 
is what is meant by Story-2 or the ESDeN.  This clearly did not happen decisively: 
it emerged.  The Death of Ivan Ilyich (1887), Strait is the Gate, James’s oeuvre 
between 1892-1903 and Conrad’s Almayer’s Folly (1895) nibble around the front 
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edges of the ESDeN proper.  Similarly, Henry Green’s Party Going (1939) does the 
same at the back end of the ESDeN, suggesting that a Story-3, in which the human 
organism lives with the awareness of death, is possible but unlikely.  Placing the 
ESDeN in a continuum of related terms, as was done with the concept of self-
deception, provides understanding of what is required by an actual ESDeN in a 
Saussurean or Wittgensteinian sort of way and prepares the way for a full analysis 
of an actual ESDeN, given in chapter 4, with the reading of Heart of Darkness. 
 
The First-Story 
 
The nature of the narrative-consciousness theory demands that the First-Story needs 
to be based on the pre-existing self-deception-theory.  It will always involve religion 
but Story-1 will be culturally dependent.  That is, the religious story will be similar 
in purpose everywhere but will have different content.  This thesis has chosen the 
Christian Bible story purely as a matter of convenience. 
 
Dawkins invokes the same “ubiquitous argument” with respect to religion 
that this thesis has used for self-deception.  He notes that “we observe large 
numbers of people – in many areas it amounts to 100 per cent – who hold beliefs 
that flatly contradict demonstrable scientific facts as well as religions followed by 
others”3 and infers that it must have an evolutionary purpose.  The evolutionary 
argument demands, as has already been argued, a selective advantage.  At first sight 
this is not apparent, for religion is extremely wasteful of time and energy in exactly 
                                                          
3  Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, London: Bantam Press, 2006, p. 173. 
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the same way as storytelling seems to be wasteful.  Believers, it would seem, are 
unlikely to have a survival advantage: time spent praying in church could be better 
employed in the propagation of their genes.  Dawkins notes, however, that one 
reason used to justify religion is the explanatory one: “Historically, religion aspired 
to explain our own existence and the nature of the universe in which we find 
ourselves.”4  Robert Park affirms this, probably generally held, view: “Creation 
myths sought to explain where humans came from.”5  Dawkins, however, discounts 
the argument as unsatisfactory on its own: “The Darwinian still wants to know 
why?”6 in the sense of, “what is its selective advantage?” 
 
This thesis is suggesting an answer.  It might be that religion was homo-
sapiens’s early exploration of this question that led to a religious solution mediated 
by gods.  Genesis is truly the beginning in the sense that it is an example of the first 
attempt at such an explanation.  As such, it is commendable.  The god answer is 
functional in that it puts off the need for an answer to the future – that is, the next 
life.  Once this is done other things or projects can be adopted.  The god answer, 
however, comes first.  It is a higher level of explanation than the others.  The others 
are not needed in the absence of the first.  It is necessary to stress the importance of 
this deduction.  What comes first, along with language and intelligence and 
consciousness, is recognition of existential futility.  Existential futility is not an idea 
developed relatively recently but an idea that has always existed as part of the 
                                                          
4  Ibid., p.347. 
5  Robert L. Park, Superstition: Belief in the age of Science, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2008, p. 28. 
6  Dawkins, The God Delusion, p. 169. 
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concept of being human.  Right from the dawn of mankind there have been two 
drives: one to propagate life (the selfish gene) and one to do away with it (based on 
the awareness of existential futility).  Since it is, de facto, obvious that the first drive 
is more successful, this thesis has suggested that the second drive has been mitigated 
by using the skill of self-deceiving.  This “skill”, then, has been put to a universal 
purpose to create a “self” that rejects existential death.  The ability will have 
evolved just as any other mechanism will have evolved.  So, religion, used in this 
way, is not a mere by-product.  It was essential for everyone.  It is not an answer to 
the question of why are we here at all.  It is, assuming the pre-existing awareness of 
futility, to disguise this knowledge.  A story was needed by everyone and it is 
reasonable to suppose that the same story – religion – was, at one time, used by 
everyone.  Its very common existence today is simply because it remains a good 
disguise.  The only difference is that now it is just one of an armoury of disguises. 
 
Dawkins, in addition to the ubiquity of religion, introduces other interesting 
ideas which can be co-opted by the self-deception-narrative-consciousness theory.  
What follows is a brief look at the most relevant two.  
 
(i)  Give Me Your Children – The Parent-Child Mechanism 
 
Dawkins reiterates a well known assertion: “Natural selection builds child brains 
with a tendency to believe whatever their parents and tribal elders tell them.”7  The 
reason for this is obvious.  “Playing with fire” is dangerous and it is more efficient 
                                                          
7  Ibid., p. 176. 
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not to do it because of cultural taboos than to learn by trial and error.  Dawkins 
argues that it is because of this “inbuilt” mechanism that “belief” is transmitted so 
effectively.  This mechanism does not explain the origins of belief but it does 
explain why, once belief is established, it will continue.  Because of this parent-
child mechanism large numbers of people will never have experienced awareness 
of existential futility.  The experience will be pre-empted by the childhood 
experience.  From now on the parent-child mechanism is used synonymously with 
the self-deceptive-process. 
 
(ii)  Dennett’s Predictive Model 
 
Fingarette’s spelling-out behaviourist model has been preferred to the metaphorical 
space idea of consciousness.  Here too a behaviourist approach has descriptive 
advantages.  Dawkins concurs with the view already expressed in the introduction 
that the ability to predict the behaviour of other entities in the world is important for 
survival.  Dennett builds on this and suggests a “three way classification of the 
‘stances’ that are adopted by people in trying to understand the behaviour of entities 
such as animals, machines or each other”.8  The three stances are physical, design 
and intentional.  The physical is the psychological equivalent of cause and effect. It 
always works in principle, but it can take too long so the next two stances are 
shortcuts.  The design stance makes the assumption that an entity is designed, and 
the intentional stance goes one better and assumes “an agent, indeed a rational 
agent, who harbours beliefs and desires and other mental states that exhibit 
                                                          
8  Ibid., p. 182. 
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intentionality or ‘aboutness,’ and whose actions can be explained (or predicted) on 
the basis of the content of these states”.9  Dawkins gives the example of an 
attacking tiger.  He argues that when it is observed that “that cat intends to eat 
you”10 it would be foolish to consider the physics of its molecules or the design of 
its teeth or claws, it is best to “cut to the intentional chase”.11  Failure to do so and 
act accordingly will result in natural selecting-out.  This is merely another way of 
arguing that human behaviour incorporates a “drive” to give meaning.  Here is 
another 
 for 
stumps, as indeed every Zande does most carefully, and that if 
he had not been bewitched he would have seen the stump.12 
                                                          
example.   
A boy knocked his foot against a small stump of wood in the 
centre of bush path, a frequent happening in Africa, and suffered 
pain and inconvenience in consequence.…He declared that 
witchcraft had made him knock his foot against the stump.…He 
agreed that witchcraft had nothing to do with the stump of wood 
being in his path but added that he had kept his eyes open
 
The boy, in order to explain the unexpected or the unusual, invents the idea of 
witches.  Where there seems to be no apparent physical cause to explain the event 
and the complete lack of design, the Zande has recourse to the short cut of intent.  
Somebody must have done something.  The idea that humans desire to make sense 
of life crosses cultural boundaries although the idea of witches may not.  A person, 
in effect, generally explains an event in terms of cause and effect but in the absence 
of a clear cause uses instead another power.  The alternatives are just names serving 
as explanations.  In this particular case the assigning of a “real” agent, as an 
9  Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, London: Penguin, 1993, p. 76. 
10  Ibid., p. 182. 
11  Ibid. 
12  E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Rationality of Magic, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937, p. 65. 
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explanation, is false, not because there is no “real” agent but because it does not 
have predictive power.  If the same idea were to work elsewhere, as Eco says it must 
in reading, then it is a useful idea for it provides an explanation for what 
differentiates self-deception as a mechanism from unconscious motivation.  The 
story told, with intention, provides within the text the materials to predict the 
outcome.  Intention, described in this way, might appear to be more a property of 
the reader who picks up the clues and makes the predictions, rather than the teller.  
Cedric W
rt of 
 text is imaginatively intentional if predictions made by the 
ader on the assumption of its intentionality are fulfilled.13 
 
ly 
tention and collusion will be seen to be bi-directional: the one implies the other. 
 
                                                          
atts, when discussing covert plotting, argues that: 
it is critically sterile to attempt to distinguish between conscious 
and unconscious intentions [referring to the author], but 
critically fruitful to distinguish between imaginative intention 
and the want of it.  [The rule is] an apparently anomalous pa
a
re
 
However, the written story does have, in fact, a teller: the author or machine.  It is a 
matter of choice whether extra-textual material from this source is used by the 
reader to augment their enjoyment.  This thesis chooses to do just this with, in 
particular, its analysis of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness.  Nevertheless it has been 
noted that self-deception actually lies with neither one nor the other: it involves the 
space between the teller and the hearer and this will become an essential distinction 
for the narrative-consciousness theory.  This will be given the term collusion and 
will receive full elucidation in the chapter on Heart of Darkness.  Ultimate
in
13  Cedric Watts, The Deceptive Text: An Introduction to Covert Plots, Brighton: The Harvester 
Press, 1984, p.15. 
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 The essential framework of the process of narration within the ESDeN, 
which was incompletely itemised above, can now be completed: 
• Consciousness is regarded as only a story and no more.  In this 
thesis the story is given the special name, narrative-consciousness. 
• The story has to make p and not-p available. 
• The structure of the story is the separation, or split, of p and not-p: 
One story is immediately available on first reading and will be called 
the overt plot and the other is not and will be called the covert plot. 
• The narrative allows the reader the possibility of predicting the 
presence of both plots and this is what is meant by intentional. 
• The covert plot will prove to be collusive, and, therefore, its mere 
presence is taken as proof that the overall narrative-consciousness is 
intentional.  
 
 
Story-1 
 
The First-Story is the story of religion and it was generated at the origins of 
consciousness.  It will not contain a covert plot for it is passed on through the 
parent-child mechanism and will be structured, therefore, on the self-deceptive-
process.  The nature of the existential threat to the continuation of life is such that 
the story will have to have been re-written periodically to defend consciousness 
from the re-emergence of the threat.  That is, the “religion” story is just a story that 
gives meaning to a power outside of the individual.  It will have had to have been 
regenerated many times.  This thesis restricts itself, as a matter of convenience, to 
two of its later manifestations because, like Dawkins, they are the versions with 
which it happens to be most familiar.  These are Judaism and Christianity.  The 
Bible contains a collection of sacred texts including the story, told in the four 
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Gospels,14 of Jesus’s mission.  This story is, in effect, the story of the transition 
from the older to the newer religion.  Mark, in his version, took “the jumble of 
events that comprised Christ’s life and fixed these events into some kind of 
biographical form”.15  His narrative might be given chapter headings as follows: 
Baptism, Wilderness, Ministry, Death and Resurrection. 
 
A. N. Wilson points out that not much is known about the actual history of 
Jesus so he considers it a legitimate methodology to create his own storied version.  
His version is based on three observations.  First, he states categorically that: “The 
gospels of Matthew, Mark and Luke never state that Jesus claimed to be God.”16  
The second observation follows from the first: Jesus was not a supernatural being.  
Third, Wilson believes that clues to the real life can be deduced by a close reading 
of the gospels which can’t help leaking real life into the fictional story.  These 
deductions give him the license, he believes, “to reconstruct, I hope plausibly, some 
picture of the historical Jesus”.17  Imitating this methodology, it is possible to 
construct yet another interpretation, based on the theory of narrative-consciousness:  
This version will include the same chapter headings but modified as follows: 
(i) Baptism.   A new sequence is about to start.  The existing cover 
story is under threat. 
(ii) Wilderness.   the process and the point of recognition. 
(iii) Ministry.   process of narration. 
                                                          
14  There are of course many others including the version relating to Judas but this is an 
unnecessary complication.  The story in the Bible is the version that has been accepted by most. 
15  Nick Cave, ‘Introduction’, The Gospel According to Mark: Authorised King James Version, 
Edinburgh: Canongate, 1998, p. viii.  Note also that it really does start with the baptism.  Not the 
birth.  Matthew adds the birth and Luke further adds the boyhood. 
16  A. N. Wilson, Jesus, London: Flamingo, 1993, p. 110.  Wilson repeats this over and over 
again.  See p. 57 for another example. 
17  Ibid., p, xiii. 
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(iv) Death. point of narration. 
(v) Resurrection. new cover story (put) in place. 
 
What is certain is that at the beginning a cover story is in place – the monotheistic 
God of the Jews.  What is equally certain is that for some this is not adequate and is 
replaced, at the end, with another cover story – the Trinitarian God of Pauline 
Christians. 
 
(i)  Cover Story in Place 
 
The story of narrative-consciousness must contain two significant entities: a 
representation of not-p, existential awareness which causes emotional angst and an 
attitudinal “life is not worth living” and a representation of p, the opposite, 
happiness and the view “life is worth living”.  Initially the paradox is in a position 
of resolution.  The Judaic God is foregrounded as the cover story and its not-p is 
buried. 
 
The initial relevant death is the Baptism of Jesus.18  It gives a warning that a 
challenge (process of recognition) is about to take place.  This, in turn, indicates a 
start to the repetitive cycle.  A Baptism is, of course, representative of rebirth: the 
rite of the dying of one’s old self: to be born anew. 
 
 
                                                          
18  See Mark 1:9. 
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(ii)  Process of Recognition 
 
Mark then states: “And immediately the Spirit driveth him into the wilderness.”19  
The text then tells how Jesus meets up with the devil who exposes him to a series of 
temptations and gives Jesus’s responses to the temptations.  The responses, the 
believer is told, lay the foundations for his coming ministry: namely he does not 
succumb to them but asserts, in each case, the power of his (supernatural) father, as: 
“Man does not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedth out of the 
mouth of God.”20  Unfortunately, the story in the Bible does not make sense – if 
tested against the reality principle.  First, Jesus is alone in the wilderness and so it is 
not possible to know what happened.  There can be no independent objective 
evidence.  Second, he was reportedly without food - “he did eat nothing”21 - for 
forty days.22  He was reported as “hungered”23 whereas, more realistically, he 
should have been dead or, at the very least, hallucinating.24  If the latter, the second 
or third hand reports of the temptations offered to Jesus might be legitimately read 
in any way, with equal plausibility.  The disciples, Wilson believes, should not be 
uncritically believed.  They, he asserts, wrote their texts backwards: “The Gospels 
are not history-books.  They are narratives framed by communities of believers who 
entertained certain beliefs about Jesus which they took for granted.”25  It follows 
                                                          
19  Mark 1:12. 
20  Matthew 4:4. 
21  Luke 4:2. 
22  Luke 4:2. (Matt 4:2 says “fasted forty days and forty nights”.) 
23  Luke 4:2. 
24  If as always the New Testament is based on the Old then Exodus (Ex 34:28) goes even 
further: Moses was on Mount Sinai for “forty days and nights” and “he did neither eat bread, nor 
drink water”. 
25  Wilson, Jesus, p. xiv 
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that other alternative stories are possible.26  The temptations in the wilderness are 
more economically explained as a testing of a god cover story.   
 
Consider how the story is introduced.  In Mark the reader is told “the spirit 
driveth him into the wilderness”.27  In Matthew this becomes: “Then was Jesus led 
up of the spirit into the wilderness.”28  In Luke, this becomes “[he] was led by the 
spirit into the wilderness”.29  The reader has two choices: they can believe that the 
spirit is dissociated from the body - the necessary split condition for self-deception - 
or that the Trinity is already established and the spirit is just one aspect of the same 
narrative-mind which is telling another part what to do.  In either case the actuality 
of a split has been established and the possibility of self-deception introduced.  The 
story continues with the actual temptations.  There are three of these.  In Mark Jesus 
was merely “tempted of Satan”.30  In Matthew the order is stones, temple and 
kingdoms.31  In Luke the order is stones, kingdoms and temple.32  In attempting, 
like Wilson, to construct a “historical picture” a non-supernatural being might 
consider what they would do under the same circumstances.  Suppose that, after 
forty days without food, the power to turn stones into bread was on offer?  The 
survivors of the Chilean air crash were happy to eat human flesh so there is little 
doubt that an ordinary person would eat bread.  It is certain “that man shall not live 
                                                          
26  Wilson gives his account of it in ibid., pp. 110-112.  The account amounts to a claim that 
Jesus was advocating a rejection of a “collective response” in favour of an “individual” answer, 
albeit within the “protection of God”. 
27  Mark 1:12. 
28  Matthew 4:1. 
29  Luke 4:1. 
30  Mark 1:13. 
31  Matthew 4:3-11. 
32  Luke 4:3-12. 
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by bread alone”,33 but nor shall he live without it.  Miracles were, at one time, a 
serious part of religious belief34 but they have, mostly, had to be dropped because 
they do not happen.  Belief in a god who can suspend natural laws is not acceptable 
so, given the context of the “temptations in the wilderness” story, a real person 
most likely would find the cover story severely challenged.  The second temptation 
offered to Jesus had relevance to “all the kingdoms of the world”.35  In Matthew 
these Satan “will give thee”36 and in Luke, “All this power I will give thee.”37  
Clearly this is a less universal choice than the desire for food to live.  Some people 
might indeed sell their souls for power.  Certainly most people appear to consider 
personal achievement important.  A god who cannot facilitate personal projects 
might not be as attractive as one that could.  The third temptation now becomes 
crucial. 
 
(iii)  Point of Recognition/Choice 
 
Among its colloquial meanings, “being in the wilderness” means being depressed.  
In this specific case the suggestion is that Jesus’s experience (like any other mortal 
placed in the same extreme position) had led him to the conclusion that there was 
no god; that man was alone; that he became existentially aware of the futility of 
life.  At this point of choice, for a moment, Jesus would have decided life was not 
worth it.  He would then be really tempted to end it all.  This makes sense of his 
                                                          
33  Luke 4:4. 
34  See J. C. A. Gaskin, “Hume on Religion”, in David Fate Norton (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Hume, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.314. 
35  Matthew 4:8 and Luke 4:5. 
36  Matthew 4:8. 
37  Luke 4:6. 
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climbing up to the top of the temple to consider the possibility of jumping off.  
Matthew hides the temple scenario by his ordering of the temptations but Luke lays 
it bare by making it the culmination of his story.  Here, Jesus is taken to the 
“pinnacle of the temple” and invited to “cast thyself down from hence”.38  This is 
as clear a description that it is possible to give of the existential choice.  In this 
instance Jesus rejects the “temptation” to jump off and kill himself and substitutes a 
project.  He rejects suicide, and decides to put in place another cover story.  The 
text immediately conceded that this is an existential self-deceptive choice for the 
last verse of the temptation chapter sums up: “And when the devil had ended all the 
temptation, he departed from him for a season.”39  The text is aware that the cover 
story is just a temporary project. 
 
(iv)  Process of Narration 
 
The chosen project is easy enough to state.  It is a social work project: “to heal the 
broken hearted…to preach deliverance to the captives and recovering of sight to the 
blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised.”40  It is clear from the birth of the 
Church that this process actually happened but there is a difference between stating 
that it happened and showing the mechanism of its happening.  There are many 
other recorded cases where either evidence of a point of narration is given or a new 
cover story is put in place.  The Death of Ivan Ilyich is an example of the coping 
mechanism.  Tolstoy expresses Ivan’s project thus: “I have no doubt that there is 
                                                          
38  Luke 4:10. 
39  Luke, 4:13.  My emphasis. 
40  Luke, 4:18. 
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truth in the teachings [of Christianity], but I also have no doubt that there is 
falsehood in them too, and that I must discover what is true and what is false and 
separate one from the other.”41  In short, the narrative-consciousness that is named 
Tolstoy divides itself into two: the real Tolstoy and the fictional Ivan.  When Ivan 
dies he leaves the narrative-consciousness and takes angst with him.  This makes it 
possible for Tolstoy to go on.  Camus jumps to his point of narration too.  He 
claims his Sisyphus sees the Universe “without a master… [as]…neither sterile nor 
futile” and is therefore “happy”.42  Dimmesdale does the same:   
“Do I feel joy again?” cried he, wondering at himself. 
“Methought the germ of it was dead in me!  O Hester, thou art 
my better angel! I seem to have flung myself – sick, sin-stained, 
and sorrow blackened – down upon these forest leaves, and to 
have risen up all made anew, and with new powers to glorify 
Him that hath been merciful.  This is already the better life.  
Why did we not find it sooner?”43   
 
John Stuart Mill gives a description of a possible mechanism (now called a project):  
“They only are happy who have their minds fixed on some other object other than 
their own happiness; on the happiness of others [like Tolstoy], on the improvement 
of mankind, even on some art or pursuit.”44  Joseph Conrad and Henry James, as 
has been seen, found their “other object” in their work.  Cedric Watts claims Sartre 
adopted the same technique: “Writing was a therapy for Sartre, helping him to 
exorcise the hallucinations which troubled him in younger years.”45  Sartre also, in 
Nausea, has his hero Roquentin effectively do the same.  Roquentin claims to be 
                                                          
41  Leo Tolstoy, “A Confession”, in A Confession and Other Religious Writings, trans. Jane 
Kentish, London: Penguin, 1987, p. 78 
42  Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, London: Penguin, 1975, p.111. 
43  Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, London: Penguin, 1994, p. 172. 
44  John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, New York: Signet Classics, p. 112. 
45  Watts, The Deceptive Text, note 2, p. 195: 
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“an extreme philosophical rebel who truly believes that all is meaningless” whilst 
showing he is actually a “Romantic with liberal sympathies”46 who found it in 
himself to compose (like Tolstoy, Conrad and James) “these notebooks” which the 
fictional editor “found”47 among his papers.   
 
All of these narratives recovered from their respective existential angst and 
the Jesus story does too.  It starts with the question “shall I jump off the roof” and 
ends with a death and a resurrection.  The thesis will return to this latter point: the 
point of narration, after it has discussed the actual mechanism involved in the 
process of narration. 
 
The above writers, then, say they recovered but either cannot describe or 
choose not to spell-out how their new projects become acceptable: how their 
enthusiasm for life was renewed; how existential futility was forgotten.48  What is 
fascinating about the biblical story is that there are intimations given of just this and 
this is really why it is included in this chapter.  Before details are given, it is fruitful 
to revisit the cover story project in different terms: in terms of why it is put in place 
rather than what is put in place.  Nick Cave, perhaps inadvertently, suggests that the 
whole gospel of Mark is permeated by “aloneness”: that Jesus’s immediate project 
(his ministry) reflects the “wilderness of his soul” where “all the outpourings of his 
brilliant, jewel-like imagination are in turns misunderstood, rebuffed, ignored, 
                                                          
46  Ibid.,  p.155 
47  Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, London: Penguin, 1965, Editor’s note.  It is assumed Roquentin is 
either dead or has completely abandoned his former self. 
48  This thesis claims that Conrad’s Heart of Darkness is an exemplary text showing how this is 
done. 
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mocked and vilified”.49  Put less florally this means there is a tension between what 
Jesus said overtly and what he knew covertly.   The process of narration involves a 
construction of a story that separates these two contradictory propositions.  The 
biblical story is the overall narrative-consciousness.  One part of it is represented by 
Jesus as told by his actual story recovered by Wilson.  The other part of it is the 
Jesus represented by the story given by his disciples.  The former is what Kermode, 
in his The Genesis of Secrecy, calls the manifest plot and the latter is what he will 
call a latent plot or interpretation.  Both are available but normally a reader 
chooses to read one or to work out the other: that is, they choose to spell-out one of 
them and to not attend to, or not-spell-out, the other.  All of these, however, are 
seen to be contained within the overt plotting.  There is no covert plotting in the 
biblical story.  Kermode does not divide by plot but by plot and interpretation but 
this is a big step in the path to understanding what is meant by covert plotting. 
 
The method, used by Jesus’s ministry, as related by the synoptic gospels, 
revolves around the use of parables: “And he taught them many things by 
parables.”50  Why he did so is explicitly explained by the famous Marcan quote. 
To you has been given the secret of the kingdom of God, but for 
those outside everything is in parables; so that they may indeed 
see but not perceive, and may indeed hear but not understand; 
lest they should turn and be forgiven.51 
                                                          
49  Cave, “Introduction”, p. ix. 
50  Mark 4:2. 
51  Mark 4:11-12 in the Revised Standard Version, quoted in Frank Kermode, The Genesis of 
Secrecy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 2. The wordings in other versions of 
the Bible are of course, different.  In the Authorised Version, for example, it reads:  
 
all these things are done in parables: that seeing they may see, and not 
perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest at any time 
they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them. 
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 Kermode sets up his thesis by arguing that “there has been something of a 
consensus among experts that parables of the kind found in the New Testament 
were always essentially simple”,52 but then sets about dismantling this “truism”.  
He substitutes just the opposite: the parable is not intended to elucidate the 
situation, at least for the outsider, but to hide it: “the divine author made his stories 
obscure in order to prevent the reprobate from understanding them.”53 
 
Matthew’s version might change the interpretation.  It changes the “so that” 
to “because”.54  This does not remove the exclusion but changes the focus.  The 
outsiders are outside because they are too stupid to understand.  Kermode describes 
this well: “we have two kindred but different secrecy theories….One says the 
stories are obscure on purpose to damn the outsiders; the other…says that they are 
not necessarily impenetrable, but that the outsiders, being what they are, will 
misunderstand them anyway.”55  The thesis puts this differently.  The first is 
available within the text whereas the other is not: it depends upon the reader. 
 
The problem is then made universal for the disciples do not seem to be able to 
understand either: “Even his disciples, who we would hope would absorb some of 
Christ’s brilliance, seem to be in a perpetual fog of misunderstanding.”56  Kermode 
adds:  
                                                          
52  Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy, p. 25. 
53  Ibid., p. 45. 
54  Matthew 13:13. 
55  Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy, p .32. 
56  Cave, “Introduction”, p. ix. 
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no one, so far as I know, has improved on the disciples’ 
performance.  The riddle remains dark, so does the gospel.  
Parable, it seems, may proclaim a truth as a herald does, and at 
the same time, conceal truth like an oracle.57  
 
Kermode is making it clear that the teaching of Jesus may be about the 
mystery (or secret) of the kingdom of God but the point is either not to tell or not to 
understand.  He then introduces his next idea: a plot separation.  Kermode uses the 
terms manifest plot and latent plot.  He identifies the manifest plot with the ordinary 
moral imperative of the tale and the latent plot with need for interpretation.  He then 
adjusts the names by assigning value.  He replaces manifest with carnal and 
replaces latent with spiritual and describes their essential difference: “[All] carnal 
readings are much the same.  [All] spiritual readings are different.”58   
 
He then devotes an entire chapter to answering the question “Why are 
Narratives Obscure?” by starting with the claim that “‘narrativity’ always entails a 
measure of opacity”.59  He means by this two things which mirror the insider-
outsider opposition.  First, he is making the rather trivial, but not insignificant point 
that the opacity is the invention of “interpreters de métier” in order “to protect their 
profession”.60  The second point is rather more profound.  It refers to the topic of 
interpretation.  Kermode approaches this topic by analysing the narrative telling of 
the parables.  What emerges shows that the adoption of a parable method of telling 
necessitates a proliferation of readings: that narrative by its very nature invites a 
                                                          
57  Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy, p. 47. 
58  Ibid., p. 9. 
59  Ibid., p. 25. 
60  Ibid. 
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plurality of readings.  The latent plot, he suggests, becomes available only after 
interpretation and “more interpreters mean more interpretations”.61   
 
Kermode describes the situation accurately but his answer suggests a further 
question: “Why should anyone want their narrative to be obscure if it were possible 
to make it transparent?”  An adequate explanation lies in the twin facts that Jesus 
was not supernatural and there is no kingdom of God.  Jesus knew there is nothing 
but didn’t want to tell the flock so he tells a parable.  The answer to the new “why” 
question is now clear in evolutionary terms.  If he tells the truth to himself he will 
commit suicide.  If he were to tell the flock and they believed him then they may 
commit suicide.  So he does neither: he adopts existential-self-deception and the 
means to this end is the parable.  He has a project for himself in his ministry and he 
promises meaning to the flock.  He, however, is not exactly dishonest; he is not 
exactly a liar.  He does announce the good news: the secret of the kingdom of God 
is nothing.  There are two sides.  Jesus is protecting himself and the listeners need 
to protect themselves.  They can take what they want out of it as do Dimmesdale’s 
parishioners.  In the same way as the Azande62 assign purpose to spirits so believers 
assign purpose to a supernatural being with a different name, God.  Kermode is, in 
effect, showing that modern interpreters substitute their own formula: a formula 
which is no longer designed to give the answer.  The two versions of the story are 
not different versions.  They provide the two sides of the shared collusion.  In short, 
a story now must be understood to hide the truth.  The biblical story is the religious 
                                                          
61  Ibid., p. 3. 
62  Azande is the plural of Zande.  Hence a Zande (individual), but the Azande. 
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way of pretending to seek the truth whilst hiding it.  Interpretation is the secular 
way of pretending to seek the truth whilst hiding it and since each spiritual reading 
“is different” each interpretation reflects the enlightenment view of individuality.  
Kermode presses this point to the extreme.  He finishes his work by essentially 
claiming just this: there is no truth; the stories are narratives only because of our 
“impudent intervention”.63  A latent plot is a Matthew-driven interpretation.  It is a 
device invented by the listener.  It does not actually exist in the text.  It is abstracted 
from the text by the reader who brings to their reading additional information that is 
not available in the text. 
 
This is true as far as it goes.  It is true of the overt plot but it misses another 
layer.  For this, another idea, introduced by Cedric Watts, is needed: his idea is of a 
covert plot.  Now latent plots and covert plots may seem to be the same thing, but 
they are not.  A covert plot is the Marcan version.  It is imposed by the narrative.  It 
is an actual plot that is available in the text.  It may not be seen at a first reading, 
just like a latent plot, but it is there.  It may take some time for the covert plot to 
become visible because whilst the reader is busy interpreting, busy discovering 
latent plots, then they will not discover the covert plot.  If and when they do 
discover that what is metaphorically labelled “the kingdom of God” is more 
accurately called “nothing”, the pre-existing cover story will break down and will 
have to be, laboriously rebuilt. 
 
 
                                                          
63  Ibid., p. 145. 
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(v)  The Point of Narration 
 
The point of recognition recognises that p and not-p are incompatible.  The point of 
narration has the very specific purpose to (re)separate them.  The trial narrative tells 
how this is done and the crucifixion narrative does it.  The trial sets out the 
opposites.  Jesus, when asked if he is Christ, answers “I am”,64 whereas Peter, when 
asked, denies him “thrice”.65  Then Jesus (as not-p) dies: a death which required the 
collusion of both sides of the narrative-consciousness.  Peter survives to become 
“the rock”66 on which the Church is built and the disciples survive to give their 
version of the God story: referred to as the resurrection.  Peter’s denial of Jesus and 
the “you are the Church” are reconciled.  Jesus links the two sides.  In one, he 
knows the truth and this is disposed of (denied).  In the other, his life is stolen 
(resurrected) by his followers.  It might be truly said that he “died to save us all”.67 
 
(vi)  (New)(Next) Cover Story in Place 
 
The story contains two significant entities.  The first represents not-p and the 
second represents p.  The original position of resolution, the (supposed) existence 
of the Jewish God, has been replaced by a modified position of resolution, the 
                                                          
64  Mark 14:62 and Kermode, The Genesis of Secrecy, fn. 25, p. 156.  The translation may be 
“You have said that I am” and as such is duplicated by Matthew and Luke.  However, Kermode likes 
the first version better.  He says, “From the narrative point of view the received reading is stronger, 
partly because it is unexpected, partly because of the counterpoint of Peter’s denial.”  If this 
interpretation is accepted then it does of course negate Wilson’s claim (quoted above) that the Jesus 
of the synoptic gospels never makes the claim to be God. 
65  Mark 14: 62 and 72. 
66 Matthew 16: 16-18. 
67  Cecil Frances Alexander, “There is a Green Hill Far Away”, Hymns for Little Children, 
London: Joseph Masters, 1852, pp. 31-32. 
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(supposed) existence of the Christian God.  It is still, however, a meta-narrative 
based on the idea of an external source.  The Christian God is now foregrounded 
and its not-p is buried. 
 
(vi)  Repetition 
 
In the last version of the cycle of change from one cover story to another an 
imaginary process was considered in which the “real” disciples accommodated the 
“real” Jesus and put into place a story of the “biblical” Jesus.  This story can now 
be examined by another person; an imaginary person.  This imaginary person 
represents everybody, just as Dimmesdale, as a self-deceiver, represents everybody.  
Wilson, for example, must have gone through something like this process: “It was a 
slow, and in my case, as it happens, painful process, to discard a belief in 
Christianity.”68  The belief or cover story cannot sustain itself for ever for it is 
subjected to the same processes that afflicted Orgon and Madam Pernelle.  They 
were bombarded with unease, internal and external evidence against it and leakage 
from not-p.  Wilson notes that faith as it is presented in the gospel story “must seem 
very puzzling”69 for general discrepancies suggest themselves even to the mind of a 
child.  Wilson records his own experience including: “Even if we insist on taking 
every word of the bible as literally true, we shall still not be able to find there the 
myth of Jesus being born in a stable.”70  Every discrepancy must instigate unease. 
Sometimes it may be possible to contain each with a further re-interpretation of the 
                                                          
68  Wilson, Jesus, p. xvi. 
69  Ibid., p. vii. 
70  Ibid., p. ix.  
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text which may lead to one of the countless new sects which have emerged through 
the ages.  
 
Other examples of counter evidence derive from direct experience.  They 
derive from the experience of an increasingly secular, scientific, and sceptical 
community and the nature of this type of evidence precludes the possibility of a 
simple replacement story.  The evidence comes in many forms but the most 
damaging have been provided by the advance of science.  No one, born outside of 
the Christian age, believes that a virgin can conceive, that a man can walk on water 
or that a dead man can come alive.  Every religious claim that laid itself open to 
testing by empirical means has been discredited.  The most famous is, of course, the 
blunder made by the Roman Catholic Church when it “publicly condemned Galileo 
Galilei to ‘abjure, curse and detest’ any notion of heliocentric motion”.71  The 
breakdown of the cover story, this time, is more serious than the breakdown of the 
Jewish God cover story: a replacement story is no longer sufficient; a rewriting is 
necessary.  Religion, although it may remain a cherished belief for some, can no 
longer claim to be a natural or self-evident belief.  It becomes the case that 
“religious belief is not universal.…It is also evident that individuals can and do act 
perfectly adequately in the world without religious belief.”72   
 
The cover story has no choice but to break down, during the process of 
recognition, due to this evidence.  The god-myth, providing the possibility of 
                                                          
71  James Hansen, “Can Science Allow Miracles?”, New Scientist, 8 April, 1982, pp. 73-78. 
72  Gaskin, “Hume on religion”, p. 337. 
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meaning to life by virtue of an entity which knows and will tell you when the time 
is right, may be retained by some due to the parent-child mechanism.  But for others 
it needs to be replaced.  It can be replaced by other metanarratives providing other 
sources of external meaning, such as science or Marxism, which may be passed on, 
in turn, by the parent-child mechanism.  But if this is not effective, another solution 
has to be found.  Chapter 2 has indicated what this might be: a likely contender for 
a new cover story is provided by modifying the essence of Story-1.  Story-2 evolves 
out of Story-1 by retaining the view that there is still an answer, a meaning, but 
differs from Story-1 in that it does not claim to know what it is.  It suggests 
meaning is there, but it is not known and must be sought for.  Rimmon-Kenan 
transfers this generalised search to narrative when she asserts that “texts promise 
understanding”.73  But such a step falls into the same trap as religion and other 
metanarratives.  It may be a widely held belief but it is not a natural belief in either 
the Humean74 or the evolutionary sense.  It cannot permanently hold off the attack 
of existential futility.  It is just a matter of time before the “belief” gives way to 
reason.  It is not a matter of “if” but “when” awareness that life is contingent, 
absurd, has no necessary meaning and is bound to end in death re-enters the 
narrative-consciousness.  Once again a position will be reached when a choice has 
to be made.  The ESDeS agrees that it is necessary to believe in something.  It gives 
the something the name, overt plot or project.  All that has changed from Story-1 is 
that the evolutionary imperative has become centred on an individual choice.  
                                                          
73  Shlomith Rimmon Kenan, Narrative Fiction: Contemporary poetics, London: Methuen, 
1983, p.125. 
74  A natural belief is one which is believed in order to make normal, everyday life possible. 
Gaskins list some examples including, “belief in the continuous existence of an external world 
independent of our perception of the world…[and]…belief that the regularities of the past will 
continue into the future”.  Gaskin, “Hume on religion”, p. 337. 
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However, it is not easy to turn the choice into a cover story.  Isaac Bashevis Singer 
puts it well:  “Faith doesn’t come by itself.  You must work for it.”75  The next few 
sections show some of the transitory attempts to reach the haven of the Story-2. 
 
The Transition to Story-2 
 
Both the modernist novel and the ESDeS emerged as identifiable narrative forms 
during the late nineteenth century.  This period has been perceived as a period of 
“ambivalence”.76  It is both a looking back - “a rather tired period” - and a looking 
forward - “an era of new beginnings”.77  The ambivalence expressed itself in a 
number of ways, one of which was, perhaps, an anxiety for things lost.  Sally 
Ledger and Roger Luckhurst in their introduction to the The Fin-de-Siècle record a 
typical question of the period: “what good was literacy if it was only to foster such 
[new and popular] literatures?”78  Elaine Showalter puts a rather interesting and 
more theoretical slant onto the events of this period.  She argues that the fin-de-
siècle is a cyclical event and each involves a peculiarly existential outlook: “the 
crises of the fin-de-siècle…are…more weighted with symbolic and historical 
meaning because we invest them with the metaphors of death and rebirth.”79  It is 
not surprising then that this general ambiguity is mirrored within some texts of this 
                                                          
75  Isaac Bashevis Singer, The Penitent, London: Penguin Modern Classics, 1986, p. 17. 
76  Sally Ledger and Roger Luckhurst (eds), The Fin-de-Siècle, c.1880-1900: A Reader in 
Cultural History, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. xiii. 
77  Gail Marshall (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to The Fin de Siècle, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 5. 
78  Ledger and Luckhurst, The Fin-de-Siècle , p. xv.  The authors give many other examples all 
of which can be categorised under their term of degeneration which they contrasts with regeneration. 
79  Elaine Showalter, Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the Fin de Siècle, London: 
Virago, 1992, p. 2. 
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period.  Texts that try but do not quite succeed in moving on to a full ESDeS.  The 
thesis has picked out a few to illustrate particular points.  The Death of Ivan Ilyich 
gives a fine description of the process of recognition.  Strait is the Gate struggles 
with the concept of choice.  Post-Domville James recognises the concept of 
motivating absence and secret and, finally, Almayer’s Folly, which although it 
contains a covert plot does not quite attain the status of intentional. 
 
(i)  The Near ESDeS Reading of The Death of Ivan Ilyich 
 
Ivan Ilyich’s life is described as “the simplest, most ordinary and therefore most 
terrible”.80  In this, therefore, he represents everyone.  The reader should not be able 
to say the events are about him but not about them.  Nevertheless, this is exactly 
what they are invited to do.  This is achieved by the plotting of the novel which 
disrupts the time order of events so that Ivan’s death is announced before his life is 
described.  The theme of the novella is transparent.  It is about the futility of life.  
Tolstoy asks “is there any meaning in my life that will not be annihilated by the 
inevitability of death that awaits me?”81  However, the early scenes give an 
abbreviated version of the message.  Existential futility is presented and then 
negated.  The readers are invited to “look but not see”.82  Acquaintances and friends 
(including Piotr Ivanovich) hearing of his death immediately disassociate 
themselves from it: “he had to go and die but I manage things better – I am alive.”83  
                                                          
80  Ibid., p. 13. 
81  Tolstoy, “A Confession”, p. 35. 
82  A paraphrase of Mark 4:  11-12. 
83  Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilyich, p. 3. 
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The meaning of this is spelt out.  The process and point of recognition are to be 
followed by an implied process of narration and a point of narration.  Piotr has a 
brief point of recognition when he is suddenly struck “with horror” at “the thought 
of the man’s sufferings” and “was overcome with a feeling of dread on his own 
account.…Why, it might happen to me…he thought…and was terrified.”  But 
immediately, “he could not have explained how, there came to his support the old 
reflection that this thing had befallen Ivan Ilyich and not him”.84  The message is 
not to foreground the death but to make life possible.  The story of death is made 
available but it is then to be hidden.  The following tells how: 
Schwartz was above all these happenings and would not 
surrender to any depressing influences.  His very look said that 
the incident of a requiem service for Ivan Ilyich could not 
possibly constitute sufficient grounds for interrupting the 
recognised order of things – in other words – that nothing could 
interfere with the unwrapping and cutting of a new pack.85 
 
Hawthorne uses a narrator to gain access to privileged information but he stays 
within realism by claiming he does so because he has had access to “a manuscript 
of old date”.86  Tolstoy in The Death of Ivan Ilyich is different.  He provides a 
narrator that makes no such claim.  The fictional story is told within a realist 
framework, but the days before the death and the actual death could be known by 
no one other than Ivan himself.  It is told as a mixed up, long and torturous 
acceptance of the inevitable; a record of unsorted experiences.  Since huge detail is 
provided by a narrator who was not present at the death and who has not provided 
himself with any means of knowing, the reader is entitled to assume that the 
                                                          
84  Ibid., p. 10. 
85  Ibid., p. 13. 
86  Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter, p. 220. 
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fictional death of Ivan is a metaphor for the death of the old cover story and the 
substitution of a new one.   The organised story, the one presented to the world, the 
pre-existing story is presented by the text in terms of Ivan’s successes, his marriage, 
his children and his pleasures: “His pleasures where his work was concerned lay in 
the gratification of ambition; his social pleasures lay in the gratification of his 
vanity; but his real delight was in playing whist.”87  This organised story is to be 
challenged.  The start of the challenge originates (as does the real death) with his 
“slip” and “bruise” occasioned as he furnished and decorated his drawing room. It 
continues until “he does not care at all”.88  The irony becomes that for “the sake [of 
the drawing room] (how bitterly ludicrous it seemed) he had sacrificed his life”.89  
Once he realises that he is going to die the awareness is expressed as, “he felt the 
old familiar, dull, gnawing pain…[that]…will never cease”.90  He struggles against 
it; he adopts many tactics; he “sought relief – new screens”; “He would shake 
himself, try to pull himself together”; “he did not think of It.”  However, he is 
forced to a conclusion and the conclusion was “terrible” and ridiculous” but 
ultimately he cannot deny it no longer.  He is forced to acknowledge that “It alone 
was true.”  And the “It” is “What’s the use of it all?”91  There is no escape.  He asks 
himself, “Why deceive myself?”92  Everything then presents itself in a new light.  
Now, everything “was all rubbish and delusion”.  Ivan cannot “believe in it [his 
                                                          
87  Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilyich, p. 35. 
88  Ibid., p. 46. 
89  Ibid., p. 57. 
90  Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
91  This sequence of quotes is taken from pp. 56-58.  Ivan’s “disorganised” thoughts are 
rearranged to tell the process of recognition more clearly. 
92  Ibid., p. 51. 
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organised story] any longer”.93  Pain is given as the overt cause but the underlying 
story is to be read differently.  Ivan “groaned not so much from the pain, terrible 
though it was, as from mental anguish”.94  The language builds up towards a 
climax, the point of recognition: “loathsome”, “senseless”, “no answer”, “no 
explanation”, “it was all wrong, a horrible, monstrous lie concealing both life and 
death”, and the motif word, “horror”.  Ivan has to choose and he chooses:  “What 
do I want?  Not to suffer.  To live.”95  The question is how?  Reading back, the 
narrative presents another story: “a gleam of hope [in a] raging sea of despair.”96  
And the gleam of hope is the theme of falsity and falsity is associated with the pain.  
He must either live with it or pretend that “there was no more falsity – that had 
gone with them”.97  “What tormented Ivan most was the pretence”,98 but in this he 
was on his own.  Everybody else “has no desire to understand [him]”.  The pretence 
is that death is disagreeable and not to be talked about.  Everybody, except Ivan, is 
happy with this arrangement.  He must choose to fall into line: “He was perfectly 
well aware that they were all lying all the time, and also why they were lying.”99  
He considers the God solution and ostensibly rejects it as Tolstoy does in real life: 
but not quite.  His wife asks him if he feels better after taking the Sacrament and he 
says, “Yes,”100 but “the expression on his face when he uttered that ‘Yes’ was 
dreadful.”101  The “Yes” is the point of recognition: his admission into the 
                                                          
93  Ibid., p. 66. 
94  Ibid. 
95  Ibid., p. 76. 
96  Ibid., p. 67. 
97  Ibid., p. 74. 
98  Ibid., p. 62. 
99  Ibid., p. 69. 
100  Ibid., p. 85 
101  Ibid., p. 86. 
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community of self-deceivers.  Tolstoy says of himself:  “It was so essential for me 
to believe in order to live that I hid from myself the contradictions and obscurities 
in the religious dogma.”102 
 
 The process of narration commences: “From that moment the screaming 
began that continued for three days.”103  And the novel jumps to the point of 
narration without observing the process.  Ivan emerges redeemed because he has 
adopted religion albeit without the dogma. 
 
(ii)  The Near ESDeS Reading of Strait is the Gate: 
 
The main carnal/overt plot in Strait is the Gate tells of two cousins, Alissa and 
Jerome.  Jerome tells the story, from his perspective, in his journal and through the 
explicit selections he makes from Alissa’s letters and the implicit use of her diaries.  
Alissa relates her version in her letters and in her diary.   Jerome tells how he loses 
his father at the age of 12 and is brought up by his mother and her companion, Flora 
Ashburton, in Paris.  He and the family group escape town during the “summer 
every year”104 to an uncle’s home near Le Havre.  It is here that he makes the 
acquaintance of his cousins, Alissa, Juliette and Robert.  He and Alissa, he claims, 
fall in love but seem unable to reach the point of consummation.  Alissa tells the 
reader that she is tortured by conflict.  She feels that her love is endangering 
Jerome’s soul so, in the interests of his salvation, she decides to suppress everything 
                                                          
102  Tolstoy, “A Confession”, p. 70. 
103  Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilyich, p. 86. 
104  André Gide, Strait is the Gate, London: Penguin, 2000, p. 9. 
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and retreat to a nursing home where she dies at the age of twenty five.  Her death 
leaves Jerome to cherish her memory. The near ESDeS reading of Strait is the Gate 
is told in three parts: Jerome tells the story of his relationship with Alissa up to her 
death; then Alissa retells it through her point of view in her diary; and then there is a 
codicil in which Jerome tells of his meeting with Juliette ten years after.  The text as 
a whole begins with the title and a biblical reference, Luke xiii, 24.   
 
The text, obliquely, allows Jerome to give the epigraphic parable an 
interpretation through metaphor which establishes that there are two parts of the 
overall narrative-consciousness.  It describes the garden at the holiday home in Le 
Havre.  It contains the two paths: one path was “gay with flowers”; the other was 
the “dark walk”.105  The description continues by describing the gate between the 
garden and the outside world in two ways.  This, if added to the two homophonic 
possible readings of the title and the two paths, clearly warns that there is an 
existing cover story but that it is about to split. 
 
The split is the focus of an ESDeS reading of this novel.  The gate is 
described first as having a “secret fastening”106 and second as being secret in its 
entirety: “the little secret gate.”107  This not only makes the secret ambiguous, it is a 
misuse of the word for neither the fastening or the gate itself is really secret.  
Neither the secret of the gate nor its fastening provides an impediment: Jerome and 
                                                          
105  Ibid., p. 10. 
106  Ibid. 
107  Ibid., p. 11. 
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the family pass in and out of the gate “every fine summer evening”.108  If the text is 
to be relied upon as a parable teller the secret must refer to things other than 
fastenings or gates.  The secret refers, of course, to existential futility.  This novel 
focuses on how this choice can be narrated.  It indicates immediately through 
metaphor that a retelling will not be enough this time: a different type of story is 
needed.  To the inside of the gate there are the two paths and everybody, it seems, 
has to either walk down one or the other.  But this is a false dichotomy.  The 
unreliability of the text which eventually becomes apparent has immediately 
confused the possibilities.  In fact, there is another alternative.  Outside of the gate 
there are an infinite number of paths.  Outside, it is true, there is only one “avenue”, 
but in this avenue there is a bench and, from the bench, there are a multiplicity of 
views across “the little valley filled with mist”.109  Inside there is only good and 
bad: outside there is what is perceived by each individual person on the bench 
looking over the countryside.  Inside there is the thematic story of meaning which 
revolves around religion (Story-1).  Outside there is uncertainty (mist) associated 
with individual choice (Story-2). 
 
The story, when reread in an ESDeS way, reveals a happy childhood and the 
process of separation.  Walker reports that “much of the communication between 
the two [Jerome and Alissa] is accomplished only indirectly from the earliest stage 
in their story”.110  Jerome sees what happens from his perspective and Alissa sees 
                                                          
108  Ibid., p. 10. 
109  Ibid., p. 11. 
110  Walker, André Gide, p. 47. 
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the same objective events quite differently.  Alissa, nearer the final split, writes in 
her “book”:  
As if in this book, which I began only so as to help myself to do 
without him, I was continuing to write to him.  I have torn up all 
the pages which seemed to me to be well written (I know what I 
mean by this.)  I ought to have torn up all those in which there 
was any question of him.  I ought to have torn them all up, I 
could not.111   
 
 
On the surface it is just a description of the difficulty of separation.  Underneath it 
may threaten more.  “Book” in the translation is “cahier” in the original and this is 
quite different from book and allows the possibility that the first reader, the 
translator, is colluding with the text to hide it prior motivation.  The suggestion is 
that the complete book represents a narrative-consciousness and should, therefore 
contains two available ideas which come to light because of the splitting.  By 
conflating the part with the whole this risks being overlooked.  The side given the 
name “Alissa” has the function of existential angst and as such is duty bound to 
separate herself from Jerome so that the side given the name “Jerome” can take on 
the function of projects without impediment.  It will be recalled how Mill and 
Tolstoy expressed their immediate post-point of recognition as the inability to enjoy 
what had previously been enjoyable.  Alissa has an almost identical experience.  
She says, in one of her letters to Jerome:  “My books are without virtue and without 
charm; my walks have no attraction; Nature has lost her glamour; the garden is 
emptied of colour, of scent.”112  Jerome in contrast has plans for a book, travels and 
spends time in the army.  The contrast is spelled-out by Gide with two contrasting 
                                                          
111  Gide, Strait is the Gate, p. 116. 
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views expressed at one of their later attempts at reconciliation.  Jerome describes 
the morning as breathing “laughter and delight” to which Alissa responds “we were 
not born for happiness”.113  This is an attitude that Alissa comes to represent: “I see 
nothing beyond; my life stops.”114   Alissa is surrounded by a growing number of 
motif words such as absurd and futile and uneasiness115 and gives uncharitable 
opinions, as when she interprets her brother’s success as a novelist:  “I hear his 
incurable futility of mind called ‘lightness’ and ‘grace’.”116  Walker concludes that 
“it might be argued that Alissa discovers the existential void at the heart of human 
reality”.117 
 
At the beginning of the story the whole collection of characters used the gate 
to walk in the avenue and sit down on the bench.  By the end of the story the 
situation has changed.  Alissa goes inside the door and the bolt is “drawn behind 
her”.118  She is not said to do the deed; it just happens: “the door was shut.”119 
Jerome is now afraid to go inside the gate.  He says “to have forced the door…was 
not possible to me, and whoever does not understand me here, has understood 
nothing of me up till now.”120  Alissa leaves the house to go to a nursing home in 
Paris.  The text here is describing the split which has occurred in the narrative-
consciousness.  What comes after describes how this split is to be accommodated.   
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This thesis suggests the narrative-consciousness has recognised existential 
angst.  Alissa is just the personification of this proposition.  Strictly speaking Alissa 
by going back into the garden and locking the gate and going on to die is as perfect 
a description of “buried” or “hidden” as it could be hoped for.  Jerome continues to 
live.  The process of narration would be completed if Jerome went on to put a new 
project or cover story into place.  But the text is unable to make this last step.  The 
main story cannot tell the story that it is promising to tell.  This not-telling is 
reserved for the codicil. 
 
The codicil is necessary to provide the culmination of the dilemma.  It 
describes Jerome’s meeting with Juliette ten years after Alissa’s death.  The death 
which finalised the split in the narrative-consciousness was presented as totally 
Alissa’s own choice.  Jerome and Juliette do everything in their power to prevent it.  
This is crucial.  The separation is not collusive.  Alissa acts it out despite them and 
dies.  Her death, although by starvation, is in effect a one-sided suicidal choice.  
Jerome survives and should go to make a life represented by Juliette for in the 
manifest plot she represents Gide’s Madeleine who he is said to have preferred and 
in the latent plot she represents a life that is worth living.  However, he cannot or 
does not quite make either of these steps. 
 
Jerome both rejects Alissa’s godly ways, but also seeks them.  He says he 
plans to stay faithful “to her idea of me”.121  He admits he does not have the 
necessary skill of existential-self-deception.  In response to Juliette asking “What 
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are you waiting for to marry?” he says, “To have forgotten a great many things.”122  
He has become a teacher but this is just a role: for he does “not hope ever to 
forget”.123  He is leading what Sartre would call an inauthentic life and what this 
thesis will call failure of existential-self-deception (ESD) for he “couldn’t do 
otherwise”.124  He finally chooses but his choice is contrary to the advice given by 
Juliette.  He chooses not to “wake up”.125  As for Juliette, as a minor part of the 
narrative-consciousness, she finishes the book in the shade where it was not 
possible “to distinguish her features”126 and where it might be surmised she was in 
regretful tears.  The text acknowledges that the Story-2 project has been well lit up 
but is, in the end, defeated.  The narrative-consciousness represents a perfect 
personification of Hawthorn’s “deep nostalgia for an earlier age when faith was full 
and authority was intact”.127  It has seen the inevitable, but cannot quite bring itself 
to take the extra step. 
 
(iii)  The Near ESDeS Reading of the Jamesian Oeuvre between 1892-1903 
 
Henry James “is a crucial figure in the transition from classic to modern fiction”,128 
and his work is often classified, like Gide’s Strait is the Gate, by, for example, 
Bradbury,129 within the modernist movement.  He is preoccupied with what he calls 
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“the air of reality”130 which is “what in some shape or form we might 
[immediately] encounter”.131  He concerns himself with points of view and 
consciousness but, like Gide, fails to tell an ESDeS.  His texts lack references to 
existential despair: they neither indicate its presence by genre-marking nor by its 
spelling-out in a covert plot.  But he gains attention from this thesis, as indicated in 
chapter 2, because he satisfies the criteria for a likely ESDeS author: he is an 
autobiographical author who was in self-deception when he was writing during this 
eriod. 
 
queer identity, of racial mixing, of Rooseveltian masculinity, of female power and 
                                                          
p
These reasons only attract attention to his work. His actual work is the focus 
of this part of the thesis.  His work during the period between 1892 and 1903 
contains aspects important to ESDeS.  The stories introduce or expand upon the 
concepts of bracketing deaths, secret and splitting and involve the ideas of self-
deceptive collusion and repetition.  However it is necessary, before looking at two 
examples of his work, to clarify the function of this examination.  The thesis is 
about ESDeS.  This thesis therefore is not interested in James as such; it has no 
opinion on whether or not he is “the author of some of the most mind-bogglingly 
obscure prose” or is “one of America’s greatest novelists”.132  It is clear, however, 
that his work does forment an immense volume of criticism.  It seems possible to 
find any imaginable theme inside his writing: themes “of metaphysical evils…of 
130  Henry James, “The Art of Fiction”, in Morris Shapiro (ed), Selected Literary Criticisms, 
London: Penguin, 1968, p. 86. 
131  Ibid., p. 84. 
132  Jonathan Freedman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Henry James, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. xi. 
 136
imperial destiny – to name just a few”.133  This proliferation of alternatives does 
not, however, include any suggestion that this work contains covert plotting.  This 
is a shame for the availability of these countless “interpretations” would exactly 
fulfil the function of disguising such a plot if it existed. 
 
The possibility of a covert plot, however, is hinted at.  It is given the name 
“essential secret” by Tzvetan Todorov.  Todorov refers to the “secret of narrative” 
and discusses it at length, basing his discussion on Henry James’s short fictions 
between “1892 to at least 1903”:134 “The secret of Jamesian narrative [is] precisely 
the existence of an essential secret, of something not named, of an absent and 
superpowerful force which sets the whole present machinery of the narrative in 
motion.”135  When Todorov refers to “absences” he means “the tale is formed 
around a character or a phenomenon enveloped in a certain mystery”.136  He 
regards the absence as a motivating cause of what follows: namely the narrative.  
He states: “The absence of the cause…is the text’s logical origin and reason for 
being.”137   However, this has a strange echo to it.  James’s technique, as described 
by Todorov, mirrors the technique Kermode has found in parable telling: Todorov 
finds James “on the one hand…deploys all his forces to …reveal the hidden secret; 
on the other, he constantly postpones, protects the revelation – until the story’s end, 
if not beyond.”138  Maisie, as has been argued, is an example of this.  She, too, is 
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just the same at the end as at the beginning.  This appears to be just another way of 
putting this thesis’s narrative-consciousness theory’s circular progression from 
cover story to cover story: but it is not quite the same.  From now on the thesis 
takes responsibility for the extrapolation of Todorov’s views.  It thinks that the 
choice of terminology, “absence”, makes it clear that the cover story has broken 
down but thinks Todorov overlooks the obvious fact that the secret is available to 
the narrative-consciousness because it is this which motivates the story.  From the 
reader’s point of view it may look like the text is trying to discover the secret but 
from the narrative-consciousness point of view the objective is different.  It is 
trying to re-hide it.  Todorov also draws attention to the necessity of repetition, via 
structure of the storytelling, which “allows James to keep beginning it [another 
telling of the story] over and over”.139  He is implying that since it is a fact that the 
story is repeated then it follows that the secret is not found and the search has to 
continue.  But this again does not quite fit the facts.  Each time James starts a new 
story the motivating secret is a different secret: Maisie is not really the same at the 
end as at the beginning.  She is divided into two in each case but in the beginning 
she has no responsibility for the division whilst in the end she is “dropped” as well 
as “divided”: she is innocent at the beginning and collusive at the end.  At the 
beginning, things happened to her.  At the end she says, “Yes, I’ve chosen.”140  
From this, it should follow that if the next story starts with another motivating 
absence the last story implicitly ends with a new cover story that requires another 
point of recognition or “absence”.  So even if Todorov does not exactly state that 
                                                          
139  Ibid. 
140  Henry James. What Maisie Knew, London: Penguin, 1985, p. 254. 
 138
the narrative, which is motivated by the absence, also ends with the substitution of 
another cover story, it is implicit in his account.  In effect the story is bracketed by 
“absences”.  Todorov divides James’s stories into five classes of absence, one of 
which is “both absolute and natural, with pure absence: death”.141   
 
Nor does Todorov suggest why the story should be repeated.  As stated, 
James has a choice.  He could continue with his sequence of stories involving an 
absence in each but he need not do so.  The fact that he does, however, suggests an 
imperative.  This thesis suggests the imperative follows from the narrative-
consciousness’s need to continually repress awareness of existential angst.  If this is 
so then it would no longer be a matter of choice but a matter of necessity.  Insofar 
as James’s stories reflect his narrative-consciousness at this time then they do need 
to be repeated.  This thesis finds, as an empirical fact, the absence in the covert plot 
involves a collusive death plot so has adopted the term bracketing deaths for the 
frame of the covert plot.142  This use of the term is supported because of the 
necessity involved in ESDeS.  It is further supported by the curious way Conrad 
reports the completion of a story.  He wrote to his aunt, in one of many examples, 
when he finished Almayer’s Folly and said “I regret to inform you of the death of 
Mr. Kaspar Almayer, which occurred this morning at 3 o’clock.”143 
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Between the deaths, Todorov says: “The effect of this cause is the narrative, 
the story we are told.”144  He does not, however, adequately explain why this 
“entire narrative” which does not resolve the narrator’s nor the reader’s ignorance 
should either be a job worth writing for the author or a job worth reading for the 
reader.  He does hint at it, however: “The quest for the secret must never be ended, 
for it constitutes the secret itself.”145  This could be translated into ESDeS 
terminology: There is an endlessly repetitive journey from cover story to cover 
story in which the secret is discovered and lost over and over again.  The narrative-
consciousness reasserts the split between its part that knows and dies and its part 
that does not know and continues to live.  James is clearly on the verge of moving 
on to ESDeS.  He lacks only collusive covert plotting.  Two examples have been 
chosen to illustrate his method.   
 
The first story, which precedes the Domville episode, is “The Figure in the 
Carpet”.  Its narrator-critic (NC) is told by an author, Hugh Vereker, that he had 
missed the point of his writing: “There’s an idea in my work without which I 
wouldn’t have given a straw for the whole job.”146  The two discuss it seriously for 
a moment before the discussion descends to an almost post-modern example of 
word play.  “An element of form or an element of feeling is discounted” and “some 
idea about life” accepted before the NC starts a series of jokes: “Perhaps it is a 
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preference for the letter P!”147  Nevertheless an ESDeS reading might reasonably 
assume that the “idea about life” contained nothing less than a reference to 
existential futility, although the text never makes this explicit.  It does, however, 
make it clear that the “secret”148 is structural: “something like a complex figure in a 
Persian carpet” or “the very string…my pearls are strung on”.149  The secret is 
fundamental and the rest superficial: “It stretches, this little trick of mine, from 
book to book, and everything else, comparatively, plays over the surface of it.”150 
 
The secret is approached by the text in two ways.  The first way is 
experimentally.  The NC starts to look for what he comes to call the “general 
intention”151 behind Verecker’s work and his description of his search shows 
clearly that he does appreciate it, but just does not recognise it.  His description 
replicates, again, Tolstoy’s and Mill’s real life discovery of existential futility.  He 
says:  
I not only failed to find his general intention – I found myself 
missing the subordinate intentions I had formerly found.  His 
books didn’t even remain the charming things they had been for 
me…Instead of being a pleasure the more they became a 
resource for less.152 
 
The text then moves on from the essentially introspective narrative and turns 
more into a sequence of events.  The NC passes on his knowledge to his friend, 
George Corvick, and his friend, Gwendolen.  After some time George tells 
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Gwendolen, in a double exclamation that predates Kurtz’s “Horror!” by two or 
three years that: “He has got it, he has got it.”153  His claim is verified textually by 
Vereker himself, who says there “is not a note wrong”154 and by actions, for 
Corvick does what anybody does when then have experienced the horror: “he had 
thrown everything up.”155  A series of narrative events, including the marriage of 
Corvick to Gwendolen, occurs which prevent the certain passing on of this 
discovery.  Corvick then has an accident and dies.  This death would immediately 
be identified, within an ESDeS reading, as the required separation.  Not-p is hidden 
and p is allowed to carry on.  The story could end.  It would not be a covert plotting 
as such but it would have similarities.  The overall narrative-consciousness makes 
the same claim as Watts will make with respect to a full covert plotting.  It makes it 
plain that the secret is available.  Vereker claims “I’ve shouted my intention” and 
“if you had [a glimpse of it] the element in question would soon have become 
practically all you’d see”.156  Then, the text notes with glee that “Nobody does” 
[see].157  Certainly the NC “hadn’t so much as hinted at it”.158 
 
However, the story does not stop.  Gwendolen claims “I heard 
everything”159 from her husband but no narrative substantiation is given to her 
claim.  She certainly does not pass the good news on to the NC.  She does however 
remarry – a Drayton Deane.  Once again there is a death.  Gwendolen dies in 
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childbirth.  Once again it might be assumed within the narrative-consciousness 
theory that not-p had been hidden leaving p behind making the point that the 
process is necessarily repetitive.  The thesis thinks this is probably not the point the 
text best makes.  The NC naturally assumes that if George passed the knowledge on 
to Gwendolen, she would have, in her turn, passed it on to Drayton.  This proves 
not to be the case for he didn’t know.  The NC admits this in a very significant way: 
“He wasn’t acting – it was the absurd truth.  She didn’t tell.”160 
 
It follows therefore that George did not tell Gwendolen.  It follows therefore 
that the text is making it plain that, by 1896, the parent-child mechanism is not so 
universally applied - an individual is not first told the existential secret and then 
told how to accommodate it - but must find out existential angst for themselves and 
deal with it for themselves.  Re-reading the text provides second-reading evidence 
for this.  Vereker regrets telling the NC that the secret exists.  He comes to regard it 
as a mistake: “I begin to measure the temerity of my having saddled you with a 
knowledge that you may find something of a burden.”161  It seems likely therefore 
that George told Gwendolen only this.  She certainly tells the NC, who knew of the 
secret, that she meant “to keep it to herself”162 and she clearly did not tell her new 
husband at all.  If the narrative-consciousness does, de facto, kill off not-p it does so 
without the cooperation of the p part of itself.  It therefore cannot put in place a 
collusive covert plot.  It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that the narrative-
consciousness, called James, has only two spelled-out messages.  The first is that 
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there is a secret and the second is that if you come to recognise the secret as horror, 
keep it to yourself.  The narrative-consciousness hints at “buried treasure”163 but, 
like Jerome, does not know what to do with it. 
 
The second story, which ends the post-Domville period, is ‘The Beast in the 
Jungle’ (1903).  James again makes the retention of the secret “the explicit 
theme”164 of this story.  A carnal reading of the story tells of the relationship 
between May and Marcher.  Marcher has told May that he expects something 
special to happen to him: that he was “being kept for something rare and 
strange”.165  May claims to have discovered the secret but dies without telling him. 
She dies praying that “he mightn’t ever know”.166  He eventually, perhaps, 
discovers that the secret is that nothing ever happens to him because he has spent 
his time waiting for something to happen.  This is sad but the reader might, but 
need not, agree with Todorov that the mistake seems “too insignificant”167 to merit 
the hyperbolic terminology used to describe it.  Marcher’s behaviour does not, at 
first reading, seem to merit the term “heroic”.168  The secret “thing” does not seem 
to merit the term “monstrous”169 and its discovery does not seem to deserve the 
term “horror”.170  In The Iceman Cometh, Hickey is horrified because he has killed 
his wife.  Kurtz associates horror with death and existential futility.  Horror is not a 
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term to apply to nothing happening.  Of course, if the reader expects more from 
James, as Kermode expects more from Henry Green,171 then the hyperbolic prose 
may be justified by either a spiritual reading such as provided by Leigh Wilson172 
or by an ESDeS reading as provided now. 
 
The story has a separation: this time personified as May, who knows 
something, and Marcher, who does not.  Todorov’s analysis of the story again 
comes to the conclusion that “the secret was the existence of the secret itself”,173 
but goes a little further this time.  He sees May as going further.  She recognises 
there has to be a project: any project.  For her it has been her love for Marcher, but 
she makes it clear anything else would have been as good: “what else does one ever 
want to be [but interested]?”174  Todorov also makes it clear that Marcher does not 
recognise the necessity of project.  The text implies that he knows very well that the 
“beast” is existential futility for he says quite clearly “it isn’t a matter as to which I 
can choose .… It isn’t one as to which there can be a change.”175  He also claims 
that it, “the thing”, “lay in wait for him, amid the twists and the turns of the months 
and the years”.176  He knows it, but chooses to forget it, although it keeps returning.  
James makes the issues important by putting them at the beginning and discussing 
them at length.  He has Marcher observe he was “disconcerted almost equally by 
the presence of those who knew too much and by that of those who knew 
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nothing”.177  He is not in a position to be happy with existential angst (Story-3) or 
able to accept unquestioning belief in Story-1.  Marcher then goes on to make a 
huge fuss about remembering, but this turns out to be more like the process of 
recognition.  He remembers each fact incorrectly and does not remember the crucial 
one until he is forced to.  May has to virtually drag “his secret”178 out of him.  
When he does finally admit it there is a (Hickeyean) echo of the point of 
recognition about the way he does so: “Oh, then he saw, but he was lost in wonder 
and found himself embarrassed.”179  He had managed to forget it, for “ten”180 years 
between the first meeting and the second, and managed to forget it again “for a 
year”181 between May’s death and the culminating scene by her grave.  Between 
times Marcher clings to the idea that there is a purpose and, therefore, doesn’t adopt 
a real project.  In the first “sabbatical” he finds some “forms”: “those of his little 
office under Government, those of caring for his modest patrimony, for his 
library.”182  In his second, “he visited the depths of Asia, spending himself on 
scenes of romantic interest”.183  May’s position is different.  In the carnal plotting 
she presents herself as an interested companion.  She knows perfectly well that the 
two of them cannot coexist.  It is made clear (but not explained) that “marrying 
[was] out of the question”.184  May realises that “something or other lay in wait for 
him” and it was something she could not “share”.185  She is under no illusions about 
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what this entails.  She expects she “will be but too well repaid”.186  She spells it out 
for Marcher: “You’ve had your experience.  You leave me to my fate.”187  The 
narrative-consciousness is aware of existential futility and the need for its 
forgetting.  To achieve this, the story arranges a split.  Although Marcher has had 
the experience, it is May who takes on board the knowledge: “she ‘knew’.”188  She 
accepts that in order for Marcher not to know, she has to die.  The death allows 
Marcher to continue.  However, once again it is not a collusive arrangement 
between parts of the narrative-consciousness.  Marcher does not acquiesce in the 
arrangement.  As a result his way of living, his construction of project, is not very 
impressive.  He is like Jerome and the Narrator-Critic in “The Figure in the 
Carpet”: he has the opportunity but can make nothing of it.  He can’t really get 
away from his “beast”: he spends his time fiddling with projects but is really just 
waiting.  The return of the awareness of existential futility is inevitable and this 
really is the existential reading of this text.  Consider the crucial last paragraph: “He 
saw the Jungle of his life and saw the lurking Beast; then while he looked, 
perceived it…it was close and, instinctively turning…to avoid it.”189  May tries to 
move the story on to Story-2, but Marcher, although “disconcerted” by it, insists on 
clinging onto Story-1.  He cannot face existential futility but neither can he move 
on.   
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(iv)  The Near ESDeS Reading of Conrad’s Almayer’s Folly 
 
Gide and James were obsessed, at the times of writing, with normal-self-deceptions.  
Conrad, in contrast, became very much interested in existential angst although this 
had not quite flowered at the time of his writing of Almayer’s Folly.  Bruce Johnson 
states that: “There seems to be general agreement among critics that in his first two 
novels Conrad is particularly interested in … the paralysis of will.”190  It is 
certainly true that Almayer is portrayed as not taking responsibility for his downfall 
whereas Marlow in Heart of Darkness, as will be shown in the next chapter, falls in 
a half way stage; he does take responsibility but chooses to ignore it.  This on its 
own is sufficient to deny Almayer’s Folly ESDeS status but this is not the reason 
given by this thesis.  It argues that an ESDeS requires an intentional or collusive 
covert plot.  Cedric Watts shows that the book does contain “an important covert 
plot”.191  It will be shown, however, that the covert plot is not collusive - for the 
two parts of the narrative-consciousness identified with p and not-p do not agree 
with the death choice.   
                                                          
 
The main purpose of reading this novel, at this stage, is to illustrate the 
process of covert plotting.  It is convenient, therefore, to be reminded of the 
meaning given to this.  The covert plot is similar to a normal overt plot in that it is a 
purposeful sequence available in the text as written.  It is differentiated from a 
normal overt plot in that is partly hidden so that it may elude readers.  It is also 
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differentiated from latent or spiritual plots in that it does not require interpretation 
using information or knowledge not actually available in the text. 
 
Almayer’s Folly is set on a trading river in the East Indian island of Borneo, 
and is told through the narrator and the reported internal musings of the eponymous 
hero.  It is through the latter that the scene is set: 
He [Almayer] absorbed himself in his dream of wealth and 
power away from this coast where he had dwelt for so many 
years, forgetting the bitterness of toil and strife in the vision of a 
great and splendid reward.  They would live in Europe, he and 
his daughter.  They would be rich and respected.  Nobody would 
think of her mixed blood in the presence of her great beauty and 
of his immense wealth.192 
 
Almayer is thus introduced as a certain self-deceiver and a possible racist: 
themes expanded at length until the arrival of Dain Maroola (a quarter of the way 
into the novel) introduces the possibility of movement.  Dain engages with both 
Almayer and his daughter, Nina.  Almayer thinks it will now be possible to make 
his fortune by travelling upstream to find a source of diamonds and gold.  Nina 
anticipates love.  The preparatory work done, Almayer’s Folly picks up speed.  The 
Balinese hero sets out, at night, to cross the river in flood.  He does so because he 
needs to escape the Dutch after a failed trading expedition and because he wants to 
see Nina.  The reader finds out what happens in real time when a mutilated corpse 
is found next morning.  Its face is unrecognisable but the corpse is identifiable from 
the ring and bangle that Dain always wore.  Almayer is distraught; for Dain was to 
have been his saviour, but the Dutch think their pursuit is at an end and go away.  
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Almayer goes through three stages of decoding.  First he is shown the mutilated 
corpse, which he secondly and wrongly assumes is that of Dain.  Then, finally he 
does make the correct decoding: only tardily does Almayer (and the reader) 
discover that Dain is alive and the body was a mere boatman who had been 
mutilated by Mrs. Almayer (Nina’s mother) and the jewellery donated by Dain 
himself.  From the reader’s perspective this is an example of a covert plot that does 
not quite go all the way.  It is a plot hidden from the reader for several pages 
although the reader is given clues to disentangle the truth before it is given.  One 
such clue is the lack of concern shown by Nina.  From Almayer’s point of view, not 
knowing of Nina’s love for Dain, this might not give alarm, but for the reader it is a 
clear signal amplified by her actual comment: “with her heart deeply moved by the 
sight of Almayer’s misery, knowing it was in her power to end it with a word, 
longing to bring peace to that troubled heart, she heard with terror the voice of her 
overpowering love commanding her to be silent.”193  In contrast to a true covert 
plot, however, the text provides the solution first to the reader and then to Almayer.  
The text on this occasion is clearly only delaying the truth: it is not deliberately 
hiding the truth. 
 
The overt plot continues with the escape of Dain Maroola and Nina.  Their 
escape means, and this time for good, that Almayer’s plan for wealth is totally 
destroyed.  He will not be able to pretend to himself that wealth is to be obtained 
and, with the wealth, he will be able to escape back to Europe with his daughter.  
Immediately after it is decided that the lovers should leave, it is also decided that 
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Almayer should forget: “Now she was gone his business was to forget, and he had a 
strange notion that it should be done systematically and in order.”194  Almayer is 
described as doing so immediately: “he fell on his hands and knees, and, creeping 
along the sand, erased carefully with his hand all traces of Nina’s footsteps.”195  
The two actions - escaping and forgetting - are inextricably linked. 
 
In the absence of his ambitions, what is there for Almayer?  The reader may, 
on a second reading perhaps, pay more attention to an earlier passage: 
[Almayer] looked very dejected and feeble; and by his 
side…stalked that particular fiend whose mission it is to jog the 
memories of men, lest they should forget the meaning of life.  
He whispered in Almayer’s ear a childish prattle of many years 
ago.  Almayer, his head bent on one side, seemed to listen to his 
invisible companion, but his face was like that of a man that has 
died …196 
 
The addition of “childish prattles” can be made to the long list of synonyms - 
pipedream, saving lie - for self-deception.  No longer able to believe in his original 
cover story, his project - the possibility of riches, of returning to Europe, of 
negating Nina’s mixed blood - and unable to invent a new one, there remains for 
Almayer only one alternative.  Without a self-deceptive project, existential futility 
re-emerges and cannot be resubmerged.  The narrator describes his release thus: he 
was “delivered from the trammels of earthly folly, [and] stood now in the presence 
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of Infinite Wisdom.  On his upturned face there was the serene look which follows 
the sudden release from anguish.”197 
 
The covert plot identified by Watts is called “Abdulla’s Stratagem”.198  He 
justifies calling it a covert plot (as opposed to a sub-plot) for two reasons.  First, it 
had, according to Watts, up to the publication of his book “eluded the recognition 
of the work’s critics and commentators”.199  Second, the reason it has remained 
hidden, he would argue, is because of “Conrad’s cunning”200 rather than the 
reader’s obtuseness.  However, signals are available.  Self-deception is often 
indicated by “something missing” and, Kermode claims, it may be possible to find a 
spiritual reading by “putting a lot of exegetical pressure on one point”.201  An 
ESDeS, it has been argued, is signalled by appropriate genre-markers.  A covert 
plot, argues Watts, is signalled in a similar way.  He suggests that it is often 
introduced by the appearance of an “anomaly”,202 where he means by anomaly 
“some detail which seems discordant with the overt plot”.203  The two sides can, it 
seems, coexist: “a reader notes as odd or puzzling some conspicuous elements of 
the covert plot but does not proceed to infer their linkages.”204  These “odd 
elements” appear from very early on in the text of Almayer’s Folly and could give 
rise to a number of questions such as: “why has Almayer proved to be so 
unsuccessful as a trader?” and “was Dain betrayed?”  If unease is instilled in the 
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reader they may look back and make the “anomalies” explicit.  If they do so, they 
start to read the covert plot. 
 
Syed Abdulla had long wished to dominate trade of the River Pantai and to 
overcome Almayer.  The narrator reports that “the Arabs had found out the river, 
had established a trading post in Sambir, and where they traded they would be 
masters and suffer no rival”.205  Now Abdulla by any method of measurement is a 
minor character.  He gets very few mentions before the crucial death scene.  If they 
notice him at all before this point, the reader would tend to ignore him as irrelevant 
to the main ongoing story, as an intrusion, perhaps to give the sense of realism.  He 
never reveals any of his inner life and never makes any development.  Insofar as he 
is noticed it is probably as a representative of a whole group (Arab in this case) 
rather than an individual.  Almayer makes this mistake as shown when he mutters 
to himself: “Arabs, no doubt.…What are they up to now?  Some of Abdulla’s 
business; curse him.”206  The main plots flow on independently (with the Dain-Nina 
affair dominating), so a reading concentrating on the Almayer-Abdulla plot 
necessitates detailed re-reading.  It will then be found that Syed Abdulla has 
considered a number of methods to overcome Almayer.  One method he had 
considered involved a scheme of marriage.  He had thought his loyal nephew, 
Reshid, might marry Nina, but this scheme was rejected out of hand.  Incidentally 
this can be overlooked as part of the covert plot since it also has a role to play in the 
overt plot: it does not fit in with either Almayer’s racism or his “childish prattles”.  
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Abdulla concocts another scheme.  He tells the Dutch that Dain is trading illegal 
gunpowder with the hope that his supplier, Almayer, will be implicated and 
removed from the river.  Again this scheme fails because the Dutch identify 
Abdulla as the correct villain.  Nevertheless the scheming is in the text. “How did 
you hear about the brig?” asks Almayer, and is given the answer “An Arab trader of 
this place has sent the information.”207  This treachery is repeated as soon as 
Abdulla and Reshid discover the truth behind the body in the river.   
 
Watts does an impressive job identifying the covert plot but he then leaves it 
at that.  He does not adequately explain why the covert plot is inserted.  He knows 
this is a weak point in his case for he asks rhetorically: 
The sceptical reader may well say, however: if the covert plot 
matters, what is the point of making it covert?  If something 
counts, why does the author hide it?  And what is the point of 
hiding it if it is still doomed to be eventually found?  The stuff’s 
either seen or it isn’t.  If it isn’t why include it?  And if it is seen 
surely it isn’t covert?208 
 
His answer is that “the text searches reality and offers us a training in the searching 
of reality by encouraging us to search itself”.209  This is weak and this is strange 
since Conrad spells-out the (ESDeS) reason in the very last line of the narrative:  
“‘Is he dead?’ he asked.  ‘May you live!’ answered the crowd in one shout. And 
there succeeded a breathless silence.”210  Almayer dies and Abdulla lives.  It is as if 
Watts fails to notice what he has so well explained.  The training, if training it is, is 
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to not notice the covert plot and when it is (finally) noticed (by a troublesome Watts 
or his ilk) a new cover story is needed.   
 
An ESDeS reading of Almayer’s Folly has Almayer as only a part of the 
narrative-consciousness: the part that carries knowledge of existential angst.  It is in 
the nature of ESDeS that this knowledge is relegated to a covert plot but it is neither 
necessary nor desirable to spell-this-out any more clearly.  If existential futility is 
spelt-out too obviously, the text risks (re)inviting awareness of it into the narrative- 
consciousnesses of both the writer and reader.  In this case, however, each plot 
copies the essential division and mirrors the other.  Each represents a dichotomy 
that cannot continue to exist for long since they are mutually exclusive possibilities.  
The dichotomies in each plot are brought to a crisis by the river drowning scene and 
resolved by Almayer’s death.  The process of narrative choice is completed by his 
death.  The death is, however, shown to be one-sided.  Neither Dain and Nina nor 
Abdulla co-operate in it.  Conrad recognises the significance of this: he tells his 
aunt “the last chapter…ends with a long solo for Almayer”.211  It spells-out his 
death in suicidal detail.  He smokes opium with Jim-Eng and alternates between a 
longing to forget and awareness of existential futility. 
He knew perfectly well what was to be done now.  First this, 
then that, and then forgetfulness would come easy.  Very easy.  
He had a fixed idea that if he should not forget before he died he 
would have to remember to all eternity.  Certain things had to be 
taken out of his life, stamped out of sight, destroyed, 
forgotten.212 
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The narrative-consciousness as a whole recognises the need to split.  The covert 
plot shows that either Abdulla or Almayer must die.  The overt plot sets Almayer 
up against Dain and Nina.  Either his future plans or theirs must die.  Wealth-
making and love, respectively, continue whilst Almayer, representing existential 
futility, clearly takes it upon himself to choose and does in fact die:  “The only 
white man on the east coast was dead.”213  When Almayer talks about forgetting he 
is talking about himself, what he represents.  He represents the unspeakable and 
must be forgotten to allow the human projects to continue – which they do.  The 
narration does not end with the end of the story, for readers are clearly told one half 
of each dichotomy is to continue.  The project “love” continues beyond the text for 
Conrad specifically mentions: “We had news from Bali last moon.… A grandchild 
is born to the old Rajah, and there is great rejoicing.”214  Similarly the “wealth-
making” project continues with Abdulla, who has the last word: “And as they 
passed through the crowd that fell back before them, the beads in Abdulla’s hand 
clicked, while in a solemn whisper he breathed out piously the name of Allah!  The 
Merciful!  The Compassionate!”215  The new cover stories are in place. 
 
Story-3 
 
This chapter opens with the claim that it would help to define Story-2 by saying 
what it is not.  This has been done by looking at precursors.  This approach is 
continued here by examining a story which does not fit in with Story-2 at the back 
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end.  That is: if, faced with the choice, acceptance of paradox is the path taken then 
there is no need for a split or a new cover story.  And there is no need to go further 
with the process of narration.  There is no need for repetition or a further need of a 
process or a point of recognition.  All that is needed is this particular choice.  That 
is, an individual must not only recognise existential futility but make what becomes 
a double choice: both not to “bury” this knowledge and to live with it.  Some have 
claimed this is possible.  Terry Eagleton, for a very authoritative and recent 
example, probably expresses his own view when he paraphrases Heidegger who 
says that to live authentically "is to embrace our own nothingness, accepting the 
fact that our existence is contingent, ungrounded and unchosen".216  The willing 
choice replaces the unmotivated choice.  Eagleton goes on to describe the 
consequences of such a choice: “To accept death would be to live more 
abundantly.…By acknowledging that our lives are provisional, we can slacken our 
neurotic grip on them and thus come to relish them all the more.”217 
 
However, it seems unlikely that anybody does this.  Thomas Nagel 
expresses this as: “The objective standpoint may try to cultivate an indifference to 
its own annihilation but there will be something false about it: the individual 
attachment to life will force its way back.”218  Eagleton, paradoxically, also seems 
to support this point of view:  “Anyone who genuinely believed that nothing was 
more important than anything else…would not be quite what we recognize as a 
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person.  And you would only need to observe them in action for five minutes to 
recognize that they did not actually believe this at all.”219   
 
Henry Green, however, comes very close in his Party Going.  Now, it is 
probably true that the popular view of modernist authors is that they concern 
themselves with “various typical themes” and these include “the search for meaning 
in a world without God…[and]…the loss of meaning and hope in the modern world 
and an exploration of how this loss may be faced”.220  This is easily illustrated by 
looking at student lecture notes such as those posted by John Lye at Brock 
University.  Whether or not this is generally true, it is true that the manifest plot in 
Green’s story is concerned with the meaning of life but, unlike the others discussed 
so far in this chapter, it does not seem to want to evade the knowledge that there is 
none.  Indeed, Green acted out what he may be interpreted to say in Party Going: 
“He published nothing after 1952.…These twenty-two mute years mark perhaps…a 
more personal withdrawal into the despair that always fringed his pellucid 
world.”221   
 
The overt plot, in Party Going, is merely a story about a group of rich people 
going on a trip but being held up at the station because the trains are unable to run 
because of weather conditions.  The first line sets the scene: “Fog was so dense.”222  
The continuity of the story relies on a remarkable series of meetings giving an 
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overwhelming sense that the story is trivial and vacuous.  The rich people are 
wasting their time at the station and the impression given is that it would make no 
difference if they were in the south of France - they would still be wasting their 
time.  Frank Kermode, in Genesis of Secrecy, suggests that a second, latent, 
narrative is indicated by an extra-textual belief: “we know that many insiders think 
well of Henry Green, so we assume that the book is not trivial and vacuous, even if 
it seems so at first.”223  Such a reading may draw attention, for example, to the 
contrast between the “ostentatious rich” and the “patient, cheerful, competent”224 
people.  Kermode dismisses this split as too obvious.  He is looking for something 
more “occult”.  However, what is looked for is determined by what genre-markers 
are noted: “Other interpreters would certainly choose different moments.”225  Less 
prosaically, perhaps, the desire for a more meaningful plot foregrounds, as a theme, 
existential futility.  If so, other indicators might be expected and death certainly is 
omnipresent.  The capital letters “DEPARTURES” at the station follows the arrival 
of a dead pigeon into the story and they come second only to “Fog” in text order.   
They are the first of many symbolic references to death, which also includes the 
possible interpretation of the mystery man who travels from the locked hotel to the 
station concourse, backwards and forwards from the world of the rich to the world 
of the poor and from the happy and young to the old.  Kermode thinks he represents 
the messenger of death.  Tim Parks sums up this line of thought with: “what is the 
marvellous fizz of shenanigans that makes up the bulk of the novel, if not an heroic 
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attempt to keep death at bay?”226  Fog is foregrounded and death is foregrounded 
but their opposites are not hidden.  Julia, one of the spoilt young rich, is able to see 
beauty in the light of the headlamps, everybody finds everybody else despite the 
impenetrability of the fog, and the plot is an open and transparent attempt to live 
with the realisation of existential futility: genre-marked as death.  The train is 
merely delayed by fog.  Green does not take the chance that the novel can merely 
be described as “the way things are” with no ontological significance.  He does not 
put in abundant references to pointlessness but the whole telling reverberates with 
it.  Faced with this onslaught of nothingness the reader may well be tempted to 
make another reading, a specifically ESDeS reading.  If so it would start off well.  
Green beautifully illustrates the notion that there is no “we” - “that ‘identity’ and 
‘character’ [are] convenient and somewhat over-generous fictions”227 - so that the 
ESDeS reader would see the story as just a mechanism for making available a 
single narrative-consciousness.228  The characters are shown to be neither 
particularly individual nor self aware.  Seven party goers are going on the trip, but 
in the first few pages it is difficult to disentangle who they are.  The introductions 
are so jumbled it takes several readings and a pencil and paper to distinguish them 
from each other.  Each character is introduced in different versions: boy friend; 
Robin; Robin Adams; relationship with Angela Crevy.  Sentences are used that 
conjoin ideas and therefore suggest the conjoining of characters.  The dialogue is 
often indistinguishable.  Often both action and speech come as the result of the 
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merest compulsion.  Finally Julia makes this point overtly.  She says, “What do we 
know about anyone?”229 
 
However, although the book may contain dyadic pairs it does not go on to 
split the narrative-consciousness.  The next step in Strait is the Gate, in James’s 
short stories and in Almayer’s Folly was to look for a link character that would 
indicate a ‘split’.  Jerome served the purpose between Alissa and Juliette, but in 
Almayer’s Folly with its embryonic covert plot it was suggested that a minor 
character, Abdulla in this case, with no real purpose to the main story is often a 
main indicator of a covert plot.  In this case it is likely that the mystery man, the 
only character who does not have a name, is the link.  Nobody knows who he is, but 
he does a lot of linking.  He links Julia in the hotel to her cases on the concourse.  
He links Julia to Miss Fellowes. He links the insiders - the rich in the hotel - and the 
outsiders - the workers in the concourse.  But the mystery man is so well marked he 
cannot be missed.  It is as if James’s “secret” which is not spelled-out has attached 
itself to the man by not giving him a name.  In Party Going, however, the secret is 
spelled-out and is not anything significant.  The Messenger does not lead off to a 
plot that no one notices.  The outside is there and remains there: not very much 
exploited but definitely not hidden.  The servant and the bags wait and are available 
when necessary.  Miss Fellowes does not lead off to a plot that no one notices.  She 
feels ill during the novel and needs attention but at the end of the novel she recovers 
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and the trip goes on “in spite of Miss Fellowes”.230  Kermode, however, makes a 
big thing of the mystery man in his “mythological reading”,231 a reading that is as 
ambiguous as the text it draws on.  He draws attention to what are essentially extra-
textual pieces of knowledge: knowledge an ordinary reader may not have.  He notes 
the “stranger” has different appellations - “the rough looking customer”, “the hotel 
detective” - and suggests he could be a thief “who might eye the luggage of the 
very rich” but, ultimately, seems to equate him with Hermes, “who as psychopomp 
conducts the dead to the underworld”.232  Having made the interpretation, he does 
nothing with it.  He seems to content to make the six points (in all), including that 
many interpretations are possible - “More interpreters mean more 
interpretations”233 and interpretation can come “forty years” after publication.234  
He could have made the essential theme death.  This is a possibility, an ever present 
possibility, but here it just doesn’t happen.  What does happen is that Miss Fellowes 
does not die and life goes on inside the hotel, unlike Alissa, as well as outside on 
the concourse.  Her life goes on as do the main protagonists and the workers once 
the “first train went out”.235 And, given their relationships, each life goes on exactly 
as before, with the full knowledge of each other.  The possibility for an overt-covert 
plot distinction is recognised but not acted upon.  There is an obvious insider and 
outsider situation and a messenger between the two but nothing happens.  Hermes 
does not carry anyone off in either one direction or another.  Alissa went inside and 
stayed.  These frivolous rich went inside but come out again.  Hermes goes back 
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and forward.  The outside is mentioned over and over again but on the whole not 
paid any intention.  In this sense then the novel passes beyond the ESDeN.  P is 
mentioned and not attended.  Not-p is foregrounded and coexists with hedonism.  
Some might argue this is okay, that “a series of dazzlingly complex dialogues, 
hilarious social manoeuvrings and tawdry sex games”236 is an adequate substitute 
for “purpose”.  If so it is a subject for another thesis.  
                                                          
 
On the other hand, some might not think this is an acceptable approach.  
Certainly it seems that its originator thought that it could only stand so many 
repetitions.  It is this thesis’s view that the majority of people do not, or cannot, see 
that to adopt the Story-3 method is “to live more abundantly”.237  This thesis’s view 
is that they choose, instead, to adopt the ESDeS procedure.  ESDeS is either the 
only story or it is sandwiched between 1 and 3.  A full exposition of the Story-2 
technique follows with the analyses of Heart of Darkness, Chance and Thinks. 
236 Tim Parks, “Introduction”, p. xi. 
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Chapter 4   
 
Heart of Darkness 
 
The case has been put that there are good grounds for thinking that a specific novel 
genre can be identified and given the name existentially-self-deceptive-novel 
(ESDeN).  Heart of Darkness turns out to be an exemplary but complex text which 
not only illustrates what is already known about ESDeS but builds on two 
additional ideas, intentionality and repetition, and introduces the possibility of two 
types of repetition, serious and unserious.  These ideas are embedded in each other 
and are difficult to discuss using a linear narrative so, to help navigate through the 
analysis, the reading will be presented in parts.  The first part will be entitled 
“Overt Plotting”.  This consists of the manifest plot and any interpretations.  In 
general ESDeS is not interested in these because they are seen as distracters from 
the covert plot.  However, a discussion is included to reiterate the point of view that 
where existing interpretations are interesting they can be effective in this purpose.  
In addition this thesis has shown, in the ESDeS telling of the Bible story, that at the 
early part of the story continuum, where there exists a parent-child mechanism, a 
specific interpretation takes the form of an ESDeS telling of the process of self-
deception.  This is also the case here.  However, its description is divided into two 
parts to emphasise that it will hide, within it, a covert plot.  Its inclusion is, in 
effect, another genre-indicator.  The next part of the chapter should add to this 
genre-marking to indicate the presence of a covert plot but this is postponed to part 
four so that a section, entitled “Intentionality”, can be interpolated.  The problem of 
intention has been signposted a number of times because self-deception theory 
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demands that any self-deceiving and any covert plotting is intentional.  It has 
intruded into the discussion on a number of occasions: it has been demonstrated 
empirically by Hannay, in The Thirty Nine Steps; Watts and Dennett have given 
their behavioural definitions; ESDeS status was denied to Almayer’s Folly because 
of its absence.  Heart of Darkness is replete with further examples and fills in any 
doubts with respects to the relevance of intention to ESDeS.   
 
The demonstration of intentionality within Heart of Darkness is achieved 
with a three-pronged approach.  The first is picked up by Watt, Pelikan Straus and 
Gekoski from a letter written by Conrad which indicates that he thinks the point of 
the story is in its codicil.  The second approach is via the more legitimate textual 
analysis suggested by Watts.  The third line of attack is the most crucial but waits 
for the section which uncovers the covert plot.  Once these preliminary discussions 
are out of the way the thesis returns to the uncovering of “Genre-Markings” which 
indicate and justify the search for a covert plot.  Once a reader is convinced that a 
covert plot exists, a good means of locating it is to find bracketing death-like 
events.  However, in Heart of Darkness, there are a number of candidate deaths and 
these have to be un-picked first and this discussion is contained in “Bracketing 
Death-like Events”.  In doing this, a further concept, important to this thesis, 
emerges.  This concept is called repetition.  It too has been signposted a number of 
times, as a likely genre-marker, imaginatively described within the retelling of the 
Bible story and given theoretical substance via Todorov’s analysis of James.  Its 
importance is spelt out by the repetitive deaths and the idea, when established, will 
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subsequently be used to discuss the two types of repetition possible within ESDeS.  
Once the beginning and ending deaths are determined this chapter progresses with 
the next section, “Covert Plotting”.  It identifies the split, the link character and the 
actual covert plot.  It will be seen that, in this case, the covert plot is based on the 
notion of collusion and it is this which finally establishes the meaning of intention.  
The chapter then returns to the ESDeS process by describing Marlow’s journey 
back.  This takes the process from the point of recognition, reached in the second 
section, up to a problematic point of narration.  Although this will be seen to 
complete the cycle from cover story to cover story, it leaves the reader realising 
that the process is inherently unstable.  In this case the point of narration becomes 
almost immediately the next point of recognition showing that repetition or further 
storytelling will always be needed.  Finally therefore, the thesis has to return to the 
idea of repetition in order to show that it is possible to disentangle two types of 
repetition given the names serious and unserious.  This distinction will be given 
plenty of signposting during this chapter.  It will be given further substance at the 
end of this chapter and it will become clearer and more fully explored in chapter 5 
which shows how Marlow – the surviving aspect of the narrative-consciousness 
that is Heart of Darkness – achieves completion by reappearing in Chance. 
 
Overt Plotting 
 
Heart of Darkness tells of Charlie Marlow’s journey up a river to find a mad Kurtz 
who has abandoned his idealistic vision of suppressing savage customs and instead 
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has set himself up as a god.  Kurtz leaves behind, in Europe, his betrothed who is 
called by the text “the Intended”.  When Kurtz dies Marlow carries the news back 
to her.  This summary, of course, does not do it justice for the work holds, in 
addition to this manifest story, a wide range of references to other themes.  Watts 
says the work “has long been recognised as one of Conrad’s major works, and has 
evoked a wealth of exegetic writing”.1  Mark Currie goes further and says it “is the 
most analysed narrative in history”.2  A full review, therefore, is not possible but, 
fortunately, it is also not necessary.  The following provides a brief survey to 
indicate and introduce those critics and ideas that will intrude, later, into the ESDeS 
analysis. 
 
The short novel is about 100 pages long.  Cedric Watts has provided a 
comprehensive coverage of the work which has not been bettered.  He differs from 
this thesis in that he sees his task as the elucidation of the work as an individual 
work of art but he makes some telling points relevant to this thesis.  He draws 
attention to numerous inherent paradoxes in the text and introduces possible themes 
as this appears appropriate.  He conveniently makes a list of the paradoxes and 
these include: “Awareness is better than unawareness: we may become aware that it 
is better to be unaware.”3  Clearly, this exactly describes this thesis’s p, not-p split.  
In addition, he also draws attention to three important themes which have 
similarities to claims made by the ESDeS theory.  These are, to give them his 
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names, work ethic, solar death and the evolutionary theme.  The work ethic allows 
for a split between those that have it and those that do not with the possible 
interpretation that those that have it are merely engaged in a “surface truth” or 
project.  Solar death clearly has an echo in existential futility and narrative-
consciousness theory development through Story-1 to Story-3.  Although the 
evolutionary theme, for Watts, relates to his reading of the “survival of the fittest” it 
has a clear link with this thesis’s notion of prior explanation.   
 
There are, in addition to thematic approaches, a number of interpretations 
that concern themselves more with plotting content.  The most obvious is, 
according to Currie, “European imperialism through the example of the Congo Free 
State”.4  Another familiar one is known as the “grail quest”: that is, a story in 
“which the pursuit of a divine object gives the narrative its forward movement”.5  
In Heart of Darkness Marlow certainly searches for something anthropomorphised 
in the person of Kurtz.  He, according to Currie’s synthesis of J. Hillis Miller’s 
analysis, travels towards Kurtz in the hope of some revelation regarding the 
meaning of the narrative.  In this sense the story is like a parable “where the 
story…must be removed and discarded so that the meaning…may be assimilated”.6  
However, it is more like a parable – and like James’s “secret” - than it first seems.  
In a parable, it will be recalled, this interpretation is an illusion.  The telling of the 
parable is not intended to uncover the meaning but to disguise the fact that there is 
                                                          
4  Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory, p. 138. 
5  Ibid., p. 140. 
6  J. Hillis Miller, “Heart of Darkness Revisited (1985)”, in R. Muffin (ed.), Heart of 
Darkness: A Case Study in Contemporary Criticism, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989, pp. 211-
212, quoted in ibid. p. 140. 
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no meaning.  Heart of Darkness repeats this process: for though Kurtz is discovered 
there is no meaning to be found.  This thesis agrees of course that something is not 
told, is hidden, but it also asserts that there is a prior hidden.  The prior hidden 
differs from the above in that it is a necessary hidden.  It refers to what Sartre calls 
“futile passion”: “a quest…to be like God…[which is]…impossible; man, who 
cannot abandon a project which he also cannot fulfil”.7  Another interpretation, or 
perhaps an extension of this interpretation, is given by Peter Brooks’s view that the 
thrust of the text is about the failure of language to reveal the truth: “What stands at 
the heart of darkness…is unsayable, extralinguistic.”8  This approach leads into, as 
Currie draws attention to, “an enquiry into a collective psyche, a social desire for 
plotting and telling”.9  This may be so but it reiterates the naming approach 
discussed in the introduction, where it was argued that anything ubiquitous was 
likely to have an evolutionary origin.  Nevertheless, named or justified, it also 
allows the view that the psyche is the telling, and the plotting shows the way the 
psyche works and as such is another reiteration of narrative-consciousness theory.   
 
Another interpretation takes the grail quest into the interior.  An old version 
of this psychoanalytic approach is provided by Guerard.  He sees the journey as a 
“spiritual voyage of self-discovery”10 and a “night journey into the unconscious”.11  
Kurtz then is not seen as a separate identity, but as an aspect of Marlow’s psyche.  
                                                          
7  Arthur C. Danto, Sartre, Glasgow: Fontana, 1979, p. 24. 
8  Peter Brooks, “An Unreadable Report: Conrad’s Heart of Darkness”, in Elaine Jordan (ed.), 
Joseph Conrad, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996, p. 8. 
9  Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory, p. 143. 
10  A. J. Guerard, Conrad the Novelist, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958, 
p. 38. 
11  Ibid., p. 39. 
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Watts sees this as unfruitful for, as he interprets the Freudian id, the id should not 
develop and clearly Kurtz “has undergone such important changes during his time 
in the Congo”.12  Watts argues that Guerard’s reading would mean that Marlow 
should be “an ego-like facet of some greater Marlow”.13  Taking the general point 
of division of a greater whole into two parts, however, does not necessitate Watts’s 
conclusions.  The difference between Guerard and this thesis would seem to be that 
the thesis thinks both parts of the split are available (conscious) in the text and both 
parts, as parts of the same consciousness, are able to develop.  Other approaches are 
even more theory-based and even more contained by the overt: one of these is 
based on perceived absences (which recalls Todorov’s analysis of James) and is 
given considerable attention in the next section.  It concerns Ian Watt’s and Nina 
Pelikan Straus’s picking up on the absence of women.  Finally, a more recent 
reading is provided by Bernard Paris who produces a “mimetic portrait”14 of the 
transtextual Marlow.  This transtextuality has already been suggested by Watts and 
the idea will be picked up by the thesis at the end of this chapter and in chapter 5.  
It is incorporated within the concept of repetition which will be shown to have two 
facets: differentiating what Sartre calls bad faith and this thesis will call failed 
ESDeS or serious from the temporary notion of ESDeS or unserious. 
 
Two final notes draw attention to the fact that the narrative-consciousness 
theory recognises that the content of its ideas have often been noticed before, 
                                                          
12  Watts, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, p. 143. 
13  Ibid., p. 144. 
14  Bernard J. Paris, Conrad’s Charlie Marlow: A New Approach to “Heart of Darkness” and 
Lord Jim, New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2005, p. viii. 
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although they have been used differently.  It has been argued that Kermode’s 
interpretation of the biblical texts of Mark and Matthew leads to a split: with Mark 
saying the covert plot is put in place by the author of the parables and Matthew 
saying the overt plot interpretations are discovered by the listeners.  Pelikan Straus 
and Brooks, taken together, might be said to argue the same thing.  Straus claims, 
according to Currie, “Criticism may be…a covert form of autobiography.”15  
Brooks argues “the way stories are told, and what they mean, seems to depend as 
much on narratee and narrative situation as on narrator.”16  For this thesis the 
autobiography is the story generated by a narrative-consciousness.  Heart of 
Darkness is generated by a narrative-consciousness too and its job is to hide 
awareness of existential futility – which is a universal necessity – by using a cover 
story – which is an individual function.  The reader’s part in the process is to 
cooperate and miss these facts by missing the covert plot.  So it is the individual 
invention that must be kept deliberately in the foreground.  A.N. Wilson calls this 
“the powerful narrative effect of distracting our attention from the matter in 
hand”.17  It follows that, on the other hand, if the reader wants to discover the 
covert plot the best way to do so is to do the opposite and not obsess about some 
aspect or other of the overt plot. 
 
The point can be emphasised by returning to Watts’s views of Heart of 
Darkness as being concerned with paradoxes and comparing this with the alternate 
ESDeS view.  Watts says, writing of Kafka and Beckett: 
                                                          
15  Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory, p. 145. 
16  Brooks, “An Unreadable Report: Conrad’s Heart of Darkness”, p. 82. 
17  A.N.Wilson, Jesus, London: Flamingo, 1993, p. 213. 
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Both writers seduce us into attempting to allocate specific 
meanings to the Castle and Godot; and then thwart us by finally 
permitting only the general meaning, namely: the category of 
ultimate meaning-givers – a category that may have no content.  
Conrad in Heart of Darkness anticipates The Castle and Waiting 
for Godot…by tempting us to give a specific definition of 
Kurtz’s nature, a definition which other factors in the 
presentation of Kurtz then contradict.18 
 
The deliberate introduction of ambiguity and contradictions is not, in Watts’s view, 
because no final meaning can be found.  He observes the paradoxes and then sees 
his task as attempting “to resolve them”.19  This thesis, in contrast, sees the 
paradoxes as straightforward distracters.  The choice of paradox, like the choice of 
interpretation, does not matter except insofar as they disguise the covert plotting.  
Marlow himself concurs with this view: “my speech or my silence, indeed any 
action of mine, would be mere futility.  What did it matter what any one knew or 
ignored?”20   
 
Despite the fact that Gekoski notes that there are already “as many 
‘readings’ of the story as its Mr Kurtz has tusks of ivory”,21 there many be room for 
one more: a process of self-deception plot.  If a parent-child mechanism is used 
within the overt plot it shows two things.  First, that Conrad is not too happy about 
abandoning Story-1 in order to put in place Story-2 and, more importantly, if the 
overt plot were to tell of the existence of a covert plot it would seem to defeat the 
essential purpose of hiding.  This need not be the case.  The message would 
                                                          
18  Watts, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, p. 3. 
19  Ibid., p. 155. 
20  Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness in Youth/Heart of Darkness/The End of the Tether, 
London: Penguin, 1995, p. 95. 
21  R. A. Gekoski, “Heart of Darkness”, in Harold Bloom (ed.) Joseph Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness - Modern Critical Interpretations,  New York: Chelsea House, 1987, p. 57. 
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actually be, since the overt plot says there is a covert plot there is no need to 
actually look for it.  This could be called a reverse template argument:22 that what 
is obvious does not need examination.  Its obviousness keeps the problem an 
unconsidered theoretical one and hides the problem as an actual one: an actual one 
which needs to be accommodated every time it forces itself from hiding – possibly 
by reading Heart of Darkness - into the spelling-out mode. 
 
ESDeS Overt Plotting: The Self-Deceptive Process from the Pre-Existing Cover 
Story to The Point of Recognition. 
 
Watts, in his comprehensive summary of Heart of Darkness, breaks down the story 
into sections.  He chooses “Title”, “Opening” and “Marlow’s Narrative” as his 
framework.  He further breaks the last category down into smaller segments 
describing parts of the journey.  His breakdown can be translated into an ESDeS 
breakdown set.  After the title, the narrative starts by framing the story with 
Marlow’s interaction with his audience on the Nellie (pp. 47-52).23  Marlow starts 
his story with the normality before the trip including his job hunting (pp. 52-60).  
This can be redesignated as the cover story before the trip.  Marlow’s trip from the 
moment of getting his job to Kurtz’s Inner Station (pp. 60-113) becomes the 
process of recognition (of absurdity) with a lingering belief in a personal goal.  
Marlow’s stay at the Inner Station including Kurtz’s first appearance, in the “jungle 
                                                          
22  See below for Watts’s actual template argument and his three other justifications for the 
inclusion of covert plotting. 
23  The bracketed page numbers are to Conrad, Heart of Darkness and give an indication of 
their relative importance. 
 173
scene”, and the bit of the trip back before Kurtz’s death (pp. 133-137) becomes, for 
an ESDeS, the process of recognition that there is no God.  Marlow’s trip back, 
after Kurtz’s death, to Brussels (pp. 137-143) becomes the process of narration: the 
process of making a new cover story possible.  Marlow’s meeting with “The 
Intended” (pp. 143-147), ending with the lie (p. 147), becomes the point of 
narration which will be, as the thesis will soon show, followed immediately by a 
renewed point of recognition. 
 
The first section of the inner narrative represents normality or the pre-
existing cover story.  It contains only a slight suggestion of what is to come.  
Marlow tells his audience that “he doesn’t want to bother [them] with what 
happened to me” but to interest them in the chap he met “up the river”; a meeting 
he describes as the “culminating point of my experience”.24  Given the importance 
Marlow gives to Kurtz, this opposition suggests its opposite: that the chap up the 
river and himself could be conflated.  Apart from this, the section appears to be a 
relatively common-place narrative telling of Marlow’s search for a job.  This is 
followed by his trip up the river.  It has already been stated that this represents a 
quest for meaning.  It can, however, be divided into before and after meeting Kurtz.  
Even before he gets to him Marlow is having trouble with the meaning of life.  His 
experiences include many surreal events such as the “objectless blasting” of a rock 
that “was not in the way of anything" and when the “heavy and dull detonation 
shook the ground.... No change appeared on the face of the rock.”25  Then he 
                                                          
24  Ibid., p. 52. 
25  Ibid., p. 63. 
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begins to ask “what it all meant”,26 to notice and feel grateful that “the inner truth is 
hidden – luckily, luckily”27 and, finally, to acknowledge that “any action of mine, 
would be a mere futility”.28  This section may be said to culminate in the famous 
“shoe scene”, to be discussed later, which definitively establishes the context of 
absurdity.  Nevertheless, despite all these pointers, Marlow hasn’t yet met Kurtz 
and he still has hope for he expresses “extreme disappointment”29 when he 
supposes Kurtz must be dead. 
 
The next crucial stage of this interpretative narrative version of Heart of 
Darkness starts when Kurtz appears.  The text reinforces the belief that Kurtz and 
Marlow are aspects of the same narrative-consciousness by repeatedly coupling 
them together.  Marlow finds himself “lumped with Kurtz”, forced “to a choice of 
nightmares”, and reluctantly concedes, “I am Mr Kurtz’s friend.”30  Insofar, 
therefore, as Kurtz represents existential angst the narrative-consciousness has to 
decide whether to allow Marlow to live with him (Story-3) or to split from him 
(Story-2).  There are indications both ways but on balance he indicates that it is not 
likely that Kurtz will impress him: “I resented bitterly the absurd danger of our 
situation, as if to be at the mercy of that atrocious phantom had been a dishonouring 
necessity.”  He adds almost immediately and apparently inconsequentially: “Kurtz - 
Kurtz - that means short in German - don’t it?  Well, the name was as true as 
                                                          
26  Ibid., p. 73. 
27  Ibid., p. 89 
28  Ibid., p. 95. 
29  Ibid., p. 106. 
30  Ibid., p. 127. 
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everything else in life - and death.”31  “Absurd”, “death” and possibly “atrocious 
phantom” connect Kurtz to the existential dilemma and Marlow shows he would 
like to put distance between them with his disparaging comments “bitterly”, 
“atrocious” and “dishonouring necessity”. Further, any affirmative statements are 
immediately qualified: “I had turned to the wilderness really, not Mr Kurtz”32 and 
his friendship assertion is watered down with, “in a way”.33  Marlow goes further 
than even this.  Kurtz is gradually demonised.  Marlow tells his listeners, on the 
Nellie, albeit in a retrospective intrusion, that Kurtz was: 
little more than a voice.  And I heard - him - it - this voice - 
other voices - all of them were so little more than voices - and 
the memory of that time itself lingers around me, impalpable, 
like a dying vibration of one immense jabber, silly, atrocious, 
sordid, savage, or simply mean, without any kind of sense.34    
 
Marlow is surely indicating that not only is Kurtz undesirable but he would actually 
like to disengage from him - or not so much from Kurtz but from the ideas 
associated with the name of Kurtz.  This desire is surely what he means when he 
refers to the “culminating point of my experience”.  The “point” actually occurs in 
the direct, one-to-one conflict with Kurtz followed by his death.  Kurtz disappears 
from his cabin and Marlow discovers this.  He follows his trail, finds him, and 
debates with him.  Kurtz clearly wants to stay where his power base is but Marlow 
does not intend to let him stay.  He tells Kurtz, “You will be lost”, and tells his 
listeners he perceived this in a “flash of inspiration”.  He threatens “I’ll smash your 
                                                          
31  Ibid., p. 123. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid., p. 127. 
34  Ibid., p. 107. 
 176
head” and “I will throttle you for good”.35  Marlow then waxes philosophically for 
a whole page and the whole page needs to be read to get its full flavour.  But a few 
phrases make it clear that the division between the two characters is at stake.  Kurtz 
is unambiguously described as both “existential man” and “lost”.   
There was nothing either above him or below him, and I knew 
it.  He had kicked himself loose of the earth.  He was alone, and 
I before him did not know whether I stood on the ground or 
floated in the air.36  
 
Marlow, finally, is able to take Kurtz back to the boat and, long though it is, it is 
necessary to include the passage for it encapsulates the final “point of recognition 
of existential angst” - with almost Sisyphusian imagery: 
He struggled with himself, too.  I saw it, - I heard it.  I saw the 
inconceivable mystery of a soul that knew no restraint, no faith, 
and no fear, yet struggling blindly with itself.  I kept my head 
pretty well;  but when I had him at last stretched on the couch, I 
wiped my forehead, while my legs shook under me as though I 
had carried half a ton on my back down the hill.  And yet I had 
only supported him, his bony arm clasped round by neck - and 
he was not much heavier than a child.37 
 
Kurtz dies very shortly afterwards with “The horror! The horror!” on his lips as 
everyone knows, but the significance, for an ESDeS reading, lies not in this but in 
the next line.  An ESDeS reading requires a separation but if the reader 
concentrates on Kurtz it will be missed.  Kurtz is only an aspect of the overall 
narrative-consciousness.  He is the part that represents existential futility.  The 
choice is made that he will die and take this awareness away.  The other side of the 
separation remains.  This is the part of the narrative-consciousness called Marlow.  
                                                          
35  Ibid., p. 131. 
36  Ibid. 
37  Ibid., p. 133. 
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He acknowledges, “I blew the candle out and left the cabin.”38  The separation of p 
from not-p is established - in principle. 
 
It seems clear that there is so much here that Watts’s concept of 
“imaginatively intentional” is justified.  Intention, however, is so important to the 
concept of ESDeS that it will be further spelt-out in the next section. 
 
Intentionality 
 
The narrative in Heart of Darkness is divided into two parts plus a codicil: the first 
part tells of the trip up the river; the second tells of the trip down the river; the 
codicil describes the meeting between Marlow and the Intended.  Conrad asserts 
that the codicil is the crucial part and Ian Watt, Pelikan Straus and Gekoski, as 
readers, agree.  Once this is identified as the correct portion of the novella, the text 
is able to reinforce this conventional notion of intention by exhibiting intention, as 
defined by Dennett and Watts, with a covert plot.  The covert plot turns out to be a 
collusive death plot and it is this agreed version of events which can finally take on 
a definitive meaning for intention within the context of an ESDeS. 
 
In the author’s case, the evidence comes directly: abstracted from a letter 
written to Cunningham Graham: 
I am simply in seventh heaven to find you like H of D so far.  
You bless me indeed.  Mind you don’t curse me by and by for 
the very same thing.  There are two more instalments in which 
                                                          
38  Ibid., p. 137.  My emphasis. 
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the idea is so wrapped up in secondary notions that You - even 
You - may miss it.39 
 
The “idea” maps on to the self-deceptive p and not-p and the “secondary ideas” 
map onto the distracters so there can be no doubt that the “so wrapped up”, in this 
passage of the letter, suggests that Conrad was deliberately hiding something in his 
story.  He clearly did not expect the “it” to be easily found since he claims that one 
of his most ardent readers would be likely to “miss it”.  He might have said of any 
reader, “you will be so attached to whatever you see in your first reading that you 
will miss anything else”.  However, a number of readers have overcome the 
limitations of a first reading and have accepted his implicit challenge to look for 
“it”.  Clearly the looking can take the form of looking for a covert plot, as will be 
discussed later, but there are also other more straightforward “interpretations”.  The 
thesis concentrates on those provided by Ian Watt, Nina Pelikan Straus and R.A. 
Gekoski. 
 
These critics all agree with this thesis that the passage describing the 
interview between Marlow and the Intended, at the end of the story, provides the 
secret although they all stop short of the conclusion that it represents the point of 
narration.  Despite this, their arguments all have significant elements to contribute 
to an ESDeS analysis: Watt identifies the significance of the interview and hints 
that Marlow is existentially-self-deceiving; Straus uses the concepts of prior, 
                                                          
39  Letter to R. B. Cunningham Graham, 8th Feb., 1899, in Frederick R. Karl and Laurence 
Davies (eds), The Collected Letters of Joseph Conrad, Vol. 2, 1898-1902, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986, p. 157.  My emphasis. 
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universal and secret; Gekoski unambiguously identifies the centrality of ESD and 
identifies the Intended with the horror.  
 
Ian Watt, after quoting bits of the above quotation, says “Conrad nowhere 
specifies what these ‘secondary notions’ were”40 and then sets about looking for 
them.  This thesis takes the view that this is a serious misreading of Conrad’s letter.  
It is clear that it is the “idea” that is hidden and the “idea” is singular.  The 
secondary notions are both unspecified in terms of number and camouflage.  It 
seems, also, that even if the secondary notions were to be identified it does not 
follow that the “idea” would be identified as well.  Indeed, it seems likely, on the 
contrary, that the identification of any of the secondary notions would prove so 
satisfactory to the enquiring reader that the reader would look no further.  In terms 
of the self-deceptive novel, then, the “idea” is available but not admitted.  More so; 
since the number of secondary notions is not specified then a reader who is 
unsatisfied with one interpretation is at liberty to seek another.  Nevertheless, Watt 
finds, in a letter Conrad writes nearly two years after the one quoted above, what he 
calls “a clue”.41  The letter is to his publisher.  Part of it says: 
I know exactly what I am doing…in the light of the final 
incident, the whole story in all its descriptive detail shall fall 
into its place - acquire its value and its significance.  This is my 
method based on deliberate conviction.  I’ve never parted from 
it… the last pages of Heart of Darkness where the interview of 
the man and the girl locks in - as it were - the whole 30000 
words of narrative description into one suggestive view of a 
whole phase of life and makes of that story something quite on 
                                                          
40  Ian Watt, “Heart of Darkness and Nineteenth Century Thought”, in Bloom (ed.), Joseph 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, p. 83. 
41  Ibid. 
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another plane than an anecdote of a man who went mad in the 
Centre of Africa.42 
 
He interprets the quotation as meaning it is “one of the secondary themes [which is] 
locked in”43 where surely, as before, a more viable reading is that it is the “idea” 
which is locked in and any secondary interpretations of the scene are a diversion 
from the idea.  However, Watt’s chase after what he sees as the “locked in” 
secondary notions does establish the centrality of the “interview”.  Watt starts from 
the premise that one of the secondary notions is “presumably Marlow’s view of 
women”.44  He gives several textual examples of it, and ends with the conclusion: 
Marlow at the end finds himself forced to lie to her about Kurtz.  
One reason is that if he told the truth she would not have the 
necessary grounds in her own experience to be able to 
understand it, another is that since for all his seeking Marlow 
himself has found no faith which will move mountains, his 
nostalgia inclines him to cherish the faith that ignores them.45 
 
Nina Pelikan Straus would certainly take issue with the view that Marlow’s 
misogyny is simply a personal view of feminine weakness.  She sees it, instead, as 
more indicative of a patriarchal society.  Feminists argue that a simple meeting 
between a man and a woman is not possible for it is always constructed via a 
patriarchal ideology: “The lie Marlow offers her [the Intended] is understood to be 
a chivalric act . . . underscoring an ideology.”46  For Straus this specific becomes 
the general with echoes of Kermode’s view of parables: with insiders and outsiders.  
                                                          
42  Letter to William Blackwood, 31st May 1902, in Karl and Davies (eds), The Collected 
Letters of Joseph Conrad, Vol. 2, 1898-1902, p. 417. 
43  Watt, “Heart of Darkness and Nineteenth Century Thought”, p. 83. 
44  Ibid., p. 83. 
45  Ibid., p. 84. 
46  Nina Pelikan Straus, “The Exclusion of the Intended from Secret Sharing”, in Jordan (ed.), 
Joseph Conrad, p. 56. 
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For Straus, it is not a meeting between a man and a woman but a process of 
depicting “a world distinctly split into male and female realms - the first harbouring 
the possibility of ‘truth’ and the second dedicated to the maintenance of 
delusion”.47  She raises a number of interesting points relevant to this thesis.  First, 
she observes the possibility of something coming prior to something else: “No 
matter how the meaning of Heart of Darkness is defined…[there is a prior aim] of a 
homocentric universe”48 achievable by a number of means - and the means are not 
of first importance.  Once this is allowed then there is the possibility of a prior even 
to this, a prior hinted at various points of Straus’s thesis.  Her identification of a 
male-female split has already been noted.  However, this is not what this thesis 
means by its existential split.  It is necessary for knowledge of this split to be buried 
away from the storyteller as well as the listener.  Straus, perhaps inadvertently, 
backs this up with her constant references to the ubiquitous word, secret: “the 
deliberate use of a frame to include readers as hearers, suggests the secret nature of 
what is being told.”49  Later in the article she goes even further: “The guarding of 
secret knowledge is the undisclosed theme of Heart of Darkness.”50  This absence 
cannot be emphasised too much, for the only thing that is actually told is nothing.  
As Gekoski says, for example, “we are never to know the secret of Mr Kurtz’s 
degradation, or the nature of the ‘abominable satisfactions’ in which he has 
immersed himself”.51   Nor are we told why Kurtz chooses to leave the Central 
Station and return home, nor are we told what “The horror! The horror!” means.  
                                                          
47  Ibid., p. 50. 
48  Ibid., p. 52. 
49  Ibid., p. 50. 
50  Ibid., p. 62. 
51  Gekoski, “Heart of Darkness”, p. 67. 
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The text does not actually tell the reader what the pilgrims are doing, nor are they 
given any explanation of the presence of the “African woman”.52  At crucial points 
the motif word “unsayable”53 crops up to put a barrier between Marlow’s story and 
the reader, and the absence of a name for the Intended conspires to give the 
message that, echoing many biblical references, it is best not to know.  Conrad has 
the Harlequin say, “It was dangerous to enquire too much”,54 and Marlow says, “I 
don’t want to know anything of the ceremonies used.”55  The Intended’s name 
could be told on three occasions but is not.  The question becomes, is Straus’s 
analysis in terms of male-female the correct secret or one that follows after the 
existence of another prior secret?  This thesis suggests that the latter is the case.  
The male-female split is not the “idea”: it is a secondary notion on the same level as 
the suggestion given by Watt.  It is an interpretation.   
 
Gekoski does concentrate on the “idea” introduced by Conrad’s letter and 
identifies the idea specifically with existential angst.  He concentrates on the 
passage where Marlow and Kurtz have a battle of wills, picking out from Marlow’s 
description of it significant phrases: “a being to whom I could not appeal in the 
name of anything high or low”; “There was nothing either above or below him”; 
“He had kicked himself loose from the earth”; and particularly, “He was alone.”56  
Gekoski concludes that Kurtz is “a fully autonomous man, attempting to generate 
                                                          
52  Straus, “The Exclusion of the Intended from Secret Sharing”, p. 50. 
53  Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 127 and p. 147 for examples. 
54  Ibid., p. 118. 
55  Ibid., p. 121. 
56  Ibid., pp. 131-132. 
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and enact his own moral truths, confronting the results of freedom”.57  He then 
concludes that Marlow’s description of Kurtz as “hollow at the core” shows Kurtz 
has recognised the “final meaninglessness of all things”58 and contrasts this with 
the “fools” of the story who have no “imagination”.  Gekoski is not, however, 
content to leave it here.  He asks a further question: given that a person is “an 
initiate into this deepest knowledge….what is he to do with it?”59  The question 
can be applied either to Kurtz or to Marlow.  Gekoski concludes that “Kurtz…sees 
too much, too clearly, to live through it”,60 whereas Marlow ultimately finds 
himself, despite his avowed hatred for it, “forced into a position in which an 
absolute lie seems necessary”.61 
 
Gekoski then, like Watt, looks for and finds the answer in the final meeting 
between Marlow and the Intended.  He contrasts Marlow’s claim to hate lying, 
“because it appals me”,62 with his series of equivocations to the Intended.  The 
crucial equivocation comes when the grief-stricken woman pleads with Marlow to 
reveal Kurtz’s last words and he responds “the last word he pronounced was - your 
name”.63  The reason for this is generally given, as for example by Ian Watt above, 
that it protects the woman; to enable her to live with her own illusion since she 
would not have the “necessary grounds in her own experience”64 to carry on.  
                                                          
57  Gekoski, “Heart of Darkness”, p. 70. 
58  Ibid., p. 73. 
59  Ibid. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Ibid., p. 74. 
62  Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 79. 
63  Ibid., p. 147. 
64  Watt, “Heart of Darkness and Nineteenth Century Thought”, p. 84. 
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However, Gekoski rereads it with what he calls “a final ironic possibility”.65  He 
argues that “the ‘Horror’ and the name of Kurtz’s Intended may be identical”.66  
The horror does represent the void, the emptiness, the nothingness of the darkness 
at the heart but it also represents the horror in everyday life in the sense that the 
Intended lives it.  However, Gekoski does not identify the Intended with the 
universal.  His reading of the novella ends with the claim that the truth is not just 
unendurable but it is “unendurable in the context of everyday life”.  He goes on: 
“what one needs in order to maintain an assurance of safety and comfort is some 
sustaining illusion to which one can be faithful.”67  In a way Gekoski is in 
agreement with Watt.  They both portray Marlow as a hero who knows saving the 
Intended who does not.  Gekoski is just more specific about what the Intended is 
being saved from.  This conclusion could have been reached directly from the title 
for Kurtz’s loved one which, to say the least, is a strange one.  Because it is strange, 
it might be considered to carry a double meaning.  It might mean exactly what it 
says, intended, as well as to be married.  If so, then Gekoski’s conclusion that 
Marlow’s “lie” links the double use of the word “Horror” with “your [the 
Intended’s] name” can be extended so that “your name” comes to mean both horror 
and the text is intentional.   
 
The thesis accepts Gekoski’s argument as far as it goes, but thinks it does 
not go far enough. It thinks he slips back from the natural conclusion of his 
                                                          
65  Gekoski, “Heart of Darkness”, p. 74. 
66  Ibid., p. 75. 
67  Ibid., p.75. My emphasis. 
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argument by making two slips.  The thesis will return to this point and deduce its 
own conclusion at the end of this chapter. 
 
Meanwhile the reader who accepts the possibility of intention can look back 
on the text, or use a second reading, to find confirmation that it has been telling 
them this over and over again.  Marlow has spent some of the earlier part of Heart 
of Darkness dividing the world up into two types of “reality”.  First he describes the 
mundane “efficiency”68 of everyday tasks, later described as the “surface truth”69 
of life.  Then, slowly, he begins to ask himself “what it all meant”70 as he becomes 
involved with the “darkness” associated with the strangeness of his experience as 
he moves further up the river.  The surface truth is then separated from the inner 
truth which is “hidden - luckily”.71  He also divides people into two types: those 
that can and those that can’t.  For Marlow there can be no doubt that all these 
perceptions - since they are reported by him - cannot be accidental or unconscious.  
They must be taken to be what Cedric Watts has called “imaginatively 
intentional”.72  If this is so but still the “idea” is not noticed because it is too well 
hidden under the “secondary notions”, then within the structure of Heart of 
Darkness there must be a process of hiding and this too can be credited as 
“imaginatively intentional”.  Ian Watt, Nina Pelikan Straus and R.A. Gekoski then 
are, in the view of this thesis, concerned with the same thing: a reinterpretation of 
the text.  The finding of Conrad’s “it” is what Marlow would call the “surface” of 
                                                          
68  Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 51. 
69  Ibid., p. 89. 
70  Ibid., p. 73. 
71  Ibid., p. 89. 
72  Cedric Watts, The Deceptive Text: An Introduction to Covert Plots, Brighton: The Harvester 
Press, 1984, p.15. 
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things, Kermode calls the “manifest”, Cedric Watts calls the “overt” and both the 
modernist novel and the ESDeN might call the individual.  Cedric Watts, in 
contrast, does the opposite.  He concentrates on the process of hiding with his 
invention of the covert plot and shows no particular interest in the surface 
manifestations of alternative readings.  This thesis takes the same view because it 
associates the covert plotting with the hiding of existential futility and sees this as a 
universal necessity.  It has been noted, in chapter 1, that an ESDeS, and hence a 
covert plot, will be signalled first by genre-marking. 
 
Genre-Marking 
 
Genre-markers mean low-key indicators that are capable of being picked up on a 
first reading.  There is a great deal of marking included in Heart of Darkness.  It is 
discussed below under three headings: uneasiness, absurdity and hiding.  
 
(i)  Uneasiness 
 
Heart of Darkness is so concerned with the idea of ESD that it uses several 
techniques to instigate anxiety in the reader.  These include ambiguity in the title, 
use of the motif word, the involvement of self-deception and collusion. 
 
The title of the story - Heart of Darkness - is the first thing a reader comes 
across and its form suggests confusion is involved even before they start to read the 
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body of the text.  Cedric Watts describes the title, but could be describing self-
deception: “the title Heart of Darkness offers not simply alternative readings in 
retrospect, but also, from the start, a certain disturbing mysteriousness through the 
immediate possibility of alternative glosses.”73  The confusion originated with 
Conrad himself who changed the title between the story’s publication in magazine 
form and its subsequent book form.  It changed from The Heart of Darkness to 
Heart of Darkness74 and in either form allows at least three interpretations  With 
the “The”, the title suggests that “Darkness” is the noun (and “heart of” adjectival) 
and refers to a specific geographical location.  The story will, in this case, involve 
movement to the location and once there it will not be pleasant.  However, without 
the “The” it is “heart” which is read as the noun and which, therefore, suggests an 
anthropomorphic reading in which the reader’s enquiry is directed to a human 
being with a sinister or evil heart.  The third interpretation of the title is a little more 
obscure.  Suppose that both “Heart” and “Darkness” are intended as nouns 
metaphorically related to each other so that  the title could be read as the “heart is 
darkness”.  If so, the title is not referring to a geographical location or to the 
psychology of a person but to the solar death theme.  Conrad wrote “the fate of 
humanity condemned ultimately to perish from cold is not worth troubling 
about”.75 If so, then a better term than existential “man” is provided by Spittles’s 
term, “entropic man”76 which describes not just a “man” doomed to a futile passion 
but to describe a “man” living in a world doomed to thermodynamic nothingness.  
                                                          
73  Watts, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, p.9.  The following text relies heavily on this work. 
74  Ibid., p. 9. 
75  Letter to Cunningham Graham 14th January 1898, in Karl and Davies (eds), The Collected 
Letters of Joseph Conrad, Vol. 2, 1898-1902, p. 17.  
76  Brian Spittles, Joseph Conrad, London: Macmillan, 1992, p. 154. 
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There is support for this extreme existentialist view.  The opening of the narrative 
makes this view textually explicit: “the sun sank low…as if about to go out 
suddenly.”77  If this were to happen, the “darkness”78 that would ensue would 
undeniably make explicit the concept of existential futility.  This interpretation 
again brings to the foreground Marlow’s “culminating point of his experience” 
which threw “a kind of light on everything about me – and into my thoughts.…not 
very clear.  And yet it seemed to throw a kind of light.”79  Since seeing the light 
usually means understanding, Marlow’s point is that “lack of clarity” or “darkness” 
or “nothing” is the answer.  Marlow puts it more gently but reinforces the title’s 
initial hint that the meaning at the end of his quest is that there is no meaning.  It is 
no wonder that anxiety is generated.  At best there is ambiguity, at worst there is 
ertainty. 
 
                       
c
This is built upon.  Once beyond the title, and the framings, even the most 
cursory reader will be struck by the constant use of the word “uneasy” in its various 
forms.  Marlow “began to feel slightly uneasy”80 whilst applying for the job of 
steamer captain.  Nevertheless he gets the job and travels to the Central Station 
where he meets its manager who again “inspired uneasiness.  That was it! 
Uneasiness.  Not a definite mistrust – just uneasiness – nothing more.”81  The 
manager did not only inspire uneasiness in others he was, or so he claims, “very, 
                                   
 
2. 
77  Ibid., p. 48. 
78  Ibid., p. 148.
79  Ibid., p. 52. 
80  Ibid., p. 57. 
81  Ibid., p. 71-7
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very uneasy”82 himself with respect to saving Kurtz.  The sense of uneasiness is so 
pervasive in Marlow’s story it penetrates even to his listeners and through them to 
the story arkness 
reports: 
een asleep, but I was awake.  I listened, 
I listened on the watch for the sentence, for the word, that would 
give me the clue to the faint uneasiness inspired by the narrative 
night-air of the river.  
o allow her a “great and saving illusion”85 and 
Gekoski uses the term “sustaining illusion”86 to sum up the Intended and Marlow’s 
collusio
                                                          
’s subsequent readers.  The anonymous narrator of Heart of D
The others might have b
that seemed to shape itself without human lips in the heavy 
83
 
Uneasiness can, of course, be present in other types of telling.  For an 
ESDeS it is just a first step.  The uneasiness has to, in addition, coexist and 
cooperate with the presence of self-deception.  Self-deception can be a simple 
naming.  Various alternative names have been suggested, such as “pipedream” and 
“saving lie”.  Heart of Darkness is no different in this respect and adds to the 
collection.  The Intended begs of Marlow to give her “something - something - to - 
to live with”,84 Marlow is happy t
n at the end of the novel.   
 
More particularly, self-deception is connected with behaviour identifiers of 
self-deception such as post-hoc recognition, refusing to recognise evidence against 
an existing overt idea, the generation of supporting evidence and the excessive 
82  Ibid., p. 73. 
83  Ibid., p. 80. 
84  Ibid., p. 147. 
85  Ibid., p. 145. 
86  Gekoski, “Heart of Darkness’” p. 75. 
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emotional content at the point of recognition of a hidden idea.  Marlow seems to 
exhibit all of these behaviours.  Marlow suspects the manager’s “murder plot”87 but 
overlooks it.  He retrospectively realises this: “I did not see the real significance of 
the wreck at once.  I fancy I see it now”; “Certainly the affair was too stupid - when 
I think of it - to be altogether natural.”88  These are perhaps limited admissions for 
he adds shortly afterwards, “Afterwards I took it [the assumption that the manager 
was an ‘idiot’] back when it was borne upon me startlingly with what extreme 
nicety he had estimated the time requisite for the ‘affair’.”89 Retrospective 
storytelling is ideal for relating personal self-deception.  Here Marlow clearly 
admits the evidence was available and he chose to overlook it and recognises this 
when he looks back on it.  In addition, he manages also to include a feeling – 
“startlin
                                                          
gly”90 - at his point of recognition. 
 
Normal-self-deception works only if friends and family accept the 
deceiver’s description of events.  In the telling of Heart of Darkness this role falls 
to the listeners and the readers.  The quote above, from the first narrator, allows for 
this collusion – “The others might have been asleep” - at the same time as 
distancing the narrator.  The reader therefore is free to choose.  On another 
occasion, Marlow is so rude that a listener is forced to respond.  When Marlow 
accuses them of doing what they do for “half-a-crown a tumble”, a listener 
t seq. 
rt of Darkness, p. 71. 
73. 
87  Watts, The Deceptive Text, p. 119 e
88  Conrad, Hea
89  Ibid., p. 
90  Ibid. 
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responds with “Try to be civil, Marlow.”91  It is interesting to note that it is another 
listener this time, for the anonymous narrator pipes up with “I knew there was at 
least one listener awake besides myself.”92  This passage stresses that Marlow is 
being told that he, too, if he wants their collusion with his storytelling, must be 
he goes too far there will be a rebellion. 
 
cooperative.  If 
(ii)  Absurdity 
 
In addition to uneasiness and hints of self-deception, an ESDeS requires existential 
marking.  This can come in many guises.  Campbell and Collision put it rather well 
after an ) where 
Mathieu
 has both physical presence and meaning; of the 
anguish of recognising that human freedom is total but also 
meaningless because, in the end, there is nothing, neither 
values.   
ave a reasonable person aware that the text concerns itself 
ith the question of meaning.  Heart of Darkness is, however, saturated with 
existential references.   
                                                          
alysing the passage in Jean-Paul Sartre’s The Reprieve (1945
 considers committing suicide.  They say: 
That passage contains many characteristics typical of existential 
sensibility: a sense of solitariness, alienation, and lack of 
meaning; of the strangeness of matter and things; of the apparent 
contingency and pointlessness of life; of one’s inward self as a 
kind of nothingness that longs to exist as an incorrigibly real 
being that
grounds nor reasons, to determine one’s choices of actions and 
93
 
It is only necessary, it is argued, for sufficient existential references, of whatever 
form, to be present to le
w
91  Ibid., p. 89. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Robert Campbell and Diane Collison, Ending Lives, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988, p. 79. 
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 wallowing in the grass” and “an undersized railway-truck lying there on its back 
                                                          
In its most manifest form, Marlow specifically states he conceives himself 
to be apart from the others in the story.  The first narrator says of him “he did not 
represent his class”94 and he says of himself: “I am not in the least typical.”95  He 
also specifically asks the existential question, “I asked myself sometimes what it all 
meant.”96  He answers himself, on another occasion: “It occurred to me that my 
speech or my silence, indeed any action of mine, would be a mere futility.”97  And 
again, immediately after Kurtz’s death, Marlow meditates: “Droll thing life is - the 
mysterious arrangement of merciless logic for a futile purpose.”98  Kurtz himself, 
despite tricking many people, including Marlow, with his importance and 
attributes, is ultimately described as “hollow at the core”99 and dismissed by 
Marlow as merely a voice: “The voice was gone. What else had there been?”100  
Nina Pelikan Straus puts it differently but with the same effect.  She says Kurtz 
reduces “male heroism to the horror of emptiness”.101  Gekoski, as has already been 
seen, regards Heart of Darkness as dealing with the “recognition of the ultimate 
futility of life”.102  This futility is seen to extend beyond the individual and apply to 
everybody as an inevitable fact.  Arriving at the Central Station the text provides a 
series of sentences implying this more general futility: “I came upon a boiler 
94  Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 49. 
95  Ibid., p. 59. 
96  Ibid., p. 73. 
97  Ibid., p. 95. 
98  Ibid., p. 137. 
99  Ibid., p. 121. 
100  Ibid., p. 137. 
101  Straus, “The Exclusion of the Intended from Secret Sharing”, p. 51. 
102  Gekoski, “Heart of Darkness”, p. 58. 
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with its wheels in the air”.103  Technological intervention is seen as of short 
duration against the relentless and overwhelming power of nature.   
 
This general futility shades into the absurd in its surreal usage.  Marlow’s 
description of his trip down the African coast is an example: 
We pounded along, stopped, landed soldiers; went on, landed 
custom house clerks to levy toll in what looked like a God-
forsaken wilderness, with a tin shed and a flag-pole lost in it; 
landed more soldiers - to take care of the custom-house clerks, 
presumably.  Some, I heard, got drowned in the surf; but 
whether they did or not, nobody seemed particularly to care.  
They were just flung out there, and on we went.104 
 
However, when used in connection with existentialism, the word “absurd” 
is linked in particular to the arbitrariness of choice.  Nevertheless, it is a word, like 
self-deception, that is often misunderstood because speaker and listener mix up its 
alternate meanings.  The text is aware of this and uses Marlow to expresses this 
alternation in the “throwing of the shoes overboard” scene.  Marlow is addressing, 
in addition to his trapped audience, a “pilgrim in pink pyjamas”.105  The passage is, 
perhaps, a pivotal point in the story.  It follows the death of Marlow’s helmsman, 
which presages the point of recognition.  Marlow at his point in the story thinks 
“Mr. Kurtz is dead as well” and describes his feeling as: 
For the moment that was the dominant thought.  There was a 
sense of extreme disappointment, as though I had found out I 
had been striving after something altogether without substance.  
I couldn’t have been more disgusted if I had travelled all this 
way for the sole purpose of talking to Mr. Kurtz.106   
                                                          
103  Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 63. 
104  Ibid., p. 60. 
105  Ibid., p. 105. 
106  Ibid., p. 106. 
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 The text that follows enables the two meanings of absurd to be disentangled.  It 
gives, in turn, his obsessive attention to the comic scene relating to his shoes and 
the deeper level in which Marlow is separating himself from normality.  He starts 
by flinging “one shoe overboard” and follows later with “the other shoe [which] 
went flying unto the devil-god of the river”.  In between he expands on his 
increasing awareness of what the trip up the river means to him   
[I] became aware that that was exactly what I had been looking 
forward to - a talk with Kurtz.  I made the strange discovery that 
I had never imagined him as doing, you know, but as 
discoursing.  I didn’t say to myself, “Now I will never see him,” 
or “Now I will never shake him by the hand,” but “Now I will 
never hear him.”  The man presented himself as a voice.  Not of 
course that I did not connect with some sort of action.  Hadn’t I 
been told in all the tones of jealousy and admiration that he had 
collected, battered, swindled, or stolen more ivory than all the 
other agents together.  That was not the point.  The point was in 
his being a gifted creature, and that of all his gifts the one that 
stood out pre-eminently, that carried with it a sense of real 
presence, was his ability to talk, his words - the gift of 
expression, the bewildering, the illuminating, the most exalted 
and the most contemptible, the pulsating stream of light, or the 
deceitful flow from the heart of an impenetrable darkness.107 
 
 
The switching back and forth is a representation of the narrative-consciousness 
struggling to decide which plot to adopt; both p and not-p are actually sequentially 
present; existential anguish and project struggle for supremacy.  The character, 
Marlow, identifies Kurtz with a desperate attempt to hold on to external meaning 
and then returns to shoes.  This project does not have the power to hold his 
attention and he quickly returns to the struggle with the possibility of loss of 
meaning connected with the supposed death of Kurtz: “By Jove! It’s all over.  We 
                                                          
107  Ibid. 
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are too late; he has vanished – the gift has vanished.”108  The implications of this 
are horrible.  He has to face the consequences of facing up to the loss: it will 
separate him from the normality of the rest of humanity.  He shrinks from this.  He 
recognises the need for his audience and recognises its presence and the need for 
normality: “Why do you sigh in this beastly way, somebody?  Absurd?  Well, 
absurd.  Good Lord!  mustn’t a man ever - Here, give me some tobacco.”109 
 
He quickly reverts to the existential meaning of absurdity by spelling out his 
unambiguous rejection of their bourgeois existence: 
 
“Absurd!” he cried.  “This is the worst of trying to tell. .  . .Here 
you all are, each moored with two good addresses, like a hulk 
with two anchors, a butcher round one corner, a policeman 
round another, excellent appetites, and a temperature normal - 
you hear - normal from year’s end to year’s end.  Absurd!  
Absurd be - exploded!”   
 
But this is risky.  The text has Marlow flip back to surreal absurdity: “Absurd!  My 
dear boys, what can you expect from a man who out of sheer nervousness had just 
flung overboard a pair of new shoes.”110 
 
The passage continues with the same alternating sequence until Marlow 
makes a dismissive remark with respect to the Intended in particular and to women 
in general: “They – the women I mean – are out of it – should be out of it.  We 
must help them to stay in that beautiful world of their own.”111  This would seem to 
                                                          
108  Ibid. 
109  Ibid., p. 107. 
110  Ibid. 
111  Ibid. 
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support those that view Marlow as a misogynist but this passage is an example of 
Conradian delayed decoding.  He leads the reader to one point of view and then 
contradicts it.  Here he adds to this (seemingly) pejorative statement, the self-
serving addition, “lest ours gets worse”.112  Once again the text makes it clear that 
even if Marlow is contemptuous of his fellow humans he needs them to maintain 
his project. 
 
The text now, having made it plain that he considers the possibility of man’s 
absurdity in the face of the universe and infinity, could leave it there.  If it did it 
would qualify for a fairly respectable modernist novel.  However an ESDeS needs 
the reader to proceed with reading the story.  In short, having persuaded the reader 
that life is absurd, he has now to persuade them to forget this realisation.  The text 
makes it easy for them by giving them permission to suspend their awareness of 
existential knowledge by making periodic references to the need for hiding.  Once 
again it does this in abundance with all manner of mechanisms.   
 
(iii)  Hiding   
 
Normally a reader might expect a storyteller to have some meaning to impart.  If so 
it is referred to in the first few pages in a strange way.  It is referred to as “not the 
kernel”, the “haze” twice, “moonshine”, “not worth knowing” and 
“incomprehensible”.  In short, the text, before the story starts, tells the reader, if the 
reader wants to hear, that although the story might seem to be a grail quest it is 
                                                          
112  Ibid., p. 108. 
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nothing of the sort.  It is about a division into two with a necessary choice between 
them.  It introduces Marlow’s framed story with an interchange between an 
anonymous (first) narrator and Marlow.  This allows two versions of what is 
relevant to be introduced.  Marlow says, “I don’t want to bother you much about 
what happened to me personally.”113  The narrator disagrees.  He suggests Marlow 
is deceiving himself for his story is exactly what his hearers want to hear: “so many 
tellers of tales seem so often unaware of what their audience would best like to 
hear.”114  The same narrator observes another apparently contradictory pair when he 
says of Marlow: “to him the meaning of an episode was not the inside like a kernel 
but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a 
haze, in the likeness of one of these misty halos that sometimes are made visible by 
the spectral illumination of moonshine.”115  The need for the division soon becomes 
clear for since it is not meaning which is to be discovered it follows that there is 
nothing that can be discovered.  The narrator says of the ubiquitous seaman: “after 
his hours of work, a casual stroll or a casual spree on shore suffices to unfold for 
him the secret of a whole continent, and generally he finds the secret not worth 
knowing.”116 Marlow then takes over the introduction.  He introduces a hypothetical 
“decent young citizen” who has “to live in the midst of the incomprehensible”.117  
The text then disentangles this apparent blockage and foregrounds the futility of life.  
This, once established, is removed.  Listeners and the reader are told to forget the 
discovery: “Mind none of us [the Lawyer, the Accountant, the Director and the 
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115  Ibid., p. 50. 
116  Ibid. 
117  Ibid., p. 51. 
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Narrator as well as himself and the reader] would feel exactly like this.”118  The 
text, as narrative-consciousness, has been fair.  It has told the reader, within the first 
few pages, that the “idea” is the simultaneous presence of two contradictory ideas 
and that one of them is awareness of existential futility and the other is the project; 
the story which is to be told.  The meaning can be in the kernel and outside of it.  
Lack of clarity can simultaneously be light thrown onto the subject.  The meaning 
of the story, therefore, can simultaneously be in the overt plot and the covert plot 
                                                          
 
However the two ideas, although present, need not be given the same 
immediate significance.  Even this is genre-marked by Marlow.  The reference 
appears as commentary at the time of his and his steamer’s approach to Kurtz’s 
station: “When you have to attend to things of that sort, [guessing at channels, 
looking for hidden banks and sunken stones, searching for wood for the boiler.....] 
to the mere incidents of the surface, the reality - the reality, I tell you - fades.  The 
inner truth is hidden - luckily, luckily.” 119 As a technique it, in principle, tells but it 
actually hides: for the readers may well have forgotten the repetition of “luckily” 
by the time they come across the echoic repetition of “horror”.  If so the “inner 
truth” as “horror” will be successfully hidden and the ESDeS will be successful.  
Further, the fading is motivated and this is also genre-marked.  Marlow points out 
that “there is a taint of death, a flavour of mortality in lies – which is exactly what I 
hate and detest in the world – what I want to forget”.120  The normal reader may 
pick up the markers for unease but by the time they are feeling anxious and 
118  Ibid. 
119  Ibid., p. 89 
120  Ibid., p. 79. 
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thinking there might be more to the story than meets the eye, the hiding markers 
have already been passed by.  The thesis, however, plays the part of an abnormal 
reader.  It wants to accept the genre-marking for ESDeS and to go on to discover 
the covert plot hidden in Heart of Darkness  
 
The covert plot, once suspected, will be found to exist between two 
motivating absences – now called deathlike events or bracketing deaths.  The first 
death will be a minor character who will suggest the plot, based on the idea that 
"every new character signifies a new plot".121  In addition, one of the major 
characters will provide the link between one or more of the substantial overt plots 
and the covert plot.  The covert plot will be confirmed if the second deathlike event 
causes the elision of one of the characters, breaking the link between the overt and 
covert plots.  The surviving character will then be projected into the future through 
the mechanism of the unfinished.  That is, the surviving character will be taken, by 
the reader, to survive beyond the end of the fictional universe presented in the text.   
 
In Almayer’s Folly the task was easy.  There were only two deaths: Dain’s 
boatman and then Almayer himself.  In Heart of Darkness it is more difficult for 
there are five.  In order of appearance these are: the report of Fresleven’s death;122 
the Swede captain’s story of an unknown Swede “who hanged himself”;123 “the 
                                                          
121  Tzvetan Todorov, The Poetics of Prose, trans. Richard Howard, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1977, p. 70. 
122  Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 54. 
123  Ibid., p. 62. 
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middle-aged negro, with a bullet-hole in the forehead”;124 the helmsman (of the 
shoe episode);125 and Kurtz.126   
 
Bracketing Death-like Events 
 
The multiplicity of minor character deaths might, at first sight, seem to be a burden.  
Certainly the deaths are not relevant to the ongoing quest, although they might be 
said to add an air of reality.  However, it is believed that Conrad would not do 
things without a better reason, because the work has what Watts calls “tentacular 
and paradoxical qualities”,127 so the suggestion is that the multiple deaths introduce 
the idea of repetition which, ultimately, will be seen to point to the need for a story 
beyond Heart of Darkness.  Repetition has already been hinted at within the 
uneasiness section where it is shown that the novella is trapped within the framing 
on the Nellie and the repetitive rising of the sun and the flowing of the tides and 
further support will be seen to be derived from the frequent repetition of motif 
words.  In addition, as a by-product, the text makes good use of the deaths as 
further genre-marking. 
 
Fresleven dies first.  The telling of his death manages to include markers of 
absurdity and universality as well as hiding.  It also indicates the function of the 
overt plot as a distracter.  His death follows from a misunderstanding between him 
                                                          
124  Ibid., p. 69. 
125  Ibid., p. 104. 
126  Ibid., p. 137. 
127  Watts, The Deceptive Text, p. 2. 
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and the chief of a village over “two black hens”.  The captain was perceived as 
engaged in a “noble cause”,128 like Kurtz129 and who, also like Kurtz, after “a 
couple of years…out there”130 loses control as Kurtz shows “no restraint”.131  In 
the captain’s case the lack of restraint exhibits itself when he starts to beat his 
opponent.  The son of the chief responds by making "a tentative jab” and is 
surprised to find that what he thought was a “supernatural being” dies.  The 
population of the village scatter leaving the "grass growing though his ribs".132  
Presented like this, Fresleven’s death is an existential marker in the guise of 
absurdity.  Looked at another way, it is really less of a death and more of an 
opportunity.  Marlow stops going on his “own road and on [his] own legs”133 and 
instead is said to have “stepped into [someone else’s] shoes”.134  In this sense he 
loses his individuality and is represented as just another captain and this doubles as 
the idea of repetition.  The text is seeking to exploit the universality of what is to 
follow.  Marlow is to follow Fresleven immediately and this prepares the reader to 
follow Marlow who follows Kurtz.   
 
On the other hand, Fresleven is one of only four135 named people in the 
book.  This seems to suggest that he is not just another captain but, like Marlow, 
somebody special; different.  This restates the separation between the individual 
and the universal.  The difference, in this case, lies in and emphasises, the 
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130  Ibid., p. 55. 
131  Ibid., p. 111. 
132  Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
133  Ibid., p. 54. 
134  Ibid., p. 55. 
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difference exhibited by Marlow.  It is not so much that he is different, but that he 
perceives himself as different as everyone does when they first become aware of 
existential futility.  If Fresleven were to tell the story of Kurtz, the story of 
existential futility would be the same but he would solve the existential dilemma 
with a different ESD.  Presented like this, the marker is pointing to the multiplicity 
of available overt plots.  He is both the same and different.  In the sense that he is 
just a repeat then he is universal and he maps onto the covert.  In the sense that he 
perceives himself as different and individual he maps onto the overt.  The overt is 
allowable but the covert must be hidden.  Fresleven’s death does not overlook this 
necessity.  The mention of his death is accompanied by suggestions of anomalies 
which, according to Watts, can instigate a search for a covert plot.  Marlow, who is 
primarily a sea water captain, makes a lot of noise about taking a fresh-water post.  
This deviation from his normal behaviour is especially noticeable since, in order to 
obtain the post, he has to ask help from a woman, his aunt.  Given his expressed 
misogyny at other points in the text it might be thought that this should be 
explained and it is not.  The covert plot is hinted at and then forgotten. 
 
Marlow hears of Fresleven whilst he is still in Europe but does not hear of 
the unknown Swede until he starts his trip up river from the coast.  This inserted 
anecdote doubles as a timely reminder that suicide is an alternative to ESDeS.  The 
captain of the “little sea-going steamer” transports him a further thirty miles 
upstream and comments that “it is funny what some people will do for a few francs 
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a-month”.136  Marlow replies that he “expected to see that soon” only to have the 
captain tell him, somewhat cynically: “Don’t be too sure…the other day I took up a 
man [the unknown Swede] who hanged himself.”137  The narrative-consciousness 
called Conrad cannot resist giving one more hint that it has moved on from 
Victorian certainty.  Marlow, in this view, will not find meaning up the river; he 
will find there is no meaning.  If this were to be the story, then in its ESDeS telling 
a choice has to be faced.  If there is no meaning then life is pointless and rational 
behaviour demands death from an individual unless they are able to use existential-
self-deception to hide the truth by constructing an individual ESDeS.  Marlow, who 
in his fictional universe doesn’t yet know this, responds with “Why in God’s 
name?”, and the Swede captain answers: “Who knows? The sun too much for him, 
or the country perhaps”.138  Marlow, and hence the reader, is warned of the dire 
consequences of not hiding awareness of futility with an ESD.  The warning both 
indicates the presence of a covert plot and the need for hiding it. 
 
The death of the “negro”139 also doubles the sense of repetition.  Marlow 
“stumbled” upon him or her shortly after he had interacted with another “negro” 
who was “dying slowly”: 
 I found nothing else to do but to offer him one of my good 
Swede’s biscuit I had in my pocket.  The fingers closed slowly 
on it and held - there was no other movement and no other 
glance.  He had tied a bit of white worsted round his neck - 
Why? Where did he get it?  Was it a badge - an ornament - a 
                                                          
136  Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 62. 
137  Ibid. 
138  Ibid., p. 63. 
139  Ibid., p. 69. 
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charm - a propitiatory act?  It looked startling round his black 
neck, this bit of white thread from beyond the seas.140 
 
It is the third death in a very few pages and it occurs within the context of a sense 
of absurdity. 
 
The last of the minor character deaths is that of the helmsman and because it 
is the last of the motivating deaths, it must introduce the relevant story.  His 
particular death is the instigator of Marlow's “absurd” speech during which the 
helmsman is described as being "just like Kurtz”,141 and the Intended’s name is 
introduced for the first time.142  The helmsman’s death, therefore, links Marlow to 
Kurtz and through Kurtz to the Intended.  
 
The process of recognition that proceeds the covert plotting and the process 
of narration that follow may seem to be parts of a particular story but they are not.  
It is only special because, although many could have been told, this one actually 
has been told.  Any one of the other four deaths could also have served the purpose 
of motivating a following story.  The story that is told, therefore, is a matter of 
choice.  This gives more meaning to the disagreement between the frame narrator 
and Marlow.  Marlow is correct when he says his story is not about him 
“personally”, but the narrator is right too.  The listeners do not want to hear the 
story - of existential futility - he is really trying to tell.  They already know this 
story.  They want to hear the cover story: the story in the overt plot and any story 
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141  Ibid., p. 111. 
142  A painting of her is introduced earlier (Ibid., p. 76). 
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will do.  They want to, like Marlow himself, “forget”143 but it is not easy.  They 
have to do so over and over again.  Within a novella it would not be possible tell 
the story four times, but the four precipitating deaths imply that it will, eventually, 
have to be told four times and more. 
 
In addition to the repetitive sun, tides and deaths, the text uses repetition of 
words.  Cause and effect, as in Watts’s template argument, may be bi-directional.  
Repetition of words may draw attention to the repetitive deaths or the repetitive 
deaths may encourage the reader to give importance to word repetition.  The phrase 
given universal critical significance by many commentators is “The Horror! The 
Horror” so this might be regarded as the template.  It has upper-case letters so the 
horror being referred to is not just any horror but The Horror.  That is, the 
existential and unavoidable and unsayable horror.  Based on this, there are 
numerous other examples which gain in significance by comparison.  “The inner 
truth is hidden - luckily, luckily”,144 indicates an important truth – not just any 
truth.  It is legitimate, therefore, to assume the truth referred to is the same truth as 
represented by “The Horror”; the awareness of existential futility.  “Absurd! 
Absurd”145  indicates that the existential version, and not the comic version, is to be 
taken as the relevant meaning in the context.  “He [the helmsman] had no restraint, 
no restraint – just like Kurtz”146 tells the reader that if he, and Kurtz, had “left that 
shutter alone”147 the “arrow” of existential awareness would not have been able to 
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get in and cause its inevitable damage.  By the end the repetitions are becoming 
desperately repetitive: “I [the Intended] shall never see him again…never, never, 
never.”148  This is true because, as the thesis shall shortly show, the Intended 
represents seriousness.  She opts for permanency and will never allow herself to 
visit the point of recognition again.  Marlow, on the other hand, will have to repeat 
his story over and over and over again: as long as he represents the ESDeS method. 
 
The final death is unambiguous.  It is that of Kurtz.  He dies, as has already 
been argued, with ambiguity on his lips for the reader is not actually told what his 
dying words represent.  It is known, however, that Marlow survives him - but only 
just: “And then they very nearly buried me.”149  Clearly Conrad wants us to believe 
that the survival was a choice.  Marlow has chosen to live.  But it is not seen by 
him as unambiguously good: “I remained to dream the nightmare out to the 
end.”150  This nightmare derives from his now unavoidable clash with futility.151  
Marlow dwells on his suspended illness for some time and reports its conclusion to 
his audience: “No, they did not bury me, though there is a period of time which I 
remember mistily, with a shuddering wonder, like a passage through some 
inconceivable world that had no hope in it and no desire.”152  How he avoids 
following Kurtz is by accommodating the sense of futility which Kurtz could not.  
This is achieved by the process of hiding and is demonstrated by the covert 
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plotting.  It is available so the narrative-consciousness knows about it but it is well 
hidden. 
 
Covert Plotting 
 
A covert plot is not the same as a main or subplot for it is designed to resist many 
readings although, in the normal course of reading, it will only need to resist one or 
two.  In the first reading, Marr suggests, “we experience the swirl of currents where 
knowing and not-knowing meet” and “the book we shut after the first reading 
remains closed forever”153 for “you cannot step into the same flow of reading 
twice”.154   If there is a second reading it “is the thanks deserved by every author 
who smuggles more into the lines than one can casually absorb”.155  Not only does 
Heart of Darkness fall into this category, it also contains a wealth of material for 
further discovery through further readings, but only an “arrogant”156 writer would 
expect more than a second reading from a normal reader.  Given that it is unlikely 
that a text will be read more than twice and there is no motive to find a covert plot 
and there is no lack of other stories to read, the covert plot will not be found by the 
average reader.  Cedric Watts claims that he only realised there was a covert plot in 
Almayer’s Folly after reading it “for perhaps the fourth time”157 and that Ian Watt, 
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despite allocating thirty-three pages to the analysis of Almayer’s Folly, “does not 
even mention the name of Abdulla”.158  
 
If the covert plot is deliberately hidden, not intended to be found and not 
likely to be found, there seems no reason for the inclusion of a covert plot.  Watts 
realises this: “since [its] reticence does not conceal, what is its purpose?”159  He 
goes on to suggest a number of reasons.  This thesis calls them: the training, 
exemplary or didactic reason,160 the empirical reason,161 the subliminal or template 
reason, and the moral or dialectical reason.162  At this point in the argument he 
would use the template argument in regard to what he calls the murder plot within 
Heart of Darkness.163  That is, the covert plot, when discovered, “subliminally”164 
tells the reader how to read the main plot.  Watts argues that the murder plot 
reflects the Darwinian argument of the survival of the fittest.  Kurtz’s death is 
better described as a murder and this is achieved by doing nothing to prevent 
disease.  Once this is recognised the overt plot can be read, purposefully, as equally 
red in tooth and claw, with the Europeans exploiting the native Africans.  This 
seems perverse.  It relies on a doubtful psychological premise and does nothing that 
the overt plot could not do on its own.  This thesis argues that the template can 
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work, however, but by going the other way round.  Once the overt plot is 
interpreted in an ESDeS process way, the covert plot, when discovered, can be re-
examined.  If this is done it is found that the murder plot is not so simple.  It carries 
more meaning than this and this becomes significant for the final brick in the 
intentional and collusive ESDeS wall. 
 
This thesis, then, is in a different position from the normal reader because it 
is actively looking for the covert plot and is committed to not forgetting it.  It is 
helped in the first task by having, at its disposal, a theoretical foundation and it is 
helped in the second by resisting its instructions.  The foundation of the theory has 
already been indicated.  Conrad is only a particular name for a particular narrative-
consciousness.  A novel written by “Conrad”, therefore, could be written using the 
same techniques used by the same narrative-consciousness.  If the “Conrad” 
narrative-consciousness is an ESDeS then Heart of Darkness could be an ESDeN.  
If so, there will need to be a split to enable p and not-p to separate.  In this case 
Marlow, the central narrator, is set against Kurtz, the character that is superficially 
seen as the focus of the story.  He exists only as an aspect of the overall narrative-
consciousness in which Marlow will be the representative of the surviving part of 
the consciousness.  Gekoski essentially thinks this too: “Kurtz’s crucial role in the 
tale lies in his symbolic importance: in the representative quality of his history 
[and] in his role as a final incarnation of the darkness itself.”165  Since, then, 
Marlow and Mr. Kurtz are aspects of the same overall narrative-consciousness and 
Marlow, manifestly, is not dead - because he is telling the story - what can be 
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inferred?  It can be inferred that it is the knowledge that Kurtz possessed that is 
dead and, as a corollary, the aspect that is Marlow is enabled to survive.  Existential 
futility has been recognised and has to be hidden (Marlow walks away: he “left the 
cabin”166).  The argument now becomes interesting.  The question now becomes 
“how is this existential description of separation to be hidden so that the reader can 
collude in the process?”  The answer is to mirror this statement with a plot 
separation.  In this case the plot separation involves a plot that substantiates the 
collusive nature of the exercise.  The covert plot tells of a “murder plot” which 
becomes, on inspection, an intentional or “collusive death plot”. 
 
Watts, who originated the idea of covert plot and suggested “Abdulla’s 
stratagem”167 in Almayer's Folly, also suggested what he calls “the murder plot”168 
for Heart of Darkness.  It is instructional to follow his reasoning.  Watts suggests 
that Kurtz, in Heart of Darkness, is the victim of devious machinations contrived 
by the manager who wants Kurtz to die so that he can inherit the lucrative ivory 
trade established by Kurtz at the Inner Station.  This, as far as it goes, correctly 
identifies the locus of the covert plot.  But Watts does not go far enough.  He 
identifies the manager’s contribution but misses out on the participation of both 
Kurtz and Marlow.  By doing so, he misses the essence of the plot. 
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Kurtz operated from the Inner Station which is many miles upstream and 
dependant upon supplies from the Central and Outer Stations.  These supplies had 
not been provided for some time and, since Kurtz is reported to be ill, it seems to be 
necessary to save or rescue him.  The manager plans to do this by sailing a steamer 
up the river.  This is an anomaly, for it would appear to be the manager's job to 
supply the agents and no explanation for why he has not done so is offered; the 
terms save or rescue are, therefore, out of place.  However, leaving this aside or, 
rather, accepting it as given, Watts identifies a number of textual comments which 
in themselves mean little but which collectively make a case for the alleged murder.  
Marlow arrives at the company’s Central Station to finds his boat wrecked.  This is 
not necessarily significant because everything in the station is badly done: the gate 
of the station is a “neglected gap”,169 the station’s brick maker “did not make 
bricks”170 and to put out a fire, water is carried in a pail which has “a hole in the 
bottom”.171  In contrast to this, the station had “an air of plotting”,172 one plot of 
which, Watts claims, was “the manager’s plot to accelerate Kurtz’s death”.173  
Various hints of this are given.  Marlow’s ship is damaged by the manager (and a 
volunteer skipper) a mere two days before Marlow arrives.  Watts implies that this 
must have been deliberate as there was no sudden need. Kurtz had not been 
resupplied for a year, so two more days would not have mattered, especially when 
professional help was known to be close by.  The repair is delayed for a full three 
months, as accurately predicted by the manager, when it could have been done 
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much quicker if the necessary rivets had been supplied earlier.  The brick maker, 
who serves the manager as a secretary, does not exactly say so but implies the delay 
is due to the manager not including a request in his letters to the coast. The brick 
maker says, in effect, it is not my fault for “I write from dictation.”174  Finally, 
Marlow overhears the manager talking to his uncle and the talk makes it clear that 
it is only Kurtz who stands in the way of the manager’s promotion.  The manager’s 
uncle then makes the significant comment - “trust to this”175 - pointing at the 
jungle.  The meaning of this remark was made clear several pages earlier when the 
manager was heard to say that “men who come out here should have no 
entrails.”176  He means that Kurtz, like most Europeans, seems unable to cope with 
the jungle without succumbing to illness.  It is only necessary to do “nothing” for 
his murderous intent to be fulfilled. 
                                                          
 
Watts has collated the “various scattered hints”177 well.  He is able to make 
an effective cumulative argument.  However, the argument falls short in a number 
of ways.  The first concerns the participation of Kurtz and is identified by Todd 
Gray Willey, who shows that Watts misses both supporting and conflicting 
evidence.  He quotes the use of the harlequin’s statement that Kurtz “was 
shamefully abandoned”178 which, clearly, supports the murder claim.  He also 
draws attention to the fact that the text makes very clear that Kurtz was not trapped 
174  Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 81. 
175  Ibid., p. 87. 
176  Ibid., p. 72. 
177  Watts, “Heart of Darkness: The Covert Murder Plot - Plot and the Darwinian Theme”, 
p. 137. 
178  Todd Gray Willey, “The ‘Shamefully Abandoned’ Kurtz: A Rhetorical Context for Heart of 
Darkness”, Conradiana, 1978, Summer, pp 99-112.  The original quote is from Conrad, Heart of 
Darkness, p. 122. 
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and dependent on rescue.  He had earlier made a trip down the river - and back - on 
his own.  He had delivered vast quantities of ivory in a fleet of canoes and "had 
apparently intended to come himself, the station being by that time bare of goods 
and stores, but after coming three hundred miles, had suddenly decided to go 
back”.179  There seems no doubt, therefore, that if he has been isolated for more 
than a year at the Inner Station it was as a matter of choice.  If he had wanted to 
seek medical aid it was well within his power to have obtained it.  He was able to 
make the trip “alone in a small dug-out with four paddlers”.180  The manager may 
have wanted Kurtz dead but, equally, Kurtz appears not to have wanted to save 
himself.  If letting someone else die deserves the name murder, then letting oneself 
die deserves the name suicide. 
 
It will be recalled that Watts's generation of a covert plot structure draws 
the question from the astute reader, “why bother?”  Three of his answers have 
already been discussed.  A fourth reason is provided when he suggests that “the 
moral value of literary works lies in their dialectical rather than their exemplary 
force: in other words, in the effectiveness of their challenges to moral 
presuppositions rather than in their commendation of any readily-definable moral 
positions."181  He expands, later, on what he means by this: the “moral implications 
[of the covert plot in The Secret Agent] work against, and substantially contradict, 
the moral implications of the main plot.”182  Watts essentially means, as does 
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Gekoski, a conflict between the individual and the society, but the argument applies 
equally to a conflict within an individual narrative-consciousness.  Further, the 
conflict need not just be between the covert and the overt plot.  The conflict can be, 
as it is here, mirrored in both.  The manager’s “murder” is not a clear-cut murder.  
It relies on the conflating of “letting die” with “motivated murder”.  It is further 
conflicted here because Kurtz would appear to collude in his own death.  The death 
might be now regarded as suicide if the conflation “allowing to be killed” is the 
same as “suicide”.  There is a further – and much more significant - dimension 
which is also overlooked by Watts; that is Marlow’s participation in Kurtz’s death, 
for Heart of Darkness is “as much about Marlow as about Kurtz”.183  The manager 
is only a minor character who links Marlow with Kurtz – and, through Kurtz, links 
Marlow with the Intended.  Marlow’s participation in the death has the ESDeS 
effect of moving the reading away from either a legal or a moral dimension onto an 
existential one.  But, to get to this point requires a digression into moral 
philosophy. 
 
To be comfortable with the title of Watts’s covert plot, then, requires the 
equating of “murder” with “letting die”.  It is not clear whether this is permissible 
either in general or in a particular case for there does seem to be a moral difference 
between the two.  Campbell and Collison say, “Not jumping into the canal to save 
someone from drowning (assuming you could) may be reprehensible but does not 
seem, on the face of it, to be morally equivalent to pushing them in, in the first 
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place, intending them to drown.”184   Rachels provides a more clearly analysable 
situation – equivalent to the Rylean character - which seeks to locate where the 
difference, if any, lies:   
Smith and Jones both stand to make a lot of money when their 
six-year old cousin dies.  They plan, separately, to kill him.  If 
we suppose two cases, then in the first, Smith gets to him first 
while he is in the bath and holds his head under the water until 
he dies.  In the second, Jones gets to him first but, before he can 
drown him, the child slips, bangs his head and falls, 
unconscious, with his head under the water.  Jones waits, ready 
to hold his head under the water should the child recover, but 
this proves unnecessary.  Smith drowns the child.  Jones lets the 
child drown when he could have saved him.185 
 
The example seems to locate the difference between being causally and morally 
responsible.  Most people might be happy to accept that both Smith and Jones were 
morally responsible, but Rachels argues that both are also causally responsible in 
the sense that both could have saved the child if they had acted differently, if they 
had chosen to do so, and both knew this.  This argues for a principle of negative 
responsibility which states that “one is just as responsible for the consequences of 
one's inactions as for the consequences of one's actions”.186  Campbell and Collison 
argue, however, that there is a difference between Smith and Jones: that they are 
both guilty but guilty of different things, with Jones being merely guilty of “gross 
and self-serving callousness”.187  Although morally reprehensible, he would not be 
guilty of murder.  
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In Marlow's case, Kurtz's death did not come about as a direct intentional 
causal act instigated by Marlow.  He was, however, as has been argued above in the 
uneasiness section of the genre-marking discussion, in possession of the evidence 
that could have made him aware of the intention the manager had of causing 
Kurtz’s death.  Whether or not he was self-deceived, as this discussion suggests, he 
comes to know the truth at some point for he tells his listeners: “I see it now.”188  
If, however, Marlow was not self-deceived and did foresee the murder and did 
nothing then this would be the equivalent of standing by as the child drowned in the 
bath.189  In other words “foreseeing a murder” and doing nothing can be, but need 
not be, considered just as culpable as committing the murder.  This is especially 
true since his knowledge of Kurtz’s desperate and pressing need for rescue does 
make his “not caring” about the rivets culpable.  Is it possible to suppose that he 
could have got the rivets quicker?  The answer is a very definite “Yes”.  The text 
goes out of its way to make this a clear and present proposition.  It spells it out in 
every detail: “There were cases of them [rivets] down at the coast”; “We had plates 
that would do [to fill the hole in the steamer] but nothing to fasten them with”; 
“And every week the messenger…letter bag on shoulder and staff in hand, left our 
station for the coast”; “And several times a week a coast caravan came in with trade 
goods”; and “Three carriers could have brought all that was wanted to set that 
steamboat afloat.”190  All of the observers, in these examples, are standing by doing 
nothing when something could be done.  The context of the fictional example 
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suggests that the text wants the reader to give the doing of “nothing” some 
importance.  It does not stop there.  The text shows Marlow to be consciously 
avoiding the consequences of his inaction by distancing himself from 
responsi
d plenty of time for 
meditation, and now and then I would give some thought to 
Kurtz.  I wasn't very interested in him.191  
ates, 
with ma is a clear lie on par with his lie to the Intended.   
                                                          
bility:  
I had given up worrying myself about the rivets.  One's capacity 
for that kind of folly is more limited than you would suppose.  I 
said Hang! - and let things slide.  I ha
 
It is sufficient that he should call the affair “stupid” and that capacity to “worry” 
should be limited to consider Marlow as an inactive murderer.  It would appear to 
be unnecessary to add "I wasn't interested in him": a claim that the text neg
mmoth repetition.  It 
 
There is further textual support for including Marlow as a collusive 
murderer.  He seems to be constantly anticipating Kurtz's death.  He, for example, 
after the death of the helmsman, and for no good reason, except perhaps co-timing, 
assumes “I suppose Mr Kurtz is dead as well by this time”.192  Second, he seems to 
be prepared, if necessary, to go further and do the killing himself.  During the 
jungle scene, he directly expresses the possibility that he will kill Kurtz: “I'll smash 
your head” and “I will throttle you for good.”193  Finally, when Kurtz actually dies, 
Marlow's behaviour becomes crucial.  He does nothing to help: he simply walks 
out.  This makes his behaviour a direct parallel to that of Jones.  He may not be 
191  Ibid., p. 84. 
192  Ibid., p. 106. 
193  Ibid., p. 131. 
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causally responsible but he certainly can be seen as morally responsible.  Marlow is 
not unaware of this since he tells his listeners: “I believe I was considered brutally 
callous.”194  “Callous” for not caring is what he wants his listeners to take him as 
meaning but it is possible to go further and ask why he didn't try to revive Kurtz.  
As a sailor, Marlow should have been able to attempt this.  There had been a 
“practical manual method of artificial respiration…[since]…the industrial 
revolution (late 1700s) when coal mining asphyxiations and drowning were 
equent”.195  The answer is clear: Marlow wanted Kurtz dead. 
 
Mr Kurtz” and Marlow, instead of perceiving the remark as a lie goes out of his 
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It is possible to go still further and suggest that the manager and Marlow are 
colluding with each other in their murderous intents.  Whenever one of them draws 
attention to the possibility of withdrawing, the other negates it.  Early on, the 
manager, because he is concerned about Kurtz's well-being, suggests “going on at 
once” but is restrained by Marlow: “I knew, and he knew, that it was 
impossible.”196  After the attack by Kurtz's “savages”, “The manager stood by the 
wheel murmuring confidentially about the necessity of getting well away down the 
river before dark at all events, when I [Marlow] saw in the distance a clearing [the 
Inner Station].”197  On occasions, too, they seem to reinforce each other’s 
intentions.  The manager says “I would be desolated if anything should happen to 
194  Ibid., p. 137. 
195  A. Geddes, “The History of Artificial Respiration”, Engineering in Medicine and Biology 
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way to justify him: “I looked at him, and had not the slightest doubt he was 
sincere.”198 
 
The penultimate consideration is the one of responsibility.  Campbell and 
Collinson add an interesting caveat to their conclusion that Jones, by doing nothing, 
was merely guilty of “gross and self-serving callousness”: they assert that although 
he was morally reprehensible, he would not be guilty of murder “unless he was in 
loco parentis”.199  So did either the manager or Marlow have responsibility that 
could be considered equivalent to parental responsibility?  The manager might be 
considered responsible for Kurtz’s death if it could be shown that he had an 
employer’s duty of care for him.  A conclusion in this respect would involve 
knowledge of the manager’s duties.  It would appear he could not be superior to 
Kurtz, in the sense of being in charge, if he would like Kurtz’s position.  However, 
his job does seem to include relieving the up-river stations - including the one 
operated by Kurtz – and this has not been done for some time.  While insufficient 
textual evidence exists to allow allocation of certain blame, it does not seem an 
unreasonable surmise.  There is, perhaps, a marginal terminological shift here, in 
emphasis at least, towards the concept of responsibility.  But it is important because 
it seems to suggest the possibility of partial effect.  The Smith and Jones example is 
clear in that Jones is the only conscious person available and the life or death of the 
child depends entirely on his actions or inactions.  Responsibility and causality are 
unambiguously synonymous here.  However, in Kurtz’s case the manager, Marlow 
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and Kurtz himself as well as others all have possible influence and therefore 
choices to make.  They collectively may be said to cause Kurtz’s death.  But 
responsibility is a more individual term: reality may not be as important as 
perception.  Whereas the manager has an actual duty of care, Marlow does not.200  
He may, however, feel he is responsible because he, individually, could have 
prevented Kurtz’s death regardless of what others were doing or could have done.  
This is the effect produced by the text, for it portrays Marlow as being very 
definitely willing to take personal responsibility.  He holds himself responsible for 
the helmsman’s death, for example, and takes it upon himself to tip him overboard 
against the wishes of everybody else present.  He also, certainly, takes it upon 
himself to deal with the interests of Kurtz and the Intended.  He keeps “the bundle 
of papers given…by Kurtz”201  and “refused to give up the smallest scrap”.202  
Finally and crucially he is prepared to do something he “hate(s) [and] detest(s)”203 
when he chooses to lie to the Intended.  Marlow, therefore, perceives he has a 
responsibility for Kurtz.  Of course this responsibility might be seen as just a 
tautology since the killing of Kurtz is actually the killing of one aspect of himself; 
equivalent to the killing of the conflicting idea. 
 
Finally, it can be added that not only does Kurtz, by doing nothing, allow 
himself to die, he actively colludes in the killing since he also has partial 
responsibility: he has asked for, in effect, euthanasia.  So Marlow, if he did collude 
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in the death, would not be committing murder but assisted suicide.  This 
interpretation is specifically adopted by Francis Ford Coppolla’s film Apocalypse 
Now (1979). In it, Marlow is renamed Captain Willard, and Kurtz is replaced by 
Colonel Kurtz.  Willard knows before he starts that the mission must be a secret.  In 
this interpretation he actually spells-out, rather than denies, that he cannot tell 
Kurtz’s story without telling his own.  He then actually kills Kurtz, rather than 
merely witnessing his death, and Kurtz virtually asks him to do it, rather than 
merely passively waiting for it to happen.  Watts’s murder plot then has been 
changed.  The term murder has become ambiguous.  The death, by whatever name, 
clearly involves collusion between the manager, Marlow and Kurtz.  For this reason 
the murder plot has been renamed the collusive death plot.  
 
Kurtz’s death is, however, unlike the death of Almayer.  It does not end the 
story.  It is not, in this sense, actually the “culminating point” of his story.  The 
narrative-consciousness called Conrad has more work to do.  It has the journey back 
to civilisation and the end sequence, the bit that “locks in the…whole 30000 words 
of narrative”,204 before it can move on.  An ESDeS reader can give coherence to the 
“Horror!” episode by recognising it as the point of recognition; the choice.  The 
narrative-consciousness recognises that “life is…for a futile purpose”205 but chooses 
that Kurtz (and what he represents) dies so that Marlow can live.  What then needs 
to follow – to make this possible - is the process of narration. 
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ESDeS Overt Plotting: The Self-Deceptive Process to the Point of Narration. 
 
The narrative-consciousness theory does not see Marlow and Kurtz as characters 
but as aspects of the overall narrative: with Marlow coming to represent one idea 
and Kurtz the conflicting not-p – the embodiment of existential awareness of 
futility.  The initial discussion of the parent-child-self-deceptive-process, in this 
chapter, was ended at the point of recognition: when Kurtz died with “The horror!” 
on his lips, taking existential futility with him and leaving Marlow with the 
problem, what to do next?  In essence, the covert plot ends at the same time.  Elaine 
Showalter seems to pick up on this ending when she sums up Marlow’s alternatives 
at this point.  She asserts that “the text holds out hints that Marlow will replace 
Kurtz, take over his life – either by becoming mad and assuming Kurtz’s role as 
God in the Congo, or by marrying his Intended back in the Old World”.206  In 
ESDeS terminology, this represents a choice between Story-3 and Story-2 but it 
presents a false choice because Marlow cannot “replace” Kurtz.  Marlow represents 
the other side of the existential paradox and it is this other side of the separation 
that remains.  However, the presentation draws attention to the fact that the text 
wants the reader to know that this is not a self-evident choice; it could have been 
the other way.  Marlow could have been hidden and left existential awareness 
intact.  In some sense this happens because Marlow is not happy with his role as a 
project maker.  It is one thing for the narrative-consciousness to decide to ignore 
that existential angst that has been discovered, but it is not so easy to actually do so.  
                                                          
206  Elaine Showalter, Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the Fin de Siècle, London: 
Virago, 1992, p. 97. 
 223
Marlow may state he left the cabin and hence left Kurtz (not-p) behind but he does 
not find it so easy to do.  He may state “The voice was gone”, but to accept it is 
another matter.  The best he can say about it is it is a “choice of nightmares”.207  He 
tells his audience “they very nearly buried me”.  Instead, he “remained to dream the 
nightmare out to the end”.  He restates the solution: “he had made the last stride, he 
had stepped over the edge, while I had been permitted to draw back my hesitating 
foot.”208  He restates also the observation that it was difficult: “No, they did not 
bury me, though there was a period of time which I remember mistily, with a 
shuddering wonder, like a passage through some inconceivable world that had no 
hope in it and no desire.”209  The reader, therefore, if they identify Kurtz’s 
recognition of “The Horror” as the defining moment of the novel, must surely be 
making a mis-reading.  It is not the recognition of this that is crucial to the story: 
this may even represent the commonplace.  The important thing is the fact that the 
trip combines, as Gekoski recognises, “up the river to pick up Kurtz, and back 
again”.210  The journey back represents, for an ESDeS parent and child mechanism, 
the process of narration.  For a full Story-2 exposition becomes possible only after 
the completion of a covert plot.  The hiding of existential awareness is the 
prerequisite of the generation of a new cover story.  The text of Heart of Darkness 
is already making it clear that this is not the easy process that narratives such as The 
Death of Ivan Ilyich may have implied. 
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The trip back shows the process of narration.  Marlow successfully returns 
to Europe where it might be thought that he would return to normality.  The 
question becomes, what form should normality take?  There are two ways in which 
an answer to this question could be attempted.  The first is within the fictional 
universe and concerns the love motive.  Cedric Watts suggests that “there is a 
personal romantic aspect to Marlow’s visit to the Intended”.211  There is some 
justification for this assumption.  Marlow describes the Intended in Kurtz’s portrait 
of her: “She struck me as beautiful.”212  On the basis of this he decides to visit her 
and gives as his reason, “Curiosity?  Yes, and also some other feeling perhaps.”213  
This makes perfect sense in Watts’s analysis because Watts has not identified 
Marlow’s participation in Kurtz’s death.  It also seems an interesting explanation 
even after the covert plot has been renamed collusive death plot.  Within this telling 
of the covert plot, all three characters in the collusive triangle have been shown to 
have cooperated with Kurtz’s death.  If this version is preferred to the Watts’s 
version, it needs to be asked, what are their motivations?  The manager wants Kurtz 
dead, it may be assumed, because he “resents Kurtz’s success”214 or, more likely, 
because he wants to take over the lucrative ivory source, for Kurtz “sends in as 
much ivory as all the others put together”.215  The question now is why Marlow 
should wish to have Kurtz dead.  Although Bernard Paris asserts that “despite all 
that has been said about Marlow, there has been little discussion of his 
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motivations”,216 the love interest claim, as already described, provides an excellent 
motive for either killing Kurtz, or colluding with his murder or allowing him to die.  
Watts’s suggestion, therefore, that this plot continues through Marlow’s 
“transtextual biography”217 into Chance is equally valid.  This novel, to be 
discussed in depth in the next chapter, concludes with an expectation that Powell 
will marry Flora Anthony.  Watts argues that: “A balance has been redressed: a 
pattern begun so long ago in Heart of Darkness has at last been vicariously 
completed.”218  This thesis thinks that the love story solution to either version of 
the murder plot is a brilliant proposal but not completely adequate.  It leaves some 
unexplained factors which are better explained within the rules of narrative-
consciousness theory. 
 
The first objection might be that Marlow does not actually seem to be in the 
love-making mood when he returns to Europe.  He stands apart from the crowds, as 
Roquentin is later to stand apart from the citizens of Bouville.  He describes them 
scathingly: “I found myself back in the sepulchral city resenting the sight of the 
people hurrying through the streets to filch a little money from each other, to devour 
their infamous cookery, to gulp their unwholesome beer, to dream their insignificant 
and silly dreams.”219  No, it is clear that Marlow does not recover, in the usual 
meaning of the term, normality.  He recovers by adopting existential-self-deception. 
 
                                                          
216  Paris, Conrad’s Charlie Marlow, p. viii. 
217  Watts, The Deceptive Text, p. 140. 
218  Ibid. 
219  Ibid., p. 139. 
 226
This conclusion can be reworded: Kurtz undeniably knows whatever it is he 
knows and therefore, as the other part of the overall narrative-consciousness, so 
does Marlow.  The question of real interest is what it (or he) does with this 
knowledge.  Showalter says the first thing to be done is “it must be kept from non-
initiates.”220  Marlow appears to concur with this point of view for he does not 
immediately tell his story when he returns.  First he is ill.  Then, when faced with 
Company officials and distant cousins, “he refuses to give up information”.221  In 
fact, he does not tell his story until after he has had the interview with the Intended.  
The second objection to the simple love story emerges at this point.  Susan Jones 
notes that there are centres of Heart of Darkness that are often overlooked.  She 
draws attention to the female who “walked with measured steps”,222 and notes that 
“her physical vitality offer[ed] a striking contrast with the emaciated body of 
Kurtz”.223  Clearly her “vitality” would seem to imply that she is an alternative 
survivor beyond Kurtz, but the woman’s significance is not to be fully appreciated 
until the interview between Marlow and the Intended is, once again, recognised as 
the central telling.  During it “the Intended reminds Marlow of Kurtz’s African 
mistress, whom he has seen in the jungle”.224  Showalter uses this comparison to 
reinforce the division of knowledge: “Europeans are kept in the dark about the 
brute realities of imperialism, human greed, and cruelty, black women are the 
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dark.”225  The African woman stays behind with Kurtz and insofar as she represents 
the dark she also represents the knowledge that the Intended is not to be given.  
Marlow, in deciding to come back, has a more serious problem for he has seen the 
horror.  The scene with the Intended is not about “keeping the truth from the 
Intended”226 (although it also serves this purpose) it is about hiding the truth from 
himself.  In fact, he has to pick up from the Intended several tricks of the trade.  
The meeting is much more bi-directional than is often assumed.  In a sense it 
repeats the common confusion.  Within all of the overt plot interpretations Marlow 
is variously seen as either a “chivalrous” white lie teller or a male exploiter.  
However, in the covert plotting scenario the roles are reversed.  Marlow describes 
her as having “a mature capacity for fidelity, for belief”227 because he realises that 
is what he is going to need to cultivate if he is going to be able to mimic her claim 
and to say “I have survived”.228  He, in the overt telling, allows her “that great and 
saving illusion” that he will need to acquire by completing his separation from 
Kurtz and moving on.  He is projecting on to her what he is aspiring to himself.  
And just in case he is tempted to ignore the carrot he mulls over the stick: he 
wonders what would have happened “if I had rendered Kurtz that justice which was 
his due?”229  He answers himself: “It seemed to me that the house would collapse 
before I could escape.”230  The consequences would be “unspeakable pain”231 and 
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“horror!”  Luckily, luckily he doesn’t tell that story (not-p) he tells another: he has 
chosen Marlow (p). 
 
Ian Watt, Straus, Gekoski and this thesis have all shown that the “lie” within 
the codicil is the crucial, indicative, point.  This shows up the third objection.  The 
lie seems not to have worked in the sense that it did not lead to a successful 
conclusion of the love interest.  The reason for the failure is generally ascribed to 
Marlow’s selflessness.  He feels it necessary to abandon his own marriage project 
in order to save the Intended’s illusion relating to her image of Kurtz.  This is 
acceptable as far as it goes, but an even more persuasive reason is available by 
recognising the extent of Marlow’s sense of alienation.  This can be discovered by 
returning to Gekoski’s explanation of the “lie”: “the ‘Horror’ and the name of 
Kurtz’s Intended may be identical.”232   
 
It was argued above when the thesis stopped looking at Gekoski’s solution 
to the “idea” that he seems to avoid going too far down the existential angst path.  
He stops at the Intended’s individual solution.  He manages this, it is suggested, by 
adopting two conflating techniques, which may be slips.  These slips, if that is what 
they are, enter his article in its first few pages and are easily overlooked as the force 
of his full argument develops.  If the slips are followed to their logical conclusions, 
a number of things separate out: the universal is differentiated from the individual 
in a unique way that reinforces the primacy of the covert function (universal) over 
the overt function (individual) in the ESDeS and, the serious-unserious split is 
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covered in another way which ends by showing that a crucial aspect of their 
difference lies in the temporary nature of ESDeS.  The first slip involves Gekoski’s 
switching between the use of “I” (“I have argued”) to the use of “we” (“we must 
begin by”).  This is relatively trivial but indicative.  The second slip is Gekoski’s 
incorrect reference to Marlow’s audience using lower-case letters.233 
 
The “I” is connected to the individual and the “we” to the universal.  The 
“I” is used first and dropped after the first two pages of the article but its inclusion 
at all presages Gekoski’s return to the individual story after flirting with the 
universal.  The use of “we” argues for inclusiveness, cooperation and collusion 
within the functional purpose of the text.  It is as if Gekoski’s text knows that, for 
the self-deceptive text to work for the narrative-consciousness represented by Heart 
of Darkness, “we” all have to cooperate.  Marlow, as the only representative of this 
narrative-consciousness after Kurtz’s departure, tells his audience: 
No, it is impossible; it is impossible to convey the life-sensation 
of any given epoch of one’s existence, - that which makes its 
truth, its meaning - its subtle and penetrating essence.  It is 
impossible.  We live, as we dream – alone…234   
 
Everybody (we) has to face existential angst (covert plot), but everyone (I) has to 
find their own way of doing so (overt plot).  But for the overt plot to work it has to 
be acceptable to its audience.  In fact, no plot works without other characters and 
insofar as others have to be in “your” plot “you” have to be in the others’ plots.  
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Marlow may look as if he is on his own - as he is - but in order for his plotting to 
succeed it is necessary that he asks for the cooperation of others to listen to his 
story.  He may say that it is impossible to tell but this is contradicted by his 
proceeding to tell at great length.  What he means is not “I cannot find the words to 
tell” but “I should not tell”.  He says earlier, when he takes the job, “I undertook 
amongst other things not to disclose any trade secrets.  Well I am not going to.”235  
Well, this doesn't make sense either.  Trade secrets have to be passed on.  When he 
tells this to his listeners he knows the rest of the story and the readers do not.  A 
second reading allows a different interpretation.  It is true that he promises 
allegiance to the company, but mentioning it here implies he knows he has been let 
into a different conspiracy – concerning existential angst - which only works if it is 
not told.  By telling the story the way he does he actually means that he is breaking 
this rule.  If “we” are talking about “one’s existence” “we” should not be.  
Marlow’s listeners acknowledge this distinction since “there was not a word from 
anybody … [they] … might have been asleep”.236  By using the term “we” Gekoski 
seems to include himself and his readers within this cooperative grouping.  
Whatever Marlow sees as true for himself, “we” are going to go along with his 
analysis.  He tells the audience, and the reader, what it is all about and asks them, 
like a child with a secret, not to pass it on.  This is necessary because he needs the 
cooperation to tell how to both know it and “how not to pass it on”.  The audience 
accepts this restriction and the reader does (if they do) because it is in everybody’s 
interests to do so.  “We” would be colluding with the narrative-consciousness’s 
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(called Marlow) existential-self-deception by ignoring the suppression of its covert 
plotting and by not allowing this thesis’s interpretation of the final meeting with the 
Intended.  This emerges from interpreting Gekoski’s second slip. 
 
The use of upper-case letters implies the references are to individuals.  There 
is only one “Accountant” and he defines himself by the rules of accountancy.  He is 
in a fixed role.  The text of Heart of Darkness is full of the separating of those who 
adopt roles and those who adopt this thesis’s existential-self-deception.  The second 
group contains only Kurtz and Marlow both because they are individuals and 
because they make their own choices even though they know their choices are just 
convenient beliefs.  Marlow points out that Kurtz “had faith - don’t you see - he had 
faith.  He could get himself to believe anything - anything.”237  Marlow also 
differentiates himself from the collective people of Brussels.  They have 
“acquisitions, clothes, pretty rags - rags that would fly off at the first good shake” 
when what is needed is “a deliberate belief”.238  Johnson argues that this is “the 
most important speech in Heart of Darkness”239 and this is true.  Marlow here 
abandons his previous task of finding meaning to life outside of himself.  He states 
quite explicitly that any meaning given to you is worthless and recognises that if 
meaning is to be found, for him, it has to be created by himself - and deliberately at 
that.  In addition to the townsfolk of Brussels, the first group contains the vast 
majority of Conrad’s characters.  They do not make choices, they accept roles.  A 
choice needs to be constantly reaffirmed whereas a role is, by definition, more 
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permanent.  There are two categories of role players.  The first group contains the 
“good” characters or listeners to his tale: The Director of Companies, The Lawyer 
and the Accountant.  These are referred to disparagingly: “Here you all are, each 
moored with two good addresses…normal from year’s end to year’s end.”240  The 
gloss of civilised structure and the concept of the right way to behave are contrasted 
with a realisation that the alternative gives nothing but one’s own choices.  There is 
also a reference of a similar sort in the opening frame.  The Accountant brings out a 
box of dominoes.  Not only are the named listeners tainted with lack of 
individuality, restricted to roles, but the undifferentiated role of consumer is added 
to their non-identity.  In this sense normal-self-deception is grafted onto the idea of 
bad faith.  The two go together.  The framed story tells of the horrors associated 
with ivory-hunting, horrors of which the listeners prefer to know nothing.  They 
give the message - loud and clear - that they will collude with the self-deceptive not 
knowing aspects of the story.  Their well-being is held in common and, being in 
common, ensures their mutual collusion.  Marlow’s story is presented to such a 
trained group of listeners.  They are able to read the covert message and will abide 
with the injunction not to notice.  The reader, by joining them, is also being asked to 
read the purpose of the story, accept that it is in their interest to accept the 
conclusion, and to go along with it.  The second group of named-only characters are 
found within the story that Marlow tells to these listeners.  They include the 
manager, the brickmaker and the pilgrims.  The story gives a little more of their 
existence.  Unlike the listeners, who are presumably successful at what they do, 
none of this second group do their job properly.  The brickmaker “did not make 
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bricks”241 and the pilgrims are not holy.  The manager too fails to fulfil his role that 
includes the duty to restock the Inner Station.  Whatever their perceived function or 
degree of success within the novel, none of these characters can be said to possess 
individuality in the same way as Marlow and Kurtz.  Gekoski identifies the Intended 
with this group.  The Intended sacrifices her individuality to become a person who 
will live her life according to the rules of women with dead partners.  She will not 
make her own choices.  She is in bad faith.   
 
However, since Gekoski uses lower-case letters to refer to the listeners, he is 
not attributing bad faith to them.  They may be accountants (and so on), but are 
(presumably in Gekoski’s eyes) not defined by their professions; this is not all there 
is to them.  They are taken out of the equation.  They are just one of many 
accountants: they are universal listeners with (merely) convenient names.  When 
Marlow asks for cooperation from listeners with lower-case letters he is making a 
universal plea.  If Gekoski is making a mistake then it would appear that, 
subconsciously, he must recognise the significance of the change.  He is doing what 
Felman argues critics often do.  They identify with the text: “The critical 
interpretation…reproduces [the text] dramatically, unwittingly participates in it.”242  
Gekoski is inadvertently cooperating with Marlow’s plea to keep the secret hidden.  
He should have recognised that Marlow is not making a one-to-one personal plea 
but a plea that applies to everybody insofar as they make trips “up the river”.  
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However, having apparently recognised this he “steps back”, like Marlow.  He 
“forgets” that he is considering universal existential anguish and focuses instead on 
the personal.  His analysis does not give the Intended’s behaviour universal 
significance in the same way.  She retains her upper-case letter.  Gekoski reduces 
her actions to the normal and her “saving illusion” to a normal-self-deception.  This 
is acceptable for an individual.  In an ESDeS sense this is necessary for, if she did 
refer to the universal and everybody adopted this attitude, the behaviour would 
become pathological.  The behaviour of a collective “her” would restrict 
reproductive success rather than enhance it.  The adoption of a role rather than an 
ESDeS can be seen, in this sense, to be one way of avoiding evolutionarily 
maladaption.   
 
With Kurtz out of the way, the text unambiguously focuses on Marlow and 
his return journey.  He too has an upper-case letter of course but here, because the 
naming is individual, he is seen as an individual.  It is as an individual, therefore, 
that he recognises the futility of life.  It is as an individual narrative-consciousness 
that he rejects this aspect of Kurtz.  He knows, after the loss of Kurtz, he needs “a 
deliberate belief”243 to survive and shows himself trying to find one with the 
Intended. 
 
This analysis has made it clear, what has been hinted at all through this 
chapter, that there are two ways in which a narrative-consciousness could adopt a 
deliberate belief.  One has been called ESDeS and the emerging other is called bad 
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faith.  The thesis has now progressed enough to be able to make the difference clear.  
In an existentialist’s view people are all “hopelessly contingent beings thrown … 
into a world which could have logically existed without us, being itself radically 
contingent at every point”.244  To want it to be otherwise is to be in what Sartre calls 
“futile passion”245 and this motivates its denial.  Sartre calls this denial, bad faith.  If 
bad faith is possible, argues Sartre, “it is because [contingency] is an immediate 
permanent threat to every project of the human being”.246  So “the first act of Bad 
Faith…is to flee what it cannot flee, to flee what it is.”247  Sartre regards the 
adoption of bad faith as both a universal risk and as a negative moral process: “The 
very project of flight reveals to Bad Faith an inner disintegration in the heart of 
being, and it is in this disintegration that Bad Faith wishes to be.”248  Sartre, 
therefore, “contrasts Bad Faith…with Authenticity”.249   
 
This terminology can be translated into the terminology used by this thesis.  
Authenticity maps accurately onto Story-3 and ESDeS maps accurately onto Story-
2.  Bad faith maps partially onto Story-1 and partially onto normal-self-deception.  
It differs from existential-self-deception, as defined by this thesis, along three 
dimensions: degree of necessity, form and duration. 
 
Normal-self-deception originated in animals as a means for deceiving their 
prey and their partners.  At this point in evolution it would have been a temporary 
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phenomenon: put on and taken off as and when necessary.  In anthropomorphic 
terms there is the real sense of alternatives within normal-self-deception.  There are 
multiple reasons for it and multiple ways of doing it but it is not actually necessary 
to live a “saving lie” or use “pipedreams” or adopt “childish prattle”.  If, however, a 
particular form of deception becomes the norm it becomes, in anthropomorphic 
terms, a permanent role.  There may have been many causes and many possible 
alternative solutions but once a role is selected these options reduce to just one. 
 
ESD is an adaptation of animal self-deception.  In this form the possible 
causes of deception are, by definition, reduced to only the denial of existential 
contingency.  There is now no choice whether or not to indulge in the deception.  It 
now becomes necessary.  However, the way the self-deception is carried out still 
carries the two options associated with its evolutionary forebear.  It can be optional 
and multiple or it can be fixed.  The former is ESD and leads to ESDeS, whereas 
the latter is bad faith and tends to lead to the form of storytelling called Story-1.  
Strictly speaking the two are not identical.  Story-1, as related so far, entails the 
adoption of a pre-existing story – through the parent-child mechanism – and 
keeping to it.  The story has historically tended to be a “god” story and there is a 
certain irony in putting people of bad faith into this category.  There is a difference, 
however.  Bad faith people do recognise the horror for themselves but find it so 
terrible that an “inner disintegration” occurs and they “flee” from it.  The irony lies 
in the fact that the authentic person, like Kurtz, tries to be god whereas the bad faith 
person, like the Intended, adopts a god-form of story telling. 
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 The reality, in contemporary times, is that neither of these two extremes is 
normally acceptable.  Sartre may have thought that an individual, to achieve 
freedom, must reject bad faith and so, in this thesis’s terms, opt for Story-3, but this 
thesis’s hypothesis is that this does not happen very often, if at all.  It thinks the 
ESDeS is now the dominant mode of narrative-consciousness and this entails a 
necessary, individual story which acts out the choice on a temporary basis. 
 
Danto explains Sartre’s position thus:  
[human beings] are not determined to be what they are through a 
fixed human nature in which they participate; it is their nature 
not to have a nature in this sense, and their lives are spent in 
quest of a self-definition which they cannot find in the terms in 
which they seek it.  If they do find a definition, it will be a 
matter not of discovery but of decision: whatever we are is what 
we have decided to be, and we cannot therefore really be it since 
the option is always available to decide otherwise.250 
 
The difference between the two modes of accommodating existential futility 
is spelt-out by the text in Heart of Darkness. The Intended has to lie and Marlow 
doesn’t.  The Intended’s lie becomes her “own”.251  The “truth [that is] 
unendurable”252 is a personal truth.  And what might be unendurable is transformed, 
by the lie, into something ordinary.  She is kept from awareness.  She has put in 
place an image of Kurtz and has adopted her role permanently: “I am unhappy for – 
life.”253  She adopts the parent-child strategy; she avoids future questions for she 
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adopts the stance that she “knew.  She was sure.”254  She will be like the residents of 
Brussels: she has no desire or need to change.  Marlow, in contrast, is different for 
he retains the desire and power to change and does and, when he does, he will 
recognise that each new cover story will need to be repeated, retold and revitalised.  
Whatever story he adopts will, necessarily, be temporary: Heart of Darkness 
resonates with the necessity of a choice which is constantly exercised.  In short, 
Marlow is tempted to court the Intended as a cover story or project but in the end 
rejects it for he recognises that this would entail accepting her way of being in the 
world and this would be serious: “The principle of freedom cannot require that he 
should be free not to be free.”255  Marlow, therefore, insofar as he is unserious, will 
come again to another point of recognition and “the lie” which may have been 
intended as a point of narration becomes in fact and immediately a new point of 
recognition. Marlow goes off from his interview still looking for relief from his 
awareness of existential futility.  The telling of the story Heart of Darkness on the 
Nellie implies repetition but cannot itself be a repeat.  The text, representing a 
narrative-consciousness, therefore, ends unfinished.  This end is then brilliantly 
revisited with a new beginning when Marlow re-emerges in a new narrative-
consciousness, Chance. 
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Chapter 5 
Chance: An End to the Unfinished Story of Heart of Darkness. 
 
Chance is the fourth book in which Marlow appears.  At the manifest level, the text 
tells the story of Flora.  She is the daughter of the disgraced financier Mr de Barral 
who has been jailed for fraud at the start of the story.  The destitute young woman 
stays for a time with a Mr and Mrs Fyne before eloping with Captain Anthony, 
despite thinking that he could not possibly love her.  When Flora’s father is released 
from prison he joins the couple on board the Ferndale.  For a time the three live 
unhappily together observed by Anthony’s second mate, Powell, until Mr de Barral 
takes poison and dies.  Following this the couple, according to Paul Wake, “live 
happily together until the time of Captain Anthony’s death in a shipping accident six 
years later”.1  Clearly any account of the manifest plot ignores some detail.  In this 
case Wake ignores the final bit of the story: Flora retires to a secluded cottage near 
the Thames until, partly due to Marlow’s intervention, the reader is led to believe 
she and Powell marry.  Although the focus of this account appears to be on Flora, 
the story actually starts with a first chapter that concerns Powell.  He tells of the 
difficulties he experienced translating his second mate certificate into a berth.  He 
was eventually successful only due to a remarkable set of coincident events; a 
namesake in the position of power; a previous second mate with a broken leg and a 
desperate captain of the Ferndale that absolutely had to leave - to pick up its cargo 
of dynamite - on the next tide. 
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 Watts notes the Marlow transtextual aspect in The Deceptive Text and 
identifies, in addition to the overt telling, a particular style of covert plotting which 
“is covert in proportion to the reader’s unawareness of the relevant material”.2  The 
Marlow connecting theme has been revisited recently by Bernard Paris and by Paul 
Wake.  Paris has written a book on Marlow “as a mimetic portrait”3 which he says 
reverses “the usual approach to Marlow [which is] to see him in functional terms, as 
a ‘literary device’”.4  Paris goes on to claim that the purpose of the usual approach 
is “to look through Marlow to Conrad”.5  This thesis, of course, wants to reverse his 
reversal at least in the sense that it identifies Conrad with the narrative-
consciousness.  The reverse back is justified for two reasons.  First, the mimetic 
approach cannot, it seems, include Chance and second, the adoption of the mimetic 
approach sees the end of Heart of Darkness as satisfactory.  Paris ignores “the 
Marlow of Chance…[because he seems a]…much less fully realised figure”6 in 
Chance than in the other three Marlow novels.  He is satisfied with the end of Heart 
of Darkness because he interprets Marlow’s reason for telling his auditors, on the 
Nellie, his story as “a cathartic experience in which he sets the record straight, 
purges himself of his anger and guilt, and regains his sense of rectitude”.7  In short, 
there is no need for further retelling.  If this was to be accepted then it would follow 
that the experience is expected to be a one-off experience, for its success would 
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have the effect: to “put Kurtz behind him at last”.8  Yet Conrad feels compelled to 
give Marlow a further episode.  This can be explained by ESDeS which demands a 
constant renewal of a cover story.  The characters, in this view, are only “concepts 
in anthropoid shape or fragments of human psyche parading as whole human 
beings”.9  Kurtz is not seen as a person but as the part of a narrative-consciousness 
that represents awareness of existential futility and which has been hidden.  This 
model would seem to be a better fit.  In this model, Chance need not be ignored.  
Indeed it has to occur to finally bring to an end the unfinished story of Heart of 
Darkness. 
 
An ESDeS reading of the text will be quickly justified because genre-
marking is provided very early on and there is a very significant structural similarity 
between Heart of Darkness and Chance.10  These two aspects merge to make the 
first section of the book a summary of the ESDeS reading of Heart of Darkness and 
the final section the bit that “locks in” the meaning of the transtextual narrative, as 
the original narrative-consciousness sees it. 
 
The text introduces the genre-marking of unease on three separate occasions 
before the story even starts.  The first occasion lies in the immediacy and ambiguity 
of the title.  Just as Heart of Darkness could be read in three different ways, 
instilling immediate uncertainty, depending on the priority given to the component 
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words, “chance” has three alternate meanings depending on whether it is contrasted 
with intention, cause and effect or probability.  The second expression of the unease 
-marking is suggested by the epigraph printed prior to the beginning of the story.  It 
is derived from a poem by Sir Thomas Browne.  The part of the poem selected 
suggests that there is no cause and effect but this seems to be contradicted by the 
actual poem which seems to suggest not only a cause, but a divine cause.  This will 
be fully developed later in the chapter.  The third contribution to uneasiness actually 
appears in the text.  The story opens with this sentence: “I believe he had seen us out 
of the window.”11  The “I” refers to the anonymous narrator, the “he” to Powell and 
the “us” to the anonymous narrator and Marlow.  Now “believe” has a number of 
weak meanings such as “suppose”, but substitution of such a synonym would not be 
a sufficient explanation of the presence of the sentence in such a crucial place.  The 
subsequent telling of the story makes no use of the observation (the belief is neither 
confirmed nor discounted nor does it have any consequences) so is superfluous12 
since what follows does not depend upon it.  Bernard Paris has trouble with the 
word.  He finds Marlow’s need for a “deliberate belief” in Heart of Darkness to be 
“puzzling”13 and would, no doubt, find this puzzling too.  It cannot, however, be 
overlooked.  The narrative-consciousness called Conrad would not waste an initial 
sentence.  Its use is to draw the reader’s attention to the distinction between belief 
and knowledge; the possible and essential; necessity and contingency.  Conrad, 
through the narrator, makes no attempt to give the reader any evidence for the stated 
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belief so it remains an unsubstantiated belief and therefore sets the story, at it outset, 
into an ontological framework.  The implication is that there is no reason, despite 
the claim in the extended epigraph, to be given; no cause and effect; no necessity.  
Therefore, the reader is directed to think the opposite: that all is contingent.  The 
text ultimately seems to support this interpretation.  It suggests that people find it 
possible to believe things in general and to have no obvious reasons (in the sense of 
rational explanations) for doing so.  It provides a long example with de Barral’s rise 
to prominence which depended on “everyone” believing in the efficacy of 
“Thrift”.14  Later the text tells us that such a behavioural belief mechanism not only 
happens but is necessary.  It has Flora say, with reference to Captain Anthony, “I 
believe in him” and then to justify her unsubstantiated belief with, “I must believe in 
him.”15  Chance, therefore, reinforces Heart of Darkness’s and Marlow’s need for a 
“definite belief”: one that is not supported by an external metanarrative; one that is 
individually crafted.  The story that follows the first sentence is therefore delivered 
by the surviving part of the narrative-consciousness. It is Marlow’s expression of 
creation: “I am trying to account for myself.”16  It completes what Paris thinks he 
wants to do; that is put “Kurtz behind him at last”.  It completes what the ESDeS 
wants to do which is to temporarily re-hide existential angst  
 
The structural similarity between the two stories - Heart of Darkness and 
Chance - concerns the apparently unnecessary in each.  Chance, like Heart of 
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Darkness, has superfluous sections.  It has a disconnected first chapter as Conrad 
admits himself: “it was written in 1907 and the rest of the novel in 1911-12.  And it 
did not belong to that novel.”17  It also has a conveniently hurried final chapter.18  
The first bit turns out to be, in effect, a restatement of the position of the narrative-
consciousness as it was left at the end of Heart of Darkness and the “hurried 
section” finishes Heart of Darkness by showing the actualisation of its implied 
repetition. 
 
Conrad wrote to Edward Garnett, in 1898, that he was thinking of writing a 
book of “short tales in which he planned to include ‘Jim’ (20.000) ‘Youth’ (13.000) 
‘A Seaman’ (5000) ‘Dynamite’ (5000) and another story of say 15.000.”19  
Dynamite is Chance according to Jocelyn Baines: “Dynamite was probably the 
story that Conrad began to write some years later and then developed into 
Chance.”20  In between it became Explosives, which is a crossed out title on the 
manuscript of Chance.21  Conrad describes this work as about a dynamite ship 
“something like Youth”22 and Powell, of course, gets his chance because the 
Ferndale is booked “next day” to take on board “forty tons of dynamite”.23  From 
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all this it follows that whatever the publication dates of the four Marlow novels, the 
character Marlow in all of them was conceived of at the same time – 1898.  That is,  
when Conrad was originally thinking about Chance he was also thinking about the 
other Marlow stories.  It seems, therefore, not unreasonable to make the claim that 
this first section has a great deal of affinity with the other Marlow stories: that the 
ideas in this first chapter are related to this earlier period.  This is presumably what 
is meant when it is said that “it belongs to another story”.  But this does not, at the 
same time, make it out of place with the new story.  In fact, it makes it just the 
opposite.  The clear, and early, genre-marking suggesting ambiguity between Story-
1 and Story-2 returns Marlow to exactly where he left Heart of Darkness.  The first 
section is in place, therefore, to sum up, for the new reader, where Conrad had got to 
with his ESDeS at the earlier time. 
 
This is part of a more complicated argument which seems to double 
everything present in Heart of Darkness and will be fully explored below.  It will be 
presented under a series of subheadings, to help navigate through the discussion.  
These will mirror those used in chapter 4, but with changes.  There is an extra first 
heading, “The ESDeS Process: In the Introductory Section of Chance” to describe 
the operation of the “unnecessary” first bit.  The “Overt Plotting” section, as the 
interpretative distracting mechanism, has been reduced to a minimum since it is felt 
that this point has already been adequately made.  The “Genre-Markers” heading 
becomes “Additional Genre-Markers” because unease has already been introduced 
and it precedes “ESDeS in the Overt Plot” to show that these can work both ways.  
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The genre-markers encourage an ESDeS reading and the parent-child-mechanism 
indicates the lingering attachment to certainty.  As this certainty decreases it 
becomes less important and is reduced, in effect, to an additional genre-marker.  
Intentionality is excluded as a separate heading: it is included within the first half of 
the “ESDeS in the Overt Plot: Up to de Barral’s Death” since it is now, also, taken 
as a given within Conradian texts.  A section, “Bracketing Deaths”, is included but 
this is a mere formality.  Unlike the multiple death-like events in Heart of Darkness, 
the initiating and final events are clear in this work.  The “Covert Plot” is next, to be 
followed by the final part of “ESDeS in the Overt Plotting: From de Barral’s 
Death”.  “Repetition” should really be abstracted as a final and separate heading 
because it has become intrinsic to the whole narrative.  Indeed, it might be said to be 
the motivating force of the ESDeS.  It is for this reason, however, that it is not: it is 
left, as it was intended, permeating the whole narrative. 
 
The ESDeS Process: In the Introductory Section of Chance 
 
Wake points out that “uniquely, in Chance two narrators are introduced: Marlow 
and Charles Powell”,24 and Frederick Karl points out “it will be noticed that all of 
Conrad’s narrators – Marlow…Powell…are each all men of striking similarity”.25 
Marlow and Powell are both second-level narrators, they both have the same first 
name, and they both “had retired from the sea”.26  It is not unreasonable to think 
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that they are merely different representations of the same narrative-consciousness. 
The first section, which continues a short bit beyond chapter 1 to where Marlow 
takes over the main responsibility of narration from the anonymous first narrator 
and the embedded Powell, takes this possibility on in two parts.  This first part puts 
distance between Marlow and Powell by showing that Marlow is unserious 
compared to Powell who has yet to traverse the journey to the point of recognition.  
The second part, of the first section, corrects Powell’s deficit by following his 
ontological journey.   
                                                          
 
Marlow’s unseriousness is commented on very quickly and constantly 
reinforced throughout the novel.  He interrupts Powell’s tale with one of his own 
and tells it with his “usual nonchalance”,27 thus expressing his view of himself as a 
man “who believes himself free and exempt from any obligation to society”.28   He 
is perceived by Powell as the sort who does things “for the fun of the thing”,29 and 
he engages with the Fynes “in the unworthy hope of being amused”.30  That was his 
choice at the end of Heart of Darkness. The nature of the choice for him was such 
that it would make no difference if his next problem was of “utmost seriousness” or 
“excruciatingly funny”.31  However, for true ESD the choice must be constantly re-
enacted.  This is clearly a difficult idea to impart within one story.  Heart of 
Darkness implies repetition but Marlow’s reappearance within Chance actualises it.  
27  Ibid., p. 10. 
28  Gérard Jean-Aubry, The Sea Dreamer, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957, p. 239. 
29  Conrad, Chance, p. 28. 
30  Ibid., p. 40. 
31  Ibid. 
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In this case the narrative-consciousness invents a Marlow surrogate: it uses Powell 
as the illustrative character. 
 
The bulk of the first section which “does not belong” is therefore allocated to 
Powell’s journey – which repeats Marlow’s journey as he repeated Kurtz’s journey.  
Powell describes how achieving his second mate certificate was “the finest day of 
[his] life” but how “disillusion” followed swiftly upon “the finest day”32 because he 
couldn’t get a berth.  The text injects the motif word “uneasiness”33 and the 
description of Powell as “so desperate”34 between the “disillusion” and the next 
stage.  Fortunately, at this point, he meets a friend who advises him to try “Mr 
Powell at the Shipping Office”.35  The text now produces, in quick succession, a 
contrast between the universal and the individual, the examination of the possibility 
of suicide, its rejection, and the possibility of not-p, and the entrance of p. 
 
The universal is introduced by generalising Powell’s narration so that it is 
seen to have applied before.  This is done by interrupting the narration “while 
Powell lights his pipe”36  and interposing a story told by his narrating double, 
Marlow.  Neither the reader nor Marlow are actually aware of Powell’s name at this 
point.  Up to its revelation he is referred to variously as “he”, as in the first sentence, 
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and as “our new acquaintance”.37  Marlow tells his story about another Powell - the 
old Powell in the Shipping Office – and observes that “he [the old Powell] was not 
exactly remarkable” in response to a question from the narrator and replies, to a 
similar question from Powell, that he “remembered him very well”.38  Although the 
text is referring to the old Powell it could, because of the way it is said, equally well 
be referring to Marlow’s old self since he answers “with a slight reminiscent 
smile”.39  Then too Marlow is compared to “Buddha”40 and Powell to Socrates41: 
both wise men.  So, the text, having possibly linked the old Powell with Marlow, 
reinforces the impression that there is nothing new in the universe by sandwiching 
this episode between two pre-existing autobiographical episodes.  The whole Powell 
story before and after this episode is a reiteration of Conrad’s own experience.  
After meeting the old Powell, for example, the young Powell joins the Ferndale 
which echoes Conrad’s own first second mate berth, the Riverdale.  The text 
immediately negates this universalising tendency by providing the denouement of 
the delayed decoding.  The young Powell announces “my name happens to be 
Powell too”.42  The story is taken from the realm of anyone and is returned to the 
young Powell’s individual story.   
 
It is possible now to continue to read Powell’s narrative within an ESDeS 
parent-child interpretation because the possibility of an ESDeS reading has been 
advertised (with the universal) and avoided (by returning to the individual) in 
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exactly the same passage.  The next step again mirrors Heart of Darkness.  There, 
Marlow explicitly mentions that he nearly died, showing that he had considered 
suicide and rejected it.  In Chance, Powell does not go so far but, in a very 
expressive passage, he is shown to be very actively considering it.  The passage is 
too long to quote in its entirety but its implication is clear.  It starts with Powell 
saying “he didn’t think himself good enough for anybody’s kinship”43 and ends 
when the narrator sums up that “he conveyed very well to us the sense of his 
youthful hopelessness surprised at not finding its place in the sun and no recognition 
of its right to live”.44  In between there is sandwiched an overwhelming sense of 
despair.  Nevertheless, Powell, like Marlow before him, finally points out: “I 
concluded I would give up the whole business.  But I didn’t give up in the end.”45  
He senses he can create a story (p) to live by: he picked “up the thread of his 
story”.46  The text, however, cannot resist spelling-it-out that his story could have 
been otherwise: “It [the story] only has the sense that’s put into it; and that’s 
precious little sometimes.”47  It intrudes a story that tells how Powell wandered 
about in St Katherine’s Dock House looking for the shipping office.  It is a surreal 
episode, to match the “pointless” shelling of the jungle in Heart of Darkness.  Near 
the story’s end Powell is told by a “bald, fat creature” that “You’ve lost your 
way.”48  Powell accepts this summary of his meanderings and starts to leave.  He is 
told: “Shut the door quietly after you.”49  He accepts the advice and carries it out to 
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the letter: “And I did shut it quietly - you bet.  Quick and quiet.”50  The embedded 
anecdote represents the feeling of existential despair that is open to anyone to 
recognise and the meanderings indicate that not-p has been tried.   The door 
indicates the need for a choice and when Powell closes it he has chosen to create a 
new cover story.   
 
The text has given the process and the point of recognition, twice, in just 
seven pages.  It now repeats it yet again. James interprets this as “a plunge into 
threatened frustration”,51 but an ESDeS reading sees it as fairly making not-p 
available.  The young Powell story re-draws attention to the point of recognition and 
the rejection of existential angst not-p, but this time it moves the process on: it 
allows for a possible process of narration.  Powell reiterates his discovery of angst: 
“I never looked at mankind in that light before.  When one’s young human nature 
shocks one.”52  Then he “tried the first door I came to”,53  and behind it he 
successfully finds himself a new function in the form of “a tall, active man…[who] 
…rushed in”.54 
 
The final bit of the first section goes on to show that the story to be told (p) 
is agreed to by all the participants: “[I] signed my name.”55  The text now fully 
justifies the inclusion of this first section by making plain its real intent.  It goes on 
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to tell the reader that the essence of ESDeS is the need for constant retelling.  
Having “signed”, the reader is told the contract will be valid “not to exceed two 
years”.56  Marlow’s presence in the audience reinforces the repetition theme by 
reminding readers of the seafaring metaphor: there is always another trip and every 
presence is “provisional”.57  Then the text gives the reader a crucial sentence: “This 
chance meeting with a man who had sailed with Captain Anthony had revived it.”58  
This “it” has an immediate textual meaning but it also carries a bigger burden.  “It” 
refers to “the idea” and the idea, as has been shown in the last chapter, is 
synonymous with existential awareness and the realisation that its burial is 
necessary.  This gives extra meaning to the title and a crucial phrase near the end of 
chapter 1.  The title gives some sense that the novel is about the setting of opposites 
against one another: chance against necessity.  Powell asserts “my appointment was 
the work of chance”59 and this may have been true but the sentence also carries the 
implicit content that Powell could have, in theory, turned down the offer of the job.  
This makes the phrase that there are some things which “cannot be evaded”60 
crucial.  
 
The ending of Heart of Darkness worked for a brief period of time but 
eventually it had to be rewritten as a new project.  The new project is called Flora’s 
story.  It tells her manifest story from her childhood to the death of her father.  It can 
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be read as a separate story but can also provide material for many interpretations.  It 
can also be read as an ESDeS and this thesis now continues with these tasks. 
 
Overt Plotting 
 
Frederick Karl thinks that Chance is “thematically one of Conrad’s most 
straightforward novels”.61  In which case, since the title of the book is Chance, it 
might be thought that the theme is indeed chance.  However, nobody seems to think 
this is, in fact, the case.  Baines regards it as more like the opposite: he thinks it is 
more concerned with “emotional isolation”.62  Karl identifies the meaning as 
“married love”.63  Paul Wake notes both of these possibilities and many other 
themes in his attempt to find the centre of Chance in a very recent analysis,64 but 
then comes to a very different and, he claims, consensual conclusion: “there is an 
emerging consensus that the ‘centre’ of the novel is…gender.”65  This may be so, 
but two points can be (re)made with respect to overt plotting and this thesis.   The 
first is that this thesis does not think that the title is as misleading as all that.  If it 
had to choose between Conrad and a critic it would choose Conrad.  Chance is the 
choice.  As shown in the previous section, chance when contrasted with its opposite 
suggests an ESDeS and an ESDeS revolves around the axis of choice.  And the 
second point is that if an ESDeS is being considered then any final conclusion to the 
meaning of the plotting is undesirable.  Whatever theme is adopted specifically, the 
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more general point is reiterated by this thesis: the actual manifest or latent plotting is 
useful only as long as it distracts from the covert plotting.  Paul Wake might be said 
to collude with this purpose for he hardly mentions the “hurried ending” which, 
again, suggests a covert plotting, for he does not give enough significance to the 
Powell and Flora axis, first suggested by Cedric Watts.  He does not notice that, in 
the same way that Heart of Darkness is not about Kurtz but about Kurtz and 
Marlow and the Intended, Chance is not about Flora: it is about Powell and Marlow 
and Flora as aspects of an overall striving to accommodate knowledge of existential 
futility.  It is only after this prior has been achieved that overt plotting – in either 
manifest or spiritual forms – is of interest.  They are undoubtedly of interest but they 
come after the interest of this thesis.  Too much obsession with interpretations 
colludes with the function of covert plotting and causes the ESDeS genre-marking, 
including any self-deceptive process, to be overlooked which, in turn, will result in a 
successful hiding of the covert plot.   
 
Additional Genre-Markers 
 
It has already been argued that uneasiness creeps in from the very first with the 
deliberate choice of title, changed at the last minute to Chance.  The motif word 
then re-occurs every so often.  A few examples give the flavour.  It appears first in 
the context of a friend of Powell, who is never again mentioned.  He is said to be “in 
a state of outward joy and inward uneasiness”.66  It appears again with respect to 
Flora’s erstwhile boyfriend, who is in the process of abandoning her.  He is 
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observed to have an “uneasy appearance”.67  Powell is not exempt. “His uneasiness 
grew”68  when he was faced with a possibly explosive collision.   
 
Unease, of course, is not enough: it has to be associated with self-deception 
and existential-self-deception.  Normal-self-deception is widespread as always. 
Marlow, Powell and Mr de Barral are all subject to the failing.  Marlow’s most 
visible manifestation has echoes of his behaviour in Heart of Darkness in which he 
claims not to see the significance of certain events until later.  Here, too, a similar 
disjunction takes place.  He observes Flora walking dangerously near the edge of a 
cliff but claims not to interpret her behaviour correctly until she goes missing: “You 
may be surprised,” he tells his friend, “but I assure you I had not perceived this 
aspect of it till that very moment.”69  If he is to be taken at his word there would be 
no option but to see him as a self-deceiver because he has previously discussed the 
fact that an “accident” would have undoubtedly led a coroner’s inquest to conclude 
a verdict of “suicide”.70 
 
It is not as easy to isolate Powell’s self-deception.  It permeates the text and, 
mimicking Marlow’s infatuation with the Intended in Heart of Darkness, mostly 
concerns the idea of Flora.  The evidence abounds: the language used when Powell 
first sees her indicates this without the need to explicitly spell-it-out: “the testimony 
of his eyes, made him open them very wide”, “he gasped mentally”, “she seemed so 
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young and girlish”.71  In addition, Marlow specifically notes Powell’s attitude: “All 
the sympathies of Mr Powell were for Flora Anthony” and “This speech established 
Powell as a champion of Mrs Anthony.”72  De Barral is also not unaware of 
Powell’s infatuation.  He says to him, “My daughter has taken quite a liking to you, 
Mr Powell.”73  Equally, his behaviour when he needed to light a flare to avoid a 
collision indicated a besotted young man.  He turns from a capable seaman to a 
complete incompetent in her presence.  She is the one who has to light the torch, the 
result of which can be read ambiguously: “the flare blazed up violently between 
them.”74  Powell may “fall in love” but he chooses to “bury” the knowledge.  He, of 
course, continues to deny this knowledge (self-deceive) even after Captain Anthony 
is dead and even after Marlow points it out to him: “if I were you I would mention 
my enthusiasm to Mrs Anthony.  Why not?” and he responds, “Pah! Foolishness.”75 
 
In between, de Barral gives an exemplary representation of self-deceptive 
behaviour equivalent to that of the Reverend Dimmesdale.  He is presented, like 
Kurtz, as both “hollow at the core”76 and “a very remarkable person”. 77 In his case 
de Barral is remarkable because he becomes a very rich and successful financier but 
remains devoid of substance.  The text explains: “He was a mere sign, a portent.  
There was nothing in him.”78  Conrad intends his story to be taken as a general or 
universal statement.  De Barral succeeded in tapping into the general desire to 
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believe (marked by the first sentence).  In the absence of a God-belief something 
else becomes necessary and in this case it is “Thrift”.  Marlow suggests anything 
else would have been just as effective, “it may be development, or it may be 
competition, or education, or purity, or efficiency or even sanctity”.79  Conrad says 
categorically that it is a necessary thing to believe in something.  He then adds that 
de Barral “himself believed it”.80  In a few short sentences the text has laid bare the 
need for an ESDeS.  De Barral’s nothingness is linked to people’s need to believe in 
general and his need to believe it himself specifically.  The text continues with the 
pretence of giving de Barral a personality. He is made to illustrate three out of the 
four behavioural characteristics of self-deception and draws attention to, but rejects, 
the fourth.  The two paradoxical ideas are presented freely: invest money and make 
“ten per cent”81 out of ridiculous schemes.  De Barral must have known about this 
paradox but appears not to; he appears to believe.  Marlow is convinced that: “There 
was no game, no game of any sort, or shape or kind.”82  In addition de Barral 
appears impervious to the evidence.  In a wonderfully surreal description of the 
court scene that rivals Powell’s earlier “meanderings” it was demonstrated, “Under 
public examination”, that: 
He had been the prey of all sorts of swindlers, adventurers, 
visionaries and even lunatics.  Wrapping himself up in deep and 
imbecile secrecy he had gone for the most fantastic schemes; a 
harbour and docks on the coast of Patagonia, quarries in 
Labrador - such like speculations. Fisheries to feed a canning 
Factory on the banks of the Amazon was one of them.  A 
principality to be bought in Madagascar was another.  As the 
grotesques details of these incredible transactions came out one 
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by one ripples of laughter ran over the closely packed court - 
each one a little louder than the other.  The audience ended by 
fairly roaring under the cumulative effect of absurdity.  The 
Registrar laughed, the barristers laughed, the reporters laughed, 
the serried ranks of miserable depositors watching anxiously 
every word, laughed like one man.  They laughed hysterically - 
the poor wretches - on the verge of tears. 
There was only one person who remained unmoved.  It was de 
Barral himself.83 
 
There comes a time, though, when even he is forced, by the process of 
recognition and lack of societal collusion, to the point of recognition: Placed in the 
dock, “he lost his steadiness as if some sustaining illusion had gone to pieces within 
him suddenly”.84  But, like Dimmesdale, the point of recognition is quickly 
followed by a new narrative process.  Dimmesdale, it will be recalled, constantly 
faces evidence that contradicts his piety and has to reinvent his position by putting 
in place further self-deceptions.  De Barral behaves in the same way.  His first new 
story becomes, “Time! Time!  Time would have set everything right”,85 and he 
returned to his “quiet bearing which had been his usual”.86  Only post-hoc 
recognition fails.  De Barral remains happy with the new set of facts.  His daughter, 
Flora, picks him up from jail, renames him Smith and inserts him into a safe 
environment.  Within this safe environment, he is protected from further challenge.  
Nevertheless he elaborates when necessary.  To justify himself to his daughter and 
sustain her support he explains: “What has done for me was envy.  Envy.”87  He 
also boosts his self-image by persuading himself that he could start again: “The start 
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is only a matter of judicious advertising.”88  And, in this safe environment, he is, 
once again, “impervious to words, to facts, to inferences.  It would have been 
impossible to make him see his guilt or his folly - either by evidence or argument - 
if anybody had tried to argue.”89  
                                                          
 
The uneasiness marker is also linked to existential-self-deception.  De 
Barral’s court scene comes close to transcending the normal and becoming absurd 
and Marlow links it with “nothing” and “death” and “collusion” and “silence” when 
talking of a conversation with Flora: 
In fact we had nothing to say to each other; but we two, 
strangers as we really were to each other, had dealt with the 
most intimate and final of subjects, the subject of death.  It had 
created a sort of bond between us.  It made our silence weighty 
and uneasy.90 
 
This would be enough but more is provided to ensure there can be no mistake that 
the uneasiness is caused by the awareness of existential angst.  It is possible to 
locate dozens of references to the term and its synonyms: absurdity,91 nothing,92 
pointless93 and futile.94  And if this is not enough the two meanings of absurd 
contrasted in the “throwing the shoe” episode in Heart of Darkness is replicated in 
Chance.  The following passage gives an absolutely clear view of existential angst - 
88  Ibid., p. 273. 
89  Ibid., p. 280. 
90  Ibid., p. 157. 
91  See ibid. (at least), pp. 38, 41, 43, 46, 55, 64, 83, 128, 128 (sic), 174, 182, 207, 223, 275, 
299 and 203. 
92  See ibid. (at least), pp. 39, 46, 46 (sic), 55, 58, 161 and 297. 
93  See ibid. (at least), p. 264. 
94  See ibid. (at least), p. 272. 
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“loneliness”, “hopeless”, “obscure”, “soulless”, and “transient” - cast alongside 
“Fyne fussing in a knicker-bocker suit”: 
It was one of those dewy nights, clear, starry nights, oppressing 
our spirit, crushing our pride, by the brilliant evidence of the 
awful loneliness, of the hopeless obscure insignificance of our 
globe lost in the splendid revelation of a glittering, soulless 
universe.…Fyne fussing in a knicker-bocker suit before the hosts 
of heaven, on a shadowy earth, about a transient, phantom-like 
girl, seemed too ridiculous to associate with.  On the other hand 
there seemed something fascinating in the very absurdity.95  
 
The text also repeats another technique used in Heart of Darkness.  It draws 
attention to the Story continuum.  Powell is paraded as a Story-1 character: he is 
“simple, and his faculty of wonder not very great.  He’s one of those people who 
form no theories about facts.”96  Along side this naivety is placed Marlow, the 
Fynes and people in general: but these are differentiated.  Although Marlow 
recognises that he was once, like Powell, innocent of anguish, he has now passed 
the point of recognition; he has experienced the “Horror” and needs to 
accommodate it.  He needs to move on to Story-2.  He is tempted to accept 
normality and retreat back like the Fynes and people in general but, ultimately, he 
cannot.  The Fynes are absolutely certain that their moral values are absolute in the 
same way as the Intended “knew”.97  People in general are the same: “The 
composure of the people on the pavements was provoking to a degree, and as to the 
people in the shops, they were benumbed, more than half frozen – imbecile.”98  This 
is no chance observation.  He repeats it: “Luckily, people, whether mature or not 
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mature are for the most part quite incapable of understanding what is happening to 
them: a merciful provision of nature to preserve an average amount of sanity for 
working purpose of this world.”99  The Fynes and people in general are protected 
against further recognition of existential futility.  Marlow, in contrast, accepts the 
fact of anguish and lives his life through a series of provisional projects in an 
unserious way.  The narrator observes of him: “Marlow had the habit of pursuing 
general ideas in peculiar manner, between jest and earnest.”100  Marlow observes of 
himself that “surely life must be amused somehow”.101  
                                                          
 
Of course Marlow is fortunate.  He has been through the agonising; the 
coming to terms with futility.  He has acquired the ability to deal with it.  An 
anecdote linking Powell with Captain Anthony shows what happens when this isn’t 
the case and, in so doing, indicates – gives a genre-marking for - the necessity for 
hiding.  The example concerns the manner in which Powell initially obtained his 
second mate berth.  He suspects that he obtained his post because the captain had 
been given the impression that he was a relative to the old Powell.  When he finds 
an opportunity to confess to this accidental deception, Captain Anthony responds 
with “Ah! That’s the story.”102  Then he adds: “It doesn’t matter how you came on 
board.”103  The story continues with the captain immediately forgetting the 
existence of Powell and starting, again, "his headlong tramp”,104 his pacing up and 
down.  This causes Powell to remark that it was as if the captain was “doing 
99  Ibid., p. 91 
100  Ibid., p. 21. 
101  Ibid., p. 91. 
102  Ibid., p. 233. 
103  Ibid. 
104  Ibid. 
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something purposeful like the avoidance of pain or temptation”.105  Powell 
describes his feeling, while watching the captain: “It was very marked once one had 
become aware of it.  Before, one felt only a pronounced strangeness.”106  Powell 
immediately seems to regret his revelations.  He immediately withdraws from them 
and retreats back to normality:  the captain, he says, “desired him suddenly…to 
have all the staysails eased off”.107  Now Haight has pointed out that self-deception 
is signposted by something that doesn’t make sense and Watts has indicated that a 
covert plot is indicated by anomalies.  This exchange with its strangeness resonates 
with these.  The captain has not even noticed Powell.  He has been rather 
ostentatiously totally absorbed in his own worries.  He was not anxious, let alone 
feeling guilty, about an improper act or its suppression.  His comment is totally 
inappropriate.  It is as if he is commenting on something else.  His next statement 
makes more sense in the context.  He is not interested in Powell so he is not 
interested in why he came on board.  The switch from not making sense to being 
absolutely correct in the circumstances of the exchange between the two carries 
some ambiguity for a first time observant reader but not for an ESDeS reader.  They 
have already decoded the early pages of Chance as covertly conveying a recapping 
of the structural aspects of an ESDeN.  Their interpretation is likely to be a fairly 
obvious amalgamation of the two statements.  The two together are read as, it 
doesn’t matter what your story is - any overt story will do.  It is the inevitable way 
things are.  It is alright as long as it disguises, for a time, anguish, such as the text 
allocates to the captain.  Let’s get on with the work. 
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 ESDeS in the Overt Plot: Up to de Barral’s Death 
 
The narrative-consciousness, according to an ESDeS reading, arrives in the new 
book as it left the last.  The old story originated from the narrative-consciousness 
that is called Conrad for short.  The new story, because it originates from the same 
narrative-consciousness, uses the same techniques which created itself and Heart of 
Darkness.  In Heart of Darkness it creates two characters, Marlow and Kurtz, to 
represent p and not-p respectively.  Marlow is the sole survivor of this telling and 
takes on the mantle of the overall, unsplit, narrative-consciousness.  The narrative-
consciousness, in its new manifestation, Chance, might now be called Marlow.  
Marlow, therefore, creates in turn two new characters.108  Powell serves the purpose 
for Marlow that Marlow served for the original narrative-consciousness, called 
Conrad.  In the same way that Marlow is the fictional version of Conrad, Powell is 
the fictional version of the fictional Marlow.  Powell’s experiences, as related in this 
first chapter, are very similar, of course, to Conrad’s autobiographical account 
related in A Personal Record (published 1912) relating to his experiences of 1880.  
“The tendency…to look through Marlow to Conrad”109 is repeated: only in this case 
Powell can be looked through to find Marlow.  Powell and Marlow are two halves 
of genuine “literary device”.110  Each half speaks separately when it is convenient to 
create distance but they come together, in the last “hurried section”, in order to 
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repeat, more effectively, the separation at the end of Heart of Darkness.  The 
purpose of this division is to separate Marlow’s professed unseriousness from the 
constant pressure to be serious.  To have a project demands seriousness so he 
creates Powell to do this work yet at the same time retain his integrity.  Marlow, in 
addition to Powell, creates a parallel figure, to serve as Kurtz, in the character of Mr 
de Barral.  Flora is the repetition of the minor character, the Intended but, unlike the 
Intended, she has a major role in Marlow’s Chance.  She is used to explore the 
possibilities of project.  She forms various dyads: paired with her father she 
represents angst and paired with Anthony or Powell she represents continuing 
projects.  Before this exploration can take place, within the parent-child mechanism 
or process of self-deception, there are the necessary first steps which are to 
recognise futility, to reject suicide and to make a choice to have a project. 
 
The meaning of chance can be taken to be either not a result of any obvious 
cause or intention or as a synonym for probability.  However, the text, at first 
reading, seems unsure which definition to use.  Sometimes simple chance seems to 
be an acceptable explanation of some event in the absence of more information.  
Marlow describes, in this simple explanatory way, two such events: his “accidental 
acquaintance with the Fynes”; and “this chance meeting with a man who had sailed 
with Captain Anthony.”111  If asked to explain what chance means, when used like 
this, Marlow would answer: “By accident I mean that which happens blindly and 
without intelligent design.”112  This meaning sometimes suffers expansion, to take 
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on the explanatory form of a controlling power such as fate or destiny.  The text 
slips into this way of thinking quite often.  It explains Flora’s governess in this way: 
“the woman whom chance had put in command.”113  Similarly, it was “chance [that] 
had thrown the girl [Flora] in his [Captain Anthony’s] way”.114  If asked to explain 
what chance means, when used like this, the text would say “a mysterious force”.115  
Browne’s introductory epigraph may bias the reader in either direction.  It, at first, 
only seems to assert that: “Those that hold that all things are governed by fortune 
had not erred.”  However, since an “epigraph is part of the narrative in the sense of 
providing an oblique comment on it”,116 it would seem fair to explore it further and, 
if this is done, it will be found that the poem from which the epigraph is drawn goes 
on to add that “such believers in fortune would not have erred if they had recognised 
that behind Chance lies a divine pattern”.117  In this extended reading, Browne 
would appear to be suggesting the exact opposite to the title.  Slippage from 
“chance” to “fate” or “fortune” does not change its essence but further slippage into 
“divine” reverses the meaning.  Chance is said to mean “without an obvious cause”, 
so if “divine” is substituted then there is a very obvious cause: in fact the 
teleological argument for God by comparison with a watch and watchmaker.  So 
does Conrad imply that when he uses the word chance he means Story-1 and 
determined? 
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There are certainly many lines written in Chance that give this impression. 
Consider the following: 
1. “The exacting life of the sea has this advantage over the life of the earth 
that its claims are simple and cannot be evaded.”118 
 
2. “There is necessity in these things.”119 
 
3. “That man’s coming brought him face to face with necessity to speak and 
act a lie.”120 
 
4. “Existence has its claims which are obeyed mechanically.”121 
 
Quotes 1, 2 and 4 above assert that within the context of “not knowing” everything 
seems as of necessity.  This is the essence of Story-1.  Danto, too, argues that this is 
the case for most people.  They “never having risen to the level of anguish, they 
have no anguish to escape or to try to escape”.122  The text of Chance, as has been 
seen, could not agree more: “[people are] for the most part incapable of 
understanding what is happening to them.”123  However, the third quotation gives 
the interpretation a different slant.  “Face to face with necessity” suggests 
recognition of anguish and, therefore, necessity now means life is necessarily 
pointless, not that it must happen.  Death must happen but life up to death has 
alternatives.  The possibility of a “lie” will actualise the alternatives.  There is a 
necessity but the necessity is to make the choice: that is choice within contingency.  
Awareness of existential angst means one has to commit Camusian suicide, or 
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somehow live with the awareness, or hide the awareness: that is, lie about the logic 
of suicide. 
 
Further, whether an event happens to a person because it might or because it 
must makes no real difference to the person - once it has happened.  What matters is 
whether the individual could have had any direct influence.  The text is aware of this 
consideration.  In this sense it does agree with Baines that the novella is not about 
the “workings of chance”.  The text actually spells this out for the reader.  Early on, 
when Flora goes missing and suicide is suspected, a conversation takes place 
between Fyne and Marlow.  This conversation foregrounds the fact that the overall 
text is identifiable as one narrative-consciousness because Marlow takes both, of 
two opposite, points of view by himself and leaves Fyne a mere bystander.  He first 
asks himself “Was it a tragedy?” and immediately afterwards rationally concludes: 
“This is a farce.”  Two possibilities are presented, but the text negates the apparent 
opposition by concluding that: “As a matter of fact it was neither farce nor 
tragedy.”124  The reader is told that chance is not to be put into opposition with a 
deterministic cause and effect; that it is not the paradox represented by p and not-p.  
They both exist within the world of the overt plot and some will explain events by 
the former and some by the latter.  But whilst it is true that the book is not about the 
“workings of chance” as such, it does draw attention to the area: namely that these 
alternatives are different in kind from contingent where contingent means true by 
virtue of the way things are in fact and not by logical necessity.  Ultimately the 
novella comes down to this view, and reasserts its status as an ESDeN, by asserting, 
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on its penultimate page: “And the science of life consists in seizing every chance 
that presents itself.”125  This is nothing short of a claim for the real meaning of 
Chance’s “chance”.  Life is contingent: it is so but need not have been.  The 
narrative-consciousnesses exists as a matter of observable fact within a world that is 
not necessary, is doomed to ultimate extinction and holds out no external purpose.  
Nevertheless the narrative-consciousness enables the organism to continue to exist, 
make choices, and create individual projects within such a world of contingency.  
Given any event, once it has happened, there is nothing to do but “seize” the 
opportunity.  And seizing the opportunity means amongst other things choosing 
which parts of a story to tell. 
 
Flora’s father spells-out the existential choice: 
But this sort of life!  What sense, what meaning, what value has 
it either for you or me?  It’s just sitting down to look at death, 
that’s coming, coming.  What else is it?  I don’t know how you 
can put up with that.  I don’t think you can stand it for long.  
Some day you will jump over board.126 
 
He clearly predicts suicide.  This may remind the readers that, throughout 
the book, Flora has been constantly threatening suicide and there are a considerable 
number of other discussions on the possibility of death.  Clearly in her ESDeS role 
as an aspect of the narrative-consciousness he would not be able to pair up with any 
putative partners if she had committed suicide.  There would be no need, in this 
case, for a continuing story.  However, it has to be presented as a possibility.  Early 
in Flora’s story, she goes for a walk on the cliff and it is only the proximity of 
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Marlow that prevents a suicidal jump.  A flashback reveals that she had also 
considered the subject earlier after she had been sacked from a governess’s job.  
Marlow reflects: “Suicide, I suspect, is very often the outcome of mere mental 
weariness.”127  He is making the point that these are not existential choices.  Mrs 
Fyne also has her gender-political opinions: “She held, I suppose, that a woman 
holds an absolute right…to escape in her own way from a man mismanaged 
world.”128  On another occasions, de Barral obtains some poison presumably to use 
to avoid ignominy in the event of exposure for his fraudulent dealings.  Later, on the 
Ferndale, de Barral expresses the view that “putting an end to one’s existence may 
not be altogether unwelcome”.129  All of these involve what might be called normal, 
avoidable life events: loneliness, humiliation, politics and old age.  In themselves 
they are interesting but within an ESDeS they act as distracters: the more interesting 
they are the more effective they are.  Nevertheless, the text plays fair.  It makes 
some existential examples available.  One such is represented by Flora’s attempt to 
jump off the cliff.  Marlow’s account of the event shows that she specifically rejects 
“Providence” as a reason for her survival.  She claims the behaviour for herself: 
One reaches a point…where nothing that concerns one matters 
any longer.  But something did keep her back.  I should never 
have guessed what it was.  She herself confessed that it seemed 
absurd to say.  It was the Fyne dog.130  
 
The observation conjures up a wonderful sense of absurdity.  And, although Flora 
says “something” kept her back, the text makes it plain that the suicide attempt was 
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“planned”.  The overall text, later, puts her actions in even more Sartrean existential 
terms when it has Captain Anthony say to Flora, “You are free [to choose].”131  The 
captain means, of course, free in the sense that he will not be demanding of her 
marriage duties but, within an ESDeS analysis, it resonates with existential freedom, 
where recognition of anguish should lead to the view expressed in Sartre’s Being 
and Nothingness that “I apprehend myself at once as totally free and as not being 
able to derive the meaning of the world except as coming from myself”.132  Flora 
replies, “But I don’t want to be let off.”  The narrative-consciousness is at the point 
of recognition.  It intends Flora as project to continue. Suicide, as a solution to 
existential angst, is rejected as it was previously rejected by the choice in Heart of 
Darkness.  The overall narrative-consciousness has to again learn to live with angst 
or to hide it.  It must continue to look for meaning within its own resources.  It still 
needs Flora as project to do something: to pair up with p or not-p.  But she, as with 
the Marlow of Heart of Darkness, finds that the choice is not easy.  She embarks on 
the process with a long series of trial runs of her own life.  This starts after her 
mother dies133 and her father is sent to prison.134  She, at first, becomes a project for 
the Fynes but finds eventually that she can no longer tolerate being told what to do 
by Mrs Fyne.  To solve this dilemma she, in the first instance, runs off (elopes) with 
Captain Anthony and, in the second, she collects her father and imposes him onto 
the marriage.  She is in the middle: with father representing angst on the one side 
and Anthony on the other.  The situation is not a happy one.  Flora declares she 
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“can’t go on”,135 but of course she has to choose.  Flora can exist only in an axis 
with either de Barral or Anthony and the text makes it explicit that this is a choice 
between “dreariness and horror”.136  For a long spell the narrative-consciousness 
can choose neither one nor the other but ultimately the overall text chooses to let de 
Barral, and hence the Flora-de Barral axis, die and take angst with him leaving the 
project Flora-Captain Anthony as p to survive.  Although it is Mr de Barral (not-p) 
who dies, the text allows the possibility that the angst axis could survive leaving p to 
die: “He [Captain Anthony] was looking down at Mr Smith, thinking perhaps that it 
was mere chance his own body was not lying there.”137  The narrative-
consciousness now has to do two things.  It has to convincingly hide not-p and it 
will do this by introducing a covert plot between an initiating absence and this 
death, and this will start the process of instating a new cover story. 
 
Bracketing Deaths 
 
There are five deaths and a death-like absence in Chance.  The first two deaths take 
place outside of the text.  Captain Anthony’s mother and father die before the story 
begins, and can be safely overlooked.  Then Flora’s mother dies and her father goes 
to gaol and these deaths clearly precipitate the fictional story.  Subsequently Mr de 
Barral dies and then in the last part of the novel Captain Anthony dies.  Once the 
death of de Barral is recognised as the death that represents the point of recognition 
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then it is clear that the covert plot will be found between his going to gaol and his 
death. 
 
The Covert Plot 
 
Since the overt plotting seems “relatively straightforward”,138 it might come as a 
surprise that Chance is often found to be “an extremely complex text”139 because of 
its complexities of presentation which have given rise to a good “deal of critical 
comment”.140  Henry James regarded Chance as more concerned with technique 
than story.  It is, he argues, “an extraordinary exhibition of method”.141  Brooks, 
likewise, suggests that the complexities arise out of “dense narrative layerings”.142  
In the story of Chance, for example, de Barral’s suicide is experienced by Powell 
who tells it to Marlow who tells it to the narrator who tells it to the reader.  Every 
stage is fraught with transmission difficulties and it might be wondered why Conrad 
has included this complication.  There are various views.  Jocelyn Baines, for one 
example, feels that “there are only rare occasions when anything is gained from this 
cumbersome method of presentation”.143  Paul Wake is also aware of the problems 
inherent in too many embedded narrators, but thinks they might serve a useful 
purpose: “in foregrounding their own linguistic practices, [they] alert the reader to 
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her/his role in the interpretative process.”144  This thesis believes it does so in a 
particular way that has already been raised on a number of previous occasions.  One 
is generically called the problem of language.  Peter Brooks in his essay “The 
Unreadable Report” is discussing Heart of Darkness but his ideas transfer to 
Chance.  He assigns a name to the layers of telling: “ready made life plots – that the 
text casts up along the way: orders that marshal reality and might explain it if only 
one could believe them.”145  He concludes that they are not in fact to be believed, 
that they serve the function of “cover-up, concealment, lie”146 which lead to a quite 
a dramatic conclusion to the “Horror!” scene.  Brooks says that it seems “to make a 
mockery of storytelling and ethics, or to gull one’s listeners”.147  Shoshana Felman 
recognises the same technique in the prologue of The Turn of the Screw (1898) 
which “rather disconnects the story from the narrator since it introduces not one 
narrator but three.”148  In short then multiple narrators can serve the purpose of 
covering up the truth and gulling the reader.  Looked at like this the “cumbersome 
method of presentation” is seen to be no more that another hiding mechanism.  Its 
use implies the existence of a covert plot. 
 
Two further things come together with this conclusion to suggest an 
interesting way into the covert plotting of Chance.  The first is to recall that Conrad 
uses a particular technique in his writing.  It has been shown in chapter 2 that he was 
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happy to mix up genres and to use the detective genre in particular.  The second is to 
recall that the plot in Heart of Darkness turned out to be a collusive death plot.  If 
this is assumed to be the case again then the way to disentangle the process is to go 
over the same journey in the same way as a detective follows a criminal.  In this 
way the suicide of de Barral can be unpicked to, again, reveal another collusive 
death plot. 
 
Mr de Barral’s death sequence starts when Powell looks through a “skylight” 
from the deck into the “saloon, consecrated to the exclusiveness of Captain 
Anthony’s married life”.149  He sees the captain pour a drink and then leave the 
room.  Then he sees “a hand” emerge from behind a curtain, swerve to and rest on 
the edge of “the glass”150 of “brandy” and “water”151 and then draw back.  He 
immediately rushes down to the cabin even though it is not clear why he does so.  
He does not exactly explain at this stage so Marlow and the reader are left 
perplexed.  He answers Marlow’s “Why?” with the strange answer: “It was the 
quickest dodge to get [Anthony] away from [the drink].”152  When he arrives he 
debates at length whether or not to “remove the suspected tumbler” but eventually 
does not do so. He is joined by Anthony and is again tempted to “dash the glass on 
the deck”153 but does not do so.  He reveals at this stage that he thinks the drink has 
been “doctored”: a piece of news Anthony takes calmly.  Flora then arrives followed 
by de Barral.  Talk ensues leaving Flora draped around Anthony’s neck so he takes 
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her out leaving Powell alone with de Barral.  Further talk ensues and then de Barral 
picks up the glass and “tossed the liquor down his throat”.154  The death could be, 
and usually is, presented as a straightforward case of “suicide”.155  A half-way 
competent detective, however, would neither be prepared to accept Powell’s 
testimony of this aspect of the incident nor any of the rest of his tale as it included in 
the text. 
 
The text, however, warns the attentive reader that what is told on the surface 
is not the truth.  Powell introduces the suicide scene with a curious statement: “He 
who has eyes, you know, nothing can stop him from seeing things as long as there 
are things to see in front of him.”156  Now the “you know” seems to suggest that the 
rest of the sentence is a paraphrase of a well known saying.  In this case, it is 
suggested, the saying is slightly misquoted.  Powell is referring to the biblical 
quotation: “Who hath ears let him hear.”157  The irony is, of course, that he is using 
the quotation as if the meaning is transparent, whilst the biblical version makes it 
clear that it means just the opposite.  The quoted passage continues: “Therefore 
speak I to them in parables: because they seeing see not; and hearing they hear not, 
neither do they understand.”158  Ears and eyes are used interchangeably in this 
passage.  In both cases it is intended that they should be understood figuratively and 
mean “understanding”.  The parable is intended to confuse and hide the truth159 and 
is, therefore, making the same point as the “cumbersome presentation”.  This 
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episode with Powell is intended to warn the reader that what is being observed is not 
the meaning of the text.  With this prompt, it is appropriate to reread the story. 
 
There are negatives and positives in the story as presented.  On the negative 
side, Powell’s evidence is presented third hand through Marlow and the narrator, 
both of whom seem to accept his testimony at face value.  In fact it can be, to some 
extent, contradicted.  If Captain Anthony was forced to testify he would have to say 
that when he re-entered his saloon he did not see de Barral.  He would have to say 
he found only Powell in the cabin: “there, before him, stood his second officer, a 
seemingly decent, well-bred young man, who, being on duty, had left the deck and 
had sneaked into the saloon, apparently for the inexpressibly mean purpose of 
drinking up what was left of his captain’s brandy-and-water.”160  His own testimony 
is not consistent.  The first time he describes the so-called-doctoring of the glass he 
says he sees the hand “resting on its edge”.  When he next describes it the hand was 
“hovering over the glass”.  On neither occasion did he see anything drop into the 
drink so that it would merit the epithet “doctored”.  In fact, he later doubts his 
initiating premise.  He thought to himself: “there’s nothing in the drink.  I have been 
dreaming, I have made an awful mistake.”161  The reason why he jumped to the 
conclusion at the time demands an explanation. 
 
On the positive side, Powell’s version of the story is backed by some 
evidence that he does not mention.  It would seem that de Barral has a motive for 
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killing the captain.  He was jealous of his attachment to his daughter.  “His brain” 
was filled with “a jealous rage”162 when he hears of the marriage and he tells his 
daughter: “I would like to break his [Anthony’s] neck.”163  This intent is constant.  
He says just before the suicide, “if I hadn’t been an old man I would have flown at 
his throat months ago”.164  His failure to achieve his murderous intent is 
accompanied by the further humiliation involved in the way he loses the battle for 
Flora.  Finally, these are grounds, as has already been seen, for believing that he 
agrees with suicide if occasion demands it.  He reaffirms this on yet another 
occasion, which becomes appropriate here, when he tells his daughter: “once I could 
be sure that you were happy then of course I would have no reason to care for 
life.”165  The positives seem to overwhelm the negatives.  De Barral’s contribution 
to his own death seems proved.  However, the others are not blameless. 
 
There is no need to go down the road of directly implicating either Powell, 
Flora or the captain in the death by suggesting that the poison was put into the glass 
by one of them, although all three had the opportunity and were just as likely to 
have had the means.  Nevertheless, there are two very significant reasons for 
thinking they have contributions to make.  The first is that an intertextual literary 
illusion is used to signpost it.  It is used just in case the reader has been so centred 
on the sad position of Flora that they have not picked up on the sad position of de 
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Barral.  It tells the reader: “She [Flora] looked like a forsaken elf.”166  There can be 
no doubt that this is an intended literary reference because the text preceding this 
odd description announces Mr Powell as an “industrious reader”.167  The reference 
is of course to Pearl in Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter: “Pearl, that wild and flighty 
little elf.”168  She, like Pearl, is surrounded by characters who are deeply self-
deceiving and Hawthorne’s novel has been regarded as the exemplary text on self-
deception.  It has been used extensively by this thesis to isolate the behavioural 
indicators that de Barral so fully exhibits.  The reader of this thesis then should be 
well aware of the consequences of a sudden breakdown in the self-deceptive 
process.  The thesis has gone into detail recording “Hickey’s surprise and shock 
[when he discovered] he was in self-deception”.169  De Barral is, of course, another 
such hugely self-deceptive man that has to suffer the consequences of his actions: 
namely, the participatory efforts of the three plotters.  
 
The text makes available the evidence to suggest that Anthony, Flora and 
Powell use a very pragmatic and clever means to induce de Barral’s suicidal action. 
If the hypothetical detective retraces the steps through the agreed events of the story 
another version emerges.  When the captain comes in to find Powell alone in his 
cabin the detective might note that he behaves strangely.  He does not admonish 
Powell for spying or for fabricating.  He seems to accept what is said as if it was no 
surprise: “The captain had a wonderful self-command.”  It was as if he had found 
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“something to think about”.170  It is at this point that Flora and de Barral enter the 
room and the text notes that “each situation…has its psychological moment.”171  It 
is as if the captain had been waiting for this point and is ready to take full advantage 
of it.  This is the point when their conspiracy actually surfaces. 
 
Marlow tells the reader “we have the inner knowledge”, and “we have the 
secret of the situation”.172  What does he mean?  Well, he means the narrative-
consciousness knows de Barral’s psychological state.  He had been the “great Mr de 
Barral” but is now useless, dependant on the good graces of his daughter and her 
husband and there is “nothing more futile than a bent poker”.173  He had been forced 
to witness his daughter marriage, without love: to be as unfortunate “as much as if 
[she] had gone on the streets”.174  He knows he cannot protect her and so “felt 
ashamed to live”.175  He is described on several occasions as expressing the wish for 
death.  All that stands between him and his demise is his self-deception: his 
pipedream that a new start is around the corner and “only a matter of judicious 
advertising.”176   
 
Once all four participants are in the room, they collude in what follows.  
Flora, on cue, expresses her dismay: “I can’t go on like this Roderick - between you 
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two.”177  In the manifest plot and in front of her father Flora is seen “clinging round 
Captain Anthony’s neck”.  The captain - now “exulting” - then removes her to the 
adjacent cabin and “what [they] done (sic) there will ne’er be known”,178 but could, 
no doubt, be imagined by de Barral who is, therefore, not just defeated but 
humiliated.  He stutters out his feelings to Powell who he regards as his only friend: 
he had “no friends on board this shop…except [Powell]”:179 
Who would have believed it? With her arms around his neck.  
When! Oh! Ha! Ha! You did see! Didn’t you?  It wasn’t a 
delusion - was it?  Her arms around … But I have never wholly 
trusted her.180   
 
Powell could have commiserated with him for he knows he is his only friend, but he 
does not.  He thrusts the dagger in deeper: “I flew out at him.”181  He could have 
prevented his actions but he does not, despite standing close enough to de Barral to 
grab his “shoulder”.182  The old man was too quick for the young man.  He protests 
feebly: “He was too quick for me.”183  Faced with the “exulting”184 captain, the 
deserting daughter, the disloyal friend and nowhere else to go, what else could he 
do?  He cooperates with the judgement of the narrative-consciousness and “tossed 
the liquor down his throat”.185  De Barral has done a good job for the team.   
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A final twist both provides a background for the revelation of the 
conspiracy and a link with Heart of Darkness.  Anthony and Powell did not 
immediately announce de Barral’s death.  They contrived to put the body in its bunk 
to be found by the steward as Marlow contrived to have Kurtz found by the 
manager’s boy.  The “suicide” episode is thereby disguised as natural and the whole 
episode, which started with the captain telling Powell “Not a word!”,186 ends with 
him telling him: “Silence! Silence for ever about this.”187  The doubling of the 
wording, based on the template “The horror! The horror!” in Heart of Darkness, 
suggests added significance.  It here suggests that the narrative-consciousness is 
revealing, again, that the characters are just aspects of the whole for the captain is 
able to say he “knew that the young man [Powell] understood him”.188  Finally, 
Marlow, as the overall narrative-consciousness, puts in his pennyworth of collusion.  
Strictly speaking there is no poison in the text prior to this point so Marlow invents 
a mechanism for de Barral to possess it.  He does so, he says, to do away “with the 
added horror of a coldly premeditated crime”.189  It is best, he says, to give the 
credit to “chance”.190  Powell once again agrees and reiterates the purpose: “don’t 
let us think about it.”191 
 
Now this is not the original covert plot invented by Cedric Watts. His 
concerned the attraction between Marlow and the Intended at the end of Heart of 
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Darkness which, he says, is “vicariously completed”192 in Chance.  It is true that in 
Heart of Darkness Marlow seems to acquire an attraction for the Intended and this 
gives him a motive for not being more proactive in saving Kurtz.  Powell, in 
Chance, also acquires an attraction for Flora.  It is reasonable to assume that 
Marlow went to see the Intended for this reason quite separate from any loyalty to 
Kurtz or duty to return papers.  It is also reasonable, therefore, to assume that 
Powell was less than honest when he claims he could not stop the suicide.  In fact he 
was quite happy to let it happen.  He was horrified by the way Flora was treated and 
wanted it to end and maybe to replace de Barral in her affections.  Watts thinks that 
Powell represents Marlow in the new telling and fulfils his destiny.  An ESDeS 
reading accepts this but puts it differently.  It was decided at the end of the last 
chapter that Marlow rejected the Intended as a project because she would not 
transcend her role and he needed to remain an individual to be free to take up 
choices.  Marlow uses Powell to accept what Marlow could not accept: to act out his 
existential dilemma, his wish for authenticity but a longing for certainty. 
 
ESDeS in the Overt Plot: From de Barral’s Death 
 
Flora declares she “can’t go on”.  She means, of course, living with the mutually 
paradoxical ideas; being between her husband (p) and her father (not-p).  But, given 
her suicidal tendencies this can only be taken to mean the time has come to choose.  
The captain brilliantly plays on her psyche.  He refuses to put pressure on her: he 
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says “I simply surrender.”193  The consequence of such a surrender would be that 
angst would win by default and de Barral acknowledges this with “a triumphant 
chuckling sound”.194  Anthony then puts his surrender into unambiguously 
existential terms: “You are free. I let you off.”195  Flora, equally unambiguously, 
rejects the chance to be authentic: “I don’t want to be let off.”196  In rejecting 
freedom she adopts bad faith - just as the Intended chooses to be unhappy “for 
life”.197 
 
She chooses, therefore, Anthony, but this step in her story will be passed 
over for the time being.  The thesis wants to continue her story from where Watts 
leaves off.  The story does not end “happily” as suggested by Ray nor does it end 
with Flora and Anthony “happily married” as suggested by Wake.  It ends, just like 
Heart of Darkness, in the codicil; in the “hurried” bit at the end when Powell is 
reacquainted with Flora and they, under Marlow’s tutelage, are assumed to marry. 
This is the ending planned, says Watts, for Heart of Darkness.  What is ESDeS to 
make of this marriage?  It thinks this ending reiterates, more clearly, the conclusions 
it has already reached.  It thinks the narrative-consciousness – now known as 
Marlow – is faced with the new existential paradox: it wants to retain its ability to 
choose but it also wants a project.  The trouble is that project has evolved two sides; 
temporary and permanent: unserious and serious.  Marlow as an aspect of Conrad’s 
narrative-consciousness wanted to become normal but couldn’t do it once he 
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identified the Intended with one half of the “nightmare”.198  The same applies in 
Chance.  The narrative-consciousness called Marlow identifies Flora not as project 
ESDeS but as project dreariness.  Angst is horror and middle-class certainty is 
dreariness.  It wants to make this clear because it has not another book to go to so it 
finds it convenient to put the end before the end.  The Flora-Powell axis is described 
by what went before; the Flora-Anthony axis.  The thesis left Heart of Darkness 
aware that the Intended was not an individual free to choose but a role.  She was a 
widow and “unhappy for – life”.  The thesis has left the covert plotting in Chance 
with Flora saying she “did not want to be free” and she identifies this lack of 
freedom with Captain Anthony.  Flora, it seems, wanted to be in love with Anthony 
and to be happily married to Anthony.  This is okay but not if she consumes herself 
as an entity and does not allow the possibility for change.  Not if she adopts a role 
provided for her by society.  Not if she has no life of her own apart from her role as 
a wife.  She categorically rejects the call to be authentic.  She accepts the alternative 
to authentic and opts for seriousness. 
 
The ending does not, therefore, fulfil Marlow’s ambition at the end of Heart 
of Darkness; it replicates it.  The final part tells, as it did with Heart of Darkness, 
that life is not a romance but a survival in the face of existential awareness.  The 
final sequence has Marlow decide, “I must…go alone.”199  This act leaves Powell 
and Flora behind.  They represent, together, seriousness, as a copy of Flora and 
Anthony, whereas Marlow wants to be unserious.  The narrative-consciousness 
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dispenses with two of its characters and chooses, again, to stay with Marlow.  Flora 
and Powell remain as the Intended remained and Marlow “goes” again as he 
“escaped” in Heart of Darkness.  He knows, however, that his freedom is only 
“provisional”: that seriousness and existential awareness will always threaten.  He 
has Powell remind him of this:  “You shall hear from me before long.”  Marlow 
observes: “This was yesterday….I haven’t heard yet; but I expect to hear any 
moment.”200  He, for a moment, is as near as it is possible to come to a truly 
existential man.  But even he knows he will not be able to sustain his unseriousness 
for long for he still lingers in a belief that there is meaning.  This telling ends with: 
“Hang it all, for all my belief in Chance [or choice?] I am not exactly a pagan.”201  
He is an ESDeS man: he knows he will need another project.   
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Chapter 6 
Thinks: A Contemporary ESDeN 
 
A narrative-consciousness is a narrative that can take the form of an ESDeS or 
Story-2.  The purpose of the narrative is to not notice awareness of existential angst.  
The adoption of the ESDeS method of accommodating existential angst is both 
developmental and cultural.  At any given point in history some people will remain 
at Story-1 whilst others have to move on to Story-2.  Heart of Darkness recognises 
this by differentiating between Marlow and the “savage who was fireman…He was 
useful because he had been instructed; and what he knew was this – that should the 
water in the transparent thing disappear, the evil spirit inside the boiler would get 
angry.”1  Chance reiterates this point, as has already been mentioned: “people, 
whether mature or not mature are for the most part quite incapable of understanding 
what is happening to them.”2  In contrast Marlow observes of himself that “surely 
life must be amused somehow”.3  The developmental change within an individual is 
reflected in the self-deceptive-process interpretation of their overt plot.  The 
character is forced, by their experiences, to reach their point of recognition.  Conrad, 
however, makes this point even more explicitly, as we have seen, with his evocative 
description of the individual’s development: “Going up the river was like travelling 
back to the earliest beginnings of the world.”4  This line is glossed, by Brooks, as 
“Marlow’s journey repeats ontogenetically, a kind of reverse phylogeny, an 
                                                          
1  Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness in Youth/Heart of Darkness/The End of the Tether, 
London: Penguin, 1995, p. 92. 
2  Joseph Conrad, Chance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 91. 
3  Ibid., p. 91. 
4  Conrad, Heart of Darkness, p. 88. 
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unravelling of the threads of civilisation.”5  Martin Ray picks up this thread with his 
mirror image statement of the development of Chance as “like a fossil record of the 
changes in Conrad’s style over the years of its writing”.6  The individual’s 
accommodation with existential futility can be achieved by either the adoption of 
seriousness or, on a temporary basis, by the use of a current ESDeS.  In the latter 
case a new point of recognition will eventually force its way into the narrative-
consciousness at which point it will have to repeat or replace its story.  Thinks has 
been chosen to represent a contemporary example of such a replacement. 
 
It ostensibly tells the tale of relationships at “a ‘greenfields’ university”.7  It 
describes a growing relationship between Ralph Messenger and Helen Reed.  Ralph 
is the head of the psychology department and Helen is a visiting creative writing 
teacher.  Helen arrives at the university campus whilst in a state of depression 
following the death of her husband.  She remains faithful to Martin’s memory until 
she discovers that nearly everybody else on the campus, in the present, and Martin, 
in the past, live by a different set of values.  Carrie, Ralph’s wife, has a liaison with 
Nicholas Beck.  Ralph has relationships with Marianne and with Ludmilla and 
wants one with Helen.  Martin has had relationships with numerous research 
assistants including one who turns up on Helen’s course.  Helen is, therefore, 
eventually seduced into a sexual relationship.  This is short lived.  It comes to an 
end due to a combination of circumstances: Ralph discovers he might have a 
                                                          
5  Peter Brooks, “An Unreadable Report: Conrad’s  Heart of Darkness”, in Elaine Jordan 
(ed.), Joseph Conrad, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996, p. 71. 
6  Martin Ray, “Introduction”, to Conrad, Chance, p. xv. 
7  David Lodge, Thinks, London: Penguin, 2002, p. 10. 
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terminal illness, he encroaches on Helen’s privacy by reading her journal and 
Helen’s contract comes to an end anyway.  In between, one of Ralph’s colleagues, 
Duggers, is mentioned from time to time until he commits suicide to avoid arrest for 
downloading child pornography.   
 
This plot and further various sub-plots are presented through three points of 
view.  Ralph’s contributions are given in the form of a flow of consciousness audio 
diary and takes up about a fifth of the novel.  Helen’s contributions are given in the 
form of a written journal and takes up a little less than two-fifths.  The narrator’s 
point of view is given in third person reportage and takes most of the remainder.  
The reportage is unusual in that it is in the present tense.  There are, in addition, 
other public domain intrusions in the form of student essays, letters and emails but 
these can, by Lodge’s own admission, be omitted since “you could cut them out, 
you wouldn’t notice”.8  Strictly speaking he only says this of the literary exercises 
but the emails between Ralph and Ludmilla come into the same category.  They are 
there only as a result of his visit to Prague.9  The visit is an occasion for him to 
indulge in rich food which in turn provides a reason for feeling ill.  He ascribes his 
feeling ill to chronic indigestion, but his description of the symptoms gives the 
reader a chance to anticipate the diagnosis of a more serious illness.  As a 
consequence of the visit Ralph has an affair.  It is inevitable given the nature of 
Ralph’s character: he cannot go abroad without indulging in an affair.  Ludmilla, 
however, is incidental to both the ongoing overt plotting and to an ESDeS reading. 
                                                          
8  David Lodge, “A conversation about Thinks”, in David Lodge, Consciousness and the 
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9  Lodge, Thinks, p. 214. 
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 The theory of the narrative-consciousness, as developed by this thesis, 
requires three initial premises: the organism is merely a machine which writes a 
narrative which mainly tells about the producer.  Thinks is a particular text and is 
therefore a particular narrative-consciousness; it might be given the name David 
Lodge for convenience.  There is both authorial and textual justification for this 
assertion. 
 
Lodge describes himself as “a teacher of fiction and therefore a very self-
conscious novelist” and as a novelist who is “very conscious of what [he] is 
doing”.10  In addition he has strenuously denied, in a conversation with Kate 
Daniels,11 that his characters (with particular reference to Ralph and Helen) have 
any life other than that which he gives to them.  He also asserted that Helen’s 
mature views, as represented by her speech to the consciousness-conference, are his 
own. Helen’s views, in the novel, include the claim that: “Real writing is inevitably 
a kind of self-exposure.”12  By this she means “it reveals indirectly your fears, 
desires, fantasies, priorities”.13  Although Helen doesn’t actually say the words she 
would clearly include awareness of existential futility if she had wanted to make this 
plain.  The thesis would want to go further and claim that Helen expresses the end 
conclusion of the narrative-consciousness called Lodge.  It also wants to claim that 
all the characters, in this model, are to be seen merely as aspects of the primary 
                                                          
10  Lodge, “A conversation about Thinks”, p. 296. 
11  David Lodge and Kate Daniels, “Consciousness and the Novel: Writer and Novelist David 
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narrative-consciousness.  More specifically it sees Helen and the narrator as the 
representatives of the proposition, p – the belief that life has a meaning - Duggers as 
the representative of the proposition, not-p – the awareness that it does not.  Ralph 
sits in between these two extremes and represents the choice.  The physical division 
of the brain into two separately functioning hemispheres connected by a 
communicating corpus callosum is an appropriate metaphor.  The narrative whole 
becomes, then, dividable into two main divisions corresponding to p and not-p and 
these are called the overt plotting and the covert plotting.  These act out an ESDeS 
reading of the novel in which the tension lies in whether Ralph eventually adopts 
Helen’s solution to the existential problem or whether he adopts Duggers’s. 
 
The manifest text justifies Lodge’s claim that he is a “very self-conscious 
novelist” for Thinks acknowledges all premises required by the theory of narrative-
consciousness.  It has Ralph state, referring to Helen: “You’re a machine that’s been 
programmed by culture not to recognise that it’s a machine.”14  It then, as Ralph, 
explains the function of the machine: “We make up stories about ourselves.”15  
Whatever the merits of Ralph’s case it does foreground the observable fact that 
stories are told.  In fact the readers only know about Ralph and Helen from the 
stories they tell.  This, in effect, foregrounds the idea of the narrative nature of the 
self.  Even the narrator comes into this category for he often lets slip that he is an 
omniscient narrator. 
                                                          
14  Ibid., p. 102.  In his conversation with Craig Raine, Lodge explains what he means by 
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 Why storytelling is so ubiquitous is also touched upon.  Helen repeats the 
now well-worn argument: “Of course one can argue that there’s a basic human need 
for narrative.”16  This argument on its own might be called the it-is-just-so argument 
but Helen provides more than this and, in so doing, introduces the ESDeS’s third 
premise.  She says, in a short interchange with Ralph: “I suppose that’s why people 
read novels…. To find out what goes on in other people’s heads.”17  Ralph takes up 
her point of view and turns it around:  “But all they really find out is what goes on 
in the writer’s head.”18  The text then spends the bulk of the novel attempting to 
illustrate and justify Ralph’s, and this thesis’s, assertion.  It does so in a number of 
ways: through its presentational technique, its thematic content and its choice of 
plots, in addition to the direct authorial contribution provided by Lodge. 
 
Presentational techniques include the splitting of the narrative-consciousness 
with use of multiple voices and then its rejoining by identifying one voice with 
another.  The novel uses multiple voices which means that events are often 
presented three times.  This might suggest that three points of view are provided but 
closer examination quickly establishes that this method only serves to identity each 
character with each other and with Lodge.  There are three important examples of 
this: the “disappearance” scene, the “kiss” scene and the “I’m leaving” scene.  In 
each the identity of the description suggests identity of source.  The “disappearance” 
refers to Helen’s walk around the campus.  Ralph observes her from his office and 
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says “she’d disappeared into thin air”.19 For Helen this becomes, “I slipped into the 
chapel”.20  The omniscient narrator attempts to give the event some objectivity by 
putting the two together in a direct speech interchange: 
“You seemed to disappear into thin air.” 
“Did I?” 
“Where were you?” 
“I went into the chapel.”21 
 
The “kiss” scene gives another even more identical series of descriptions.  Ralph 
steals his first kiss as the two emerge from the hot pool.  Helen says, “I didn’t 
resist”,22 Ralph reports, “she didn’t resist”,23 whilst the narrator confirms that Helen 
“does not resist”.24  This kiss clearly took place and the action is in the public 
domain but the concept of resistance is a private one.  It is not really possible for the 
narrator to say Helen “did not resist”.  To legitimately make this value judgement 
the narrator requires an additional source of information: the mask of objectivity 
slips.  Finally, in the scene where Ralph refuses to be sympathetic to Helen’s 
sadness over her husband’s death, the three reporters again use much the same 
words.  Helen gets angry and “almost got up and left him at the table”.25  This is an 
internal thought and is not, like her actions “going into the chapel” and to a lesser 
extent “the kiss”, available in the public domain.  Ralph observes her (lack of) 
behaviour and forms an opinion: “I thought for a moment she was going to walk 
                                                          
19  Ibid., p. 8. 
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22  Ibid., p. 103. 
23  Ibid., p. 118. 
24  Ibid., p. 102. 
25  Ibid., p. 62. 
 293
away.”26  The narrator describes the same event: “she looks…angry enough to get 
up and leave him sitting at the table.”27  It is legitimate for both Ralph and the 
narrator to observe her behaviour but for both to correctly infer from it the affect, 
anger, may be possible but since she does not get up and go for both to infer that 
was a possibility seems less likely. 
 
The voices of all three then seem to emerge from the same source.  They 
then recombine.  The voices of Helen and the narrator are most obviously intended 
to merge as one.  Helen finds her experience such that she says: “I still shrink from 
examining the experience with the straight unflinching eye of the first person.  Let 
me try another way.”28  The other way involves adopting the same third person 
storytelling technique as the narrator.  Craig Raine suggests some textual evidence 
that Helen and the narrator are different because the quality of their writing differs.  
He suggests that Helen is only a mediocre writer.  Helen’s writing is perceived “not 
brilliant” and full of “cliché” whilst the narrator’s writing is described as 
“brilliant”.29  He cites Ralph’s and Sandra Pickering’s suggestions that her writing 
has limitations.  Lodge says, in her defence, that he intended Helen to be a good 
novelist who “won prizes and was approved of by the Spectator”.30   
 
In addition to presentational techniques the text provides direct thematic 
content with respect to the ongoing consciousness debate between Ralph and Helen 
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30  Ibid. 
 294
and this overlaps with the “reading the journal” plot.  Ralph argues: “We never 
know for certain what another person is really thinking.”31  Lodge probably bases 
this thinking on Henry Green.  He notes in his essay “Consciousness and the 
Novel”: 
Henry Green persevered with the dialogue novel to the end of 
his writing life, in books like Nothing (1950) and Doting (1952).  
In two radio talks broadcast at about that time, he defended this 
method, and criticised the fictional convention by which the 
narrator claims a privileged knowledge of the consciousness of 
the characters: “Do we know, in life, what other people are 
really like?” he asked.  “I very much doubt it. We certainly do 
not know what other people are thinking and feeling.  How then 
can the novelist be so sure?”32 
 
Helen counters this argument with “novelists have been doing that [succeeding] for 
the last two hundred years”,33 and provides evidence for her point of view by 
quoting a passage from James which she seems to think shows that James is 
speaking the mind of Kate Croy in Wings of a Dove.  Ralph retorts: “James can 
[only] claim to know what’s going on in Kate Whatshername’s head because he put 
it there, he invented her.”34 
 
Ralph wants to swop his audio diary with Helen’s journal in an attempt to 
overcome this limitation.  If the journal is like his own “flow of consciousness” 
diary then it would at least show what was in Helen’s consciousness at the particular 
time it was written.  However, it also has a more direct narrative function.  The 
                                                          
31  Lodge, Thinks, p. 41. 
32  Lodge, Consciousness and the Novel, p.80. 
33  Lodge, Thinks, p. 41. 
34  Ibid., p. 42. 
 295
illicit reading returns the reader back to both an ESDeS genre-marker for the 
reading and to the main plotting.  It exposes Ralph’s self-deception and the Carrie 
and Nicholas Beck campus relationship.  Ralph is being cheated on by Carrie 
without, apparently, knowing it.  He, like all self-deceivers, has chosen to accept 
evidence that supports his state and ignore evidence which is against it.  He and 
everyone else, including the reader, is led to believe that Nicholas is “a celibate 
homosexual”35 and his meetings with Carrie are purely for the purposes of buying 
antiques.  There would have undoubtedly been contrary evidence.  The reader is 
presented with the same clues available to Helen and, by implication, to Ralph.  The 
clues are overlooked until the evidence becomes too strong.  Carrie’s car is seen 
parked in Nicholas’s driveway.  Helen notes that Charlotte and Prince in The 
Golden Bowl start their love affair in Gloucester.  Helen then actually spots the two 
kissing in a tea room.  Ralph eventually admits to discovering the affair when 
presented by written testimony from Helen’s journal. 
 
Having established that Thinks is a narrative-consciousness it becomes 
legitimate to read it as an ESDeS.  To do so this analysis is, as in previous chapters, 
carried out under subheadings.  In this case three are sufficient: “Overt Plotting”, 
“Genre-Marking” and “Covert Plotting”.  The ESDeS version of the overt plot does 
not exist as expected for a more contemporary ESDeN because Lodge presumably 
doesn’t long for past certainties as much as Conrad and the bracketing deaths are 
included with the covert plotting section. 
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Overt Plotting 
 
The manifest plot has already been outlined.  At first reading it might be thought 
that it seems a bit light.  If so, the reader who has expectations of a writer of 
Lodge’s reputation will look deeper in order to find interpretations.  Craig Raine 
does this.  He suggests that Thinks is about “intimacy”, whereas Lodge thinks that 
the “novel is about consciousness in all its aspects”36 and wants Helen “to be 
confronted with a whole set of deceptions”.37  Either way, as this thesis has argued 
throughout, knowledge of the overt plot is not of interest except insofar as it 
distracts from the covert plotting or it includes a self-deceptive process.  The latter 
is deemed to be a hangover from Story-1 and is expected to disappear as 
unnecessary when the Story-2 becomes established.  This is the case in Thinks.  The 
former point is a purely empirical question: is the overt plotting, in fact, sufficiently 
distracting to successfully hide the covert plotting?  In this case, the covert plot 
concerns a character called Duggers.  It can be easily demonstrated that it is not 
noticed since, in two very detailed conversations,38 the significance of Duggers, for 
an ESDeS, was not mentioned. 
 
In the conversation between Lodge and Craig Raine, Duggers is mentioned 
by name only twice.  On both occasions, Lodge’s answers to Raine’s observations 
have a flavour of disingenuity.  On the first occasion Duggers comes up as 
incidental to the topic of intuition.  Raine and Lodge are discussing the topic and 
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even suggest that it exists as some sort of immaterial communication system.  
Duggers is put forward as part of an example: “He commits suicide at the very 
moment that Ralph hears he is reprieved.”39  Lodge’s explanation is vague at the 
very least and perhaps intentionally evasive: “Ralph’s tempted by the idea that it’s 
not a complete coincidence, that there must be some kind of system behind this.”40  
Indeed there is.  If Lodge intends the book to be an ESDeN then he would not want 
to acknowledge the possibility of a specific system because this would be to point, 
too clearly, to a covert plot and, hence, invalidate the purpose of the novel.  This 
thesis, however, does allocate importance to the coincidence of possible deaths.  
Duggers commits suicide and carries off existential angst allowing other aspects of 
the narrative-consciousness to move on to new projects.  The second time Duggers 
is mentioned is in connection with the “flexing” of his gloves.  Raine notes that a 
doctor, in an embedded story, has the same “flexing” mannerism and sees 
significance, not in Duggers, but in the repetition of the action.  Lodge denies intent 
here, but the tone of his answer is interesting.  He says to Raine: “You’re an 
incredibly attentive reader.  Not many people would notice.  They’re separated by 
about twenty pages.”41  Clearly if Lodge wants to hide anything (in a covert plot 
say) he would expect only the odd “unbelievably attentive reader” to notice the 
hiding if the links are twenty or more pages apart.  Everybody else would not notice.  
There is a third reference to Duggers in the conversation.  It is not by name but by 
the appellation minor character.  Craig Raine draws attention to a minor character, 
Annabel Riverdale, as suitable for development.  Lodge could have said that he 
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could not develop every minor character but that he thought it was sufficient to 
develop Duggers.  But he does not.  Lodge squashes the whole line of thought: “I 
could have spread myself, followed up more of the characters.  But I am not sure 
that would have been a good idea.”42  Given the existence and coherence of the 
Duggers covert plot this answer is at best disingenuous.   
 
Finally it is noted that a further conversation about Thinks took place three 
years later - between Kate Daniels and Lodge - with a reading list that included the 
Craig Raine conversation.  Despite this potential starting point and despite the fact 
that the audience consisted, for the most part, of trained psychotherapists, there was 
not a single mention of Duggers. 
 
Given, then, that it can be taken as an established fact that the Duggers 
covert plot is not noticed even by “incredibly attentive readers”, two related 
questions can now be considered:  “Is the covert plot fairly signposted?” and “What 
is the covert plot?” 
 
Genre-Marking 
 
There is textual evidence of uneasiness, self-deception, death and futility, hiding, 
collusion and repetition in Thinks.  These are interlinked but for the sake of 
convenience subtitled.  The techniques adopted by Thinks include some adopted by 
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the other exemplar texts but, in addition, it also uses two techniques that Lodge has 
expressed a particular affection for: “allusion and joke”43  and “double “function”.44 
 
(i)  Uneasiness 
 
The uneasiness genre-marker is put in to encourage readers to think that there must 
be more to the text than appears at first reading.  Thinks does not in this case make 
use of uneasiness as a motif word or other word ambiguities directly.  However, 
there are three anecdotal aspects to its narration that turn out to be very indicative.   
 
The first and second are connected and crucial and are, indirectly, connected 
to the ambiguous title technique: the names in the book can be given additional 
significance.  Duggers, for example, is introduced into the text in various ways: as 
“Professor D. C. Douglass” on his office door; as “Duggers” as an approaching 
person; as “Douglas C. Douglass” when being introduced and, finally, as “Professor 
Douglass” when being addressed directly.45  The combination of his complete name 
and title is never given, and, after this flourish of activity, he is only ever referred to 
as Duggers.  Then, before he or his conversation can be developed, an emergency 
arises.  The computer system has crashed.46  This might not be regarded as an 
unusual event but it is made so, in this context, because the computer system is 
called “Captain Haddock” which is very obviously a literary intrusion.  Lodge 
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makes the allusion clear in this case: Helen has observed earlier that the name 
comes from the Tintin books.47  Douglas Douglass is placed alongside a literary 
allusion.  Lodge, knowing author that he is, cannot be unaware that the archetypal 
character with the same first and last name is Humbert Humbert.48  Further, in this 
case, the doubling is underscored for his surname, “Douglass”, has a double letter.49  
Finally, as if this is not enough, the text has linked this letter doubling and this name 
doubling to a computer and to fishiness. 
 
The third intrusion of unease is related less generally to fishiness and more 
specifically to perverse sexual activity.  Out of character sexual terminology 
sometimes jars and somehow draws attention to itself.  It is legitimate for the text to 
establish Ralph’s predatoriness and Helen’s frustrated state of mind but sometimes 
anecdotes are included that either go beyond this or clash with other aspects of a 
character.  The relation of Ralph’s first experience is an example of this.  In his 
audio diary, he describes his early sexual encounters with an older woman, Martha 
Beard, and it jars: certainly when he tells Carrie about it she is not impressed.  
However, it is her choice of language to describe it that jars most.  Carrie is 
portrayed, elsewhere in the text, as not making a noise “unless we are alone in the 
house”50 and as not walking around naked:51 in short, as somewhat prudish.  As 
such the language she uses is out of character and this arouses unease.  She says of 
Ralph’s first partner, in her interchange with him: “She was a sexually frustrated 
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adult who used your adolescent dick as a dildo.”52  It is more the sort of expression 
Ralph would use.  More like his “I’d like to listen to it again and masturbate to it in 
memory of Isabel Hotchkiss”53.  The overlapping of language lessens the 
distinctiveness of the characters.  But this is not a criticism.  The text is like Party 
Going.  It is making the point that the characters all come from the same source: that 
they all “flex” their fingers in the same way. 
 
If the telling does cause unease it will be well for the reader to bear in mind 
two facts: Ralph’s account of an event may be unreliable and this anecdote links 
him to sexual abuse, which in turn will link him, eventually, to Duggers. 
 
(ii)  Self-deception 
 
Helen and her, now dead, husband Martin are an archetypal self-deceptive pair, as 
described by Trivers in chapter 1.  Martin is a serial betrayer, but this betrayal is 
“not noticed” by Helen.  As a result she brings up her children as well as she can.  
The deception is revealed by Sandra Pickering,54 who is Martin’s ex-lover and 
Helen’s current student.  Helen, once she accepts the deception, is able to reflect: 
A number of little incidents and enigmas, that I had hardly 
recognised at the time, suddenly came back sharply into focus, 
charged with implication.  A shirt or two of his that 
unaccountably disappeared.  Phone calls that went dead when I 
answered.  Messages that he would have to work late.55  
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The fact that the evidence had been available and had been overlooked is an 
essential characteristic of self-deception.  The fact that Helen is able to, and chooses 
to, spell-it-out after the event is also a fundamental characteristic of self-deception.  
This, however, is just an example of normal-self-deception. 
 
Earlier, the text had already presented another, more illustrative, example.  It 
may have been overlooked because readers are not yet aware of Helen’s normal-
self-deceptive tendencies.  It is more important because her behaviour points to the 
possibility of an ESDeS through self-deception linking with the idea of absurdity.  It 
starts off in the context of normal, morally suspect, self-deception.  In this Thinks 
scenario Ralph is putting pressure on Helen to start an affair, but up to the relevant 
scene she makes a big point of being loyal to Martin’s memory.  Before she actually 
“accepted” the first “mouth to mouth”56 kiss which signalled the start of the affair 
she indulges in a classic example of bad faith.  Her exhibition of bad faith almost 
exactly mirrors Sartre’s defining example.  Sartre has his exemplar “woman”57 
pretend she does not notice her aspiring lover’s intentions towards her.  She leaves 
her hand to be held by him “but she does not notice that she is leaving it”.58  Helen 
chooses in a similar fashion: “I felt his foot touch mine once or twice in the hot tub, 
but I thought it was just accidental, it never crossed my mind that he had any 
amorous intentions.”59  How could this be true?  How could it never have crossed 
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57  Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, London: Methuen, 1969, 
p.55. 
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her mind when she had already had a “presentiment that he was going to kiss me on 
the cheek”?60 
 
There are other examples of self-deception of course but this bad faith 
episode exemplifies the essence of Thinks and emerges more fully in the next 
section. 
 
(iii)  Meaning 
 
A meaning genre-marker comes in many forms in order to transform self-deceptive 
unease into existentially-self-deceptive unease. Existential meaning is hinted at 
within the overt plot but its genre-marking really comes from its connection to its 
undesirable alternative.  Thinks does this brilliantly by placing unseriousness in 
opposition to seriousness.  The latter is placed firmly into the overt plotting and the 
former is left hidden in the covert structure.   
 
The narrative-consciousnesses in Heart of Darkness and Chance are shown as going 
through the existential-self-deceptive process in detail whereas Ralph and Helen are 
not: the characters in Thinks take angst as self-evident if they think of it at all.  They 
defend themselves from ESD awareness by adopting the middle-class form of bad 
faith or seriousness.  Thinks illustrates the process of recognition and the process of 
narration for the reader but not for the characters.  Sartre illustrates the point of 
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recognition with what Danto calls “Roquentin’s shattering vision”:61 that is 
Roquentin experiencing “nausea”.  Conrad has Kurtz repeat the experience with his 
“Horror” scene.  Both authors emphasise the discovery and relegate the effect of this 
experience to second place: to mere descriptive mention.  They both see their 
respective contemporaries as contemptible because they are seen to be serious about 
their projects.  Both authors see the cause and effect process to be first futility and 
then, after, the seeing of projects as unserious.  Lodge – in contrast - never has his 
characters seeing their projects as unserious.  The whole novel is permeated by the 
middle-class complacency and moral certainties that Roquentin and Marlow so 
hated: Gloucester is added to the streets of Bouville and Brussels and London.  It is 
almost impossible to read the book unless one is, already, part of the scene: that is, 
aware of its social and cultural boundaries.  Lodge cleverly drops names into the 
plotting in such a way that the reader could be excused for assuming the fictional 
characters are real so enmeshed are they in the “real”.  Sometimes a particular 
reader will recognise a reference and sometimes not.  Either way, readers, in 
general, are introduced to the correct way of behaving.  Consensus is established 
between middle-class intellectuals using suitable snide comments about target 
political figures (Blair and Bush), by referring to “appropriate” films (Ghost) and its 
actors (Goldberg and Moore).  The “right” artists (including Max Karinthy of the 
mural scene – presumably Kadinsky?), novelists (Amis, Welsh, Rushdie, Beckett, 
Weldon, James, Stein, Bauby and many others), philosophers (Watson, Nagel, 
Searle and many others) and scientists (Shrödinger, Penrose, Turing and many 
others) tell the reader who is currently important and, by omission, who is not.  The 
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characters drink the right wine (“This Beaujolais is really very decent”62) and aspire 
to proper schools.  Helen and Martin baptise their children into the Catholic faith 
because “the local Catholic primary school was better than the state ones and we 
couldn’t afford private education”.63  North London Collegiate64 and Manchester 
and Oxford (they are described as “real places with real people in them”) follow.  
The prevailing cultural norm is concerned with these common concerns and it is, 
therefore, in this context that the characters have to show they are not naive with 
respect to death and futility and the ephemeral nature of consciousness.  Helen 
provides most of the references as Ralph is portrayed as incurably optimistic.  She is 
depressed after her husband’s death and comes to the university to do something to 
get over it.  But she is not convincing.  She says that “inventing fictitious characters 
and making things up for them to do seems so futile”,65 but this relates more to her 
self-deceptive personality than to a genuine process of recognition.  She manifestly 
does not make up characters or invent things for them to do.  At best she takes 
“good care not to use anything in a way that would embarrass anyone”.66  Her 
assertion is pretentious.  However, she does come very close to genuine existential 
angst when she has a session reflecting on the plight of Jean-Dominique Bauby.  
Her thoughts lead her to a statement that mirrors closely the initial premise of this 
thesis: 
Homo sapiens, by virtue of his sudden surge in brain-power, 
apprehends his own mortality, and is so appalled by the 
discovery that he makes up a story.67 
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 She then concludes that the Adam and Eve story can be reinterpreted: “The fall of 
man was a fall into self-consciousness, and God a compensatory fiction.”68   
 
These are passing reflections.  The essences of the characters making up this 
narrative-consciousness remain defended by ESDeS until the very end of the novel.  
Ralph, even when faced with his own imminent death, remains enmeshed in trivial 
problems: the consciousness conference, his affair with Helen, his trouble with 
funding and his involvement with Ludmilla.  Helen too, even when being enmeshed 
in deceptions and toying with her existential awareness, becomes “panicky at the 
thought”69 of giving her talk.  The material concerns of Almayer’s Folly – wealth, 
status and love – are retained by these characters even in the face of expressed 
futility. 
 
The existential theme is, however, available in a disguised sense.  Raine 
almost picks up on it, more theoretically, in another context.  He sees significance in 
the name Messenger in the same way as this thesis sees significance in the name 
Douglas(s): 
What about Messenger’s name?  He brings the news?  What is 
the news?  Is it that Eros and Thanatos are linked?  
Thinks…begins with Isabel Hotchkiss and sex, but it turns out 
she died of breast cancer.  So sex and death are there at the 
beginning.  And the novel almost ends with the same 
conclusion.70 
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 The argument is not disavowed by Lodge; it is ignored.  He enters, instead, into a 
long rambling diversion which ends with an observation that the same set of events 
can serve a “double function”.  He recalls Ralph’s first sexual encounter.  It takes 
place on a sheep farm with the farmer’s wife, Martha Beard.  The anecdote, he says, 
“turns out to have another function”.71  Not only does Martha provide his first 
sexual encounter but the sheepdogs provide the virus which causes his later illness.  
This is good plotting for the overt story but the incomplete Eros-Thanatos 
interpretation and its dismissal need explanations.  A first explanation comes as a 
logical corollary to the framing.  It makes the existential point that everything in 
between is just a project.  Lodge provides textual support for this supposition.  
Carrie is writing a book: Helen gives her encouragement and Ralph puts the 
encouragement into words: “It’s just what Carrie needs, a project of her own that’s 
really fulfilling.”72  But the way the manifest plotting is done suggests that going 
down this logical, conflicted route is, again, better described as middle-class 
superficiality or bad faith.  Alternatively Lodge does not answer because to do so 
would mean pointing out that the book did, in fact, both start and end with Eros and 
Thanatos. This would point, once again, to ESDeS and to covert plotting.  Thinks 
does start and end in “sex and death” but only if properly put. Sex might more 
properly be depicted as life or self-preservation.  Within an ESDeS the terms do not 
relate to the actual and the linking but to the choice between them.  They are neither 
put as inevitable and sequential nor as simultaneous nor as conflicting: they are 
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alternatives.  If Lodge’s “double function” claim is a basic technique then he might 
want to add to Raine’s claim that Ralph’s name is significant.  Messenger carries 
information in two distinct ways: about life and death and, also more directly as the 
link character between the overt plotting and the covert plotting.  That is, 
information is carried between the Helen story and the covert story.  He is the 
narrative-consciousness’s “corpus callosum”.  The ESDeS represents the process 
which enables a resolution between p and not-p.  Self-preservation – not sex - is the 
alternative to death.  Duggers has adopted death (but he is not noticed), leaving the 
book to extol the moving on (life) of Helen and Ralph.  Ralph has moved over into 
the “right” hemisphere with Helen.  He has been preserved at the expense of 
Duggers. 
 
(iv)  Hiding 
 
The two observations that Duggers is not noticed and life goes on prove that the 
covert plot (if it exists) has been successfully hidden.  But has the reader been given 
enough information to justify the claim that the covert plot is available and 
intentional?  The answer to this is multi-faceted.  The text gives plenty of genre-
markers in other areas but, at a first reading, seems weak on hiding genre-markers.  
Whereas Marlow, for example, constantly makes direct reference to the need for 
hiding and the need for forgetting, Ralph and his colleagues do not, obviously, do 
so.  Maybe it is not even necessary.  The characters within the overall story are all 
acting-out, as has been seen in the last section, stereotypical roles.  However, further 
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genre-marking can be teased out by again adopting Lodge’s philosophy of “double 
function”.  The need for evasion comes up with respect to two subjects: infidelity 
and death. 
 
The first example relates directly to death and pretence.  Carrie’s father has a 
serious heart attack and might possibly die.  One of her children, Hope, asks directly 
whether he will die and follows this up with “what happens to people when they 
die?”73  This is a perfectly normal question which leads to a perfectly normal 
dispute between the parents.  Ralph wants to tell the truth and Carrie wants to 
pretend.  In addition to the interest in the debate itself, the possible death provides 
for a distracter in the form of an irrelevant separation: irrelevant, that is, to the 
covert plotting.  For overt plotting purposes the possible death means Carrie will fly 
to America and Ralph will be given the space to progress his affair with Helen.  The 
movement with the overt plot obscures the second alternative in the Lodgean double 
function.  This hints at ESD.  Ralph is being consistent with what he believes.  He is 
being honest.  He is not pretending.  He is loudly proclaiming he is not self-
deceptive in nature.  This describes one way of being in the world.  However, Carrie 
represents another way.  She wants to say things she does not believe.  This is for 
the justifiable purpose of not hurting Hope’s feelings, but clearly there is a hint that 
the same tactic can be adopted to avoid unpleasant feelings within the single 
consciousness.  Here such unpleasant feelings are connected to the more general 
point of the futility indicated by inevitable and personal death. 
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The second example is also told within the possibility of a Lodgean double 
function, but is even less likely to be noticed for it comes before the last example 
might raise awareness with respect to death.  It is also indicated by having two 
contributions.  This time they are not separated by character but by more than the 
designated “twenty” pages.  Ralph’s contribution is given early on and seems 
innocent.  It is given as another example of his intellectual honesty.  He identifies 
“secrecy of thought” with “the privacy of consciousness”74 and this is presented as 
self evident.  Helen, later, puts it differently.  She turns it into something connected 
with intrigue and collusiveness.  It - the “secret” - changes from being absolutely 
necessary and private to something that is necessary by choice and collusive: “we 
had agreed to conceal.”75  This is enough to justify looking for a covert plot.  The 
references point to deliberate hiding and are misleading only in their direction of 
where to look.  The affair is part of the overt plot and its associated secret is as 
uninteresting as the affair.  But, if it is taken seriously, it serves as a distracter, for 
the relevant collusive hiding involves Ralph with Duggers, not with Helen.  The 
covert plot is pointed to but hidden at the same time.  This is exactly what an ESDeS 
demands. 
 
(v)  Collusion 
 
Collusion comes in two broad forms.  The first is explicit and relates to the 
bourgeois project which has already been described in the meaning section.  The 
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narrative-consciousness as represented by all the characters defends itself from ESD 
awareness by adopting the middle-class form of bad faith or seriousness.  It has no 
need of an existentially-self-deceptive process.  This project is seen to be 
continuously on offer.  Not only is this true but the reader is invited to collude by 
imitation: to read the right books, to see the right films, to go to the right schools 
and to generally conform.  This is done by the intermixing of real names.  Only the 
people who recognise them are included, are the right sort of people.  In addition the 
point is made verbally.  The reader is frequently told that the lives and actions of the 
characters are interesting.  This may be so in fact.  Raine claims, with respect to the 
consciousness discussions: “When you’re reading Thinks…you’re fascinated by the 
information.  The sheer interest of it stops you raising an objection.”76  Lodge 
doesn’t believe it though.  During the conversation he clearly thinks Raine is 
referring to his technique of “allusion and joke”.  And the text doesn’t believe it 
either.  It needs to keep reminding the reader, when the interest, if it exists, should 
be self-evident.  Early on, Ralph describes a conversation with Helen as “quite a 
lively conversation”.77  Helen returns the compliment when she says the Centre 
“proved unexpectedly interesting”.78  The reader even has to be told that life is “full 
of interest and deeply satisfying”.79  They are reminded right through to the end 
when something is supposed to be good.  Helen’s views on consciousness, given at 
the conference, are described as superficial but the reader is not allowed to leave it 
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like that.  They are told it “was such an inspiring talk”.80  Ralph is the only character 
allowed to criticise.  He doesn’t much like the students’ essays or Helen’s book, but 
in the end he too is forced into the mould: “he was perceptibly less assertive, more 
subdued, more middle-aged.”81  If the reader likes the book and agrees that it is 
interesting, like Raine, they are likely to be middle-class.  The social pressure which 
makes them conform in every other way will serve the existential purpose here: they 
will collude with the text and not discover the covert plotting.  The paradoxical 
alternative - existential angst - must be buried. 
 
If, however, the reader does not find the overt plotting interesting, despite 
the injunctions to do so, they will not collude at this level.  They may then discover 
the covert plot.  If they do they will still find themselves invited to collude, as in 
Heart of Darkness, by becoming part of the collusive death plot: the Duggers covert 
plot.  The paradoxical alternative to life - existential angst - must be buried. 
 
(vi)  Repetition 
 
If Douglas Douglass and Messenger, as names, are allowed their metaphorical 
significance then it would be foolish to overlook Reed.  Helen draws attention to the 
problem of reading.  When Ralph questions the need for “more novelists”82 - 
possibly because he himself doesn’t “read much contemporary fiction”83 - Helen 
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notes that people need stories.  She worries about it.  She asks herself, but doesn’t 
answer, several times, why there is a need for “the endless multiplication of new 
stories?”84 
Before the rise of the novel there wasn’t the same obligation on 
the storyteller – you could relate the old familiar tales over and 
over….But for the last three centuries writers have been 
required to make up a new story every time….the plot must be 
fleshed out with a new set of characters, and worked out in a 
new set of circumstances….it seems extraordinary, even 
perverse, that we should bother to invent all these additional 
pretend-lives….the reader must register and memorize these 
facts in order to follow your story, but they are flushed away 
almost as soon as the book is finished, to make room for another 
story.  Before long nothing remains in the reader’s memory but 
a name or two, a few vague impressions of people, an indistinct 
recollection of the plot, and a general sense of having been 
entertained, or not, as the case may be.  Should I really be 
encouraging these bright young people to add their quotient to 
the dust-heap of forgotten pseudo-lives?85 
 
It is clear stories are told, written, listened to and read but it is not yet clear to Helen 
why this should be so.  She thinks, at this point in time, it is not because of their 
plots, or because of their insights into consciousnesses, or because they entertain – 
although they may do all of these.  However, she will, by the end of the novel, be 
able to see that the narrative-consciousness theory can provide a satisfactory 
answer: they serve a crucial existential purpose.  Insofar as people are writing 
themselves as Ralph asserts - “We make [ourselves] up all the time.  Like you make 
up your stories”86 - they do so within Story-2.  And then their stories do not last, by 
definition.  They have to be replaced or repeated.  Thinks knows this and makes a 
motif of the idea.  Every story, within the story, has the possibility of three 
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repetitions from apparently different points of view.  And then, at the end of the 
novel, Helen moves on after the necessary suicide of Duggers – the separation of 
angst – by writing another story.  This allows other Lodgean “allusion”.  Helen’s 
new book borrows from Sartre’s Nausea.  Her book Crying is a Puzzler has already 
been written as Thinks.  A reviewer of the book describes it as “so old fashioned as 
to be almost experimental”.87  The text is stating clearly that Eagleton’s desire "to 
embrace our own nothingness”88 is to be rejected in favour of continuous repetition 
of the individual ESDeS.  To do so, however, the text has to provide the means.  It 
has to provide a covert plot to justify ridding itself of the part of its narrative-
consciousness that represents awareness of existential futility. 
 
The Covert Plotting 
 
Narrative-consciousness-theory is based on the idea that if existential angst is to be 
hidden its text as a whole requires a division into two stories: overt plotting and 
covert plotting.  The text of Thinks allows for such a division as soon as it starts.  It 
makes division an issue by its technique of oscillating between the narratives 
provided by Ralph and Helen.  It specifies what this might mean by having Helen, 
in her first contribution, focus on a division of mind when she states: “It’s as if I am 
two people at once.”89  It then, as the theory demands, makes it clear through its use 
of genre-markers that a covert plot exists.  The theory goes on to suggest that the 
covert plotting will exist between death-like events.  There are three deaths in this 
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novel.  The first two deaths start the chain with the process of recognition which 
leads to a point of recognition.  This starts the choice to avoid suicide and to create, 
by a process of narration, a new project ending in another death to allow the 
establishment of the project.  The death-separation gets rid of angst into the covert 
plot allowing the positive part of the narrative-consciousness to be able to adopt the 
new project with enthusiasm. 
 
The first two deaths provide starting points for Ralph and Helen 
respectively.  The first death takes place in fictional time before the start of this 
story.  It is the death of Isabel Hotchkiss.  Her death is described, by Ralph, as “a 
full stop”.90  It manifestly isn’t as far as this story is concerned: it is, for Ralph, the 
beginning.  Reference to it, since it adds nothing to the story except by 
interpretation, can be deemed to be the last point of narration.  A point of narration 
is always the start of a new cycle.  The cover story begins to break down during a 
new process of recognition.  As has been stated, the merit of this book is that it does 
not concern itself too much with this: it takes it as given.  Craig Raine, however, has 
linked the start to Eros and Thanatos which, if allowed in a modified form, 
reinforces the claim that what is to follow is a battle between these.  The second 
death is that of Helen’s husband, Martin.  Its narration is repeated three times in 
three nearly identical versions.  The triple telling reinforces the identity of the three 
tellers - Helen, the narrator and Ralph - as intentional aspects of the narrative 
consciousness called Lodge.  It does a little more than this.  This repetitive telling is 
connected with going away.  When Helen tells Ralph about her husband’s death he 
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is not sympathetic.  He says, “That was tough for you, but a good way to go for 
him.”91  Helen reacts, in all three versions, by appearing to want to leave.  Martin 
“go[es]” but, when it comes down to it, Helen does not.  A deliberate choice is 
taken: she stays and starts creating a new story.  In the overt plot the choice is to 
start an affair with Ralph.  In an ESDeS the possibility of going away means 
considering the idea of suicide: that is taking recognised angst to its logical 
conclusion; recognising that “life is pointless”.  If Helen had gone away she would 
not have experienced the particular process of adjustment described in this narrative.  
Since she stays, the process of narration starts.  It is Martin’s death which 
necessitates Helen’s need for work and her presence at the university.  It is also his 
death – reworked by the sub-plot of the student’s suspected plagiarism – that allows 
the possibility of the relationship – in the overt plot – with Ralph.   
 
The last death is that of Duggers.  After it, Ralph and Helen, separately, are 
able to start a new project.  The novel is not the new project.  It is the self-deceptive 
cycle.  In between the deaths is the covert plot.  The covert plotting makes it clear 
that it is not Helen who is two people at once.  The text does make it very explicit, 
however, that the Ralph and Duggers parts of the overall consciousness are mutually 
exclusive.  The covert plot, here, includes making this knowledge available.  
Because they represent two mutually contradictory propositions, one or the other 
has to go.  But because the process is intentional the choice of who has to go is 
collusive. 
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Duggers gets so very few mentions it is worthwhile listing them.  The first 
seven take place before the appearance of the policeman and the emergence of the 
child-pornography plot. The second group of seven take place after.  In between 
there is the intrusion of what the thesis likes to call a distracting possible death. 
 
Duggers’s first scene has already been introduced.  It takes place during the 
tour of the psychology building.  The tour is described by the third-person narrator 
in the present tense.  It is, therefore, intended to be taken as objective.  The scene 
takes only a small section of a large chapter.  In it, Duggers’s name, in various 
versions, is mentioned nine times.  This makes it a little unusual.  The repetition 
seems, at first, to draw attention to him and would seem to argue against connecting 
him to the covert plot.  It has, however, the opposite effect.  An ESDeS text needs 
always to make not-p available and to hide it.  The repetitive use of alternatives has 
the effect of minimising the force of the particular naming “Douglas C. Douglass”.  
What is made available, if it is noticed, is that the double name and the double “s” 
serves two purposes.  First, they make available the nature of consciousness 
required by an ESDeS.  The overall story must contain two stories.  Second, and 
much more importantly, the doubling is a clear (Lodgean) literary allusion.  This has 
already been discussed in the context of the uneasiness genre-marker which shows 
that Duggers is linked to Lolita (1959) and paedophilia.  It is, nonetheless, still 
possible to assert that, as a matter of fact, Duggers is not noticed.  Further analysis 
of the context of this section shows why.  The Duggers appearance is preceded and 
succeeded by a huge number of names, several alternative candidates for linking 
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and the higher profile overt plots of illicit relationships and further interest in the 
consciousness debate theme.  To illustrate this point it might be noted that his name 
come up in a book which contains nearly 200 names.  The tour itself introduces 
seventeen new names in addition to the twenty-eight previously mentioned (not 
including Ralph and Helen) and the 127 yet to be mentioned – a staggering 172 
names in one book.  Most of the names are connected to minor characters.  The fact 
that most of these are seldom if ever mentioned again would encourage the reader 
not to notice minor characters.  Of the few that do get a mention, including Annabel 
Riverdale, some seem more likely than Duggers to produce subplots and which 
makes the fact that he is overlooked more likely.  One thing is incontrovertible: 
Duggers is never again referred to by his full name.  His death, however, at the end 
of the book may make an “attentive” reader ask why this is.  Obtaining an answer 
would necessitate a second reading which would elicit the following analysis. 
 
Once the Duggers allusion is picked up the covert plot starts to unravel.  The 
second substantive reference92 starts to reveal numerous connections between 
Duggers and Ralph entirely separate from the overt plotting.  Subsequent references 
are minor and build on this start.  The connections can be classified into similarities 
and differences. Both characters are scientists. Both were applicants for the Head of 
Department job, both have an interest in paedophilia (loosely defined) and both 
have considered taking their own lives.  However, as the text makes clear they are 
opposites in all of these things.  Duggers is a real scientist whereas Ralph is just a 
                                                          
92  Ibid., pp. 113-116.  
 319
“mediadong”.93  Duggers does not get the Head of Department job and Ralph does.  
Duggers is eventually caught downloading pornography whereas Ralph restricts his 
fantasies to his audio diary.  They differ most significantly in that Ralph is presented 
as an attractive figure and Duggers as a stereotypical outsider.  Typical quotes 
derived from this section include:  “Duggers lives with his widowed mother and 
unmarried sister”94 and “He is totally devoid of charm.”95 
 
The information is provided by Ralph’s audio notes and starts with Ralph 
recounting how he met Duggers entering the psychology building just as he was 
leaving.  The nature of the meeting serves to highlight the congruence of both 
Duggers’s and Ralph’s behaviour as surreptitious.  On this occasion Ralph notes 
that Duggers “looked slightly flustered…no doubt I did too”.96  Prompted by this 
meeting Ralph recalls that Duggers was “the leading internal candidate” when he 
was applying for his job and expressed some anxiety that he might be about “to hit 
the headlines with a sensational new discovery”.97  The section ends with what 
Raine would describe as a case of intuition but the thesis sees as more significant in 
terms of pinning down the covert plot.  Duggers’s name is linked with Turing.  
Turing was a real – in the sense of not fictional – scientist.  His intrusion can be 
seen simply as a technique of giving the text some realist authenticity but it can also 
be given more importance since he is “true” in the sense he actually happened.  The 
three tellings in Thinks may in general be unreliable but the reader is warned to take 
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notice of this particular fact: Turing was a “lonely, repressed, unhappy homosexual” 
who “eventually kills himself”.98  If Ralph is not surprised when Duggers kills 
himself then it will not be because of intuition but because he had already noticed 
the evidence for its likelihood.  The reader is then distracted by being led back to 
one of the main plots of the Helen “kiss”, and her near nakedness through Carrie’s 
lack of nakedness to Emily’s (Ralph’s step-daughter) actual nakedness.  Ralph has 
accidently observed Emily in her bath and although the look was not long it gave 
him sufficient information to include a fairly erotic, albeit brief, description of her, 
on his stream of consciousness tape, which culminates in him saying, “I’d like to 
fuck Emily.”99  Not put with Jamesian elegance and not more than a dozen lines, 
then back to the possibility of Helen and the recall of a scene with Marianne next to 
the bottle bank.  The key events are lost among the highlights but once looked for 
they give another exciting conjunction.  Duggers, who may make the headlines, is 
contrasted with Ralph, who thinks about them all the time.  Duggers, who is 
compared to a repressed homosexual, is compared with Ralph who has illicit 
thoughts with respect to his daughter.  Once the connections are raised other re-
readings become possible.  It can be noticed that Ralph had previously recalled his 
first sexual encounter with an older woman, Martha.  He goes into great detail and 
readers might feel that the literary intention of the recall is to fill out Ralph’s 
character – that is he is obsessed with sex.  But when he tells his wife she is 
shocked.  She interprets the woman’s behaviour as “sexual abuse”.100  Ralph’s 
recollections show that he can misinterpret situations; that what he thinks is normal 
                                                          
98  Ibid., p. 116. 
99  Ibid., p. 117. 
100  Ibid., p. 70. 
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might be regarded by others as perverse.  Both Duggers and Ralph are linked to an 
allegation of perversity: albeit not yet of the same sort.  Certainly both fantasies are 
self-perceived as perversities for they both keep them secret.  The difference is that 
Duggers, due to his linking with Turing, probably feels unhappy about his 
“perversion” whilst Ralph appears happy about his. 
 
The third and last significant amount of space101 allocated to Duggers comes 
in the narrator’s report of Ralph’s fiftieth birthday party.  It is spread over several 
pages but only as tiny inserts.  It adds to Duggers’s image as an unattractive 
outsider.  He arrives first.  It is necessary to delegate Helen to talk to him.  He is 
shown to eat unattractively: “He nibbles [a macadamia nut] with a rapid movement 
of his front teeth, like a squirrel.”102  His talk with Helen relates to science and 
Helen talks nonsense about it and so annoys him.  He then disappears whilst the 
insider people have insider conversations about politics, books and relationships.  
He reappears just to go home and the text takes a penultimate opportunity, in this 
section, to make him look silly.  He doesn’t smile, “he exposes his teeth in a 
smile”.103  Finally, his outsider status is established as it begun.  Ralph dismisses 
him with “always the first to arrive and the first to go”.104 
 
The first three examples are introduced 54 pages into the novel and are 
completed within a further 72 pages.  There are only a further four, tiny, 
                                                          
101  Ibid., pp. 126–132. 
102  Ibid., p. 127. 
103  Ibid., p. 135. 
104  Ibid., p. 137. 
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references105 before the child pornography plot starts to emerge into the overt scene 
162 pages later: significantly more than needed to exclude, by Lodge’s definition, 
even the very “attentive” reader.  In short any recall with reference to Duggers has 
faded before the significant event.  These additional references only add to his 
image as a person who is unattractive in comparison to Ralph.  The narrator notes 
that he is the lucky winner of the duck-race competition but is not there to collect 
his prize.  He is described, by Ralph, as “a reclusive buggar”.106  Ralph, in return, is 
described by him, through Helen, as a “master of the scientific soundbite”.107  This 
observation clearly rankles with Ralph since he re-visits the exchange in his 
diary.108  Duggers get a further tiny mention as one of the exclusive group of people 
who call Ralph “Messenger”.  He does so not because he is a close friend but 
because he is a “very formal colleague”.109  The final reference, prior to the arrival 
of the police, has him, once again, dismissed as not important.  This time he is 
described as a deputy (to Ralph) who does not have “social organisation [as] his 
forte”.110 
 
Duggers and Ralph, then, are opposing parts of the narrative consciousness.  
They are opposites in one more, very significant, way: death.  This idea has been 
introduced as a genre-marker and covert plot instigator but now gets full rein within 
the important overt plot:  Ralph becomes concerned that he will die.  This possible 
death is in the overt plot and is called, therefore, a distracting death in the same way 
                                                          
105  Ibid., pp. 240, 251, 255 and 272. 
106  Ibid., p. 240. 
107  Ibid., p. 241. 
108  Ibid., p. 250. 
109  Ibid., p. 255. 
110  Ibid., p. 272. 
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that all overt plots are seen, by this thesis, to be distracters.  The novel actually picks 
up momentum towards the end as Ralph seems to become more and more embroiled 
in the consequences of his lifestyle  There is a sense in which the novel has been 
leading up to his downfall for his charm wears thin and he begins to emerge as a 
pretty obnoxious character.  The first indication of the distracting death appears, as a 
hint, as he starts to complain about not feeling well on his visit to Prague.  He 
eventually goes to see his GP and asks, “could it be cancer?”111  The answer is an 
implied “yes”.  Ralph’s response to this is consistently pragmatic: “As soon as I’m 
quite sure I have an irreversible terminal condition I shall make for the Exit while 
I’m still able to walk out unassisted.”112  It is, in context, added to a growing list of 
problems that have slowly emerged as the novel has progressed: Donaldson’s 
honorary degree, trouble with the MoD, Ludmilla’s research grant, the possibility of 
exposure with respect to Marianne, the possibility of exposure with respect to Helen 
and the imminence of the consciousness conference (con-con).  Once again it is not 
surprising that the reader overlooks poor Douglas.  When the policeman turns up 
suggesting somebody in the Centre is downloading child pornography the reader 
simply adds this on to Ralph’s list.  After all, the reader knows he was sexually 
attracted to Emily.  Ralph is about to get his come-uppance in one way or another.  
The text becomes even more dominated by him and the possibility of his death 
seems to become the natural outcome.  It has been shown, empirically, that  real 
readers never give a thought to Duggers.  To emphasise the gap, the possible death 
                                                          
111  Ibid., p. 270. 
112  Ibid., p. 282. 
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story runs and runs.  Ralph has tests, abandons the NHS consultant and visits a 
private consultant.  He is promised the results soon. 
 
There are three tiny mentions of Duggers in the second group of preparatory 
remarks.  The first is in Ralph’s diary.113  Ralph considers that he is complicit in his 
possible downfall by disclosing ongoing talks with the MoD.  This turns out to be 
not true, as Ralph admits later.114  Then, at the con-con, Helen records and reiterates 
the opposition between Ralph and Duggers.  Ralph is described as “in sparkling 
form”, whereas when Helen mentions Duggers’s success in the duck race 
competition she gives him, once again, the chance to spell-out how uninteresting he 
is: “The prize was a case of champagne and I don’t drink.”115  Finally, Duggers is 
seen as in a backwater “at work on his algorithms” whilst Helen and Ralph are 
immersed in their own, more interesting, concerns: Helen is in need of a kiss and 
Ralph’s mind was “on something else”.116 
 
The fourth textual reference, in this second cluster, is the most significant 
element for an ESDeS reading after the double name episode.  The double name 
episode establishes Duggers and pornography as the covert link with Ralph.  This 
episode overtly describes his first connection with the crime and covertly justifies 
the claim that Ralph and Duggers are antipathetic parts of one consciousness 
because Ralph has known about Duggers all along without objective evidence.  He 
                                                          
113  See ibid., pp. 296, 307, 311. 
114  Ibid., p. 329. 
115  Ibid., p. 308. 
116  Ibid., p. 311. 
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has privileged access.  Further, the fact that he has known and has done nothing 
about it says Duggers’s death is, like Kurtz’s, murder or at the very least collusive 
suicide.  The conversation is between Ralph and the police office and the episode is 
quoted in full: 
“I’ve got a name for you.” 
“Who is it?” 
“Professor Douglass.” 
“Are you sure?” 
“About seventy per cent sure.” 
“I see,” says Ralph. 
“You don’t seem very surprised,” says DS Agnew. 
“No, well, it’s strange, but the other day it suddenly occurred to 
me that it might be him.”117 
 
 
Why should he think this?  Earlier, when other colleagues had been put in the frame 
he strenuously defends them.  He says, “Jim Bellows, but I’m sure he’s not 
involved.”118  And when asked whether Stuart Phillips is “trustworthy”, he answers, 
“Completely.”119  The claim bears only two explanations.  One is a spiritual 
interpretation: intuition.  Craig Raine thinks that this theme is central to Thinks.  He 
cites two examples: Ralph’s potency fails before he knows he is threatened and 
Carrie knows the surgeon is incompetent without evidence.  But again Lodge will 
have none of Raine’s mystification.  He says the evidence exists but it is not spelt-
out.  Raine sums up for him by saying, “it’s rational.  It’s based on evidence.  It’s 
not mystical” and Lodge agrees, “Yeah.”120  So if evidence exists, somewhere, he is 
just like Marlow.  He knew when he compared Duggers to Turing.  He knew “the 
other day”.  Yet despite knowing, he did nothing to help Duggers before the 
                                                          
117  Ibid., p. 322. 
118  Ibid., p. 289 
119  Ibid., p. 290. 
120  Lodge, “A conversation about Thinks”, p. 289. 
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problem arose and he did nothing to help him after it arose.  He did not even warn 
him as a matter of decency.  It might even be said that he colludes with the police to 
ensure Duggers’s downfall.  He gives him no chance to control his reaction so that it 
will not “tell…what I [DS Agnew] want to know”.  He even points out to the police 
that Duggers has “more than one” hard disk and “he may be in his office now”.121 
 
The fourth mention of Douglas, in the group of seven, is the suicide section.  
Every reference within it deserves particular attention as in a crime scene.  Ralph 
continues to actively assist the police.  He calls for Douglas to come to his office.  
The office is deserted but Douglas is still available.  Ralph explains the situation 
but, again, does nothing to prepare Douglas or to assist him.  In fact he puts him off 
his guard.  He says only that the police think “somebody” is downloading child 
pornography and says, only, “as Deputy Director of the Centre, you would wish to 
be informed”.122  Duggers is asked if the police can look at his hard disc.  Ralph 
again colludes: “It’s only a formality.”123  Then Ralph hears the “Good news”:124 
that his condition is not serious – he is not going to die.  The distracting death 
evaporates.  Meanwhile, the detective takes Douglas off.  Ralph spreads his good 
news to Carrie and to Helen.  While he is doing this “Detective Sergeant Agnew 
bursts abruptly into the room”:   
“You’d better come, sir” he says, “It’s Professor Douglass.”  
“What about him?”   
“I’m afraid he’s dead, sir.”125  
                                                          
121  Lodge, Thinks, p. 322. 
122  Ibid., p. 323, 
123  Ibid. 
124  Ibid., p. 324. 
125  Ibid., p. 325.  My emphasis. 
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 The text does not leave the next bit to chance in its penultimate references to 
Duggers.  It spells out the significant remarks.  Ralph muses over the death and 
records: 
• “Everyone is in a state of shock … except me.”126 
• “He must have had a plan … like me.”127 
• “In a way I almost feel as if he died instead of me.”128 
• “It was as if we were balanced on a pair of scales.”129 
 
It could not be clearer.  Ralph reiterates his privileged knowledge.  He has 
been expecting the death.  He acknowledges that suicide was an option for both of 
them.  He spells-out that it was either Duggers or him: that is it was either not-p or 
p.  Having arranged the logically essential - the death of the outsider, the 
representative of existential angst - the narrative-consciousness can forget not-p.  
Ralph reports that “Duggers’ unoccupied seat at dinner didn’t attract much 
attention”.130  Part of the reason for this is that Ralph, in particular, did not mention 
him.  He explains this by saying, “I couldn’t think of any form of words that 
wouldn’t sound like a sick joke to myself, to Carrie, and eventually, when the truth 
came out, to everybody else.  So I simply made no reference to him in my 
speech.”131  He, in fact, chooses to not-spell-it-out. 
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The paradoxical not-p is consigned to the covert part of the consciousness 
with the last reference to Duggers.  Helen sums him up by saying, “Douglass’s 
suicide…had everything to do with my decision [to carry on].”132  It becomes 
possible and necessary for the overt part of the consciousness to aspire to some sort 
of enthusiasm for new projects.   
 
This moving on, however, can take two forms.  Ralph and Carrie choose the 
serious route.  Helen chooses the unserious route. 
 
Ralph and Carrie adopt the bourgeois norm. There is a certain irony in this 
for they were presented at the beginning of the book as rebels but this turns out to be 
just their way of writing their cover story.  During the book they are pretentious.  
Beyond the book: “Carrie did not finish her novel…she took up sculpture…and 
opened a small gallery” and “Ralph published his book Machine Living…and was 
awarded a CBE.”133 
 
Helen, via a final literary allusion, adopts ESDeS.  There were early hints 
that she was prepared to abandon bourgeois complacency for in her book, The Eye 
of the Storm, her then felt despair is removed by the bondage sex scene.  There are 
further hints in her attitude to the insiders at the “Richmond’s dinner party”134 and 
at Ralph’s fiftieth birthday party despite her behaviour towards Duggers.  And, of 
course, there is Lodge’s revelation that Helen represents his point of view.  But 
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these are just hints.  Her attitude now becomes more available.  There is a certain 
self-reflective modernist irony about how she does this for it has been suggested, 
throughout this thesis, that writers resolve their real-life points of recognition by 
writing their way out of it.  James and Conrad certainly did.  For Helen, her new 
project is also a new novel.  The narrative-consciousness must have been reminded 
of Sartre who makes it plain he is his character Roquentin - “I was Roquentin”135 - 
and Roquentin has already written the novel Nausea by the time he suggests to the 
reader that he might do so.  Here the narrative-consciousness of which Helen is an 
acknowledged part has already written “her” novel as Thinks although she calls it 
Crying is a Puzzler.136  In so doing she is able to abandon existential angst for a 
time but, as she would be the first to acknowledge, it will be “required to make up a 
new story”.  She has answered her own question at last.  Perhaps she should not “be 
encouraging” others but she has no choice but to do so herself: for her, there will 
have to be another story. 
 
                                                          
135  Jean-Paul Sartre, Words, London: Penguin, 1964, p.156. 
136  Ibid., p. 340. 
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Conclusion 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis argued that, there is no such thing as a “we”, the thesis 
should drop the use of personal pronouns and, instead, adopt the passive voice.  
However since his conclusion clearly emerges from a particular narrative-
consciousness, it now seems appropriate to revert to the use of “I” which in turn 
legitimises, I believe, a personal observation.  It seems to be the case that science 
writing is generally different from the more discursive writing adopted within the 
arts.  It is the practice in science to start with a discrepancy and then to follow the 
evidence, step by step to a conclusion.  In more discursive writing it is usual to 
reverse this procedure: that is to state the argument and only then to justify it.  The 
argument that makes up this thesis is, in this sense, sandwiched between two 
conclusions for my thesis falls someway between the two forms of exposition.  I 
introduced the thesis by making the claim that there is an outstanding problem of 
how to explain the empirical observation that storytelling is a ubiquitous activity.  I 
then note that various commentators have described this by word substitution that 
suggests an evolutionary origin.  In the introduction I attempted to signpost what 
this meant for literary theory.  This involved the description of the consciousness as 
a narrative-consciousness which writes a story of the self.1  I gave the story the 
name ESDeS and stated that the purpose of the story is to accommodate awareness 
of existential angst2 by dividing the story into two parts: an overt plot and a covert 
                                                          
1  The concept self, it will be recalled, carries no implications beyond the claim that it is the 
conscious correlate for the biological concept of the organism. 
2  It will be remembered that this thesis adopts Haight’s propositional terminology to avoid 
repetition: “not worth living” becomes “not-p” and “worth living” becomes p. 
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plot had evolved to accommodate awareness of existential futility.  Inevitably the 
attempt at signposting is incomplete: a complete exposition is necessarily complex 
and it is not possible to present the complexities until they have meaning and the 
meanings could not be explained without the evidence that made them necessary. 
 
A summary of the overall conclusions therefore seems more than usually 
necessary.  This summary is structured around a series of four questions  implied 
and stated  provided by Joseph Carroll’s review essay “Universals in Literary 
Study” in his recent book Literary Darwinism.3  In the essay Carroll points out that 
the idea of universals has a long philosophic tradition, from at least Aristotle, but 
that in its naturalistic form it is nothing more than a name for “a common human 
nature”.4  He points out that “naturalism is the only orientation in which theorists 
are actively developing the theory of literary universals” and that, since the late 
eighteenth century, it has been challenged by “philosophic particularism and 
historicism”.5  Clearly the idea of a common human nature exhibited by ubiquitous 
attributes called drives or instincts and expressed in particular behaviours such as 
storytelling was expressed before Darwin, but the idea is continuous up to Darwin.  
After Darwin, however the idea takes on a new expository form.  Evolutionary 
thinkers in the human sciences “have reaffirmed the elementary Darwinian idea that 
human beings, like all other animals, have evolved through an adaptive process and 
that consequently they display an innate species-typical structure of cognitive and 
                                                          
3  Joseph Carroll, Literary Darwinism: Evolution, Human Nature and Literature, London: 
Routledge, 2004. 
4  Ibid., p. 117. 
5  Ibid. 
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behavioral characteristics”.6  Carroll agrees that this formulation adds nothing other 
than to reassert the view “that there is such a thing as human nature”.7  In this 
respect his summary starts at the same point as my introduction.  He, however, 
structures his review around his framework of questions and I find this structure 
convenient to adopt to give the conclusion an air of freshness.  I have, however, 
rearranged his questions to fit in with the structure I have already adopted in the 
main text: 
• What precisely is this species-typical or universal structure? 
• What bearing does it have on literary representation?   
• What is the relationship between universals and particulars? 
• What is the relation of literary universals to cultural difference and to 
historical periods? 
 
The first answer suggests that Carroll’s “species-typical or universal 
structure” underlying literary representation is a narrative-consciousness: that is, the 
so-called self represented by consciousness is nothing more than a story.  The strong 
version of this theory asserts that the story could have a causal link to behaviour.  
The weak version of this theory regards the story as a mere epiphenomenon.  The 
self may, as Carroll suggests, provide the means for organisation but it need not be 
for “the organization of behaviour in goal-directed ways”.8  It might be only to 
make sense of behaviour which will take place regardless of the content of the story.   
 
If the strong theory is acceptable then it would suggest that when 
consciousness evolved and it was necessarily accompanied by the recognition of 
                                                          
6  Ibid., p. 124. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Ibid., p. 128. 
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angst (not-p: there is no purpose to life other than propagation) then it would follow 
that organisms which also had the ability to self-deceive (that is to hide this 
awareness) would differentially survive to propagate.   
 
In the weak theory, which does not see a causal link between the story in the 
consciousness and behaviour, the story serves a less dramatic function.  The 
organism will survive because of its Darwinian imperative but the story will not 
make sense unless it also incorporates self-deception to hide not-p.  Successful 
hiding will lead to a feeling of psychological well-being.  Failure to hide will lead to 
the reverse of psychological well-being. 
 
The answer to Carroll’s second question follows automatically.  The 
function of the story, that is the self or is told by the self, is to separate p from not-p.  
The means of separation constitutes the main bulk and motivation of the thesis.  The 
thesis progressed through the examination of self-deception literature and several 
literary texts produced in the period starting in the mid nineteenth century.  These 
examinations uncovered many complexities: genre-markings for unease associated 
with self-deception; additional genre-markers for meaning and hiding; the covert 
plot; the nature of the covert plot; the fact that the covert plot is to be found between 
two bracketing deaths; at the closing death two characters within the overall 
narrative-consciousness will separate; at the closing death one character will leave 
and one will survive; the leaving character represents not-p; the surviving character 
represents p; the remainder of the narrative will indicate that p is represented by the 
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installation of a new cover story or project.  The new project is, in effect, the content 
of the overt plot which can be literally anything: plot or character or experimental 
“flow of consciousness”.  However, the anything turned out to not quite mean 
anything in the sense that it could take one of two forms: serious or unserious.  Or, 
to put this another way, the character that survives has two possibilities: the project 
can be permanent or serious or the project is recognised as temporary.  It is only in 
the unserious version that the self exists as an ESDeS. 
 
Again this conclusion leads directly to an answer to Carroll’s third question.  
In his essay he suggests that the consensus view is that the idea of literary universals 
“sets itself in opposition to the idea of literary particulars”.9  In a sense this is true 
but it reiterates the arguments made in my comparison between ESDeS and the 
modernist novel: such an opposition would be a superficial view.  From an 
adaptationist’s point of view they are both essential because one cannot exist 
without the other.  The thesis suggests that the successful hiding of the covert plot is 
primarily made possible by foregrounding p at the expense of not-p:10 the more 
interesting the content of the overt the less likely further plotting will be sought.  
Rephrased to more identically accommodate the wording used by Carroll, the 
division allows for the natural separation of what is necessary – the universal – from 
what is optional – the individual.  It is true that particularism is the belief that every 
                                                          
9  Ibid., p. 120. 
10  There are other mechanisms including linear narrative, obfuscation, multiple narrators, 
delayed decoding and, no doubt, others will be continuously invented.  These are however all 
secondary to the main mechanism. 
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moment of perception is unique and irreducible11 but in the adaptationist framework 
these perceptions only become possible if the organism survives to have them.  In 
this sense the covert plotting is a prior necessity.  It comes before the overt plotting.  
I repeat, the covert plotting would not be sustainable without successful overt 
plotting. 
 
Finally, to get at Carroll’s fourth and last question it is necessary to recall, as 
argued in the introduction, that movement to literary representation is made possible 
by assuming that the machine that generates the self will also generate stories in the 
same mould: a postulate that Carroll acknowledges is adopted by all literary 
Darwinians: “literary texts are themselves organized in close correspondence with 
the elementary structures of the adapted mind.”12  The literary text produced is then 
called an existentially-self-deceptive-novel or ESDeN.  It should have a mechanism 
that is capable of hiding but even this turns out to involve more complexity: the 
structure of the storytelling seems to have been modified through time with the true 
ESDeN existing only as the mid-term in a series of three.  This development implies 
a contribution from the universal’s other challenger, historicism: which is the belief 
that literary expression can be radically modified by cultural context.  However, 
whatever forms the story written by a narrative-consciousness takes, it is secondary 
to its motivation.  What is important is that the story mechanism, however it is 
transmitted, saves the organism from angst in each case.   
 
                                                          
11  In this sense the “individual” – the term used by the thesis – is a collection of particulars so 
the words can, in the context of this thesis, be used interchangeably. 
12  Carroll, Literary Darwinism, p. 125. 
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The first form, Story-1, takes place in an environment where everybody 
believes the same thing: that there is a reason to life and it is either given or will be 
given by a transcendental mechanism.  In this form the story did not have a covert 
plot but followed the process of self-deception within an overt plot.  The thesis, like 
Dawkins, rejects this but acknowledges that the rejection is not universal.  Some 
people choose to retain this view.  However, the thesis goes on to suggest that, along 
with the modernist novel, the ESDeN has emerged with environmental changes that 
took place from the middle of the nineteenth century.  There is no sharp division 
between the Story-1 method of storytelling and the ESDeN method or Story-2.  The 
process of self-deception technique used to express Story-1 lingers on in, for 
example, Heart of Darkness giving substance to the view that modernism embodies 
experimentalism with a lingering desire for the past: in the new phase the narrative-
consciousness of both writers and readers would like there to be an external source 
of reason but accepts that there is none.  Under the new circumstances, the 
narrative-consciousness has no choice but to create a new type of story structure 
which both recognises the existence of existential futility and contrives to forget, or 
hide, this knowledge.  The new expression exhibited by the narrative-consciousness 
can then be replicated in selected generated external storytelling, such as Heart of 
Darkness, Chance and Thinks, by having a covert plot/overt plot division.  The 
thesis considers the possibility that there is a third way.  This assumes, in theory, 
that a cover story is not necessary.  This could, in theory, be the form particularism 
takes after Darwin: “Philosophic particularism enters into the closely related 
movements…and through these movements it had a major impact on modernist 
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literature”.13  However, this thesis does not find any real substantive evidence for it.  
Even the most post-modern works seem to contain projects: indeed they may be said 
embody a project.  There may be a post-modern person but there cannot be, by 
definition a sequel to a post-modern novel.  
 
Perhaps Coleridge’s most famous aphorism is his advocacy of a “willing suspension 
of disbelief” which purports to explain how “characters supernatural, or at least 
romantic”14 can gain “human interest” by “supposing them real”.15  It provides the 
backdrop for, perhaps, the thesis’s second most important lesson: whilst Coleridge 
is right about the overt plotting, he is exactly wrong with respect to the covert 
plotting.  To enjoy the overt story it may be necessary to believe that the characters 
are people who could exist even if one knows they do not but to get to this point it is 
necessary to drop the awareness of existential angst and to substitute “a belief” that 
the subsequent suspension of disbelief is worthwhile. 
 
The most enduring lesson and, perhaps, the most important one is that the 
narrative-consciousnesses of both writers and readers can be certain that another 
story will soon become necessary.  Telling, writing, listening to and reading stories 
are ubiquitous human activities for a reason 
.
                                                          
13  Ibid., p. 117. 
14  Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, London: J. M. Dent, 1956, p. 169. 
15  Ibid., p. 168. 
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 Glossary of technical terms  
Each term is indicated by bold type in the main text on the first relevant occasion it 
is used. 
Available actually present in the narrative-consciousness or the text that mirrors 
narrative-consciousness.  The presence overcomes the problem 
perceived by self-deception theorists who do not think that it is possible 
for p and not-p to be present at the same time in a conventional 
consciousness. 
 
Bracketing deaths the two events which mark the beginning (the breakdown of the pre-
existing cover story) and the end (the choice) of the process of 
recognition.  They appear to be, on most occasions, deaths but this is not 
essential.  They can be absences of any sort. 
 
Carnal plot synonym for manifest plot. 
 
Choice represents the selection of Story by the narrative-consciousness.  It, in 
theory, could be suicide but in practice is either a reversal to Story-1 (via 
the parent-child mechanism or by adopting seriousness), a Story-2 (by 
adopting unseriousness of ESDeS) or, possibly a Story-3.  It takes place 
in principle at the point of recognition and is completed by the point of 
narration. 
 
Collusive death plot indicates that all characters within the covert plotting agree as to the 
character chosen to die.  This is taken by the narrative-consciousness 
theory to mean that the act is intentional. 
 
Collusion/collusive indicates that both sides of the p, not-p divide within the narrative-
consciousness agree as to the choice. 
 
Cover story the stable state in which not-p is successfully being hidden and p is 
successfully in operation.  See pre-existing cover story and project. 
 
Covert plotting a specific type of plotting that is available but disguised due to the 
ingenuity of the originating narrative-consciousness (the author).  It is 
to be distinguished from latent plots which require the active invention 
of the reader. 
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Distracters anything that draws attention away from the covert plotting.  The 
most likely distracters are successful overt plots and good 
interpretations of the overt plot.  However, there are many others 
including the triviality of the overt plot and large numbers of 
alternative minor characters. 
 
Existential-self- deception motivated by a need to escape the awareness of existential 
deception (ESD) self-futility. 
 
Existentially-self- the theory that claims that the self is no more than a machine which 
deceptive-narrative-  has evolved a narrative-consciousness. 
consciousness theory  
 
Existentially-self- a written work that uses the same techniques as ESDeS. 
Deceptive-novel 
(ESDeN) 
  
Existentially-self- see existentially-self-deceptive-storytelling. 
deceptive-story  
(ESDeS) 
 
Existentially-self- see existentially-self-deceptive-storytelling. 
Deceptive-storyteller  
(ESDeS) 
  
Existentially-self- a story designed to facilitate the hiding of existential futility.  The 
Deceptive-storytelling acronym also stands for story and for storyteller. 
(ESDeS) 
 
  
Existentially-self- a genre marker that links the marker for unease specifically to  
deceptive-unease self-deception and to meaning. 
  
Failure of ESD at a point of narration the narrative-consciousness has choices.  
One of these is to self-deceive with respect to existential futility.  
This is given the name bad faith by existentialist theory but changed 
to serious or the failure of ESD by the narrative-consciousness 
theory. 
 
First-Story a convenient starting point.  It will embrace the existential story in its 
species-wide form.  It will take the form of the self-deceptive 
process: that is it will not contain a covert plot. 
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Forget/forgotten synonym for hide/hidden 
 
Genre markers markers to indicate that the story should be interpreted as an ESDeS. 
 
Hide/hiding/ the process which accommodates ESD or not-p.  It is also the name for a 
hidden  specific genre marker that marks the presence of covert plotting.   
 
Individual relates to the overt plotting and refers to the idea that any story will do 
provided that it serves as a distracter.  It is used, within this thesis, as 
the polar term to universal.  It clearly has a connection to the idea, used 
within the theory of the Enlightenment and the modernist novel, that the 
individual way of being in the world takes precedence over the collective 
way of being in the world. 
 
Intentional this is not used in the usual anthropomorphic way.  It indicates either a 
property of the text within an ESDeS that enables the covert plotting to 
be predicted or, more specifically, the covert plotting will consist of a 
collusive death plot. 
 
Interpretation a reading of the overt or manifest plot that relies on information not 
specifically given in the text.  This is the main means of distracting from 
the covert plotting. 
 
Latent plot an alternate name for an interpreted plot.  It is not a covert plot. 
 
Manifest plot an alternative name for overt plot. 
 
Meaning/absurdity an alternate name for existential futility.  It is also the name give to a 
specific genre marker to indicate the presence of covert plotting. 
 
Narrative- the part of the human machine that creates the story to hide awareness of  
consciousness existential futility.  It will contain several aspects personified as 
characters.  One or more characters will represent existential futility 
(not-p) and one or more characters will represent putative projects (p).  
At the point of narration one or other of these will die. 
 
Not-p a short-hand, logic, symbol indicating a proposition.  In this text it 
carries the specific meaning: “life is not worth living”.  
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Not-spelling-out an alternate name for hiding. 
 
Overt plotting a specific type of plotting that is available along side the covert 
plotting but, in contrast to covert plotting, it should be foregrounded 
because its prior function is to disguise the covert plotting.  
 
p: a short-hand, logic symbol indicating a proposition.  In this text it 
carries the specific meaning: “life is worth living”.  When it takes on 
specific means of showing that life is worth living it can be called a 
project. 
 
Parent-child process is almost a synonym for the self-deceptive process.  It differs only in 
its motivation.  The parent-child process follows a point of 
recognition whereas the self-deceptive process need not. 
 
Point of narration the point of the narrative where the character representing existential 
angst dies and existential angst (p) is hidden away and the characters 
representing the possibility of a new project (p) are foregrounded.  It 
can almost coincide with the point of narration where the process 
of narration is stated or implied but not-spelled-out. 
 
Point of recognition the culmination of the process of recognition.  The narrative-
consciousness can do longer escape the awareness of existential 
futility. 
 
Pre-existing cover the cover story that is present at the beginning of an ESDeS or a  
story  new repetition.  Clearly the repetition ends with a new cover story 
which becomes the pre-existing cover story for the next narrative. 
 
Prior the idea that one process necessarily precedes another. 
 
Process of narration this is seldom included in the overt plotting even if one of its 
interpretations is the self-deceptive-process.  It is the structural 
division of the overall narrative-consciousness into two parts: the 
overt plotting and the covert plotting. 
 
Process of recognition the part of the narrative which shows the pre-existing cover story 
breaking down.  It is characterised by the exhibition of the four self-
deceptive behaviours: rejecting contrary evidence, substituting 
supporting evidence, post-hoc recognition and the point of 
recognition. 
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Project the specific manifestation of p and an alternative name for cover 
story.  It carries intimations of temporariness. 
 
Repetition an ESDeS is temporary and has to be repeated as soon as futility re-
enters the narrative-consciousness.  It can also be a genre marker 
for the presence the ESDeS. 
 
Secret a name given to indicate the likely presence of covert plot.  It is 
generally an unfulfilled promise. 
 
Self-deceptive process the collective name for the series of steps: cover story→process of 
recognition→point of recognition→process of narration→point 
of narration→new cover story.   
 
Self-deceptive unease a genre-marker that links the marker for unease specifically to self-
deception. 
 
Serious an alternate name for bad faith or reversion to Story-1.  It means a 
choice has been taken to reject freedom of choice.  This will take the 
form of adopting a permanent role which has a functional similarity 
to accepting an external metanarrative, such as God.  It carries 
attitudinal connotations: the way to be in the world as opposed to the 
specific manifestation of a particular Story-1. 
 
Spelling-out the opposite to hiding. 
 
Spiritual plot an alternate name for an interpreted or latent plot.  It is not a covert 
plot. 
 
Split/splitting the separation of p from not-p at the point of narration.  The choice 
is a decision (near the point of recognition) which is actualised by 
the split. 
 
Story-1 the existential story in its species-wide form.  It will take the form of 
the self-deceptive process: that is, it will not contain a covert plot. 
 
Story-2 this is an alternate name for ESDeS.  That is, it contains, necessarily, a 
covert plot.  If it also contains the self-deceptive process this will be 
relegated to genre-marking status and indicates a reluctance to move on 
from Story-1. 
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 Story-3 this is a hypothesised form of story which may be a progression from 
ESDeS.  If it exists it will neither contain a covert plot nor a self-
deceptive process.  
 
Survive/survival to avoid awareness of existential futility. 
 
Unease/uneasiness the initial genre marker that indicates the possibility of an ESDeS.  
When it is combined successively with a self-deception marker and a 
meaning marker the possibility becomes a certainty. 
 
Universal it is used, within this thesis, as the polar term to individual.  it relates to 
the covert plotting and refers to the idea that there is a necessary prior 
step before the individual  
 
Unserious an alternate name for ESDeS or Story-2.  It carries attitudinal 
connotations: the way to be in the world as opposed to the specific 
manifestation of a particular ESDeS or Story-2. 
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